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ABSTRACT 
This work describes the evolution cf electronic warfare equipment and 
techniques in the USA, from the first instance of radio jamming in that country 
in 1901 until the end of World War II in 1945. 
It begins with a review of early work on telegraph, radio and radar 
systems throughout the world, and countermeasures used during trials or in 
combat prior to World War II. Immediately after the USA ertered the conflict in 
1941, the Radio Research Laboratory was set up near Boston to develop radio 
countermeasures equipment for the US armed forces. The organisation rapidly 
outgrew the capacity of a angle laboratory and in October 1942 Dion 15 d 
the National Defense Research Committee was formed, to co-ordinate US work 
on countermeasures. The activities of RRL and Divi. s. on 15 are described in 
detail, using cortemporary records and accounts from participants. 
Radar jammers developed by Divison 15 were first used in action in July 
194 3 during the invason of Sicily, and wert on to play important roles in 
support amphikious landings and strategic bombing operations in the European 
and Pacific theatres of operations. The jamming devices and tactics employed, 
the enemy attempts to develop counter-countermeasures and the US moves to 
counter these counters are all described in detail Conclusions are draw n on the 
effectiveness of the various types of jamming, based on post-war interrogation 
of German and Japanese serving officers and technical personneL Appendices 
gi. ve technical details of the countermeasures devices produced in the USA 
during World War II, and the development of radar and radar counter- 
countermeasures in Germany and Japan. 
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AUTHOR'S NOTE 
In cycler to maintain the relevance of the account, I have had to 
stick closely to the usually accepted defirntion cf electronic 
warfare: that divison of the military use of electronics involving 
actions taken to prevent, reduce or exploit an enemy's use of 
radiated electro-magnetic energy, and actions taken to ensure one's 
own effective use ct radiated electro-magnetic energy. But to 
convey a full understanding of this main theme I have had, from time 
to time, to touch on other subjects on the periphery of electronic 
warfare. The development of radar in the USA and abroad is covered 
only as far as is necessary for the reader to follow the main story. 
The important but separate fields of agnal sin e_. 11 i ge nce and 
c rypto-analyss are mentioned only where they influenced the course 
of electronic warfare. No attempt has been made to cover deception 
methods rot related to electronic warfare. 
In each case the ranks and forms of address of individuals are 
those they held at the time they are mentioned in the text. To asset 
the modern reader, terms such as MHz, radar, Elint, electronic 
warfare, etc have been used even though different terminology was 
in general use curing the time period described in the text. German 
words such as Würzburg, Nippel etc have been anglicised to 
Wuerzburg, Dueppel etc. For amplicity the AN prefixes for US 
equipments have been cropped; thugs AN/APR-4, AN/APT-2 etc are 
referred to as APR-4, APT-2 etc. 
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NOTE ON PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED WORK ON US ELECTRONIC 
WARFARE 
Pr[or to this work there had been no concerted attempt to describe 
and analyse the US electronic waif are e ff ort during World W ar II and its 
effect on the enemy. The omission is understanda : by its very nature 
eLectror1Lc warfare tends to be shrouded in secrecy, and the techrncalities 
of the subject present further difficulties to researchers trying to gain an 
understanding cf it. 
When the first accounts mentiorring US electronic warf are appeared 
on after the war, the main details of the subject retained security 
classifications. The 30-page US Government press release IIectronics 
Warfare issued in November 1945 gave a limited, superficial and mainly 
self-congratulatory insight into a few aspects of the subject. The best 
account on US electronic warf are published during the early post war 
years appeared as a chapter in Scientists Against Time by James P. 
Baxter (Massachusetts Institute cf Technology Press, 1948), though even 
this did little more than scrape the surface cf the subject. The multi- 
volume official histories The Army Air Forces in World War II by W. 
Craven and J. Crate and History of United States Naval Operations in 
World War 11 by Samuel Eliot Mc con contained numerous references to 
the use of radar and radio countermeasures during the conflict. 
When the security blanket on US electronic warfare during world 
War II was finally lifted during the 1960's and 1970's, there was no 
attempt to prodace a detailed analytical work on the subject as a whale 
- 12 - 
though same books touched on aspects of it. Roger Freeman's The Mighty 
Eghth (1970) cortained many references to the use cf radar counter- 
measures daring strategic bombing operations by the US Eighth Air Force. 
Martin Streetly's Confound and Destroy (1977) gave a good account c1 the 
operations by the 803rd Bombardment Squadron and other US -specialLgt 
units involved with radar countermeasures which operated from England in 
1944 and 1945, and technical details of same of the countermeasures 
devices. Flitz Trenkle's Die deutschen Funkmessverfahren bis 1945 (1979) 
gave an insight into radar developments in Germany during the conflict 
and attempts to overcome the effects of the US countermeasures. 
The same author's Die deutschen Funkstoerverfahren (1982) gave details 
of German attempts to jam Allied electronic systems. Hughston Lowder 
and Jack Scott's book Batfish (1980) contained an account of the US 
submarine's operation in which it sank three Japanese submarines on 
successive rights by homing on their radar transmissions. In 1980 the 
Association of Old Crows produced a book for limited circulation entitled 
Radio Countermeasures RCM, which contained parts of the transcripts of 
interviews of US electronic warfare pioneers carried out by this author. 
Richard C. Knott's The Black Cats (1981) contained a few references to 
operations against Japanese radars by US Catalina flight boats during the 
Pacific campaign. Taken together, these references give only a patchy 
coverage of the history of US electronic warf are during the period up to 
1946; in fairness, it should be said that none of the authors intended 
more. 
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CHAPTER 1 BEFORE PEARL HARBOR 
Tracing the history cf electronic warf are in the U cited States cf 
America, one can find roots which extend back long before the outhreak 
cf World War IL. This chapter will draw together the many different 
threads of the early part cf the story, to establish the decree to which 
the conceptual and technical groundwork in this field had been 
established prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 
1941. 
The first electronic communications system to go into large 
scale use was the telegraph, after Samuel Morse invented his 
apparatus for sending messages over wires in 1837. Six years later 
the US Congress voted $30,000 for the installation cf a line between 
Washington and Baltimore. Just how poor were military corn muni- 
cations, bef ore this invention, is shown by the f act that at this ti me 
the principal means cf sending messages between the US Navy 
Pacific Squadron and the Navy Department in Washington was by 
dispatch vessels sailing around Cape Horn (1); in 1846 the Navy's 
Pacific Squadron knew nothing of the war with Mexico until an 
officer who had travelled overland trought the news. (2) 
Once the use cf the 'speaking wires' was established, they 
spread rapoly. Undersea cables followed, and in 1858 Presdent 
Buchanan and Queen Victoria exchanged telegraphed messages cf 
congratulation over the newly laid trans-Atlantic link (3). The more 
advanced armies and navies readily adopted the device and, snce in 
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wartime the denial cf an enemy's means of com municaticns was a 
prize worthy c# consderaole effort., countermeasures against the new 
invention would not be long in coming. They were to cý_ used during 
the first major conflict anywhere in which bath saes employed the 
telegraph on a large scale: the US Civil War. 
From the outbreaK ci the US Civil War in 1861, telegraph lines 
became an important target for the cavalry raiding forces cE both 
skies. The Union forces, being the more extend vely equipped with 
telegraphic sjstems, were the more vulnerable in this respect and 
the Confederate troops explcated this: 
Amongst the rarest treed cf men, a kind cf Signal Corps 
elite, were the telegraphers attached to ConfederatFý cavalry 
commands. These fellows - all cf whom also qualified as flagmen 
- rode at the head of every such command and curing many raids 
into Union territory they switched military traffic to the wrong 
destinations, they transmitted false orders to the headquarters 
of U rnon commanders, they cast suspicion upon all orders that 
came by wire. And when they had finished the job, they cut all 
the wire in sght and took home with them as much as they 
could roll up in a hurry. (4) 
Thus were born the techcnques cf disrupting and spoofing enemy 
electronic communications, techniques which fina considerable 
relevance today. Because they did not involve 'radiated electro- 
magnetic energy', the telegraph systems and the measires to counter 
them do not fall within the boundaries defined by the term 
'electronic warfare'. Nevertheless, some cl the methods, were later 
employed against radiating systems and so deserve mention here. 
II 
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The telegraph revoluuonized military oom munications, but it was 
not long before science had something even better to wer. In 1888 
the German Harnich Hertz demonstrated that electrical sparks would 
propagate agnals into space at the speed of lignt. Fdlowing this 
discovery, scientists in several countries pushed the development cf 
the sD-called 'Hertzian waves'. And, as in the case with the tele- 
graph, development aimed at military applications soon followed. In 
18 95 Captain H. Jackson, corn manch-ng the Royal Navy torpedo school 
at Plymouth in England, built a radio system able to transmit morse 
signals over 100 yards. Two years later the Italian pioneer Guglielmo 
Marconi demonstrated a system to send and receive agnals over a 
distance cf 11 miles. (5) 
.? c-, 0ý- 1. l<-, 
Lj 
. 
For overland communications, initially the radio off eyed merely 
another way of doing the same as the telegraph was already doing 
rapidly and efficiently; and it was less effective than the telephone, 
whose use was spreading rapidly. Oversea communications were 
another matter, however. Once they were out cf sght cf land, ships 
were completely isolated. So those interested in marine com mun- 
ications eagerly grasped the new invention, as a means cf solving 
one of their most intractable problems. Marconi strove to develop a 
radio set citable for use at sea and in mid-1897 he achieved a range 
of 11 miles between the Italian armored cruiser San Martino and the 
dockyard at La Spezia (6). Also in that year the German pioneer 
Adolf 9aby forecast that the most important poýsgbiLýties cf the new 
device would lie in the fields of military and naval com munications, 
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and for use with airships. Significantly, he also propheaed the use of 
radio jamming in wartime. (7) 
D wing Royal Navy manoeuvres ±f the west aE England in 1899, 
two cruisers and a battleship carried Marconi radio sets and their 
signals were picked up at distances up to 89 miles. Fallowing this 
MarcoM took same cf his equipment to the USA, and in September 
used it to pass reports to the New York Herald on the progress cf 
the America's Cup yacht races ott New Jersey. The US Navy 
requested a demonstration and Marconi fitted his sets into the 
battleship USS Massachusetts, the cruiser New York and the torpedo 
boat Porter. (8) 
Now radio at sea began to establish itself as b. ng potentially ct 
equal importance to the telegraph an land. Iritially there were very 
few sets, whose spark transmitters radiated sgnals over a wide band 
of frequencies whose mid-point depended on the length of the aeriaL 
As the number aE transmitters increased, some with higher powers to 
give improve range, instances cf unintentional jamming occurred as 
operators tried to pass messages %m u]taneously . This type of uni n- 
tentional interference, to both friendly and enemy transmissions, was 
to become a normal feature of military mom municatirns in the years 
to fallow and even in the 1980's the problem remains. 
The first recorded instance cf deliberate radio jamming took 
place in September 1901, in the USA. Interestingly, it was aimed at 
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securing commercial gain rather than military ad vancag _. As rov º 
there was consderable public interest in the A menca's Cup yacnt 
races; and the newspaper first to reach the stands carrying each 
result stood to reap a large profit. In that year m arcorIL cmau-v da 
contract from the Associated Press to and radio reports on the 
America's Cup yacht races. Another concern, the newly formed 
Wireless Telegraph Company of America, secured a amilar contract 
to pass reports to the Publishers' Press Association. A third 
company, the American Wireless Telephone and Telegraph Co, failed 
to get a sponsor but decided to exploit the atuation in a manner 
hardly in keeping with the highest standards c# burn ness ethics. The 
AWT&T used a transmitter more pow erful than its com peti. tors and 
one d its engineers, John Pickard, worked out a methoa which 
allow ea him to jam signals from the other corn parties while at the 
same time reporting on the progress cf the race from his boat. He 
evolved a ample code whereby one 1O-second dash, repeated at 
intervals, indicated that the US yacht Columbia was in the lead, two 
such dashes indicated that the British yacht Shamrock was ahead, 
three that they were neck and neck, and so on. Thus only the 
AWT&T was able to pass accurate reports on the races, and profited 
accordingly. Pickard's gloating account of the incirient state: 
When the yachts crossed the fi rush line we held down tfh 
key and then continued to hold it down, by the ample method of 
putting a weLght on it. Thus radiating waves ... we sailed for 
our home port, and the batteries lasted for the entire hour and a 
quarter that we utilized to send the longest dash ever sent by 
wireless. (9) 
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In December 1901 M arcorn. sent the morse letter 'S', three dots, 
over the 2,000 miles from Newfoundland to Cornwall in England eng 
a 10 Kw transmitter radiating on a center frequency cf 310 KHz. It 
was a dramatically impressive demonstration, which proved beyond 
doubt that radio was the way ahead for long range communications 
for Mips at sea and between punts not connected by cable. (10) 
The first intentional use cf radio jamming by the military 
occurred in 1902, during Royal Navy fleet exercises in the Mediterr- 
anean. During these the 'enemy' fleet was blockaded in harbour, 
watched by cruisers who were to summon the main battLefleet by 
radio it there was any attempt at a breakout. When the 'olockaäed' 
ships put to sea the cruisers tried to report this, but their agnals 
were jammed by amultaneous transmissions from the 'enemy' and the 
main battlefleet failed to engage. (11) 
By the time of the US Navy fleet manoeuvres in the summer d 
1903, that service possessed five radio stations along the Atlantic 
coast and had five ships equipped with the device. For the exeröses 
the force was divided into two. 'White', the enemy fleet, was to 
start 500 miles east of Cape Cod and attempt a sm ulated landing of 
troops on the New England coast. The 'Blue' fleet was to try to 
engage the 'white' force before it reached the coat and had four d 
the dips fitted with radio, positioned as a screen to warn of th n, 
'W hite' approach. Only one ct the 'W hite' ships carried radio, the 
USS Texas; she was to try to jam the sgnting n ports and so prevent 
- 19 - 
the 'Blue' forces clr i ng in. That was the plan, but it failed to work 
and the radio man on board Texas ended up in the trig. Afterwards 
the unfortunate man explained: 
I was on watch and everything was working fine. I heard a 
message begin, and the first three letters were G, 0 and L, -so I knew it was gcang to be G0 LD and that it was from the other 
side. I reached for the key, but the Flag Lieutenant who was 
with me said, "No, don't do that, I want the entire message. " 
When the message was ended, the Lieutenant said "Make inter- 
f erence" and I said "Sir, it's no use now. The message has gone 
out with a speed cf 186,000 miles a second and we can't catch 
up with it. " So here I am cn tread and water. (12) 
It is the first recorded instance of a conflict between those who 
wished to listen to enemy radio agnals for intelligence, and the 
who wished to jam them to prevent the irtormation reaching the 
enemy. The problem persists to the present day. 
By 190 3 the jamming of enemy radio communications was 'an 
idea whose time had come'. This was born out the following year 
soon after the outbreak of the Ru Japanese war, the first in 
which both sides' naval forces used radio. On the morning of 14 
April 190 4 the Japanese armored cruisers K asuga and Nisshin bomb- 
arded the Rus4an naval base at Paart. Arthur, using radio to spot the 
fall of shot and pass corrections. At the radio station on shore one 
of the Russan operators heard the Japanese signals, realized their 
importance and used his spark transmitter to jam them. As a result. 
the bombardment caused little damage and few casualties. Radio 
jamming had made its first, unplanned and improvised, step into the 
arena of combat. (13) 
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During the remainder cx the conflict, which reacne 1 its climax 
with the resounding Japanese naval victory in the Tsushima Strait in 
May 1905, the Japanese made aorAderably more effective 'se of 
radio than their opponents. The Russian Navy (ref erred to conceal 
the presence of its lips wherever possible by maintaining radio 
silence, to listen to and exploit enemy transmissions when it could 
and, rn rare occasions, to jam them. (14) 
In 1906 the US Navy fitted a primitive radio direction finder to 
the cöUier Lebanon for tests. Although this early equipment demon- 
strated only a limited capability, the Chief of the USN Bureau c 
Equipment saw its posabilities and wrote irtorming the Secretary of 
the Navy that 
The resits thereon obtained indicate that a development of 
the system will have a far-reaching tect an the safety of 
vessels at sea, and will posgbly play an important part in naval 
warfare by making it feasible to locate the chrection of an 
enemy's fleet. (15) 
From the opening of World War I. in August 1914, there was 
widespread use cf radio jamming. This began on 4 August, the day 
before Britain entered the war on the ade of Belgium and France 
against Germany and Austria. In the Mediterranean the British 
cruisers Indomitable and Indefatigable passed close to the German 
cruisers Goeben and Breslau; both forces were moving at high speed, 
neither knowing whether the other was likely to open fire. In the 
event there were no shots but, as the German Admiral Scucnon later 
wrote: 'The British awsers merely attempted to pm systematically 
cur wireless corn murucations. ' (16) 
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During subsequent naval actions communications jamming was 
employed from time to tune, though the increaang success cf cr ypto- 
analysis put a brake on this activity as the war progressed : the 
iritefl Bence value from de-c ypted enemy agnais was often far 
greater than the transtrory advantage to be gained from lamming 
them. Naval forces also became conscious that too liberal a use cf 
radio could betray a great deal cf used ul information to the enemy, 
even if cyphers remained secure. Commanders stressed the impor- 
tance of maintaining radio s1ence whenever possible, and of mini- 
mining signals traffic when it was not. For close manoeuvring, fleets 
reverted to the older visual signalling methods. Once warships were 
within %ght cf the enemy, however, captains were permitted the 
free use of radio. 
Early in 1915 the Royal Navy erected a chain cf dir ectior- - 
finding stations along the east coast of England, whose bearings 
could establish the position cf any ship or aärcraft uang radio in the 
North Sea area. The stations employed the well-known Belllni-Tcsi 
system of direction-finding aerials, but their performance was 
greatly enhanced by a senstive new type of amplifier developed by 
the Marconi company and us ng then mionic valves. This chain cf 
stations proved particularly usff ul in providing irf ormation on the 
movements of Zeppelins during operations, as thew crews would 
frequently request navigational bearings from direction-finding 
stations in Germany. (17 ) 
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When the USA entered the conflict in April 1917 its naval battle 
squadron under Admiral Rodman pined the British Grand Fleet and 
used British sgnals equipment and procedures. US Navy destroyers 
and escorts operated separately, however, and retained their vatci: 
radios which were a great advance on the sits fitted to the Royal 
Navy ships. Also some US destroyers carried the Type 995 radio 
direction-finder, which proved of consderab]e value for assembling 
hunting groups and convoys and also for taking bearings an U-boat 
transmissons. (18 ) 
Radio for air-to-ground communications assumed consderable 
importance during World War I, usually to pass tactical reconn- 
aissance reports or gunfire corrections. Because these were usually 
of little intelligence value to the enemy, they were often jammed. 
Operators trying to take down gunfire corrections from artillery 
observation aircraft found unintentional interference from nearby 
f lien dly machines at least as much a problem as the deliberate 
jamming from the enemy, however. The cfficial British history dear 
ribed one method of lessening such interference, used during the 
Battle cf the Somme in 1916: 
One great difficulty was the ease with which wireless 
messages from spotting airplanes were jammed by amilar mess- 
ages s. mu]taneously emitted by friendly adjacent aircraft. A 
remedy was found by the adoption of the "clapper-wreak", by 
which the pitch or tone of the note sent out by the aeroplane 
would be varied. This ample device made it possible to double 
the rumber cf aircraft used for spotting in any gLven area, and 
at the time the battle opened wireless aeroplanes, in the prop- 
ortion of one to every 2,000 yards cl trench line, could operate 
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with the artillery without the risk aE finding their agnals 
jammed. (19) 
The capper-break was also successful in reducing the of f ect cf 
deliberate jamming, and can be a ordered the first example cf an 
electronic counter-countermeasure. Information is sparse on the use 
cif radio jam ming by or against US forces during the conflict. Since 
the US Army and Air Service made conaderable use cf Bntish agnals 
equipment, however, it is likely that their experiences were similar 
to those ci the British forces. 
Following the end of World War I. the US Naval Research Labor- 
atory at Anacostia conducted experiments to improve high frequency 
communications between ground stations and A ips at sea and 
aircraft airborne, with initial forays into the fields of radio tele- 
printers, photo facsimile transmission equipment and television. In 
1929 the NR L devoted some effort to 'avoiding enemy detection, and 
detecting enemy transmis, ons' as well as the 'creation of inter- 
Terence for the enemy'. NRL engineers modified existing commun- 
ications transmitters to sweep across a band of frequencies, to cause 
interference to enemy systems. They considered that if such jam ming 
was required in time of war, in-service corn m unicaticns transmitters 
with relatively simple modifications would be aiffident to provide it. 
(20) 
During the 1920's and 1930's several nations experimented with 
radio controlled aircraft and 'flying bombs'. The NR L conducted 
experiments in this field, then went an to consder what counter- 
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measures would be necessary should the US Navy find itself confront- 
ed by such weapons. The first requirement was a receiver to detect 
the frequency used for the enemy control signals. To prove the fea. s- 
ihility ct such a system NRL engineers modified a Model SE 2952 
receiver to sweep continuously through the band between 240 and 
650 KHz. When it picked up the sgnals a neon tube was arranged to 
strike up behind the appropriate point cn the frequency diaL Thus 
was probably the first continuously scanning visual display intercept 
receiver ever built. (21) 
III 
By the early 1930's transmitters were becoming sufficiently 
powerful, receivers suffidently sensitive and aerials aifficiently 
directional to permit an entirely new development in the field of 
electronics: the device we now call radar. 
During his experiments in the 1880's Heinrich Hertz had demon- 
strated that metal plates would reflect electromagnetic waves, and 
the concept of detecting distant objects by sich means can be 
traced back to his initial experiments. The first formal mention of 
such a sjstem appears to have stemmed from the pen cf the US 
inventor Nikola Tesla, famous for his innovative work in the develop- 
ment cf alternating current electrical systems. In an article entitled 
The Problem cf Increasing Human Energy published in June 1900, he 
wrote: 
When we raise the voice and hear an echo in reply, we know 
that the sound cf the vaiLce must have reached a distant wall, or 
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boundary, and must have been reflected from the same. Exactly 
as the sound, so an electrical wave is reflected, and the sa me 
evidence which is afforded by an echo is afforded by an elect- 
rical phenomenon known as a "stationary wave" - that is, a wave 
with fixed nodal and ventral regicns ... Stationary waves in the earth will mean something m,: )re than 
mere telegraphy without wires to any distance. They will enable 
us to attain many important specific resuks, imposable other- 
wise. For instance, by their use we may produce at will, from a 
sending station, an electrical effect in any particular region of 
the globe; we may determine the relative position or course of a 
moving object, sich as a vessel at sea, the distance travelled by 
same, or its speed. (23) 
Tesla's concept was visionary rather than practical, and it has only 
loose ties with radar as we now know it. Within a short time, 
however, more practical experiments would begin along these lines. 
In 190 4 the G Ps man scientist Christian Hulsmeyer patented a 
device with a transmitter and a receiver mounted ade-by-ade and so 
arranged 'that waves gojected from the transmitter can only 
actuate the receiver by being reflected from some metallic body, 
which at sea would presumably be another ship'; in theory the device 
would also detect iceburgs. Hulsmeyer called his invention the 'Tele- 
mobil cope'; the echo dgnals were to spund a bell, to warn cf the 
proximity of ether sips or objects. The apparatus employed a mark 
transmitter and coherer receiver. 
In May 1904 the inventor reportedly gave a siccessf ul demon- 
stration of his device at the Hohenzollern Bridge at C dogne, using 
ships passing up and down the Rhine as targets. As they approached 
his apparatus the bell would ring, and it ceased when the ship passed 
cuts. de the beam cf the apparatus. Hulz m ey är went on co extend the 
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range Cf 1üs detector to 3,000 metres, but although it : roused some 
interest there were no buyers (24). Given the lack d effective c hr- 
ecticonal aerials and sensitive receivers in 190 4, it would seem likely 
that the device had a high false alarm rate which would have mitig- 
ated against its usefulness. 
Several nations claim the invention of radar for their own. As 
we have observed, however, by the 1930's all the necessary 
developments in transmitter, receiver and aerial desgn had been 
made and it remained only to assemble such a detection system . 
Radar was now a device 'whose time had come', as is borne out by 
the fact that scientists working independently in the USA, Great 
Britain, France, Germany, Holland, Japan and the Soviet Urion all 
produced working sets. 
In the USA the NRL began experiments with radio detection as 
early as 1922, wing a continuous wave transmitter on 60 MHz set up 
at Anacostia; it radiated across the Potomac and Anacostia rivers, 
to a receiver at Haines Pcint. As ships passed through the trans- 
mi. sson path they caused fluctuations in the strength at the received 
signals (25). The device had an effective range of about 3 miles. This 
was an 'interference detector' rather than a 'radar', but its import- 
ante to the story is that it marked a step in the development cf the 
latter device. This same princLple would be resurrected in the 
modern times, for use in f orw ard-scatter over-the-horizon radar 
systems. 
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Development cf the interference detector at the NR L continued, 
and by 1934 the device was able to detect aircraft at 50 miles. 
Members cf the Subcommittee on Naval Appropriations aE the Hain-- 
c Representatives watched a demorstration cf tie device, which 
impressed them sufficiently to gain a special appropnation cf 
$100,000 to further work in this field. At the beginning aE 1935 NRL 
engineers began testing a 60 MHz pulsed radar to detect aircraft. 
Initially there were severe problems with this, however: pulses from 
the high powered transmitter caused 'ringing' in the receives, which 
swamped the echo signals returned from objects nearby. (26) 
Meanwhile, un known to the researchers in the üSA, work cf a 
similar nature was moving ahead fast in Great Britain and Germany. 
By June 1935 a British experimental pulsed radar operating on 11 
MHz was giving detection ranges Cf 17 miles rn aircraft; in March 
1936 an improved version was able to detect aircraft 75 miles away 
(27). And by September 1936 a German radar, operating on what was 
then the extremely high frequency cf 600 MHz, detected an aircraft 
12 miles away. (28) 
With the threat of impending war still remote from the USA, the 
development cf radar lacxed the urgency cf that in Europe. Never- 
theless, US developments did not lag far behind thcse elsew here. By 
April 1936 NRL engineers had built a 28 MHz pulsed radar w wich 
gave 10 mile detection ranges on aircraft; by the following June its 
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range was 25 miles. By November 1936 a new type of radar, 
operating on 80 M ri z, was detecting aircraft. 38 miles away. In April 
1937 an experimental 200 MHz radar fitted to the destroyer USS 
Leary detected aircraft at 20 miles by the following year a more 
advanced ship-borne set gave double this range. In December 1938 a 
200 MHz XAF radar went to Sea cn the battleship US S New York, 
and early in 1939 it was used during the fleet exercises in the 
Caribbean. It detected aircraft at 100 miles (equivalent to more than 
half an hour's warring cf attack, given the speeds cf bombers at 
that time), and ships at 15 miles. The XAF radar proved so success 
ful that the M oriel CXAM patterned on it went into production, and 
would enter service in the spring ct 1940. (29) 
The NR L passed details cf its work on radar to the US Army 
Signal Corps laboratory at Fort Monmouth, and by the end of 1936 
the Army had tested a pulsed radar operating on 110 MHz. In May 
1937 the Secretary for War, the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief 
ct the Mr Corps observed a successful de mor ration of a combined 
radar and infra-red detection system linked to a searchlight. The 
infra-red system was later discarded but the radar, modified to 
operate on 200 MHz, became the SCR-268 coastal and anti-aircraft 
gun control set; this was the first radar to go into production for 
the US Army and it would enter service early in 1941. (30) 
Although the evolution of radar in the USA is not, strictly 
speaking, part of the story cf electronic warfare,, the reader needs 
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an insght into this subject because the developm enc. cf counter- 
measures would follow hard on the heels that ± radar. By the 
outbreak cf world war II in Europe, in September 1939, wont in tl; e 
USA on radar was well advanced and the nation had established a 
pool of scientists, physicists and engineers who understood the 
necessary techniques. Also, within the military, there were a few 
forward looking officers who perceived the importance of sich 
equipment in any future cr flict and who ens i red the necessary 
resources were made available for its development. Thus, unwitt- 
ingly, firm foundations were being laid for the US entry into the 
field of electronic warfare when this became necessary. 
IV 
Once radar was established as an important means cf detecting 
and locating enemy st*: )s and aircraft, it could be only a matter a[ 
time before somebody thought of jamming it. As early as October 
1935 Robert Watson-Watt,, in charge cf the British programme to 
develop radar, had received a government request 'To consder 
whether radio location could be defeated by deliberate jam MI ng' . 
Fallowing this, one of Watson-Watt's departments at the research 
establishment at Bawdsey in SufEalk began theoretical work on the 
probe m. In January 1938 the team began jamming tests, us ng a 
ground spark transmitter against the radar at Bawdsey and two 
others along the coast. In May 1938 the first airborne jamming test 
took place, us. ng an interrupted-continuous-wave transmitter on 
board a Landon tw iri- igined biplane flying boat. (31) 
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Following these tests, various antip m mi ng systems were built 
into the Chain Home radars being erected along the east coast cf 
England - the first-ever examples cf what we now call radar elect- 
ronic counter-countermeasures (E CCM). Stations were able to 
transmit and receive on four different frequencies in the 20 to 52 
MHz band, so that operators could salect the frequency least 
affected by enemy ja m mi ng. The radar was fitted with an inter- 
mediate frequency rejector unit with a loudspeaker, so the operator 
could listen to the intensity cf the jimming; he then altered the 
tuning or the bandwidth cf the receiver's intermediate frequency 
amplifier, to reduce the sound from the loudspeaker and also the 
Effect cf the jamming. The operator could vary the pulse repetition 
frequency cf the radar, to counter pulse-locked jam ming. Another 
interesting idea was the use of variable colour afterglow on the 
A-scope cathode ray tube: the instantaneous trace appeared in blue, 
the afterglow in yellow. By viewing the screen through blue, green 
or yellow filters, the operator could see through some types of 
jamming (32). Then, as now,, the ability to detect aircraft through 
jamming depended to a great extent on the degree cf training, skill 
and experience cf individual operators. 
The general concluacn formed after the British jamming tests in 
1938 and 1939 was that, with the help cf the various anti- m mi ng 
systems, a good operator with some training should be able to track 
aircraft through any jamming likely to be met under operational 
- 31 - 
conditirons. After conversations with some of those on the periphery, 
however, the author has formed the impression that the tests were 
run with the intention cf produang only this conclusrn. In other 
words, the jamming was not allowed to exceed the ability of the 
radars to operate through it. To the reader in the 1980's such an 
attitude might seem short-sighted. But it should be remembered that 
in the late 1930's radar was like a prematurely born infant, having 
to fight hard for the resources on which would depend its survival 
and development. Too effective a demorstration cf the means by 
which an enemy might neutralize the device, early on, might have 
given the financiers an excuse to cease funding the project a]tog- 
ether. There was another consideration. In Britain at this time, as in 
other countries working on radar, very few people knew about the 
device. So the only people in a portion to develop jamming systems 
were those same engineers who had wonted so hard to make the 
device work in the first place. It would have been asking too much 
1 human beings, to expect these engineers to put their hearts into 
defeating what they had created. 
Thus, for understandable bureaucratic and human reasons, the 
idea of radar jamming was not pushed as hard as it might have been 
in Great Britain in 1938 and 1939. Loolärx at US radar development 
during this period, one can detect ages, that amilar influences were 
Probably at work here also. Certainty there was no sejnous attempt 
to test any form of jamming against the early US radars. 
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For the first 8 months after the outbreak cf the war in Europe, 
the combatants warily szed each ckher up. Then, in May 1940, the 
Germans struck in the west and, after a victorious campaign lasting 
just over a month, they forced Holland, Belcßum and France to capiLt- 
ulate. Only Great Britain remained in the conflict against Germany. 
Her first line cf defence was the squadrons of Royal Air Force 
Fighter Command, and their success depended on the chain cf radar 
stations along the south and east coasts cf England. The Battle cf 
Britain opened in July and after some initial skirmishing the Luft- 
waff e sent dive-bombers to attack the radars - the tirst-ever 
example of what are now termed def ence suppressor 'hard-kill' 
countermeasures. The British radars were well emplaced, however, 
and the small bombs carried by the dive bombers could not knock out 
the sets for more than a few hours at a time. Moreover, the 
defending Spitfires and Hurricanes inflicted heavy lasses and the 
attackers were forced to abandon this countermeasure. Then the 
German Luftwaffe tried another tack. In September its sgnals per- 
sonnet erected a ground radar jamming station at Mount Couple, a 
hill overlooking Calais. The type cf jammer employed, code-named 
'Breslau', radiated 1Kw cI noise on spot frequencies in 22 to 50 
MHz band used by the Chain Home radars on the cther ade cf the 
Channel (33). Due to its fixed postirn, however,, the Mount Couple 
station was never able to prevent at least some cf the British radars 
plotting the incoming German attack formations at any gLven time. 
Also, the anti j. m mi ng devices built into the Chain Home radars 
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as. ted the more experienced operators to work through all but the 
worst ct the jamming. 
V 
Meanwhile, unknown to its makers, a US-built radio receiver was 
starting to PlaY an 'important part in a different electronic battle 
now developing in Europe. During the late spring cf 1940 the British 
Air Ministry Scientific Intelligence Directorate, headed by a young 
physicist named Dr R. V. Janes, began to receive disquieting reports 
from several sources cn a new and obviously very secret GEr man 
device code-named 'K rockebein' . In fact K roc kebein C crooked leg') 
was a long range blind bombing system similar to the radio range 
navigation system then in common use, though initially Jones did not. 
know this. A ground transmitter radiated a beam to mark a flight 
path for aircraft, with morse dots to one ade cf the beam and morse 
dashes on the other; in the center lane the dots and dashes merged 
tocßvea steady note. To fly the beam, i ots had only to stay in the 
zone where they heard the steady note sgnaL The German Krncke- 
bein system worked on frequencies in the 30 to 33.3 MHz band and, 
in preparation for the planned night bombing onslaught on Britain, 
several new transmitters were erected in France and Hyland follow - 
ing the capture of these countries. Although Dr Jones had evidence 
that the German system used transmissions on frequencies around 30 
MHz, at that time the Royal Air Force had no sgnals intercept 
organization equipped to exa ccii ne that part of the spectrum (34). In 
its quest for a suitable intercept receiver, the British Air Ministry 
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bought several examples cf a receiver intended for 'ham' radio 
enthusiasts and covering the band 27 and 143 MHz: the S. 27 made by 
the Halli aafters Corporation, a small company located just outside 
Chicago (the Hal]krafters Corporation would later become a major 
producer cf electronic warfare equipment and today, as part of the 
Northrop Corporation, is still active in this field). One S. 27 was 
fitted into an Anon twin-engined reconnaissance aircraft, for what 
became the first British airborne Elint missons (35). On its third 
flight during the hunt for the mystery German signals, on 21 June 
1940, the crew aE the Anson found what they were looking for: a 
full pattern of Knickebein sgnals aligned over Lincolnshire with 
morse dots to the south, dashes to the north and a steady note agnal 
running up the middle. Once the pattern of the sgnals was known, 
the method cf operation ci Krickebein was immediately obvious. The 
well-known 'Battle of the Beams', the Royal Air Force campaign to 
jam K rnckebein, stemmed directly from this all-important Elint 
misson. (36) 
Early in 1941 the Hall afters S. 27 was again used by the 
British to considerable effect,, this time to plot the pc . tions cf the 
125 MHz German Freya early warning radars an the other ade aE the 
English Channel. Derrick Garrard, a member of Dr R. V Jones's staff, 
described to the author his 'do it yourself' work in this field: 
I took my car to various paints on the south and east coasts 
of England. On the back seat I had the Hall afters receiver, 
running cEf a separate large 6 volt battery so that it would not 
drain the car's battery; between stops to search for enemy 
signals, I would re-charge this additional battery from my 
engine-driven generator. The car had a sin roof which I would 
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open, and poke cut my home-made d aeriaL Tnat was in the days 
before the term "anaprop" [anomalous propagation] existed, but 
we knew that this inf requent but fairly predictable form of 
propagation existed. Because of this I was able to pick up the 
Freya -signals and get rough bearings an them from up to 130 
miles. As the German beam swung round it would illuminate the 
horizon - the effect we now call "forward scatter". This must 
have been one of the very first observations of this Effect. 
Having established the approximate potions ct several German 
radars on the other ade cf the Channel, Garrard returned with a 
Royal Air Force VHF fixer van, normally used to track friendly 
fighters from their radio transmis. 4cns, and with this was able to 
refine his bearings. He observed the sgnals from each radar for as 
long as 30 minutes, taking repeated bearings and then averaging his 
results. With this system he triangulated the positions cf several 
Freyas along the coast between Holland and the north coast cf Britt- 
any. Later, when the accuracy cf platting would be confirmed photo- 
graphically by reconnaissance aircraft, Garrard's methods were 
shown to be surprisingly accurate - within half a degree in many 
cases. (37) 
VI 
Initially the war in Rampe had little effect an radar develop- 
ment in the USA. But following the rapid German victories over 
France, Holland and Belgium in the summer cf 1940, and the hasty 
evacuation cf the British forces from the mainland cif Europe, the 
possbhility ct the USA becoming embroiled in the conflict increased 
greatly. Winston Churchill was anxious to en-cure that US srs. --ratists 
received the full benef it cf his nation's work in this field, so that 
the fight could continue even if the Germans invaded Britain. In 
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September 1940, when the Battle of Britain was at its Might, he 
sent Sir Henry Tizard to the USA at the head cf a tech rncal miss on. 
At first their American counterparts treated the visitors with 
reserve. But then Tizard produced his ace cf trumps: the high-pow, -, r 
magnetron, developed by Dr. J. Randall and Mr H. Boot at B irmi ng- 
ham U riversty a few months earlier, which produced an unpreced- 
ented 10 Kw at a frequency cf 3,000 MHz: sufficient to power a 
radar operating on microwave frequencies. The revelation marked the 
opening cf a lengthy period of technical co-operation between the 
USA and Great Britain in radar and, later, countermeasures. The US 
Radiation laboratory, formed a few weeks earlier at the Massa- 
chusetts Institute cf Technology under Lee DuBridge to further the 
development cf radar in the USA, eagerly grasped the new invention 
and set about the development cf new types cf radar to exploit its 
potential to the fulL (38) 
Part of the remit cf the Radiation Laboratory was to investigate 
methods of countering enemy radars, and Dr Luis Alvarez and Liss 
section began work in this field. At this time the US possessed virt- 
ually no information on radar developments by her main potential 
enemies, Germany and Japan. Alvarez appreciated that without stich 
intelligence no jamming could take place, so his first move was to 
initiate the development cf an airborne receiver to cover the 
frequency band 100 and 950 MHz (almalt certainly the British use Cf 
the HaUicrafters S. 27 receiver for Flint work was not known to the 
US authorities at that time). (39) 
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At about this time the Dr Don Sinclair, a Canadian wog with 
the General Radio Company at Cambridge, Massachusetts, began 
work on the receiver portion cf a field strength measuring set 
intended to cover the band 100 to 3,000 MHz. To achieve the requir- 
ed broad tuning range, the receiver used the novel ' butterfly' tuning 
device which Sinclair himself had invented. It soon became clear that 
the unusual receiver might be suitable for a role quite different from 
that for which it had originally been intended, however, and in July 
19 41 the Radiation Laboratory placed an order with General Radio 
for prototypes cf an intercept equipment based on Sinclair's 
receiver. The device, which received the General Radio prototype 
deagnation P-540, was to become the first purpose-built US radar 
intercept receiver. During tests the P-540 continued to show promise 
and the Army Signal Corps placed an order for a hundred receivers 
of this type, now desgnated the SC R-587, with the Philco Corpor- 
ation. (40) 
At this time s--veral cf those at the Radiation Laboratory treat- 
ed the idea cf their own radars being jammed almost like a dirty 
word, something not to be mentioned in polite conversation. Win 
Salisbury recounted an incident when the Radlab's new centimetric 
radar ran into difficulties during bench testing: 
One day Lee DuBridge had Ed McMillan and me into t us 
office and said "We've got a problem here. Every day at 4 
o'clock, the new radar stops working. I'm appointing you two to 
find out why. " So Ed and I started investigating and we put an 
oscilloscope on the output cf the IF amplifier to see what sort 
cf modulation was there. On the screen it looked exactly like a 
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speech waveform . So we fitted a detector and loudgc eakrýr and found it was an MIT radio ham coming in with his radio tele- 
phone, on the IF frequency promptly at 4 o'clock each day. 
We had a big meeting about this, and when I said what had 
happened up went the ay "KM the ham! ". In the . 'nd I stood up 
and said "Gentlemen we should not kill this ham, w- should gL %-, ý 
him a vote cf thanks. How long do you think our radar will 
survive in service, if this sort cf thing will interfere with it? " 
(41) 
Reluctantly, those present agreed to allow the 'ham' to continue 
operating, and work began on improving the fielding around the 
intermediate frequency amplifier cl the new radar. 
Meanwhile, the Naval Research Laboratory at Anacc is was 
pushing ahead with the development cf another aspect cf electronic 
warfare: the high frequency direction finder, to pin-point hostile 
radio transmitters operating in the band 3 to 30 MHz used for long 
range communications. Back in 1936 the NRL had developed the DT 
ground direction finder which performed effectively in this role; by 
1940 several were in service. Now the reed was for a similar high 
frequency direction finder (HFDF) siitable for carriage on warships, 
to enable them to home cn enemy transmisaons (the direction finders 
fitted to US warships in World War I operated only on medium 
frequencies, below 3 MHz). At sea, the DT equipment was not .3 
success: due to reflections from the ship's structure, the bearings it 
provided were so unreliable that they were cf no operational use. 
(42) 
The breakthrough came after the fall of France, when Maurice 
D elorai ne and three compatriots who had been wonting on a new 
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type cf high frequency direction finder for the French Navy escaped 
to the USA with plans of the new device. Working at the Federal 
Telecom munications Laboratory at Amagansett, Long Island, the 
Frenchmen on had running the Prototype cf a shore-based 
direction-finder to their desgn; they went on to build aA up-borne 
version, which would later enter service with the US Navy as the 
D AQ . (43) 
VIE 
At the beginning cf December 1941, immediately before the USA 
entered the war, the development and production cf radar for the 
nation's armed forces was well advanced. By that time the US Army 
had in service a few SCR-268 's, a 200 MHz set for coastal and anti- 
aircraft gun control being produced by the Signal Corps Laboratories 
and by Western Electric. For early warring on 100 MHz there was 
the SC R-270, and its transportable verson the SC R-271, both in 
production at Westinghouse (44). The US Navy had twenty C XA M's, a 
200 MHz ai f ace and air search radar made by RCA, fitted into 
battleships, aircraft carriers and cruisers. That service had also 
received the British ASV (air to surface vessel) Mark II radar, an 
airborne set which operated on 176 M Hz; with some changes, this 
was about to enter mass production as the ASE (US Army deag nation 
SCR-521) for fitting to the P81 Catalina and ether patrol aircraft. 
A more advanced US-desgned radar for the same purpose, the ASB 
operating on 515 M Hz, was in the initial test stage and would later 
be mass produced by RCA, B endix and Westinghouse Electric. For its 
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night fighters, the Army Air Force had acquired a few British Al 
(Airborne Interception) Mark IV radars operating on 200 MHz; this 
set was about to go irto production at Bell Telephones as the 
SCR-540. Two NRL-desgned equipments were on the point cf enter- 
ing service with the US Navy: the 114 MHz SD radar for sa b mari nes 
produced by RCA; and the 700 MHzFA and FC sets for ipbo , 
gunnery control both made by Western Electric(6). And at the 
Radiation Laboratory prototypes were running cf airborne and ground 
radars operating on 3,000 MHz, powered by magnetrons. (45) 
Thus on 7 December 1941, when Japanese aircraft attacked 
Pearl Harbor, the US armed forces were usng many different types 
cf radar though in small numbers. Qualitatively, the sets entering 
production in the US were equal to those being bua in other 
nations; and some cf the microwave fire control and airborne inter- 
ccept radars being prepared at the MIT Radiation Laboratory for 
production would become the best in the world in their respective 
categories. Moreover the nation's huge electronics industry, the 
largest in the world, w as becoming more and more com mi tted to try 
production cl radar. 
Apart from the work on the P-540 intercept receiver (later 
desg hated the SC R-587) which the MIT Radiation Laboratory had 
commissioned, and the ugh frequency direction finders for the US 
Navy, little cf the work taking place in the USA at this time can be 
considered to fall totally within the boundaries of electronic warf are 
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as defined at the beginning cl this work. For a conc st. ¬ a",, i 
systematic entry cf the USA into this field -hree things were 
f: first, the nation h, ýci to have the ' bac. {ground -, .: noingy' in 
electronics necessary to develop such equipm -, :-; _ cur. 
dly, r needed 
su$icsent spare manufacturing capacity to :ýý:, a such a program to 
fruition; and thirdly, the need for d? ctro a: warfare systems had goo 
be perceived by those in postiors cf authority able to switch money 
and resources to develop such equipment. On 7 December I (Al the 
USA obviously fxýsy_s 'd the first. -w; o of these requirements in full 
measure. The third requirement was not yet sati. ie, i, but it would 
be in a remarkably short space cf time. 
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CHAPTER 2 PLUNGE INTO THE UNKNOWN 
The first moves to form an organization in the USA devoted 9Dlely 
to the development of radio countermeasures came from the Navy on 11 
December 1941, just four days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 
On that day Admiral Julius Furer, one cf the co-ordinators of naval 
research and development, convened a preliminary meeting to discuss 
setting up sich an organization. Representatives of the US Government 
Office cE Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), the Navy and the 
Radiation Laboratory were present. This meeting led to a formal 
conference between the OSRD and the Navy on 22 December; amongst 
those who attended were Admiral F urer, Rear Admiral Alexander Van 
Keuren (Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ships) and Dr Karl Compton 
(P resdent of the MIT). Following this, a letter was sent to the National 
Ddense Research Committee (NDRC) requesting that it consder forming 
an organization to development countermeasures equipment. The 
recom mendation was accepted. (1) 
The next step was to elect someone cf standing within the US 
scientific community to head the enterprise. The obvious initial 
choice for the post was Dr Luis Alvarez, whose section at e 
Radiation Laboratory had initiated work on the P-540 intercept 
receiver at the General Radio Company. Alvarez was heavily 
involved with the development cf microwave radar at the time, 
however, and declined the of±er. But he strongly recommended for 
the pc&tioon Dr Frederick Taman, then head cf the Department Cl 
Electrical Engineering at Starford U rivers. ty in C alit xna (2). 
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Terman was author d 'Radio Engineering', a much-used textbook on 
electronics at that time, and was ending his year in office as pres- 
ident of the Institute cf Radio Engineers (now incorporated in the 
the IEEE. ) 
On 28 December Terman received a telephone call from Dr L: ý- 
DuBr dge, the Director of the Radiation Laboratory , asking him to 
call as soon as possble to discuss an important matter. T er man, in 
New York for a meeting at the IRE, called on DuB ridge who asked 
him if he was willing to set up a civilian organization to develop 
radio and radar countermeasures equipment for the US armed forces. 
Terman did not rive an immediate answer; as he later told the 
author: 
I spent several days considering DuBridge's fifer, wondering 
what I might be letting myself in for if I accepted. I really had 
no idea of what would be involved. But in the end I came to the 
concluson that if I was going to get involved in the war Effort, 
this new organization was more important that anything else I 
was likely to become involved in. Accordingly, before leaving 
Boston several days after it was tendered, I accepted DuBridge's 
cffer. (3) 
Fallowing this acceptance, the NDR C drew up a formal proposal for 
the establishment cl the radio countermeasures laboratory under 
Terman, and allocated the aim cf $300,000 for the first -six months' 
cperatior s. The text of the letter cf proposal is c ven in full as 
Appendix A. Now the way was clear for the laboratory to open and 
start recruiting staff. Terman continued: 
On 12 February 1942 I took up my post at Cambridge. At 
the start I had to work with Wheeler Loomis, Du Bridge's No 2 
man, to at up my operation which would work in parallel with 
his. Loomis was a tough, hard-bciled character. It used to be 
said that at the Radiation laboratory there was a division of 
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labor: Lee DuBridge to say "yes" to everyone, and W heeler 
Loomis, cs to say "No, " Everybody loved Lee DuBridge, they 
almost hated - but greatly respected - Loomis. Soon after I 
started I asked Loomis "What do you think is needed in the way 
cf countermeasures? Where should I turn for the best advice? " 
He looked me Straight in the eye and replied "we don't know. 
That's what we hired you for. " Looking back, it was the best 
charter I could possibly have been given. Nobody in the US knew 
anything about radio countermeasures, it was my job to find out 
what could and should be done. (4) 
On 16 February Karl Compton wrote a formal letter to Dr 
Terman on behalf of the ND RC, to confirm the latter's appointment 
as head of the new radio countermeasures organization (the text cf 
the letter is given in full in Appendix B) : 
It is understood that the R. C. M. project initially will be set 
up as part cf the Radiation Laboratory and will operate for the 
present as a separate and distinct project under the general 
palicies and within the structure of the Radiation Laboratory. 
For various reasons, however, it is desirable that this project 
become administratively separate from the Radiation Laboratory 
as soon as pos_gble, after which tune the R. C. M. project and the 
Radiation Laboratory will be parallel activities, each under a 
director, both reporting to Section D-1. 
The letter went on to stress that it would be up to Terman and his 
new team to decide which avenues they should explore: 
It is im possble at the present time to outline the scope and 
sze of the R. C .M. project. The Microwave C om mittee has 
agreed, at the request of the Army and Navy, to undertake an 
intensive program on this subject. The particular lines of attack 
to be undertaken, however,, will have to be outlined by your own 
organization, in consultation with the armed services, Microwave 
Committee and Radiation Laboratory members. (6) 
From the beginräng it was made clear to T erman that although 
for the time being his section would come under the administrative 
control of the Radiation Laboratory, the work of the two croups was 
to be kept apart. Only a small proportion of those working at the 
Radlab would be allowed access to the RRL; most of those working 
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on countermeasures were allowed to visit the Radlab, however, to 
acquaint. them with the latest work on radar. The reason this one- 
way passage of information was that those working on counter- 
measures would need access to intelligence information on enemy 
equipment, not necessary to the working on radar. To provide 
radar expertise for Dr Ter man's new group two Radiation Laboratory 
engineers were tranceerred to it, Dr Win Salisbury and Dr Richard 
Raymond. At the same time Dr Don Sinclair, working at General 
Radio's Cambridge laboratory on the P-540 receiver, began to split 
his time between that laboratory and RRL. The fact that Sinclair 
was a Canadian citizen made little tiff erence: he held the necessary 
security clearances and was obviously the best man to take charge 
of the work on intercept receivers at RRL. (7) 
Dr Terman established his organization in Building 24 cf the 
Radiation Laboratory, on the MIT Campus at Cambridge. Soon after- 
wards it received the title 'Radio Research Laboratory', a name 
intended to conceal its true function. Terman had no difficulty 
getting all the money he could reasonably spend, his main problem 
was finding electronics engineers of the necessary high quality for 
his laboratory (he regarded countermeasures as essentially an . , ngi n- 
ee ing task, not requiring any of the basic research occupying tho 
scientists and physc 1sts working on radar). At the becinrnng of 1942 
the US economy was gearing itself for war and many organizations - 
incbxling the armed forces - were also looking for people with 
expertise in this field. Terman was not permitted to poach engineers 
from any organization involved in the war effort, but the working 
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cutsde it were fair game; he some of the unconventional 
methods he used to get recruits: 
John Byrne, who became my chief engineer, I picked up 
almost by accident. On my way back from the east after being 
offered the job, we happened to be flying on the same plane out 
of Chicago. He had been head of electronic engineering at Ohio 
State U riversty. He had written several papers and I had heard 
of him, though at that time I did not know him very well. 
Anyway, we sat next to each other on the plane and it turned 
out that he was in the process of changing jobs. He was about to 
go and work for Collins Radio but as yet he was not involved in 
the war effort, so I asked if he would like to in my group. He 
said he would, and joined me soon after the start. (8) 
Soon afterwards Harold Elliott, a mechanical engineer and old friend 
cf Terman's, joined the group; widely known and respected, he held 
several patents including one for a push-button tuning system for car 
radios which gained him consderable aims in royalties. By the end ct 
February 1942 the staff of the Radio Research Laboratory compp sed 
Terman, Byrne, Elliott, Salisbury and Raymond, three technicians and 
a secretary. Now the expanson of the team began to accelerate. 
Terman continued: 
Still more people were needed, many more. Gradually we 
evolved an Effective system of finding the right ones. I contact- 
ed several of those who had been students of mine at. Stanford, 
including several who were then teaching electronics at other 
schools, and hired them. As each newcomer was taken on, he 
was asked if he knew anyone he could recommend for our proj- 
ect. And when those new ones joined us, they were oven the 
same treatment. (9) 
During March 1942 the off at the RRL increased to eighteen 
and the group took over the second floor of the Hood Building at 
Cambridge. Terman was getting capable engLneer's to join him, but 
still he had no clear idea of the direction in which he ought to be 
directing their efforts: 
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Now that I had necessary clearances, it was easy for me to 
get in touch with the radar experts at the Radiation Laboratory. 
And they were very keen to talk about their latest ideas. But 
there amply was nobody we could turn to in the US when it 
came to planning countermeasures. In our group we did a lot cf 
talking, but we really did not know whether one needed .5 watts, 5 watts or 500 watts to -jam a radar. Nor did we have 
much information on the enemy equipment. We knew the Ger- 
mans had radar, but we had few details; we had no idea at all as 
to whether the Japanese had even heard of radar. (10) 
Terman was keen to let his young engineers have free rein as 
far as possible to develop their own ideas and schemes. Having just 
come from the Radiation Laboratory, Richard Raymond threw himself 
into his work with the zest of a convert eager to prove his new 
faith: 
One cf the first things we did at the new laboratory was fix 
a Yagi antenna and point it at the Radlab nearby, and radiate 
10 Kw cf power on 30 MHz. Up to that time all of the radars 
desgned at the Radlab had the same IF [intermediate frequency] 
of 30 MHz, which we thought was amply inviting jamming on 
that frequency from the enemy. Radlab took the hirt, and the 
first off ect the RRL had on the US war off ort was to cause our 
radar people to desgn and build very well-shielded IF amplifier 
stages for their sets. ' (11) 
Certainly this deliberate jamming would have reinforced the lessons 
from the ' Kill the ham! ' incident mentioned by Win Salisbury in the 
previous chapter. 
During this formative period, while the Radio Research Labor- 
atory was still 'a solution in search cf a problem', news began to 
filter through cf an incident in Europe which brought home the 
importance of the type cf warfare in which they were dabbling. On 
12 February 1942, the very day Dr Ter man had first taken uQ his 
new post at Cambridge, the German battle cruisers Scharnhora and 
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Gneisenau had sailed through the English Channel in broad daylight, 
during a rapi. d passage from Brest in north-western France to 
Germany. The operation took place under the noses cf powerful Bnc- 
ish forces and was a masterpiece aE boldness, careful planning and 
tight security. Asde from the British mistakes on that day, an 
important element in the success of the operation was the large 
scale use of ground jammers by the Germans. As the warships came 
within range cf the British coastal radars at the eastern end Cf the 
Channel, these jammers were switched on simultaneously. Many of 
the best British radar operators, those who had already encountered 
jamming from the enemy in the summer cf 1940, were now serving in 
the Mediterranean theatre where the heaviest fighting was taking 
place. Those who replaced them at the radars along the south coast 
of England had never seen previously heavy jamming, and reported 
the clutter cn their screens as 'equipment failure' or 'local inteif er- 
ence'. As a rest British commanders did not appreciate the true 
4gri ficance of the radar operators' difficu]ties until it was too late. 
All cf this came out during the far-reaching a ficsal inquiry after 
the event. (12) 
Dr George Haller was asdstant chief of the US Army Forces 
Communications Laboratory at Wright Field when the German break- 
out took place. He told the author: 
The details of the operation were slow in coming through, 
but before long we learned that the Germans had mccessfully 
used radar jamming to blot cut the radars along the south coast 
cf England to risst the passage cf their warships. Before that I, 
personally, had never even given a thought to the idea of radar 
jamming. He, then, was a completely new weapon which cur 
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enemy had demonstrated he was able to u9e against us. At the 
time, I remember, I found the prospect quite frightening. (13) 
After he received news of the German success Dr Terman 
redoubled his efforts to get things moving at the RRL; who could 
know when and where the enemy might next employ this new form of 
warfare? He recalled: 
To find out more about what could be done I wert over to 
England in April 1942, with Captains Finch and Detzer cf the US 
Navy, and stayed for about six weeks. It was a highly fruitful 
visit. The British looked after us very well and showed us every- 
thing we wanted to see. I was invited to lunch with Sir Henry 
Tizard, one of their top scientists who was one cf Mr Churchill's 
personal advisors on scientific matters. We were taken to the 
Telecommunications Research Establishment at S wanage where 
we saw a lot of Dr Robert Cockburn, the oracle at that time on 
radio and radar countermeasures [Cockburn's organization had 
produced the jammers which had successfully countered the 
German Krickebein navigational system in 19401. And we visited 
the Admiralty Signals Establishment near Portsmouth. The British 
treated us as very important people who could be cf great 
potential help to them. 
When I arrived back from England, in June, I had a much 
clearer idea of what we should be doing at RRL. Like us, the 
British knew nothing about Japanese radar. But they had a lot of 
information on what the Germans were diing. There were two 
main types of radar in large scale service with the German 
forces: the Freya, which worked on 125 MHz, and the Wuerzburg 
which worked on 560 MHz. So at Cambridge we started work to 
produce jammers to counter each of these frequencies. We did 
not wait for any formal request from the military before we 
began work. We took the view that if the military had to ask us 
to begin a research project, we had failed! It was our job to 
foresee what was needed and what we could do, not wait for 
them to tell us. (14) 
Now that he had a clearer view of his goals, Dr Terman divided his 
group into four main sections: one under John Byrne was to work on 
apmm er code-named Mandrel to courter the 125 MHz Freya radar; 
one under gab Sorrel was to work on a jammer code-named Carpet 
to counter the 560 MHz W uerzburg flak control radar; one under Dan 
Sinclair was to work on developments of the SC R-587 intercept 
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receiver; and one under Clark Cahill was to investigate the vuln r- 
ability to ja m ming cf current and future US radars. 
The type cf jamming used during the pre-war tests in England, 
and by the Germans in combat, had been of the pulsed or synchron- 
ized pulsed type. This produced a 'picket fence' pattern on the 
A-scopes of the radars then in use, but between the 'spikes' of 
jamming a trained radar operator could continue to plot targets. 
During investigations in England to determine the best type cf mod- 
ulation for jamming radars, Dr Cockburn realized that the receivers 
of the early radars were working close to the limits of their eff ect- 
iveness: the feeble echo sgnats from an aircraft could only just be 
distinguished against the background of atmospheric 'rxise'. So, 
Cockburn reasoned, if additional background raise could be irtrod- 
uced into the receiver via the aerial, all but the strongest aircraft 
echoes would be concealed. From this, it followed that the best way 
to counter an enemy radar would be to radiate powerful signals on 
its frequency modulated with random noise (15). Like so much truly 
original thinking, in retrospect this concept seems obvious enough; 
but at the time this was not the case. Cockburn's discovery was to 
form the bass for radar case jamming as we know it. W hen T er man 
visited England, Cockburn made available tis work on the theoretical 
analysis of raise jamming and this would influence the desgn of 
jammers at RRL. 
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II 
At this poir t in the late spring cf 1942, as Dr Term an was 
deciding which enemy radars his laboratory would attempt to counter 
and how, let us take a brief look at the operational deployment of 
radar in the German and Japanese armed forces (more com prehens vv. 
accounts of the evolution of radar in German and Japan, respect- 
ively, are given in Appendices E and G). 
The German radar equipment produced in the greatest numbers 
was the 125 MHz Freya early warring set, deployed throughout 
metropolitan Germany and occupied Eurmpe. This was the type cf 
radar whose sgnals Dick Garrard had picked up uang the Halli- 
crafters S. 27 receiver on the back seat of his car. Now the search 
for these radars aged inland was one of the tasks of Ebntmodified 
Wellington bombers of No 109 Squadron of the Royal Air Force, also 
using Hallircraf tors receivers. (16) 
The next most ru merous German radar was the 370 MHz Seetakt, 
used for coastal search and gunnery control and fitted to most cf at 
the larger German warships. (17) 
The third type of the German radar in large-scale service was 
the 560 MHz Wuerzburg, used for flak and searchlight control and as 
a heightf index at some Freya rtes. F cr its day this pencil-bea ra 
radar was extremely advanced. Its importance had been fully apprec- 
iated by the British intelligence service, and the first to be accurat- 
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ely located was photographed from a reconnaissance Spitfire at St 
Bruneval on the north coast cf France. On 28 February 1942 British 
paratroops mounted a daring operation to capture the radar, and the 
attack was a complete success. The raiders returned to England with 
the aerial element, receiver, receiver amplifier, modulator, 
transmitter and one of the operators. The information residing from 
the St Bruneval raid would play an important part in assisting the US 
jamming offensive against Wuerzburg later in the war. (18) 
For the ground control of right fighters the Luftw afte had 
recently introduced the Giant Wu erzburg, a set electrically s milar 
to the normal Wuerzburg but with an aerial reflector dish enlarged 
from 10 to 25 feet to give a finer beam and increased range. (19) 
For airborne use three German radars were in the service test 
stage: the 490 MHz Lichtenstein for right fighters; and the 120 MHz 
Rostock and the 180 MHz Neptun for maritime patrol aircraft. (20) 
In 1941 the Japanese Army completed development work and had 
begun deploying a bistatic electronic interference detector system, 
s milar to that tested bef ore the war by the US Naval Research 
Laboratory. The Japanese system was deagnated the Type A Detect- 
; it was a continuous wave device with separate transmitter and 
receiver operating on frequencies between 40 and 80 MHz, radiating 
up to 400 watts. The greatest range over which a pair cf Type A 
Detectors, was deployed was between F ccm osa and Shanghai, a 
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distance cf more than 400 miles, and it must be recorded that this 
was the first-ever example ei an operational over-the-horizon radar. 
The device was able to indicate only the presence cE aircraft flying 
somewhere between the transmitter and the receiver, now ever; it 
could give no information on their range, altitude, heading or the 
number present. (21) 
During the spring c 1942 the Japanese Navy had begun to 
deploy a 100 MHz ground early warring radar, designated the Mark I 
Model 1. Soon afterwards an equivalent Japanese Army set appeared, 
the Tachi-6 which operated an angle frequencies in the band 68 to 
80 MHz (22). The Navy pushed ahead with a shipborne radar and in 
March of 1942 the first of these, the 200 MHz Mark II Model 1 for 
surface search and gunnery control, began sea tests on the battle- 
ship Ise. It is interesting to note that the Japanese had developed 
the high powered magnetron independently and in the spring of 1942 
their first microwave radar, the 3,000 MHz Mark II Model 2, was 
ready for service tests an the battleship Hyuga. (23) 
At this time the Japanese had no radar for searchlight or anti- 
aircraft fire controL Examples of the SCR-268 radar, and documents 
on the British ' Elsie' searchlight control radar and the G Lnlaying 
Mark if set, had however been captured during the initial advances 
by Japanese forces. New types of radar based cn these were under 
development, but none was yet ready for service. The Japanese were 
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also working on a surface search radar for patrol aircraft, but it was 
not yet ready for production either. (24) 
Of the enemy radars the German Freya, Seetakt and Wuerzburg 
sets were well known to British intelligence by the spring of 1942; 
and initial reports had been received cn the Giant W uer zburg. This 
information had been passed to the US intelligence services, and 
from there to Dr T&man's laboratory. Nothing was yet known in 
Great Britain or the USA cf the other German radars, or cf any cf 
the Japanese sets. 
III 
Soon after Dr Terman's return from England in June 1942, the 
time came for the Radio Research Laboratory to move away from 
Cambridge as planned at its inception. Terman told the author: 
Karl Compton, the presdent of MIT, returned from one cf 
the NDR C monthly meetings and telephoned news of the derision 
to me: "Beinring yesterday afternoon at 4 o'clock, you became 
a Harvard man! ", he said. So it came about that we moved into a 
wing aE the Biological Laboratory on Divinity Avenue at 
Harvard, which would be our home for the rest of the war. (25) 
The move to Harvard went relatively smoothly and as the Radio 
Research Laboratory staff settled into their new quarters, work 
resumed on the development of countermeasures equipment. Bill 
Rambo described the work in the transmitter group: 
Fallowing my initial introduction and the move to Harvard, 
the first job they gave me was to build an RF oscillator - 
jammer is too strong a word - to operate on the 560 MHz 
frequency of the German Wuerzburg radar, using components 
that were readily available. In this I worked under the guidance 
of Bab Sorrel, the leader aE the transmitter group. The best tube 
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then readily available was the w entern Electric "doorknob" tube 
(sc) named because of its shape), but the frequency required was 
close to the limits of its capability. I was greatly encouraged to 
be able to light a tiny flashlight bulb with the i watt output 
from my oscsllator. 
I moved on, constructing bigger and better oscUlators to 
operate at 560 MHz - the step from } watt to i watt might not 
sound like much, but it was a 100 per cent increase! Eventually 
we managed to get 5 watts from a couple cf doorknob tubes in 
push-pull, and these powered the APT-2 Carpet jammer. Better 
tubes began to emerge from General Electric,, Westinghouse and 
IT & T. We had a very good liaison with the tube manufacturers, 
and their representatives would Iring us their latest hand-made 
prototypes. (26) 
At the same time, Clark C ahill's counter-countermeasures group 
began ran rung tests to determine how ef fective enemy ja m ming right 
be against some of the radars used by the üS forces. 0. G. 'Mike' 
Villard worked with Cahill and he remembered: 
We installed a couple of radars on the top of the RRL build- 
ing and tried various forms of jamming against them :a US Army 
SCR-268 searchlight and gun control set, and a British ASV 
Mark II airborne radar used for the detection of shipping. Bath 
of these first-generation radars proved painfully easy to pm. 
Although there was little that could be done to reduce the 
radars' vulnerability to noise jamming, we did devise sDm e fixes 
to enable them to and up to the less-Effective jamming agnals. 
For example, in the SCR-268 the detector was DC coupled to 
the following video amplifier tube. As a result even a little CW 
jamming was enough to bias off or completely overload the video 
amplifier. The obvious remedy was to put in capacitive coupling, 
which stopped this particular form of overloading. On our re- 
com m endation I believe this simple modification was ultimately 
incorporated into all SCR-268's. 
pur findings on the ef f ects of the various types of ja m ming 
were passed to the radar people at the Radiation Laboratory at 
MIT, with the result that the newer sets were designed - to the 
extent that was possible - to be ]e$ vulnerable to enemy inter- 
ference. Furthermore, by their very nature the new microwave 
radars then being developed were considerably more difficult to 
jam than the early long wave radars had been. (27) 
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In the receiver group progress was also rapid. Dr Joseph Pettit 
jci ned the RRL just bef ore the move from C am biridge, immediately 
after received his doctorate in electrical engineering: 
Once I knew enough to be employable, I was assigned to uie 
receiver group under Don Sinclair. Then, soon after I started, 
Sinclair had to return to General Radio and I was appointed 
head of the group. The first project I was involved with was the 
SC R-587, and airborne Elint receiver to cover the frequency 
band 100 to 950 MHz. By today's standards it was a fairly crude 
superhet device, and required one to twiddle a couple cf knobs 
in order to }sing in a station. once we had made it work we 
handed it over to Philco, who produced it in small numbers. (28) 
The big drawback cf the SC R-587 was that it did not have angle- 
knob tuning, which restricted its value as an Flint receiver. So the 
next step was to re-design it with single-knob tuning, and with a few 
other improvements such as stagger tuning to increase the bandwidth 
of the intermediate-frequency amplifier it became the APR-1. 
A further aspect of the work at RRL was a series of exper- 
iments with the use of metal foil to jam radars, the technique later 
named 'Chaff' in the USA and 'Window' in Great Britain. Dr Taman 
had first heard of this method during his visit to England, where 
expesi m ents had been conducted with large oblongs of fail unrelated 
to the wavelength cf the radar to be jammed. T Erman passed details 
of what he had learned to Win Salisbury, who began experimenting 
with resonant lengths of fail hand-rolled into cigarette-section 
cylinders to make them effective over a broad spread of frequencies. 
During July 1942 he tested these cylinders against me of the MIT 
laboratory radars near Boston, dropping them from an old B-18 
bomber flying out of Fast Boston (now Logan) airport. (29) 
- 59 - 
While tests cf the f dl strips were taking place in use USA, 
ethers were being mounted in Germany and Great Britain. In each 
country the initial conclusion was s milar : the countermeasure was 
devastatingly effective against precision radars operating on fre- 
quenc ies between about 200 and 600 MHz; if dropped in sufficient 
numbers, the sb ips produced scores of spurious echoes on the radar 
screens and made the tracking of aircraft almost impossible. In each 
country the most stringent steps were taken to prevent the enemy 
learning of this countermeasure, including the postponement cf its 
operational use unless or until counter-countermeasures could be 
developed. In Germany Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering personally 
banned all further testing of Dueppel, as the foil strips were known 
there (30). In Great Britain Lord Cherwell, Mr Churchill's chief 
scientific advisor, allowed tests with 'Window' to continue but cnly 
with the strictest security safeguards (31). In the USA the Navy 
ordered a halt to the tests at the RRL, and enforced this with 
armed marine guards posted around Salisbury's B-18 at East Boston 
airport. Following this, work on the courtermeasure in the USA 
ceased for some months. (32) 
IV 
During July and August 1942, the Radio Research Laboratory 
received a valuable trance uson of skM in the shape cf the Columbia 
Broadcasting System team which had been working to develop colour 
television. This work was not related to the war effort, and after 
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some discu. on Dr Terman was able to persuade the Vice- Presd&. nt 
aE CBS to allow the team to transEer to the RRL. As well as 
furthering the nation's war effort, Terman stressed that this would 
enable the team to keep abreast of the latest developments in elect- 
ronics and this would almost certainly be usef ul to the company 
after the war. Some cf the team came to RRL direct, others worked 
in the CBS laboratories on projects for RRL. In this way Ter man 
secured the services of several notable experts inclxding Dr Peter 
Goldmark who was one of the leading experts on television (and who 
would develop the long-playing record after the war), and John Dyer 
who had served as chief radio engineer on Byrd's expedition to the 
Antarctic in 1933 (33). The youngest member of the team was 
Eugene Fubini, an of the famous mathematician Enrico FubirjL. 
V 
By the second week in August 1942 Dr Terman could look back 
on six months of solid achievement, since the day in February when 
he had taken the first tentative steps to fulfill the rather vague 
com rrmis. 9. on he had accepted from Lee Du Bridge. Now the Radio 
Research Laboratory was firmly established at Harvard, it had more 
than 170 capable and enthusiastic engineers and staff and was still 
growing, and the various research groups were working towards 
clearly defined goals. As yet no RR L-initiated countermeasures 
equipment was ready for production but it would not be long before 
production could 
begin. 
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CHAPTER 3 NUDGING TOWARDS BATTLE 
While Dr Ter man had been establishing and expan cling --n- Radio 
Research Laboratory during the -spring and aim m er Ct 1942, people in 
ether organizations were also engaged in work which would play an 
important part in the countermeasures story. 
Although RRL was responable for co--crdinating the development 
cf radio counter measures for all four US armed services, the Nava] 
Research Laboratory at A nacostia continued with its own work in 
this field while maintaining a close liaison with Dr Terman and his 
team. Following the heavy losses of shipping during attacks by 
German U-boats ctf the east coast cl the USA and in the Atlantic, 
there was an urgent requirement for an effective high frequency 
direction finder for convoy escorts, to enable them to locate enemy 
submarines when they transmitted. As the cEficial US Navy historian 
later wrote: 
Although the shore HF/DF stations were cf inestimable value 
in locating submarines in time to divert the routing cf convoys, 
or to warn them ci enemy presence, the necessary delay in 
receiving their reports made it highly desrable to install H F/D F 
on escorts. (1) 
W odd. ng under NR L auspices, the expatriate French engineers at the 
IT'r Laboratory at Amangansett made considerable progress with 
their i, pborne instantaneous high frequency direction finder. By the 
spring of 1942 it was ready for sea tests. On 26 March two cf the 
French engineers, M auiice Deloraine and Heusi Bt agrnr. , attended a 
corf erence at the US Navy Bureau cf Ships to discuss the installation 
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of the new device on warships. Numerous senior officers were 
present. Later Deloraine wrote: 
After being questioned about our ability to deliver a ship-- 
borne HF/DF, we were asked where we wanted to place the 
antenna. This was a critical question, clearly entirely B usig%es' 
responsbi ity. He pointed to the top cE the highest mast and 
saiid: "This is your radar antenna is it not? " Yes was the answer. 
"Then I propose you remove it and we place our antenna there 
instead. " I thought we were going to be thrown out cf the room, 
but they agreed to do it. (2) 
The acceptance that the aerial of the high frequency direction 
finder could replace even that cf the radar on the covetted mast- 
head position, illustrates the regard with which the new device was 
held. The meeting decided that the direction finder should undergo 
sea tests on the destroyer USS Cory. These proved aiccessf ul, and 
the device went into prod i ction deagnated the D AQ. F or a time it 
was US Navy policy that half of its destroyers should be fitted with 
HF/DF aerials at the top cf the mainmast and the other half would 
carry radar aerials there. But before this was implemented a better 
solution was found: all new -construction warships cf this type were 
fitted with two masts, which allowed the aerials for both equipments 
to be carried high above the rest cl the vessel. (3) 
II 
A further move in the spring of 1942, which would later have an 
important bearing on the countermeasures story, was the establish- 
ment cf the Army Air Forces airborne radar school at Boca Raton 
near Fort Lauderdale in Florida. To ease the problem of accom m- 
odation the War Department secured the lease of the palatial Baca 
Raton Club nearby with 650 rooms s=ounded by two golf courses. 
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six tenras courts, swimming pools, beaches and beautifully landscaped 
gardens. It did not take long, however, for the military to send in 9 
many people that mast semblance of luxury disappeared with the 
overcrowding usual at service facilities in wartime (4). At Boca 
Raton students were taught to service and operate the metric- 
wavelength radars fitted to maritime patrol aircraft and right 
fighters, the microwave SC R-517 for patrol aircraft and the British 
GEE medium range hyperbolic navigational system. Airborne inst- 
ruction in operating the radars took place in aircraft flying from 
Morrison Field, near West Palm Beach. At the end of the three- 
month course, graduates were qualified to command airborne radar 
maintenance shops. (5). 
II 
The siccessEul passage ct the German battle cruisers through 
the English C hannel in February 1942 had c;. ven a powerful boost to 
the development of electronic countermeasures in Britain, just as it 
had in the USA. One cf the first devices which rested was code- 
named 'Moonshine': an airborne pulse repeater to operate against 
German Freya early warning radars working in the 125 M Hz band. 
Triggered by the pulse from the enemy radar, Moonshine replied with 
a wide-pulse sgnal corresponding to a concentration of aircraft up 
to five miles in depth, amplitude modulated s that it had the 
beating and interweaving characteristic cf an echo returned by 
several aircraft flying in dose formation. One Moonshine aircraft 
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was necessary to cover each Freya radar to be spoofed, so during a. 
operation several such machines would be used. (6) 
During the late spring cf 1942 No 515 Squadron cf the Royal Ar 
Farce received rune Defiant two-seat fighters fitted with Moonshine. 
On 6 August the Squadron flew its first test feint operation, when 
eight Defiants staged a Moonshine 'demonstration' over the English 
Channel near Portland. An estimated 26 German fighters took off 
from bases in north western France in readiness to engage the 
'raiders' and the Cherbourg balloon barrage was raised. To confirm 
Moonshine had caused the reaction, sx days later the same aircraft 
flew the same misson but with their repeaters switched off; no 
enemy fighter activity was observed and the Cherbourg balloons 
stayed town. (7) 
The availability of the M oonshine squadron coincided with the 
initial attack by B-17 Flying Fortresses of the US 8th Air Force in 
England. On 17 August the 97th Barb Group sent twelve B-17 's to 
bomb the rail yards at Rouen in France. Two feint attacking forces, 
each with three B-17 's, flew ahead of the main raiding force. One 
feint headed west towards Alderney in the Channel Islands, about 
150 miles west cf the target; the second feinting force headed 
towards Dunkirk, 120 miles north-east of the target. Flying with th. - 
easterly feint were all nine Moonshine Defiants, plus 97 Spitfires 
arrayed as escorts to cýve the qx)d realism. Both 
feinting forces 
flew to within ten miles of the enemy coast, then turned around and 
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went home. The British report on the action noted that an est- 
imaged 150 German fighters took off to engage the threatened 
attack on Dunkirk, but failed to intercept- 
This operation stirred up German reaction on a considerable 
scale. Aircraft of the N. Section of the Pas de Calais were air- 
borne by 17 20 and the recall to one wing was heard at 17 47. 
The raiders were designated as bombers, main formation, second 
formation, and withdrawal cover. An announcement sent cut by 
control at 17 30, and notable for its departure from the usual 
jargon, reported bombers at 2/3,000 feet, covered by fighters in 
serried mass. Control's analysis of the attacking force was not 
clearly laid cut: the formations were often inaccurately labelled 
and it was only in the latter stages that control avoided con- 
fusion by concentrating on the movement of only one of the 
formations. (8) 
Meanwhile the real attacking force, escorted by more than 170 Spt- 
fires of the Royal Air Force, was able to bomb Rouen and return 
with no bombers lost or damaged to fighter attack. About 80 German 
fighters attempted to engage the B-17 's but only one was able to get 
through the escorts and approach the bombers, and it inflicted no 
damage. 
Initially the Moonshine feints were aiccessEul in drawing German 
fighters away from the American daylight bomber formations; but as 
the Luftwaffe deployed more and more Freya and Wuerzburg radars 
in Western Europe the tactic became progressvely less effective. 
Moreover, in the autumn of 1942 the B-17 's began to penetrate 
deeper into occupied territory and from visual sghting reports the 
German fighter controllers had little difficulty in establishing which 
attacking force was the real one. No 515 Squadron flew its final 
Moonshine feint in support of an 8th Air Force operation in October 
1942. (9) 
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Probably the most significant result of the M oorstnne operations 
was that they gave the 8th Air Force planners an imght into the 
advantages aE usng radar countermeasures to support attacks. 
Although there is no proof, it is likely that this helped establish a 
military requirement for the first RR L-desgned pm mers when they 
became av i1 ble a few months later. 
In the final months of 1942, during attacks on targets near the 
coast cf occupied Europe, the US heavy bombers often used low alt- 
itude approach tactics to remain unseen by the German radars for as 
long as possible. Typical of such attacks was that on 9 November 
against the U-boat be at St Nazaire in western France. The raiding 
force, comprising thirty-three B-17 's and thirteen B-24's, flew from 
their bases in eastern England to Lizard Pcir - at 2,000 feet. As they 
left the coast the bombers descended to 500 feet to remain beneath 
the German radar cover. Sweeping round in a wide arc out to sea 
just cutsde the enemy radar cover, the raiders remained unseen until 
they were within 50 miles west of the target. Then they climbed to 
their attack altitudes between 6,000 and 10,000 feet and entered 
their bomb runs. No German fighters contested the incursion, but 
there was accurate and intense Flak which caused the destruction of 
three bombers and damage to 23 ethers. (10) 
Meanwhile, unknown to the 8th Air Force, US bombers had 
already started to jam the German Freya early warring radars. The 
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SCR-522 VHF radio fitted to the American aircraft caused inter- 
ference on Freyas in the area, if the radio channel in use was close 
to the tatters' operating frequencies. The matter was discusEied by 
the Luftwaffe during a routine conference an equipment held at the 
Reich Air ministry in Berlin on 5 January 1943. Engineer Colonel 
Dietrich Schwenke, head of inne] i; ence on enemy equipment in the 
west, revealed that a Norden bombsight had been recovered intact 
from a B-17 which had recently come down in France; then he inf - 
armed the meeting: 
A test has been conducted with the American VHF radio, 
which has shown beyond doubt that this equipment can cause 
interference on the Freya radar. It is entirely possble that the 
jamming [previously experienced] on this frequency is deliberate, 
or it might be accidental The previously reported instances cf 
the jamming of Freya can be traced back to this cause. (11) 
General-Feldmarschall Erhard Milch, head to the Lufrw affe eq ip- 
ment procurement organization, asked if it was possible that German 
VHF radics caused similar interference to Allied radars. Schwenke 
replied that, theoretically, it was posgble (in fact the FuGe 16, the 
standard German aircraft VHF radio, used the 38 to 43 MHz band 
where there were few Allied radars cperating; so there was little 
opportunity for the Luftwaffe to retaliate in the sa me way) . (12) 
The jamming of Freya by the SCR-522 was accidental One int- 
eresting pc i, nt is that, just as the US forces failed to realize that it 
was happening, the Germans failed to appredate that Freya, in its 
turn, was caging interference cri the SC R-522. But during this 
period US aircrew returning from operations over Europe cf ten vorn o- 
lamed of severe interference on certain ct their VHF channels; the 
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cause of the interference was on linked with the Freya, through no 
further aonclus. ons were drawn at the time. 
IV 
During October 1942 there was a major reorganization aE the 
lines of authority between the Radio Research Laboratory and the 
National DEfense Research Committee. Previously the RRL had been 
part cf the NDR C's 'F' Committee which was concerned mainly with 
the development cI radar. Now Dr TErman's laboratory had a streng- 
th of 20 5 people of all grades of which 78 were engaged in research; 
and it was still expanding as fast as the intake cf qualified engineers 
would allow (13). The NDR C decided to expand the radio 
countermeasures development Effort into a full Division, which would 
later take control of new facilities beyond those at Harvard. The 
man chosen to take overall charge cf the civisi. on was Dr Guy Suits, 
until then the Assistant Director aE the General Electric research 
laboratories at Schenectady, NY. Suits told the author: 
Dr Vannevar Bush, head of the NRDC, contacted General 
Electric and asked if I could be made available to head the new 
division. General Electric asked Bush to contact me direct for 
my feelings on the matter and after a chat I agreed to take the 
new post. At that time I knew the meaning cf the term "radar 
countermeasures", but that was about the limit of my knowledge 
on the subject. 
In October 1942 I took up my new post as Chief of Division 
"F", soon afterwards re-named Division 15, ci the NDRC. If oun d 
Vannevar Bush a tremendous man to work for. An alder and 
much respected scientist, he had excellent relations with the 
President and Congress. When he went before a Ccngress. onal 
C om mi ttee asking for funds he was very convincing and almost 
always got what he asked for. If he didn't he would sometimes 
have a word with the President and get what he wanted that 
way. To operate a large civilian organization to control war 
work in wartime, when there were already the armed services 
who were supposed to do all of that, and at the same time main- 
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taro good relations with those services and C cngress and the 
President as well, you almost can't do that. But Bush did. 
Getting financial support from the NDR C was never a 
problem, they gave us the utmost co--operation. All we had to do 
was convince them we had an opportunity worth supporting - and 
they were always looking for worthwhile opportunities into 
which to channel their funds. When we wished to make a prop- 
osal or there was the annual budget review I would go along 
with Terman and some of the department heads and we would 
describe what we were icing, what additional resources we felt 
were necessary and what it would cost. And almost without 
exception they accepted the figures we gave them. I don't recall 
that they ever said anything like "You're getting out of hand 
here, we'll cut your request in two, " as so often happens in 
industry. (14) 
Beats saw his role as being supportive of T er man , to manage sum e cf 
the other activities outsde the RRL and smooth the latter's path by 
supplying whatever resources were needed to expand the Harvard 
organization. 
In parallel with the work at Harvard, the RRL sponsored re- 
search at cutsde laboratories. Some cf the most important at this 
time was undertaken by the Bell Telephone laboratories, where Dr 
Knox Black developed techniques for jamming enemy radio commun- 
ications systems. In the event there would be no major requirement 
for such jammers by the US armed forces; their use would have hind- 
eyed the collection cf s. gnais intelligence and, as was revealed only 
long after the war, the Allies had succeeded in breaking into the 
German and Japanese code and cypher systems and placed great 
reliance on information obtained in this way. The stubborn refusal cf 
the military to use com m unications pm mi ng on a large scale cid not, 
of course, lessen the technical value of Black's worst. But the 
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derision to adopt this course would be a source aE considerable 
frustration to Black and ris team. (15) 
V 
With the development of equipment to counter the German 
radars now progressng rapidly, we shift our attention to the unf old- 
ing pattern of events in the Pacific. From there, in the aim mer cf 
1942, came the revelation that the Japanese, too, had a radar capa- 
bility that could not be ignored. 
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CHAPTER 4 PACIFIC ELIN'r 
During the eight months following the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor on 7 December 1941, there was no serious attempt ny the 
Allies to discover whether enemy forces in the Pacific theatre w, l re 
us ng radar. For most of that time the available Allied troops and 
equipment had to be thrown into battle piecemeal to halt the Jap- 
anese advance. There was no time or effort to haare to investigate 
devices the enemy might be usng. Only with the decisive victory 
over the Japanese aircraft carriers during the Battle cf midway in 
June 19 42 were US forces in the Pacific able to secure a breathing 
space. But then, it is clear with the easy superiority d hindsght, a 
piece cf circular logic prevented the hunt for enemy radar sgnals: 
because no serious search had been made for such sgnals, the was 
no information on enemy radars; and because there was no 
information on enemy radars, there were no demands for a search for 
their sgnals. 
This state cf cosy ignorance came to an abrupt halt on 7 August 
1942, when US Marines stormed ashore at Guadalcanal in the Solo- 
mon Islands and seized the partially completed airfield there. To one 
side of the construction ste marines found a boat like operating 
cabin topped by a bedring-like structure: a Mark I Model I early 
warring radar (1). Immediately, the captured set was A-Li pped to th, _ 
Naval Research Laboratory at Anacostia and restored to working 
order. Lieutenant Ralph Clark, assgned to Navy Bureau cf Aero- 
nautics, was one d those who examined it. - 
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I had a look at it and I remember being impressed how crude it was compared with our own early sets - and Goodness knows, 
air first generation SC R-268, -270 and -271 sets were crude 
enough! Nearly all the tubes in the Japanese equipment appeared to be copies of types made by General Electric. (2) 
The chance capture cf the Japanese early warring radar on 
Guadalcanal caused a flurry of excitement and pointed out the rid 
for an electronic reconnaissance effort in the Pacific theatre: if the 
enemy had one radar there were undoubtedly others, and Allied 
commanders needed to know about the types, numbers and capabil- 
ities of the enemy sets. 
At the NR L Dr Robert Page and tis team began work to design 
and hand-build a few examples cf a crystal-type intercept receiver 
suitable for airborne or shipborne use, the XARD (approximate eff - 
ective cover 50 to 1,000 MHz). At the same time Dr Guthrie cf the 
same organization began work on a citable jamming transmitter (3). 
Early in September sx PE#. ty Offices radiomen were selected for 
additional training to operate and maintain the new equipment. The 
men went to NRL and received two weeks' instruction on the XARD 
receiver and the associated airborne jamming transmitter (little is 
known cE the latter, its frequency coverage is thought to have been 
approximately from 75 to 125 MH z). At the end cf their hasty trairzi- 
ng the six were formed into a detachment designated Cast Mike 
Project 1 (C M for 'countermeasures'), and flown to Hawaii with their 
equipment. Chief Petty Officer Jack Churchill, newly promoted, took 
charge cf the party and demonstrated the receiver and jammer at 
the Pacific Fleet Radar School at Pearl Harbor. Towards the end cf 
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September he and Petty Officer Robert Rul left for the south 
Pacific war zone, taking with them some c± their receivers and 
jammers. (4) 
a 
The brig stop-over cf the Cast Mike 1 team was not the only 
event cf countermeasures interest at Pearl Harbor in September 
1942. The submarine USS Drum was also at the be, preparing for 
her third war patrol. Radioman Donald Vaughan, one of her crew, 
remembers that a civilian came rn board and installed an ARC-1 
radar intercept receiver (ARC-1 was the US Navy deagnation for the 
Army SCR-587 receiver; it should not be conf used with the 
AN/AR C -1, the andard VHF transceiver equipment fitted to US air- 
craft during the latter part cf World War R). (5) 
On 23 September Drum left Pearl Harbor, and early in October 
arrived off the east coast of Japan where she sank three freighters. 
At this time there were insufficient US submarines to detach one 
solely for Elint work and Drum's primary misson was to seek and 
destroy enemy shipping. The boat took no special action to search 
for enemy signals, and Vaughan's orders were to operate the receiver 
only when he was not otherwise engaged. The sibmarine carried no 
special aerials for the intercept receives, the operator had to wire 
the set to one ct the boat's normal communications aerials. (6) 
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As Drum cruised off the Japanese coast Vaughan remembers 
logging a few enemy radar signals. When the boat returned to Pearl 
Harbor early in November, his log aroused comderable interest (7). 
With the passage aE more than forty years Vaughan does not rem- 
ember details cf the s. gnals he picked up nor, despite an intensive 
search, has it been pc able to find written or verbal evidence to 
support f is account. In view cf the secrecy that would have surr- 
cunded such a venture, however, it is not airprisng that confirm- 
ation has been difficult to find. Because Dan Vaughan could well 
have been the first US serviceman ever to detect sgnals from an 
enemy-operated radar rn a search receiver, his uncorroborated acc- 
aunt is included in this history. 
III 
While Drum cruised deep into enemy waters, Jack Churchill and 
Bab Russell aE the Cast Mike 1 team arrived at Headquarters 
COM AI R SO PAC (Commander Air South Pacific) at E iritu Santo in 
the New Hebrides. They installed an XARD receiver in aB -17 E 
Flying Fortress Cf the 11th Bomb Group, Army Air Forces. The pair 
had also brought with them a few cf the NR L-built radar jammers,, 
but until enemy radar signals were found these were to be held on 
the ground ready for installation. One cf the Navy men was to fly 
with the bomber to operate the XARD, doubling as a gunner if the 
aircraft came under fighter attack. (8) 
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Jack Churchill flew with the first B-17 Flint misson on 31 
October 1942, a reconnaissance flight of over 11 hours from Espiritu 
Santo to Guadalcanal and Bcugainville, and back. As in the case cf 
USS Dxum's patrol to Japan, the bomber flew a normal misson with 
no deviations to look for enemy radar sgnals; none were found. 
During November 1942 Churchill flew rn seven long range rec- 
onnaissance missons to the ScIomons and New Britain in the B-17, 
staging through Henderson Field on Guadalcanal an three occasions. 
On the 25th the aircraft found and bombed Japanese warships ctf 
Rabaul and Bougainville, and had a skirmish with enemy fighters. But 
still no enemy radar s. gnals were detected. (9) 
We now move away from the Pacific, to observe related events 
taking place elsewhere. But before leaving this theatre it is worth 
noting that, in spite of the delays in starting Elint operations in the 
Padfic area, by modern standards events had still moved relatively 
quickly. The reconnaissances by USS Drum and the Cast Mike 1 team 
had begun within ten months cf the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
and within a little over two months cf the capture cf the enemy 
radar on GuadalcanaL 
IV 
With the Radio Research Laboratory at Harvard preparing its 
first airborne countermeasures equipments for production in the 
autumn of 1942, the Army Air Forces for whom most d the devices 
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were intended lacked any aircrew trained to operate them. M ajoc 
Mel Jackson journeyed from the Army Air Forces headquarters in 
Washington to the radar school at Boca Raton to investigate the 
possibility of starting a radio counter measures course mere. Jackson 
discussed the course with Lieutenant Colonel Monte Canterbury and 
Lieutenant Hugh Winter, two cf ficers on the Gaff cf the school. (10) 
Following the visit Hugh Winter established a radio counter- 
measures course at Boca Raton, based on a syllabus he drafted with 
Jackson. For security reasons the four-week period cf instruction 
became known simply as 'Hugh Winter's C curse' . The first such 
course began rn 2 November 1942 with four students: 2nd Lieut- 
enants Edward Tiet z, William Praun, Philip Rousculp and Rudolf 
Arndt, all of whom had been trained in airborne radar at the MIT 
and Boca Raton. The countermeasures course provided the students 
with a theoretical background to the new subject and same practice 
in operating the SC R-587 receiver on the bench. Upon successful 
completion of 'Hugh Winter's Course' r the graduates were awarded 
flight status as radio observers. (11) 
W ble the initial intake cf students was going through the new 
course at Boca Raton, there was a further development 
in the count- 
ermeasures war in the Pacific. Following a reconnaissance cf the 
Japanese-occupied island of Kiska in the Aleutians, an Army Air 
Forces aircraft returned with photographs cf a pair cf unusual 
structures at one cf the enemy potions (12). 
It was thought the 
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'structures' might be radar sets, and the obvious way to confirm this 
was to fly an aircraft carrying ane or more intercept receivers 
through the area. As we have seen, one sich aircraft was already 
operating in the south Pacific; but it is not clear whether Jack 
Churchill's dforts were known at the Army Air Forces Headquarters. 
At any event, that service now to embarked on a separate and more 
ambitious crash programme to modify an aircraft for the Elint role in 
the north Pacific theatre. 
In November 1942 Major George Haller, the Asistant Ctief Cl 
the Army Air Forces Aircraft Radio and Corn municatims Laboratory 
at Wright Field, received a visit from Lieutenant Colonel James 
McRae from the Pentagon. The pair discussed the latest intelligence 
on Japanese radar, and how a suitable aircraft could be modified for 
the Elint role. Haller said his group could do the installation work, 
using receivers already available or which could be rapidly modified 
for the task. The informal discussons complete, McRae returned to 
Washington where he drafted an appropriate letter for the sgnature 
of General 'Hap' Arnold, Chief of Staff cf the Army Air Forces. A 
few days later Halle Is bass, Colonel Yeager, dashed into his cf fice 
in a flurry holding the letter signed by the General He told Haller 
to drop everything else and give top priority to the work cf install- 
ing the receivers into the aircraft. The project was code-named 
'Ferret'. Yeager had no inkling cf McR ae's earlier visit, and no 
doubt was impressed with his subordinate's immediate grasp cf was 
required! (13) 
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A B-24D Liberator was allocated for the new role and conver- 
son began. Lieutenant Ralph Clark from the Naval Research Labor- 
atory was one cf those summoned to Wright Field to risst. He 
recaU, ed: 
Around Christmas 1942 a crash-program at Wright Field 
fitted a B-24 with the necessary receivers for a radar search cf 
the Aleutians. I spent a week at W right as we [the Navy and 
NR LI supplied most of the equipment. As well as an SCR-587 
modified to tune down to 30 MHz, we fitted a Hall icrafters 
com merci. al receiver [an S. 27 ), homing antennas and a breadboard 
model of a pulse analyzer built by the Naval Research Labor- 
atory. (14) 
Two graduates from 'Hugh Winter's Course' at Boca Raton were 
assgned to the crew cf the Ferret B-24: 2nd Lieutenants Ed Tietz 
and Bill Praun. After a kxiefing at the Pentagon, the pair went to 
Wright Field to familiarize themselves with the equipment being 
fitted to the aircraft. 
Early in January 19 43 the work on the intercept receiver install- 
ation was complete and the aircraft went to Fort Worth, Texas, to 
have its engines modified for cold weather operations. Next, the two 
operators tried out their receivers against radars along the west of 
the USA. At the beginning cf February the B-24 Ferret flew to Adak 
in the Aleutians, its be for the planned Flint operations. But then 
the weather closed in, and for much cf the month that followed air 
operations were impcsgble. (15) 
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On the morning Cf 6 March 1943 the Ferret B-24 took cff from 
Adak and headed eastwards towards Kiska. Manning the intercept 
receivers, Ed Tietz and Bill Praun soon picked up the sgnals they 
were looking for. Tietz remembered: 
We heard the signals in our earphones of a 100 MHz radar 
scanning at a steady rate. They sounded just like the sgnals 
from the search radars I had listened to during our training 
flights over the USA. No different at all. (17) 
During the flight the two operators picked up transmissions from two 
Japanese radars close together in the frequency spectrum, both M ark 
I Model l's s milar to the set captured on Guadalcanal. Having meas- 
ured the radars' frequencies, Tietz and Praun used their primitive 
analyzer to determine the pulse width and repetition frequency of 
the sgnals. Then the crew set cut to measure the volume cf cover- 
age cf the sets with a series aE circuits around the island at differ- 
ent altitudes. The operators noted where the enemy radar sgnals 
faded out and faded in, and passed these to the navigator who 
plotted them to discover the 'holes' in the enemy radar cover. Those 
readers familiar with modern radar Elint techrriques will, no doubt, 
recognize the professionalism displayed during this, one cf the first 
ventures by US personnel in this field. Although the operation had 
been planned from first principles, Ed Tietz and Bill Praun worked 
systematically to achieve their goal. The initial misaon by the B-24 
Ferret lasted about five hours, nearly half cf which were spent in 
circling Kiska. (17) 
During two further Ferret missons, on 7 and 15 March, Tiet z 
and Praun further refined their picture cf the Kiska radars' cover- 
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age. In the course cf one cf these flights the B-24 extended its 
search to the Japanese-held islands cf Attu and Agattu to the west. 
of Kiska, to determine if there were enemy radars there; no sgnals 
were heard coming from either island. During the mi-sAon cn the 7th 
a Japanese floatplane flew in formation with the Ferret aircraft for 
several minutes at a respectful distance, then broke away without 
attempting to attack. (18) 
After their third mission the Ferret crew drew up a contour map 
of the area around Kiska showing the coverage cf the radars, and 
passed this to 11th Air Force headquarters at Adak. 
Its initial misaon in the Aleutians complete, the Ferret B-24 
returned to Wright Field. Tietz and Praun reported their findings 
Major Mel Jackson at the Pentagon, then went to the Radiation Lab- 
oratory and RRL for further debriefings. The first f ull-hearted US 
venture into the field of Eint had achieved all that could reasonably 
have been expected cf it. 
V 
At the same time as the Army Air Forces' Ferret missorns were 
being prepared and flown, the less ambitious Cast Mike 1 operations 
oar inued in the south Pacific. In December 1943 Jack ChurciiM 
started flying the XARD receives in PBY -5 A Catalina am phi 
b. ians cf 
Navy Patrol Squadron VP-72, engaged in reconnaissance msaors 
around the Sc omon Islands from bases at Guadalcanal and 
E iritu 
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Santo. Catahnas operating in the theatre flew mainly at right and 
were painted hack, and were known as 'Black Cats'. Churchill cont- 
inued the Elint operations through January, usng B-17 Is and PB Y's, 
but still failed to detect enemy radar sgnals (19). W hý--ther this was 
due to a lack cf enemy transmisgons when the aircraft were in their 
area, or the shortcomings cf the XARD receiver, is im pcsgble to 
establish with certainty. Without doubt the XA RD left a lot to be 
dewed as an operational intercept receiver. It had been put to- 
gether in a hurry, and it showed : the aerial fed a quarter-w av, e stub, 
and to search the frequency spectrum the operator had manually to 
slide a shorting bar up and down the stub; when he heard the buzz 
cf radar signals in his headphones, the operator could read their 
frequency cff cali brations on the stub. It was a crude system and in 
the Catalina - where the aerial and d'iorting stub had to be mounted 
above the operator's head - the XARDw as at its worst. D ouglas 
Roberts jci ned Churchill at Guadalcanal in January 1943, and had 
some harsh things to say about the XARD: 
It was a lemon! To tune it you had to reach up over your 
had to slide the turfing short up and down,, there was no tuning 
knob. That may not sound too hard, but when you had to reach 
over your head to push that short up and down for about two 
hours, you thought your arm was going to fall if ! Another prob- 
lem was that the stub was slver-plated, and when it was expo-- 
ed to the South Pacific humidity it started to corrode; w hen 
that happened, during Luring the receiver began to get "noisy". 
(20) 
Early in 194 3 Cast Mike 1 received a few ARC-1 receivers (Navy 
SC R-587 Is), which Douglas Roberts remembers as a considerable 
advance over the XARD: 
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It was a vast improvement over the XA RD. It had )mob 
tuning which you had to turn by hand, but that was a lot eas. er 
than pushing that stub up and down above your head. (21) 
VI 
Despite the efforts being made to find it, information on Japan- 
ese radars remained qDarse in the spring of 1943. One M ark I Model I 
early warring set had been captured cn Guadalcanal, two more had 
been postively located rn Kiska and one had been detected an Wake 
Island. In addition there was a smattering cl information on similar 
radars on the Japanese home islands. A start had been made to Elint 
operations in the Pacific, but clearly there was a long way to go 
bef ore Allied intelligence cf ficers possessed a detailed p sture cf 
Japanese work in this field. In the mean time, events in the Euro- 
pean and Mediterranean theatres were moving far more rapidly. 
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CHAPTER 5 SKIRMISHES IN THE ETHER 
While the initial Elint missons were being flown in the Pacific 
theatre, in Europe the Royal Air Force already Knew sufficient 
about the enemy radar network to initiate a campaign of active 
countermeasures to aipport its right bombing cf fernsve on Germany. 
To counter the German Freya and Wassermann early warring 
radars operating on frequencies around 125 M Hz, R AF bombers were 
fitted with the British 'Mandrel' jammer. (Although it was deigned 
for the same function and carried the same code-name as the 
Mandrel [APT-31 developed at RRL, the British equipment was quite 
different from its US counterpart. Similarly the British Carpet. 
jammer under development to counter W uerzbu rg was quite different 
from the APT-2 descried for the same purpose at RRL (1). To avoid 
ccorCusion the US jammers will be referred to by their code-names 
and the British jammers will be referred to as 'British Mandrel' and 
'British Carpet' etc where appropriate in this account). 
To further slow the reaction cf the enemy defences Royal Air 
Force night ban bens now carried 'Tinsel', a modification to their 
high frequency radio transmitters. A microphone fitted behind one of 
the engines could be used to modulate the transmitter, after it had 
been tuned to one of the German tighter control radio channels. 
The Royal Air Force began uang Mandrel and Tinsel in Decem - 
ber 1942 and initially the losws during raids rn Ga many fell by 
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about a third. The Germans reacted swiftly to the radar jam ming, 
however, and in January 1943 a British monitoring station Eic ked up 
signals from a Freya near Calais on the new frequency of 107.9 
MHz. T hus began the extension of the Freya band to avoid pm mi ng, 
to be matched by the extenson cf the frequency spread cf M ancirel, 
which was to continue for the rest f the conflict. (2) 
The opening cf the British jamming campaign against the German 
air defences marked a s. gnificant milestone in the tistory of count- 
erm easures. From now on }a m mi ng would be in almost daily use in 
support cf air attacks, as a matter ± routine; no longer would this 
form of warfare be confined to a few specialized operations. The 
genie was out of its battle and nobody could push it back. 
11 
By the end cf 1942 the APT-2 Carpet jammer was ready to go 
into production, but an unexpected problem prevented it from doing 
so: there was no c ficial US military requirement for such a device. 
The Eighth Air Force operated over Europe only when clear skies 
were forecast at the targets and visual bombing was possible. But 
that meant German antiaircraft gunners could aim their weapons 
usng optical fire control methods. Jamming the Wuerzburg radar 
used to aim guns at night or through cloud would do little to reduce 
losses, the argument ran, so what was the paint aE putting Carpet 
into 
production? 
Fortunately Lieutenant Colonel James McRae, 
controlling procurement for the Army Signal Corps, was more 
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far-sighted than many cf his contemporaries (3). He saw the 
posgbilltires cf Carpet, as RRL Associate Director Dr A. Earl Cullum 
remembered: 
He accepted cur arguments that sooner or later the Army 
Air Forces would have a requirement for such a jammer, and on 
his own responsibility placed an order for a huncked. It was a 
brave decision and one which marked an important step in the 
development cf counterm easy res in the US. McRae deserves 
every credit for it, had someone higher up taken issue with him 
he could have been in deep trouble. Those initial Carpets 
probably ccst about $5,000 each so the first hundred would have 
come to around half a million dollars. Today such a sum would 
be considered rather puny for a jamming program - it would 
probably not even cover the cost cf the technical manuals - but 
in 1943 it was a horrendous a mount cf money to commit without 
proper authority. (4) 
Fortunately a service requirement was on issued for Carpet; 
Mc Rae's head did cx)t remain 'on the block' for long, and the irnti. al 
order was raised to 200. By April 1943, in addition to the APT-2 
Carpet, three other R RL-dessgned jammers had been placed in limit- 
ed production: the APT-1 Dina, the APT-3 Mandrel and the APQ-2 
Rug (for frequency coverage and cther details, see Appendix C) (5). 
Thus by the early spring 1943 development was complete and 
production had begun cf jammers to cover the spectrum from 85 to 
720 MHz, able to counter the vast majority cf German and Japanese 
radars then in use or which would be introduced during the corflict. 
The auto-search receiver designed by Per Geldmark, known as 
the RC-160 at Harvard and later as the APR-2 by the US military, 
proved extremely difficult to produce even though there was a clear- 
at cut service requirement for it. George Rappaport, one cf 
the 
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the Aircraft Radio Laboratory at Wright Field responsble for gett- 
ing the RR L-designed equipments into service, com mented: 
This was a brilliant piece cf desgn by Per Goldmark, but 
initially it seemed to defy production. It caused us so many 
problems that one day Jim McRae suggested that was ought to 
get somebody to drop an RC-160 on Japan, then the Japs could 
spend the rest cf the war trying to copy the receiver and get it into production! That remark did not endear us to Peter 
Goldmark! (6) 
At the same time as its first jamming transmitters were beging 
put into production, RRL cantiiii ed to examine cther ways aE count- 
ering enemy radars. Although the demands of security had forced a 
halt to the tests with airdropped metal-cil dipoles (Chaff) in the 
USA in the summer cf 1942, Dr Terman was keen to continue re- 
search into this countermeasure. Accordingly he asked the disting- 
uished aerial expert Dr L. J. Chu to conduct a theoretical study of 
the electrical behaviour of the dipoles. Later TErman wrote: 
To my knowledge this was the first theoretical study cf 
Window [as it was known in Britain) - the British work I had 
seen was all experimental. Chu investigated the scattering cross 
section as a function of frequency for rectangular sheets with 
random orientations, making calculations for varying ratios aE 
width to height. Also, because Salisbury had been thinking in 
terms of other shapes, Chu likewise developed formulas for the 
scattering cross sections of cylinders, ellipsoids with high 
degrees of eccentricity, and various cther geometrical shapes. 
Chu completed his work in a few months and wrote a report 
giving formulas, sample results and curves. 
The Chu report was filed in a safe because that was all we 
could do with it, but it was not forgotten. After the passage ci 
some months I concluded that although Window was still super 
top secret, the war was developing and that one of these days 
someone was going to start using it. When this happened, the 
United States needed to be ready to participate. Accordingly I 
gave the astronomer Fred W tipple, one cf RR L's new recruits, 
the job cf looking over Chu's report with particular reference to 
practical applications. After studying Chu's results, Whipple 
came up with an observation of great practical agnificance. This 
was that it was implicit in Chu's mathematics that the scatt- 
ering cross section over a wide band cf frequencies that could 
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be obtained from a pound of aluminum foil would be greatest if 
the foil was in the form cE resonant dipoles; and that Chu's 
theoretical formulas could be arranged to demonstrate the 
unexpected concluson that even far cff resonance the narrower 
the dipole the greater the scattering crass section would be for 
one pound of f aiL (7) 
Today Whipple's concluson, that a given weight cf metal foil would 
f unction most Ef fectively if it was cut into thin lengths resonant. 
with the radar to be interfered with, is so obvious that it hardly 
warrants comment; but, like Cockburn's discovery that random noise 
was the most Effective way of modulating a jamming transmitter, at 
the time the discovery represented a major step forward. For the 
moment Terman could not conduct practical tests to confirm the 
validity cf W hipple's theory, because of the security clampdown in 
the USA. Details of the discovery were passed to the Telecom mun- 
ications Research Establishment in England, however, and led to 
immediate tests with the thin resonant strips there. These demonst- 
rated that W hipple's conclusons were correct, and the Royal Air 
Force placed a large order for strips cut to half the wavelength cf 
the German Wuerzburg radar; as they left the factories the strips 
were stoc l . led, ready 
for the time permissan was given to use the 
countermeasure against the enemy. 
M cst of the work on jammers at RRL during the early months cf 
1943 was devoted to airborne equipment for the Army Air Forces. 
There was one rx able excetticn, however. At this time desgn work 
began, in conj. inction with the Naval Research Laboratory, on a 150 
watt shipborne pm mer using a magnetron as power source, to cover 
- 91 - 
the frequency band 350 to 800 MHz. T Iris deNdce would later go into 
production at General Electric, desgnated the TD Y. (8) 
iia 
Clark C ahill's radio counter-countermeasures team at RRL was 
charged with the task zf reducing the vulnerability of the US radars 
to possble enemy jamming, and training the operators to be able to 
work through jamming if x sable. Several radars were examined E rom 
this aspect including the naval FD equipment, a bliipbome airface-to- 
surface gun]aying set qperating on 700 MHz; Stanley K aisel was one 
cf the RRL engineers involved with this project: 
We found there was a lot a good operator could do to 
improve his ability to see through jamming. While this work was 
in progress I visited the US Navy headquarters at. Casco Bay, 
Maine, which controlled the Atlantic fleet's cruisers and dest- 
royers. Chatting to their radar people, I found they knew 
nothing about jamming or operating techniques to counter it. I 
returned to RRL and said to Dr T erm an "This is terrible, w hat 
those guys need is training. We can reduce their vulnerability 
tremendously if we get a training program going. " And in typical 
Ter m an fashion he replied "Do it ! 11 That was his style, he was 
very good at turning people loose. We found the Navy had prod- 
uced some simulators for training operators on the FD radar, so 
we had one delivered to RRL and I began work on modifications 
to it to show what the various forms of electronic jamming 
would look like. About half way through I was transferred to 
another job; Dan Scheuch completed the modification work and I 
understand it was well received by the Navy. 
It was at about this time that the air defence radars around 
Boston experienced their first jamming. Once a week there 
would be a night exercise and one or more aircraft would fly 
past the def ence radars on Blue Hill; and from the roof cf RRL, 
about 10 miles away, we would watch the radar-directed 9--arch- 
lights tracking the planes. One day I thought: 'Z wonder how 
they will cope with a little Jamming? " Well, somehow a jammer 
got itself tuned to the right frequency, a 100 watt amplifier was 
connected up, an antenna came to be painting in the right 
direction and s: )meboxy must accidentally have flipped the 
switch. From then on the eEf ect was f asks nating . The searchligh 
ceased tracking the aircraft, wandered around for a bit, then 
switched off. When the radar signals ceased we could visualiz, _, 
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the guys frantically pulling boxes out of the racks to try to 
discover what had gone wrong with their radar! The next day I 
confessed to Clark Cahill what had happened and he mentioned 
it to Terman; back came the word: "Please, don't do that again! " 
But I am pretty sure Dr TErman grit quite a kick out cf it all, 
and it would have strengthened his hand when he tried to gell 
the services on the need for anti ja m mi ng training. (9) 
IV 
Early in 1943 the first RRL persrnnel arrived in England to join the 
staff at the Telecommunications Research Establishment (which by then 
had moved to Malvern in the west cf England). Their arrival did much to 
strengthen the bonds between the two organizations, though the at mos- 
phere at Malvern was quite different from that ± inexperienced enthus- 
i. asm at Harvard as Dr John Dyer explained: 
I was greatly impressed by what I saw. They had a lot cf 
tremendous people there with whom I got on famously - and still 
do. But the first thing that struck me when I arrived there was 
how tired and drawn they all were. They had been hard at it 
working seven days a week with scarcely a freak for nearly two 
years, and they were simply worn out. Nerves became frayed and 
sometimes people got very tense. Bob Cockburn headed the 
British countermeasures development operation, in House 7 at 
the T RE. I was in his office one day with several cf his group, 
when he and Martin Ryle [later Sir Martin Ryle, joint winner cf 
the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1974] started to go at each other 
verbally; there was some really violent language. They stopped 
short, but only just, of having a go at eachvther physically . 
Suddenly Cockburn turned to me and said "Dyer, am I not right? " 
Of course, there was only one answer I could give so I said "No! " 
That was not the answer Cockburn had expected, but it was the 
only one I was going to give whether he was right or wrong. 
That broke the tension and everyone burst out laugh. ng . (10) 
The RRL engineers were integrated into the British research teams, 
and when they returned to the US after a few months were able to 
take back many useful lessons. 
- 93 - 
V 
So far the countermeasures equipments desgned at the RRL had 
yet to exert any influence on military operations. But at sea the 
D AQ high frequency direction finder, developed by Maurice Deloraine 
and Henri Buggries at the ITT laboratories under the auspices of the 
Naval Research Laboratory, was beginning to have a cc nsderable 
effect. The German 'Wolf Pack' tactics depended for their success 
on a shadowing U-boat being able to make and hold contact with one 
cf the Allied convoys; from there the U -boat sent broadcasts at 
regular intervals to the German Navy headquarters in France, giving 
the convoy's position, heading and speed. Acting on this information 
the headquarters sent orders to the remainder cf the U-boats in the 
pack to ! zing them together ahead c the convoy, in readiness to 
launch a concerted attack. From the Allied pant cf view, therefore, 
it was vitally important to find the shadowing U-boat and ank it or 
force it to lose contact. Huffduff, as the high frequency direction 
finders became known, gave a bearing on the shadowing U-boat when 
it transmitted the contact report; and the cross of two or more sich 
bearings from different escorts positioned around the convoy gave 
the U-boat's position. In the cfficsal account Histo y of United States 
Naval Operations in World War II the reader will find numerous 
endorsements cf the Effectiveness cl this device (11). Typical cl 
such reports is that from Captain Short USN, com m ancing the 6th 
Support Group coin prising the escort carrier USS Bogue and th, 2 
destroyers Belknap, Green, Osmond, Ingram and George E Badger. 
The Group was operating to cover the westbound trans- A tlanti. c 
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convoy ON 18 4d using the latter part cf may 19 4 3; afterwards Short 
noted: 
The HF/DF equipment proved invaluable. On the morning of 
May 22 this equipment was used to home one cl the TB F's 
[Avenger anti-submarine aircraft]. At 10.51 an HF/DF bearing 
was obtained on a submarine, but before this bearing could be 
transmitted a TB F on patrol had already attacked the submarine 
[U-305, which suffered damage]. In the afternoon, an HF/DF 
bearing was directly responsble for the attack on the submarine 
which surrendered [U-596, which was so seriously damaged that 
she foundered immediately after her crew abandoned her]. (12) 
\a 
Ding the first five months cf 1943 the US radio counter- 
measures effort continued to make sgnificant advances. The initial 
batches of RR L-desgned jammers left the production lines and at 
sea the NR L-sponsored ugh frequency direction finders were adding 
to the effectiveness of Mied convoy escorts in their efforts to 
counter the German U-boats. 
In this same period there was a major change in the American 
and British war strategies: their forces were now moving resolutely 
from the defensive over to the cffensve in the European and Pacific 
theatres ct operations. Radio countermeasures, predominantly a 
weapon to support the offence rather than the defence, were about 
to become more important than ever. 
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CHAPTER 6 MEDITERRANEAN INTERLUDE 
The success cf the Ferret B-24 missons in the Aleutians demon- 
strated the value cf this type cf aircraft, and led to a requirement 
for cthers to be converted for use elsewhere. Ferrets IlI, IV and V, 
all B-17 's, were allocated to the Mediterranean theatre where they 
were required to establish the layout cf the German radar chain as 
part d the preparations for the invasion cf Sicily (1) planned to 
cpen in July 1943 (Ferret 11 was to remain in the USA as a pattern 
aircraft). 
Ccnverson work on Ferret III was completed in mid-April 1943. 
The suite cf receivers fitted to the B-17 included a HAW afters 
S. 27 with panoramic adaptor, an SCR-587 and an APR-3 wide-band 
receiver. In addition the B-17 carried directional aerials on each side 
cf the fuselage to enable it to home rn the source cf any radar 
signals it found. The homing system was wired to gLve indications 
similar to a radio range: the pilot heard a series of morse letter A's 
in his earphones when he needed to turn right for the transmitter, 
N's when he needed to turn left, and a steady note when the aircraft 
was heading directly towards or away from the transmitter. (2) 
With Lieutenant H. Millen in charge cf the detachment Ferret III s+et. 
cut from Morrison Field, Florida, on 22 April 1943. Staging through 
Puerto Rico, Tnrndad, Natal, Ascension Island, Dakar and Marrakech the 
B-17 arrived at Maison Blanche airfield near Algiers cn 7 May. From 
there it moved to the nearby airfield at Blida which was to be its 
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operational base for the initial operations. Sinclair and the two 
countermeasures cfficers rn the B-17,2nd Lieutenants Roger Ihle and 
Mathew Slavin, immediately made contact with their apps to numbers cn 
No 192 Squadron cf the Royal Air Force, whose converted W eUington 
bombers also operated in the Elint role. As a rest cf these discussons 
the American operators decided to modify their Ferret. On 11 M ay 
Sinclair noted in his diary: 
Lts Ihle and Slavin, in the light cl their visit to the 192 
Squadron Wellingtons, confirmed my previous Dörrion that we 
should mount the CRO [cathode-ray oscilloscope] and an audio 
oscillator to supplement, if not supplant, the ARL[ Aircraft 
Radio Lab] pulse analyzer. It was also fairly obvious that, for 
radar search, the panoramic attachment to the S. 27 was not 
particularly useful It was therefore agreed that the EX] ARD, 
which is not operating properly, and if necessary the panoramic 
attachment, would be removed to make way for the CR0 and 
audio oscillator sent along as test instruments. It was also 
agreed that, snce several Freyas might be looking at us at once, 
the Zero Catcher [APR-3 wide band receiver] was not suitable 
for search equipment and the A-N directional antennas should be 
adapted to the S. 27. The Zero Catcher, on the other hand, 
should serve as an excellent tail-warring device and it was 
agreed that it should be mounted in the tail (3) 
On 18 May the B-17 made its first operational test cf the revised 
equipment layout. The Ferret took cif from Blida, flew parallel to 
the north African coast and landed at Sidi Ahmed near Bizerte in 
Tunisia. During the flight Sinclair switched on the receivers and 
picked up sgnals from Freya radars on 122.5,125.4 and 129.1 MHz, 
respectively identified as coming from Trapam and M arsala in wily. 
and from Sardirria. (4) 
Di ring the early morring darkness on the 19th the B-17 took cff 
from Sidi Ahmed for a second operational test cf its receivers, a 
-98 - 
flight which provided considerable excitement ror tree crew. Sinclair 
recalled: 
We went out and were stooging around getting all kinds of 
signals. I was listening to the low frequency receiver, mostly to 
Freyas. Slavin was using the other receiver when suddenly he 
got signals on 480 MHz. Now, 490 MHz was the German AI 
[airborne interception radar] band and I figured that was close 
enough. I said "Gil me those phones. "', stuck them an, and sure 
enough there were the signals obviously getting louder. I said 
"We've got a German right fighter on our tail! " (5) 
Directed by the navigator, the B-17 performed a series of evasive 
manoeuvres in the darkness while the countermeasures operators 
tried to keep track cf the movements cf the cther aircraft from its 
radar signals. 
From the directional antennas we could get an idea of 
whether he was to the right or the left of us. We were plugcing 
in one, plugging in the other and could tell he was coming in 
from the right, coming in from the left. The radar signals were 
getting louder the whale time. I was standing in the radio room 
at this time, holing on one cf the bars looking out cf the 
window and I saw this airplane come up from behind us. And cur 
tail gunner opened fire at lim. The guy peeled of f to the left 
and went down. He didn't come back, but on the other hand I 
didn't think we had hit him. We went down into a bank cf cloud 
and began to breath a little easier. 
As we headed back to Blida I said "That may have been a 
Junkers 88 , which the Germans are umeng as right fighters. But it might have been a British Beaufighter - they look very much 
alike. I think that when we get back we had better be quiet 
about all of this and put out a few feelers to find out what 
happened. " After we landed we got a message from a Royal Air 
Force guy who had been flying aB eaufighter. He said "If you 
guys want to keep on living, you'd better learn to shoot 
straight! " He had come up behind us with his finger on the 
trigger of tos four 20 mm cannon, recognized the B-17 outline 
and decided we were OK. And as he peeled cf f to the left our 
tail gunner had opened fire at him. 
Now the question was "How was it that we thought it was a 
German AI on 480 MHz, when it was really a British AI on 190 
MHz? " That was where the Ged-damned harmoric came in, he 
was putting out such a powerful signal that we were getting an 
indication at 480 MHz on the dial. So before we made any 
further flights I deagned a tigh-pass filter to take out anything 
over the band of frequencies we were looking at. (6) 
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U mess the operator was careful to cross-check his readings early 
superheterodyne intercept receivers like the SC R-587 were liable to 
tune to harmonic signals, indicating radar transmissons on af re- 
quency higher than was the case. The flight cn 19 May was me at 
the first instances cf this to come to light during a search in the 
combat zone - usually there was no collateral evidence to indicate 
that the operator had been crostaken, and reports cf harmornc signals 
were taken at their face value. The problem of harmonic 3gnals, 
suggesting short-wavelength enemy radars which did not in fact 
exist, haunted World W ar II Eint operations. 
On the night cf 24 May the Ferret B-17 flew a third operational 
test from Blida, which took it almost up to the coast cf Sicily. On 
this occasion sgnals from five Freya stations were Ficked up. The 
aircraft returned to Blida with three engines throwing cäi, excessve 
fuel consumption, and one of the gun turrets not working. These 
faults would keep the bomber on the ground for several days. (7) 
Initially nothing was easy for those trying to keep the B-17 
Ferret flying. The detachment had no ctfidal desgnation and, to 
recd. ve mail, the unit named itself the GR (General Reconnaissance) 
Squadron. Lacking an cfficsal table cf organization and equipment to 
enable them to craw supplies in the normal way, the airmen kept 
going on items begged, borrowed or stolen from other American and 
British units around Blida. 
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One les9on from the early flights was that the homing aerial 
system fitted to the B-17 was not really suitable for operational 
Elint work. Sinclair recalled: 
When I got to north Africa I found it was fine in theory but 
a lousy operational system. You had to be flying towards the 
radar to get a bearing on it, and there was nothing more guaran- 
teed to provoke an enemy reaction than to home in on their 
sets. I found that the antennas did not give aam pple pattern. 
There were crevasses in the pattern and it was pcsable to fly at 
right angles to the source and at aDme point the agnal would 
disappear and then come back in again. And at that point, if we 
knew where we were, we could get a bearing on the source. (8) 
Us ng a VHF transmitter set up cn the ground near the airfield at 
Blida, Sinclair and the two countermeasures operators calibrated the 
homing aerial system cf the B-17 so that they could take accurate 
bearings on the transmissions as they flew past the sDurce. 
On 6 June the B-17 Ferret was ready to fly again, and when he 
switched cn the receivers duping the test flight Sinclair experienced 
the anomalous propagation of radar agnals common in the Mediterr- 
anean area. He noted in his chary: 
In the afternoon flight we went cut to sea cf f Blida to test 
the guns, which were now OK. The 125.2 Mc Freya, which has 
been logged ss frequently, was heard at 1,000 feet (! ) ... The 
distance to Sardinia, where it is probably located, is over 300 
mikes. ' (9) 
The B-17 flew a further misson on the night cf 8/9 June, to a 
pc i nt cf f the coast c icily. Then on the night cf 14/15 the Ferret 
carried cut its most ambitious misson so far, with a flight around 
Sardinia du2ing which Ihle and Slavin logged numerous sgnals from 
enemy radars. 
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At the beginning cf July 1943 the Ferret unit in north Africa 
underwent fundamental changes. Two more B-17's, Ferrets IV and V, 
arrived in the theatre bringing Lieutenant Colonel George Haller 
from the Aircraft Radio Laboratory and Richard Raymond from RRL 
as technical advisors. D cn Sinclair returned to the USA. At the same 
time the unofficially named 'GR Squadron' was cf ficially desgnated 
the 16th Reconnaissance Squadron (Heavy) Special, and soon after- 
wards Major Norman McGowan arrived to take command. With the 
receipt cl an official table cf organization and equipment, life on 
the unit became a lot easier. (10) 
II 
As part cf the final preparations for the invasion of Sicily, 
Operation HUSKY,, jamming equipment was moved up to the jum ing- 
cf f ports and air fields. Several US Navy ships were fitted with the 
AP Q-2 Rug jammer now available in small numbers; Royal Navy 
warships were fitted with the equivalent British Type 91 Jammer. In 
each case the target cf the jamming was the German Seetakt coastal 
search and gunnery control radar, which operated on frequencies in 
the 370 MHz band and was s. ted along the enemy coast in large 
numbers. (11) 
To cover the right approach by Allied transport aircraft and 
gliders carrying airborne troops, eighteen Halifax and Wellington 
bombers cf Nos 420 , 424 and 425 Squadrons cf the 
Royal Canadian 
Aar Force, fitted with British Mandrel jammers, were to put up a 
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screen of jamming to b]ot cut the Freya and Wassermann early warn- 
ing radars in the area. At the same time thirty-five USAAFB -171s, 
each fitted with an APT-3 Mandrel to jam Freya and an APT-2 
Carpet to jam W uer zburg, were to patrol cf f the coast to protect 
the force against radar ]aid antiaircraft fire. (12) 
That was the plan, but due to an ad mirüstrative titch parts cf it 
would not be fulfilled. In the USA the B-17's were fitted with the 
Mandrel and Carpet jammers under conditions cf great secrecy, then 
flown to the be air depot in North Africa where the new crews 
assgned to the 16th Reconnaissance Squadron were to pick them up. 
Richard Raymond described what happened next: 
When the modified B-17 's arrived at the depot in North 
Africa they were checked against the official manual; where 
there were listed items of equipment missng the depot staff 
would fit them, where there were items fitted which were not in 
the manual they were taken out. The jammers, being highly 
secret items, were not listed in the manual so they and their 
cabling were ripped out, and the B-17's were cartully demod- 
ified into normal bomber aircraft! When we discovered w hat had 
happened there was a dash to the depot to rescue the aircraft, 
but on this occasion the depot people had worked very fast and 
only four cf the B-17's had not entered the demodification 
programme. (13) 
The four B-17's which survived as jamming aircraft were whisked to 
Blida, the emaciated remnant of what should have been an important 
element in the countermeasures support plan. 
The invasion ct Sicily took place cn the night cf 9-10 July and 
the four B-17's fitted with jammers gave what support they could. 
While the jamming was in progress, Richard Raymond and George 
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Haller flew in one cf the Ferret B-17 's to monitor its ef fect; 
Raymond oontiru ed: 
We cruised up and down to the west cf the island listening 
to the enemy radars and trying to discover whether the pm mi ng 
was having any Effect. From what we heard, nothing very impor- 
tant seemed to be happening. We remained in the area until 
midnight, then turned back to Blida. Unknown to us, however, 
the strong westerly winds that gave a lot cf people trouble that 
night had blown us same way from cur intended position. In fact 
we crossed the coast of Africa near the port cf Bone, 130 miles 
to the east of where we should have, and "friendly" warships in 
the harbour indicated their displeasure with a barrage of anti- 
aircraft shells bursting around us. We changed altitude, airspeed 
and direction simultaneously, withdrew from the area, re-fixed 
our position and then headed back to Blida. (14) 
The jamming from the four B-17 's, combined with that of the 
warships carrying APQ-2 Rug, marked the first use of deliberate 
active countermeasures in combat by US forces. No proper analysis 
was ever conducted by the Allies cf the Effect cf the pm mi ng 
during Operation HUSKY, nor has the author been able to find any 
reference to it in German records. So we shall probably never know 
with certainty how successful - or unsuccessE ul - that jamming was. 
III 
Too late for the invason cf Sicily, the APT-2 Carpets removed 
from the B-17 jamming aircraft were recovered and sent to the 97th 
Bomb Group for installation in that unit's B-17's (15). For the 
remainder cf the year a steadily dwindling number of Carpets would 
be used for self-irc tection during normal bombing attacks, though 
apparently with little effect. We all return to the Mediterranean 
theatre, but now attention must shift to the countermeasures story 
unfdding in England. 
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CHAPTER 7 THE PACE ACCELERATES 
In order to discover whether German anti-aircraft gunners were 
using the W uerzburg fire a trol radar when engaging bombers in 
dear skies, in the spring cf 1943 the Operational Research Section 
the US 8th Air Force in England arranged for a British radar 
warring receiver to be fitted into an operational B-17. During the 
bombing attacks on Wilhelmshafen on 15 May and St Nazaire cri the 
17th, the receiver Proved concluavely that Wuerzburg was indeed 
being used to track bombers in clear skies when optical fire control 
was possble (g. ven the choice, gunners preferred to use optical 
azimuth irf orm ation and radar range inf orm ation in their predictors; 
for a description of the World War II heavy anti-aircraft gun oper- 
ations, see Appendix D). With the discovery that W uer zburg was 
more important to daylight flak operations than had been thought, 
Headquarters 8th Air Force ordered sifficsent Carpet Jammers to run 
an operational test against the German fire control radar (1). Thanks 
to the foresight al James McRae at the headquarters Army Signal 
Corps, Delco had the jammer already in production. 
Shortly afterwards the 8th Air Force made a fundamental change 
to bombing tactics, which would heighten the need for radar 
countermeasures. U rtil. now accurate attacks had been posgble a ]y 
when there were clear wes and bombs could be aä m ed visually. As a 
react the continually chancing weather pattern over north-western 
Europe imposed severe constraints on the effectiveness of the 
daylight attacks. Forecasts of cloud over planned targets caused the 
- 106 - 
frequent cancellation of missons; or, worse, bomber form ati. ors 
fought their way through the defences and riff eyed heavy losses, 
only to find their targets shrouded in cloud and accurate bombing 
impossble. The problem of attacking unseen targets was one long 
familiar to the British right bomber crews, however, and t-he Royal 
Air Force had recently put into service the H2S ground mapping 
radar and the Oboe ground ccontraUed radar bombing system. In the 
summer of 19 43 the 8th Air Force formed aP athfindes U rit, the 
482nd Barb Group, with H2S- and Oboe-fitted B-17's and B-24's to 
lead attack formations. The US Pathfinders went into action for the 
first time cn 27 September leading an attack cn Emden, and quickly 
demonstrated their value (2). From now until the end cf the war 
Pathfinder aircraft would fly at the head of most heavy bomber 
formations. If the raiders arrived to find clear sides at the target, 
the lead bombardiers would make visual bomb runs; if it was cover- 
ed by cloud, the attack would be made usng radar. U nless they 
resorted to barrage fire which was extremely wasteful in ammuni- 
tion, the GErman gunners could engage bombers above cloud only 
with radar laid fire; so if the fire control radars could be jammed 
the accuracy of the flak, and bomber losses, wciJd both be reduced. 
If the initial operational test of Carpet was a success, it was clear 
the jammer would be needed in very large numbers. 
Early in the autumn of 1943 sxty-eight APT-2 Carpets, many 
from the initial production batch which James McRae had ordered an 
Ns own initiative, were rushed to the air bases at Snetterton Heath 
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and Knettishall in England and installed in the B-17 's of the 96th 
and 388th Bomb Graupe. On 8 October forty-two Carpet-fitted air- 
craft from the two Groups formed part of the 3rd Bcm b Division 
attacking Bremen. The Carpets were pre-tuned with 500 KHz spac- 
ing, so that a 20-bomber corn bat-bcc formation radiated p, m mi ng 
spread evenly across the band 553 to 568 MHz covering the frequen- 
des used by W uer zburg at this time (3). The radio cperator in each 
aircraft operated the jammer; he switched the Carpet to transmit as 
the formation entered the flak zone, and switched it cf f when they 
left it. 
During the initial attacks on Germany in which Carpet was used, 
the two Bomb Groups whose aircraft were fitted with the jammer 
experienced s. grnficantly lower rates Cf loss than did the remaining 
Groups without it. That this should be s) is suprigng, in view cf the 
fact that during the autumn of 1943 German fighters were shooting 
down considerably more US heavy bombers than were the anti- 
aircraft guns. During the first four attacks in which Carpet was used 
the heavy bomber losses, from all causes, were as follows (4) : 
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Date Target Sorties 
Oct 8 Bremen Carpet 42 
No Carpet 327 
Oct 9 Gdynia Carpet 52 
No Carpet 311 
Oct 10 Munster Carpet. 40 
No Carpet 211 
Oct 14 Schweinfurt Carpet 5 2 
No Carpet 217 
TOTALS Carpet 18 6 
No Carpet 1066 
Last Percent Last. 
1 2.4 
29 8.8 
4 7.7 
24 7.7 
2 5.0 
28 13.3 
7 13.5 
53 24.4 
14 7.5 
134 12.6 
The apparent lack of effect of Carpet during 9 October attack was 
because the two Bomb Groups equipped with the jammer made a 
second bomb run through the flak defences at the Gdynia, after their 
first had been disrupted by smokescreens on the ground (5). Without 
Carpet, their losses would undoubtedly have been much tigher. 
Clearly the jammer did provide useful protection against ground 
fire, and Headquarters 8th Air Force issued a requirement for siff- 
irient Carpets to fit it to all heavy bombers. As the reader will see, 
however, several months would pass before this ambitious programme 
could be realized. In the mean time Carpet would have only a 
minimal effect on the overall number of heavy bombers loste not 
enough cf the jammers were available; and in the autumn of 1943 
two-thirds of the bombers Lost fell to attacks from enemy fighters, 
which Carpet could do nothing to hinder. 
From the German pci nt cf view the initial intro action ci 
Carpet into a small proportion of the US bomber force made little 
impact on the defences. In the autumn of 1943 the move was 
-109- 
corn p1 ely overshadow ed by the large- scale use cf W inflow (Chaff ) 
by the Royal Air Force snce the previous July, to cover right 
bombing attacks. The metal strips proved extremely of f ective against 
the W uer zburg radars used for gun laying and right fighter control, 
and the Lichtenstein radars carried by the night fighters themselves. 
The Luftwaffe had to abandon its sjstem cf close control for right 
fighters, and until the defences could adjust to an entirely different 
system of ]nose-control for right fighting the Royal Air Force 
bombers enjoyed considerably lower loss rates. (6) 
To reduce the vulnerability cf W uer zburg to Chaff, the Luft- 
waffe introduced two counter-countermeasures modifications under a 
crash programme: Wuerzlaus and Nuerrburg. Wuerzlaus was a 
coherent-pulse doppler sfstem, which enabled the operator to cbst- 
inguish between the fast moving aircraft and the almost stationary 
cloud of Chaff. N uer rib urg provided the operator with an audio 
facility, to hear through headphones any modulation on the radar 
echo ssgnals: the echoes from an aircraft were modulated by the rot- 
acing ppropeUers, those from the Chaff cloud were not. By November 
1943 W uEr zlaus and Nuerrbuxg were in large scale use. The two 
systems enabled radar operators to continue tracking aörcraft flying 
through small quantities cf Chaff, though bath systems were liable to 
be swamped if inf estati, on was heavy. (7) 
On 20 December 1943 the 8th Air Force first used Chaff in 
action, dropped from B-17's and B-24's attac ling Bremen. Aircraft 
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from two Groups in each d the three Bomb Divisions (8) 
bundles of Chaff Type CHA3: 3,600 f oil strips 10-in long, 1; ' 2a" .ii 
an inch wide with a' V' crease down the middy, to jLve rigidity, an,; 
just under 1/1000 cf an inch thick; each bundle weighed 3 ounces. 
I ri tially Chaff was released by hand from the open waist gun po& t- 
ions, while the bomber formation passed through flak zones (9). The 
countermeasure proved effective in reducing losses, and its use was 
exetended to all bomb groups. 
II 
One problem faced cn both sides cf the Atlantic, now Chaff was 
being used in ever-increasing quantities, was how to prod uc ý it it in 
the amounts needed. Matt Lebenbaum told the author how one at t ih , 
engineering desgners at. RRL, Harold Elliott, and the mechanical. 
model shop at the laboratory came up with a novel solution to the 
problem cf C huff cutting: 
The British had done a loot of work on Chaff, but they wise 
having problems manufacturing it in the huge quantities required. 
Harold's Chaff-cutting machine was the neatest thing you ever 
saw. It was rather like a lawnmower with 20 blades, . -very 
second one of which was ground back slightly. The blades ws, r, ý 
rotated at 800 rpm by an electric motor and the first blade 
the foil., the second bent it along its length to chi v, ýa 'V' shape 
for rigidity, the third cut, the fourth bent, and sD on. With 'ti 
blades rotating at 800 rpm the cutter produced 8,000 Chaff 
strips per minute. I think Harold Elliott deserves great credit for 
his little machine, without which we might never have produced 
enough Chaff to protect our bombers. (10) 
The order to produce Harold Elliatt's 'lawnmowýý: ' Chatf-cutter in 
quantity went to International Paper Boc Company at tic ; 1u a, New 
Hampshire, a firm with considerable experience in making machines 
to produce cardboard ba%ces for the packing industry. Altogether 531 
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examples cI the Chaff c utter were built (11). As soon as they w" re 
completed, the first 75 machines were flown to England at top 
priority. The consignment was crnsidered so important that it was 
split between two aarc raft, so that if even if one cf the tra nsports 
was last part of the precious cargo would still get through. Na-ye cf 
the initial bat ch were last in trarkt, however, and Elliott's clever 
little machine would produce a large proportion of the Chaff used in 
Europe. 
III 
During September 1943 the Radio Research Laboratory reached a 
strength of 600 personnel of all grades of whom nearly 200 were 
engaged in research and engineering. The organ zation continued to 
expand, though not at its previous rate. (12) 
A useful facility that became avaälable to Division 15 at this 
time was the Army Air Forces countermeasures testing station set up 
at Auxiliary Field 9 (also known as Florasa Field), one cf the 5ateJI- 
ite airfields near Eglin, Florida. Division 15 established a small lab- 
oratory at the airfield (13), where tests could be carried cut usng 
Army Air Forces aircraft. In the months that followed captured 
enemy radars, including the German W u3 zburg and Japanese M Iris I 
Model I, were brought to Field 9 for tests to determine the 
effectiveness of the various types of jamming. (14) 
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Of the jammers under development at RRL in the autumn of 
1943, the M PQ-1 Tuba desgned by Dr win Salisbury transcended all 
others bath in the ambitiousness of its concept and its sheer ph}scal 
size. This ground jamming installation comprised two 25 Kw trans- 
mitters usng the W estinghouse-bam Sloan-M arshal tube or 
Resonatron (a specially made high-power tetrade), as power source. 
The full installation was desgned for carnage in sx large trucks and 
two trailers, and included three 75 Kw diesel-electric generators to 
provide the power. The target cf d us powerhouse of jamming was 
the German Lichtenstein right fighter radar, operating rn frequen- 
ties around 490 MHz. Beaming its output in a 30 ° arc eastwards over 
Europe, it was estimated that Tuba could pit out sufficient power to 
cause 'white cut' on Lichtenstein radar screens out to a distance cf 
200 miles from the jammer. The Royal Air Force placed an order for 
three Tubas to protect its right bombers. (15) 
The prototype Tuba was set up at Harvard, with its aerial cn the 
flat rte of the Hood Bitding. Salisbury arranged for a PBY Cata- 
lina flying-boat fitted with a receiver to fly through the area, to 
measure the strength cf the jamming cf variais distances from the 
transmitter. Later Salisbury tic the Tuba to the Army Air be at 
Bedford, Massachusetts, and set it up there. He found it would light 
a fluorescent tube a mile away from the transmitter. During a test 
against a 515 MHz ASB radar fitted to a B-17 flying over Philadel- 
phia, a distance f more than 250 miles, Tuba prevented the radar 
-113- 
operator seeing ether aircraft flying nearby 
first Tuba was ready to move to England. 
(16). Early in 1944 the 
Also at this time the APR-1 and APR-4 intercept receivers were 
placed in large scale production: the former was made by the Philco 
Corporation to an order from the Navy, the latter by the C rossl 
Radio Corporation for the Army Air Forces. But apart f rom this 
there were few differences between the two, both were based on the 
same receiver developed at RRL from the SC R-587. As with the 
earlier equipment there were plug-in tuning units to cover a wide 
spectrum, initially from 100 to 950 MHz, and as before the operator 
detected the radar by hearing its sgnals in his earphones. (17) 
IV 
In May 19 43 Dr Karl Compton of the National Defense Research 
Committee headed a misson to England, to discuss setting up a 
laboratory there to facilitate the introduction of countermeasures 
equipment into US combat units in Europe. Air Commodore Edward 
Addison, the Director ct Telecommunications at the British Air 
Ministry, promised every co-c ration; he had commanded the Royal 
Air Force countermeasures unit No 80 Wing during the 'Battle cf the 
Beams' and fully appreciated the value sich a facility to the 
Allid war effort. UB) 
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The new laboratory was to be part, Cf Division 15. In June Dr 
Guy Suits penned a memorandum in which he set out its respon- 
9. bi11ties: 
The prime consideration in the formation of this laboratory is the need of the US 8th Air Force for technical stance in 
the development cf applications of countermeasures. The 
laboratory, although working in close proximity to the British 
countermeasures group and taking advantage cf their experience in this field, would primarily be serving the 8th Air Force as a 
using branch. 
One cf the greatest needs for the Division 15 count- 
-r-measures program me in this country is operational in orm ation from which the laboratory developments can be cß ven develop- 
ment priority commensurate with the needs of the various 
theatres. Up to the present time this type cf information has 
been very inadequate, and it is certain that the formation of 
this laboratory in a war zone would be of immense value to the 
efficient operation of the Division 15 program here. (19) 
In September 1943 the staff for the new laboratory began to 
assemble, in a hastily erected croup of buildings alongsde the-, T ele-- 
communications Research Establishment at Malvern. Victor Fraenckel 
became Acting Director of the new organization; its full title was 
'American-British Laboratory cf Division 15', but invariably this was 
shortened to ' AB L-15'. Dr Cockburn remembers well the arrival cf 
the Americans in force to set up their own organization. He told the 
author: 
We at TRE were up to our ears in work and had teen for 
such a long time, doing everything on a shoestring. Then sudden- 
ly this enormous fresh unit came in - in a short time AB L-15 
was as big as air effort - with everybody beaming ano sting 
with enthusiasm. By that time we were worked into the, ground, 
it was very noticeable. There was great fraternity between 
AB L-15 and my department, we borrowed equipment from each - 
other and that sDrt cf thing. But from the start it was clear 
that it was a separate Effort and they were w oricing an different 
things for their armed forces. (20) 
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M ai ntai rn ng close and frequent contact with RRL via a secure 
teletype link, AB L-15 soon began to make its presence felt. The 
laboratory detached engineers to assist fitting Carpet jammers into 
bombers. And there were requests from operational units for asgst- 
ance with cther matters. One cf the first of these concerned the 
need for modifications to the SC R-522 VHF radios fitted to the US 
aircraft, to reduce the troublesome interference from German Freya 
radars. Jahn Hollywood devised a series cE ample changes which 
cured the problem except when the aircraft was in the im mediate 
vicinity of the radar and both sets operated on the same frequency 
(the effect cf SC R-522 on Freya was reduced when the latter's 
frequencies began to area 1 over a wider part cf the -spectrum). The 
Base Air Depot at Burtonwood in England incorporated the changes 
into all SC R-522's in the theatre, and eventually some 20,000 sets 
were modified for the 8th and 9th Air Forces. (21) 
Another of the early projects undertaken by AB L-15 concerned 
the fitting cf HaUicrafters S. 27 receivers and magnetic wire record- 
ers into a few bombers, to record German ground-to, -4r com m uni- 
cations for analyss by the Intelligence service. Later the Halli- 
crafters receivers were replaced by captured German FuGe 16 
aircraft VHF sets modified at the laboratory. (22) 
V 
F Blow ing the B ri. tish use of Window (Chaff) on a large sale in 
July 1943, the Luftwaffe High Cam mand permitted its bombers to use 
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'Due el' - the Gam an code-name for this countermeasa re. From u le 
first week in August, German right bombers attacºäng targets in the 
Mediterranean theatre released Dueppe1 strips of heavy metallized 
paper measuring 79.5 cms by 1.9 cms (31 in by Jan), intended to 
counter Allied anti-aircraft gun]aying, fighter cc astral and right 
fighter radars in the 150 to 225 MHz band. (23) 
Folbwing one of these attacks the officer corn mancing the US 
Army 354th Coast A ri l1 ery Searchlight B attalian , part cf the 
defenses cf Bizerte in Tunisia, reported: 
During the air raid on Bizerte on the night cE 5th September 
1943, an SCR-268 crew detected enemy planes approaching the 
north ade of the searchlight area. A target, assumed to be the 
leading plane, was illuminated at about 15,000 yards slant range. 
Upon being illuminated this plane turned back, and at the same 
time many stationary targets appeared in the cscill, oscopes cl 
the SC R-268 's. These stationary targets were detected in all 
ranges out to 30,000 yards along the coast west cf Bizerte, some 
at an altitude estimated at 6,000 feet. The operation of the 
SCR-268's along the coast was almost completely rullified by 
these stationary targets which appeared as echoes from aircraft. 
Targets that attempted entrance on the west ade of the 
searchlight area were illuminated many times at slant ranges of 
about 15,000 yards, and upon being illuminated turned back and 
went out of searchlight range. The area west cl the searchlight 
defence area was soon filled with the same "bouncing fixed 
echoes" from 15,000 to 25,000 yards, but when an echo from an 
airplane did emerge from this mass of interfering echoes, it was 
in most instances at a greater altitude. The result cf this cond- 
ition was that the radar and searchlight crews illuminated most 
of the targets entering from the west. There was a clear space 
in the asd kscopes from the main pulse out to 15,000 yards in 
which to make the Fick-up, and the operating crews soon noticed 
that the interfering echoes were weak when the antennae w, -, re 
elevated to approximately 45 °. 
The SC R-268 's located in the interior ci the area and along 
the south side cf the area experienced little or no interference 
from unusual strange echoes. These operators did very good work 
in illuminating the targets that did come within range. (24) 
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It can be seen that, in general, only those SC R-268's nearest the 
bombers' avenues cf approach suffered send ly f roan D ueppel. The 
Beaufighter right fighters cf the US AAF and the Royal Air Force 
took a steady tall cf the attackers, in spite cf the fail. Rarely did 
more than twenty bombers take part in any cne attack, and with so 
few aircraft the Luftwaffe could not achieve densities in any way 
comparable with those put down by Allied heavy bomber forces. 
VI 
Since the US entry into the war, neither the G Er m ans nor the 
Japanese had jrung any technical surprise which demanded an 
immediate radio countermeasures resp nse from Division 15, the Air- 
craft Radio Laboratory or the Naval Research Laboratory. Ttis 
pleasant state cf affairs ended abruptly in the simmer cf 1943, when 
the Luftwaffe introduced into service two new and potentially 
devastating types of air launched arti-shippi. ng weapon: the Henschel 
293 glider bomb and the Fritz-X guided bomb. Bcth missies employed 
the Kehl-Strassburg system cf radio com mand-to-line--cf -aght 
guidance, usng one of 18 channels in the band 48 to 50 MHz. After 
launch, the aircraft's bomb aim er directed the misste rn to the 
target using a small joy-stick controller. (25) 
The Henschel 293 was intended for use against merchant ships or 
unarmoured warships. It resembled a small aircraft with a 10-foot 
wirx}span and carried a 1,100 pound warhead; after release from the 
parent aircraft, a rocket accelerated the missle to abaft 370 mph 
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after which it coasted towards its target in a shallow dive. The 
Fritz-X guided bomb was intended for use against armoured warships 
and was released akitudes around 20,000 feet. The 3,100 xxind 
weapon looked like an ordinary bomb, except that it had four fixed 
stabilizing fins mid-way along its body and moveable ccnrsol airtaces 
fitted at the rear of the csucsf orm -shaped tail; it was un pow eyed, 
but fell under gravity to reach an impact velocity close to the -}peed 
cf sound. (26) 
The Henschel 293 was first used in action on 25 August 1943, 
during an attack on a Royal Navy anti-submarine group in the Bay cf 
Biscay. One escort was sink and another damaged. (27) 
Fritz-X scored its first and greatest slccess on 9 September, as 
the main body of the Italian battle fleet was on its way from La 
Spezia to Malta to sirrender to the Allies. Just cff Sardi. rma twelve 
Dorrier 217 's of the I Lrd Gruppe cf Bomber Geschwader 100 caught 
up with the fleeing warships. Of the twelve Fntz-X missles dropped 
during the attack, two hit the battleship Rana which caught fire 
then blew up with heavy kss of life; her sster ship, the Italia, 
soff&ed a angle hit but survived. Other missies scored near misses 
on the warships. (28) 
On that same day, 9 September 1943, American and British 
troops stormed ashore at Salerno in southern Italy and during the 
week that followed the Tying Dorriers were heavily 
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engaged in attacking shipping 1f the beachhead. Fritz-X 's scored 
hits on the British battleship HMS Warspite and the cruisers USS 
Savannah and HMS Uganda, all cf which safered severe damage; the 
missiles also sank three smaller ships. (29) 
Fortunately for the Allied warships, covering fighters were soon 
able to establish air azperiority over the area around the landings 
and this curtailed the activities of the missile-carrying bombers. 
That was one answer to the problem. But another was obviously to 
build a jamming transmitter able to neutralize the Kehl-Strassburg 
radio guidance system. Bill Howe and Carl Miller at the Radio Divis- 
ion of the Naval Research Laboratory were amongst thcse drawn into 
the AA Al priority project to devise a jamming system to counter the 
German missiles (AAA1, the highest priority rating, meant work had 
to continue round the clock until it was completed). Howe 
remembered: 
At the time we had no idea in which part of the frequency 
spectrum the missile guidance sgnals were being transmitted; so 
to cover all the probable bands we modified Navy versons of the 
Hallicrafters S. 27 and S. 36 receivers (respectively the RBK and 
RC X) for our purpose, which together covered the spectrum 
from 27 to 220 MHz. These receivers were modified into 
intercept devices by the addition of motor-tuning, a scope on 
which the output signals were displayed, and by reducing the 
selectivity of the IF stages so that they gave a broader 
band-pass and sc enabled the operators to search the frequency 
spectrum more rapidly. During a period of about sx weeks we 
hastily modified some 20 pairs of receivers in this way. They 
were fitted into warships and went to sea, that was the last I 
heard of them. (30) 
It was easy enough to modify receivers to cover the required spread 
of frequencies but, as Carl Miller explained, the design of a suitable 
jamming transmitter proved more difficult: 
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Building a transmitter to cover the required band was a 
bear, that is one of the most difficult frequency spreads to 
cover. In the end we managed it by dividing the coverage into a 
couple of bands. We built a series of experimental jammers, the 
X CJ, the XCK and the X CL, which solved the problems in diff- 
erent ways. We never had any time to test the jammers, 
however, because as each hand-built set was completed some- 
body from the fleet would come and grab it from the lab- 
oratory; it would be hastily fitted into one cl the warships and 
off it would go to sea. We made about five of the jammers 
during the summer and early autumn cf 1943. (31) 
The first NRL-built anti-missile jammers and modified receivers 
were installed in the destroyers USS Davies and Jones at the Norfolk 
Navy Yard (32), and in October they set cut for the Mediterranean. 
Bcth ships took part in the action on 26 November, when Major 
Rudolf Mons led twenty-one Heinkel 177 heavy bombers of ]Ind 
Gruppe of Bomber Geschwader 40, each aircraft carrying two glider 
bombs, against convoy K MF 26 ctf Algeria (33). The two US destroy- 
ers began jamming as the missiles came in, but the ships' counter- 
measures operators found it impossble to spot-jam all cf the missiles 
simultaneously on different guidance channels, and seeveral Cf the 
glider bombs were steered towards their targets. The attackers 
scored hits on the large troopship Rohna, which sank with heavy loss 
cf life. (34) 
By the autumn of 1943 the scale cF Allied fighter cover for 
shipping in the Mediterranean was such that German bombers 
attempting attacks often incurred heavy losses. This was the main 
factor which prevented the guided missies from achieving more 
successes, rather than the hastily improvised jammers; the jammers 
provided a useful 'last chance' defence when ships were under 
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attack, however, and did much to raise the morale cf those cn the 
ships permitted to know Cf their existence. 
01 
The final months ± 1943 had seen a period aE consolidation and 
general acceptance cf radio countermeasures by US forces in the 
European theatres. Those responsible for directing the operations of 
strategic bomber units and warships were coming to realize that here 
was a new form of warfare the could not afford to neglrect. In place 
cf the previous indifference, RRL now had to meet priority demands 
for the equipments it had desgned. The APT-2 Carpet jammer and 
the APR-1 and APR-4 receivers were in full production, and Chaff 
was being manufactured in large quantities. The status cf radio 
countermeasures had risen cor iderably snce the beginning Cf the 
year. 
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CHAPTER 8 THRUST, PARRY, COUNTERTHRUST 
By the beginning of 1944 the battle had opened in earner bet- 
weer Carpet and Chaff, rn the one ade, and the German Wuerzbura 
fire control radar on the other. After the 8th Air Force first used 
Chaff in December 1943, consumption increased rapidly: in February 
1944 the bombers dropped 40 tans, in Mach 125 tons, in April 260 
tons and in May 355 tons (1). Due to distorting factors it is not poss- 
ible to calculate with precision the effect this had on heavy bom ber 
lasses: during the same period the 8th Air Force increased the sze 
cE its raiding forces, they began penetrating deeper into Germany 
and the art-L-trcraft gun defences increased in strength. These can 
be no doubt, however, that the decrease in the effectiveness cf 
radar-laid anti-aircraft. fire was crnsderable. Operating from bases 
in Italy the 15th Air Force began us ng Chaff az a large scale from 
March 1944, with s milar results. (2) 
In January 1944 the Aircraft Radio Laboratory at Wright Field 
sent representatives to England to question personnel at all levels on 
the use of Chaff. One cf those irterviewed was Lieutenant J. Dale 
of the 96th B cm b Group, a B-17 unit based at Sr tertrn Heath in 
Norfolk, who described the tactics used in the 3rd Bomb Division: 
Every plane in the Lead Combat Wing cf the Division carries 
and dispenses Chaff. They fly at altitudes ranging from 23,000 
feet and 27,000 feet. Each plane carried two cartons of Chaff 
containing a total of 144 packages. The dispengng procedure 
starts four minutes before the target is reached and continues 
until three minutes after leaving the target. The material is dis- 
pensed at the rate cf about one package every four seconds. 
This lays down a Window lane of approximately 21 miles in 
length. No attempt is made to coordinate the dispensing oper- 
a-ions betw een the various planes in the C an bat W ing except in 
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so far as the starting time is set by as gnat from the Path- 
finders when the Initial Pcint is reached. If the Division ronlý ns 
four Combat Wings the first and fourth Can bat Wings carry 
Window; if less than four, the first Combat Wing only carries 
Window. 
In these missions dispensing operations are carded out by 
the radio operator. The window in the radio compartment cf the 
plane has been removed and a chute d about 4 inches by 4 
inches crass-section has been installed in the ade of the ship in 
place of the window. The chute is inclined at 45 degrees to the 
fuselage surface cf the side of the plane and extends som ew hat 
through the wirf ace in such a way as to form a cowling, w tich 
produces a strong air current from the inside to the outside cE 
the plane. When a package of Chaff is inserted in the chute it is 
forced out rapidly by this air blast and opens on after it 
leaves the chute. (3) 
In contrast to the huge increases in the use of Chaff during the 
spring cf 1944, C a'pet had made little progress s nce the 8th Air 
Force first began eng it the previous October. On 6 April the 
supply position was as fc ws (4): 
ist Bomb Division (B-17's) 305th Group 43 
306th Group 48 
2nd Bomb Division (B-24's) 44th Group 6 
3rd Bomb Division (B-17's) 96th Group 39 
388th Group 35 
Miscellaneous 31 
Total in use 202 
Lost in operations (6 Oct 143 to Mar 1 44) 101 
Total Delivered 303 
Af urt. her 210 Carpets had left the factory and been delivered to the 
service, but it was clear that when these arii ved they would do no 
more than replace losses. The planned deluge cf Carpets to the 
f rort line units from the Delco production line was still far 
from 
reality. 
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Since the capture cf the Wuerzburg radar by British paratroops 
in February 1942, the Signals Branch of the Luftw aft e had expected 
the AIlled counterm easu res cff ens ve again this radar to begin with 
electronic jamming (5). Accordingly it had ordered the Telefunken 
company to develop modifications for Wuerzburg to cable it to 
operate rn an extra band cE frequencies and be able to shift rapidly 
within bands. The original W uerzburg mating frequencies, desg- 
nated the 'A band', ran from 553 to 566 MHz; the new frequencies, 
desgnated the 'B band', ran from 517 to 529 MHz. As part ci the 
modification, code-named Wismar, the radar was fitted with a wide- 
band aerial to accommodate both bands. With practice a good crew 
could shift frequency within the band in use in less than one minute; 
changing from one band to the other required the services of a 
mechanic and took about four miciutes. (6) 
Immediately after the introduction of Carpet the Luftwaffe ist- 
ituted the Wismar modification programme and by March 1944 work 
had been completed on a substantial proportion of the sets. Also at 
this time a new flak-control radar, the Mannheim, entered service 
with several detailed improvements over W uerzburq. Bcth radars 
operated an the same frequencies, carried the same anti- m mi ng 
devices and were ami arly susceptible to Allies countermeasures, 
however, so in this acccunt they may be considered as one. 
By the wring cf 1944 the majority cf W uezburg and M annhpi m 
radars carried the Wuerzlaus and Nurrburg modifications to give 
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relief from Chaff. (Note: the German anti-jamming modifications are 
described in greater detail in Appendix E). In combat the operators 
soon discovered, however, that W uer zlaus and Wismar were not cbm- 
patible. When they shifted frequency us ng Wismar, W ues zla us had co 
be carefully re-adjusted and this took a considerable time. (8) 
To keep track cf the widening spread cf the W ua zburg frequen- 
ties a few B-17 Flying Fortresses cf the 94th Bomb Group, based at 
Bury St Edmunds, were modified to act as monitoring aircraft in 
adcätion to their normal bombing role. Each c the aircraft carried 
additional crew man to operate the APR-4 receiver. AB L-15 encin- 
eers Matt Lebenb aum and Jerre Noe went to Bury St Edmunds to 
install the APR-4's and aL9o a British radar intercept recording 
receiver, ' Bagfull', which required no attention in the air (9). In the 
months that followed the 94th Banb Group monitoring aärcraft, fly- 
ing with their unit during normal attacks, would tying back much 
valuable information on the chancing dating pattern cf the 
German defences. 
Dwrng the spring d 1944 a slow increase in the number ct 
Carpets available to the 8th Air Force enabled a few cther Bomb 
Groups to receive the device. Lieutenant Joe W ack, who had been 
kicking his heals s nce he graduated from the radio countermeasures 
course at Boca Raton in Jaruary, remembered: 
Towards the end of May 1944 a post in countermeasures was 
finally allocated to me in England, and I was sent to join the 
448th B am b Group ct the 8th Air Force flying B-24's on strat- 
egic born ling missons from Seething near Norwich. hen I first 
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arrived there the unit had no jammers but soon afterwards, 
immediately before the invas. on of France, a team arrived and 
began fitting two APT-2 Carpets in the rear fuselage of each 
bomber. I was told to set up an RCM shop to maintain these. At 
first I had only an empty Nissen hut, but I soon got together a 
few radio mecharncs and an experienced Staff Sergeant. We had 
to scrounge the desks, benches and ground equipment we needed, 
an activity in which my Staff Sergeant demonstrated consider- 
able ingenuity. 
Apart from keeping the Carpets serviceable, I was respons- 
ible for seeing that the jammers were pre-set to the correct 
frequencies. Each week we received from 8th Air Force Head- 
quarters a histogram giving the frequencies - centred on about 
560 MHz - on which the German Wuerzburg flak control radars 
were known to be operating. Each Carpet jammed over a band- 
width of only about 2 to 3M Hz, so those of the Group had to be 
set up on cliff erent frequencies to barrage jam the entire 
Wuerzburg band. Since the aircraft were not assgned until the 
morning of the mission, my section had a busy time adjusting the 
frequencies of the Carpets to ensure there was as complete and 
uniform a spread of jamming as possble over the threat frequen- 
cies. 
In service Carpet proved to be pretty reliable. After each 
mission we would usually have to fix about one in ten, but gen- 
erally the faults which developed were only minor ones and were 
soon cleared. Generally we had an adequate supply of are 
parts. The only big problem was that we had hardly any tech- 
nical manuals. Whenever we had the RCM installation people 
visit us to put sets into the aircraft, we would borrow their 
technical orders and make notes; but those guys were always 
careful to take their manuals with them when they left for the 
next base, where there was probably the same problem. 
As the only RCM -qualified officer in the Group, it was my 
job to provide indoctrination in the subject for the rest of the 
aircrew. Carpet was new to everyone, but for several months 
the B-24's had been using Chaff against the W uer zburgs. 
However the waist gunners who tossed it cut of the aircraft had 
little idea of how it worked. When they were engaged by flak 
they had been told to dispense the foil as rapidly as possible. In 
some cases, I was told with more than a lint of pride, Chaff was 
hurled into the slipstream still in its bccKes to increase the 
dropping rate! I gave a series of briefings on RCM to the är - 
crew, to teach people to use their equipment to best advantage. 
(10) 
By the end cf May less than one in ten of the heavy bombers cf 
the 8th Air F orte car lied Carpet. To increase the ef f ecti ve spread 
cf the jamming, AB L-15 developed a receiver to enable Carpet to 
be 
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spot-tuned to the frequency of any W uerzburg emitting nearby. J. 
Gregg Stephenson explained: 
To make the most of the limited number of Carpet jammers 
avaä 1 b]e, AB L-15 devised a am pie "pcinter" receiver to enable 
the operator to spot-tune his Carpet to the frequency of the 
Wuazburg radar tracking his formation. we took a standard 
command receiver, of which there were plenty about, fitted a local oscillator and mixer deigned and built at the AB L, and 
this enabled it to sick up the W ua zburg emissons. About 20 cf 
these modified Command receivers were hand-built at the AB L 
and warmly welcomed by the 2nd Air Division, which was par- 
ticularly short of Carpets for its B-24's. (11) 
Doing May the first marually-tuned Carpets were fitted into B-24's 
cf the 44th Bomb Group at Shipdham, and these opened the jamming 
attack on the lower frequency 'B Band' (517 - 529 MHz) now being 
used by Wu er zburg and Mannheim. In the m orths that followed other 
Bomb Groups had aircraft modified in this way. 
These developments coincided with further changes in the 
tactics and operational methods of US bombers operating over 
Europe. Since the end cf 1943 the had been considerable increases 
in the strength and effectiveness aE US fighter escorts. Improved 
versons of the P-47 Thunderbolt and the P-51 Mustang now covered 
bomber formations deep into Germany, with the P-51's able to reach 
Berlin itself. The Luftwaffe fighter force aiff eyed heavily from the 
escorts, and from the early summer only rarely were defending 
fighters able to attack the US bombers in force (12). At the same 
time the heavy bombers, expiating to the full their new-found 
ability to penetrate to any target in Germany, encountered pow, yiful 
flak defences more often than previously. The resit was a slxi d'n 
and dramatic reversal in the relative importance cf Getman fighters 
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and flak in terms d the numbers of heavy bombers they shot down,, 
as the latter overtook the former (12): 
Aug 1942 to Jan 1943 
Jan 1943 to Jul 1943 
Jul 1943 to Jan 1944 
Jan 1944 to Jul 1944 
Lcst to flak 
5 
166 
165 
8 47 
Lx)st to fighters 
25 
500 
518 
637 
These figures were compiled from debriefings of recur nea bomber 
crews and must be regarded as cnly an approximation: the causes to 
which heavy bombers fell were not always clear to crews in other 
aircraft who repotted seeing them go down. Nevertheless, the table 
provides a useful overall im presson cf the causes to which bombers 
f ell. The increase in the nu m ber cf bombers shot down by flak did 
not stem from any increase in the effectiveness of individual flak 
batteries; it was amply that bombers were now attacking more 
difficult and heavily defended targets and they were doing it more 
d ten and in greater numbers than previously. Also, during the first 
half cf 1944, the Luftwaffe had formed many new flak units and 
pulled back others from occupied Europe for the defence aE the 
Reich. (13) 
With the change in the main threat to the US heavy bombers 
during the early part of 19 44, came a major change in their operat- 
ing tactics. At the beginning cf the year, when the German fighters 
posed the main threat and it was essential to concentrate the fire 
power from the bombers' own gins, the latter flew in squadron boxes 
of 18 aircraft with three sich be ces stacked vertically to form an 
attack unit of 54 aircraft. Such formations were unwieldy and to 
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hold them together required great skill from the Filets. The tauge 
54 aircraft formations were, moreover, ideal targets for the GerrrAn 
arti-aircraft gunners ance salvoes w Lich missed me squadron box 
might well inflict damage an another. With flak the more serious 
danger in the spring aE 1944, the sze cf the formations was reduced: 
the squadron braes to 12 aircraft and the attack units to 36. (14) 
As this was happening, the German moves to widen the tre- 
quency band of W uer zburg began to take äf ect. Now with the 8th 
Air Force Headquarters at. High W ycombe near Lcndon, Gene Fubini 
had the task of collating information brought back by US and British 
Ferret aircraft operating over occupied Europe, to determine the 
optimum frequency settings for Carpet. Each week Fubini's section 
sent to all operational heavy bomber units histograms showing the 
frequencies used by the German fire control radars against the 
numbers present in the various areas. (15) 
In the autumn cl 1943 a combat boat formation of 20 aircraft, 
each carrying Carpet with the pmmers' centre frequencse-s tuned 500 
KHz apart, covered the entire W ua zburg band cf 553 to 568 M ti z. In 
the summer of 1944 these tactics were no longer valid: the bombers 
flew in smaller formations and the frequency band cf W u, tburg now 
extended from 517 to 566 MHz. With about half the US heavy bomber 
attacks now being made through overcast usng radar- bombing 
methods, many more Carpets were needed to ca inter the enemy 
radar laid flak. But although this jammer was being produced in large 
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numbers, more frustrating months would pass before it would be 
avilable to the front line units in the quantities required. 
II 
In February 1944 another major RR L- dedgmed equipment was 
transported to England: Win Salisbury's tour de farce, the 50 Kw 
Tuba ground jammer. Built into sx huge lorries and two trailers, 
each encased in a water-tight crate for deck loading of the 
freighter Maurice Sigmund, it weighed more than 170 tons and at the 
time was one ct the largest angle items of equipment ever to leave 
the port of Bcston. (16) 
After its arrival in England Salisbury set up the Tuba at 
Sizewell near Lowestoft in Siffolk, from w here it w as to beam its 
transmissons eastwards towards Holland, B elcum and G er ma ny. Once 
he had it working Salisbury turned over his creation to the Royal Air 
E orce. 
Tuba was a magnificent technical achievement and it deserved 
to achieve great things. But arcumstances were to conspre against 
it. For the jammer to be effective at its fu11 range cf 200 miles, 
]ine-of-Eight considerations demanded that the victim radar - the 490 
MHz Lichtenstein airborne intercept equipment - be at 25,000 t 
or higher. But the Royal Air Force right bombers, and therefore the 
intercepting German right fighters, usually operated at altitudes 
around 20,000 feet; this limited the maximum effective range cf the 
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jammer to abaft 175 miles, somewhat short of the German Vorder. 
Moreover the jamming could be effective only when the raght fighter 
was pointing its nose, and therefore its radar, in the general direc- 
tion of the jammer; this meant the bombers would receive protection 
only during their homeward flight. These two limitations were bad 
enough, but a further factor was to prevent Tuba from having any 
effect at a1L" before the jammer was ready for operation, Lichten- 
stein had all but passed out cf service with Luftwaffe frontline 
units. The radar had proved extremely vulnerable to Chaff, and by 
the spring cf 1944 it had largely been replaced by the new S N-2 
radar operating on frequencies around 90 MHz (17 ). The low f re- 
quency cf the new set meant it was not vulnerable to the Chaff then 
being cropped by the night bombers, nor to jEimming from Tuba. 
Because SN-2 operated on smilar frequencies to the Freya early 
warning sets it escaped detection by the Allied intelligence services 
for several months, and the Luftwaffe right fighter force enjoyed 
the unfettered use of the radar. The Royal Air Force operators 
switched on Tuba to nippatt night attacks an numerous occasions in 
the summer and early autumn of 1944 (18). But a search cf surviving 
German records revealed no mention that can be linked with the 
jammer and it is doubtful whether its thunderous crescendo was even 
noticed by the intended rec±cients. 
nI 
In January 1944 A]lied forces in the Mediterranean invaded 
Anzio aDuth ct Rome. To support their air attacks on the beachhead 
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German forces employed radar countermeasures. Luftwaffe personnel 
set up 'Karl' 50 0 watt ground jammers to counter Allied radars oper- 
acing in the band 170 to 220 M Hz. In addition German bombers 
carded 'Kettenhund', a self protection jammer to cover spot f re- 
quendes in the band 140 to 220 MHz (19); during operations with 
this jammer Luftwaffe tactics were s milar to those ct the USAAF 
with Carpet, with the tuning cf jammers staggered throughcut the 
attacking force to cover Allied fire control radars on a wide spread 
cf frequencies. Used in conjunction with D ueppel, K al and Ketten- 
hund jamming proved effective against the American SCR-268 fire 
control radar. 
To reduce the effect cf the jamming, SCR-268's were hastily 
fitted with noise limiters and the receiver intermediate-frequency 
amplifiers were modified to reduce their bandwidth. More important- 
ly, soon afterwards eight SCR-545 and twelve SCR-58 4 microwave 
fire control radars arrived at the beachhead to buttress the defences 
(20); operating on frequencies unaffected by the German electronic 
ja m mi ng and Dueppel, the new radars greatly increased the of f ect- 
iveness of the Anzio gun defences. 
Lest the reader imagine that when the German jamming was 
effective it was easy for bombers to attack strip iflg cff the beach- 
head, however, it should be remembered that radar laid arti- . rcraf t 
fire was only c ne cf the hazards crews had to face. Oberfeldwebel 
Paul B alke was flight engineer an one cf nine Dormer 217 's cf ]Ind 
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Gruppe cf Kampfgeschwader 100 which set auf carrying glides bom ns 
to attack diipli ng cff the invason area at dusk on 16 F ebru arr- . The 
Dormers left from BErgamo near Milan ding the late afternoon and 
headed west over the sea intending to approach the target out of 
the setting sun. As the bombers passed Elba, how ever, enemy 
fighters were seen. The Dormers hastily broke formation, dived to 
low altitude and headed for the relative safety cf land. No fighter 
attack followed,, but the raiders were forced to make their way to 
the target lndLvidualiy. As Balke's aircraft reached Anzio it was 
already getting dark; he later told the author: 
When we arrived the attack was already in progress. We did 
not see any ether Dorniers, but from the ferocity cf the flak it 
was obvious they were in the area. The stups put up a terrific 
barrage, as did the batteries on land; also sxm e cf the warships 
began laying spoke screens. We climbed to about 2,500 metres 
[8,000 feet] and circled the target, then iicked out a ship and 
headed towards it. Hauptmann Schacke, the observes, released 
the left bomb at a range cf 7 km [about 41 miles], which meant 
the missle had a flight time cf about 50 seconds. After launch 
we could see the red flare in the tail cf the missile clearly as 
Schacke guided it towards the ship. From where I saw it, the 
flare seemed almost stationary; each time it moved slightly off 
the target, Schacke guided it back on again. As the range inc- 
reased the flare gradually became fainter and fainter, then there 
was a white explosion as it struck the ship almost amidships. 
Once we no longer had to hold our flight path to guide the 
missile, we could evade that terrible flak. We circled the target 
once more, selected another ship, then ran in co attack. With a 
great deal of iron flying through the icy we released our second 
bomb and Schacke started to control it. But this time several 
ships started to concentrate their fire on us and there were 
tracer rounds streaking past from almost every direction. With 
the general corf uson of the tracer flying about, and the smoke 
screens laid by the ships, we lost tight of the tracKing flare. 
(21) 
Ißt to its own devices the second glider bomb almost certainly 
crashed into the sea. Back an the ground at BErgamo the äresews 
were surprised to find that all the Dorniers had, been able to regain 
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the r base though one had flak damage. In spite cf jamming on the 
misste guidance channels from the destroyers Davis and Jcnes, glider 
bombs hit and sank the 7,000 ton transport Elihu Yale and a tank 
lancing craft (22). Such siccesses were few and far between for the 
German rm ss1e-carrying units by this stage cf the war, how ever . 
IV 
At the beginning cf 1944 Division 15 received a further major 
influx of slä]ls when it took over the Airborne Instruments Labora- 
tort' at Mineola, Long Island. Dr Guy Suits told the author how he 
was able to acquire the laboratory as a going concern: 
This outfit had been part of Division 6 working on submarine 
detection methods, and had developed and seen into service the 
magnetic detector used with some success by the US Navy. But 
by the end of 1943 that work was complete and AIL had worked 
itself out cf a jab. Dr Donald Hance, in charge cf the laboratory, 
was a very able guy and he had some very able people. And at 
that time Division 15 was still expanding and as always we were 
finding it hard to get enough cf the right people. So at the 
beginning of 1944 the AIL and its entire staff of 18U, about a 
quarter the sze of RRL at that time, was incorporated into 
Division 15. (23) 
By February 1944 the Allies had captured an intact guidance 
receiver from a Henschel 293 glider bomb, and its method of opera- 
tion was clear (24). With the threat sgnals thus defined, the US 
Navy was able to be m ore -q: )ecific about the type cf 
jam m er it 
required to counter the enemy guided missies. At this tim. the RRL 
workshops were in producing a batch cf fifty AR Q- 8 communications 
jammers for the Army; this 30 watt jammer had an integrated 
recover and could spot -jam channels in the band 25 to 100 MHz. 
Following representations from the Navy, the Army agreed to c ve up 
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twenty of the jam mers for converson to the art. i-misste role. a he 
RRL hastily completed the work and rushed the jammers to Navy 
Yards at Bcstai and New Yczk where they were vrstalLed into 
warships. (25) 
Following its acquisition by Division 15 the Airborne 1rsuu m ent 
Laboratory concentrated on developing methods of countering 
current and pcsable future enemy guided misste systems (26). At the 
time this seemed to be a major area cf weakness in the Allied 
countermeasures programme: the Germans had already brought into 
action two types of radio guided misste and there was ample 
evidence that they were working an weapons cf this type; there was 
no irf orm atian cn whether the Japanese were working on a milar 
lines but it was prudent to assume they were. 
AIL soon had a chance to prove its worth. In mid-April the 
Naval Research Laboratory placed a tom-Frioiity order for a tigh 
power jammer to counter the Kehl-Strassburg guidance system used 
by the German misslos in service. By concentrating almost all its 
resources on the project the laboratory was able to deliver the 
prototype of the new jammer to the NRL in jet over two weeks. It 
is believed this is an all-time record for the desgn and production at 
a major countermeasures system. D esgnated the M AS, the 
device 
was a 250 watt jammer with a built-in receiver, able to cover spot- 
f requenäes in the band 41 to 51 MHz. By now it was known that the 
Kehl- Strassburg system operated in one of 18 crystal controlled 
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channels in the band 48 to 50 MHz, with tone modulations an 1,1.5, 
8 and 12 KHz to convey the appropriate up, down, left or right 
com m and to the misste. To increase its eff ectiveness, the ja m rm ng 
from the M AS was sluare-wave-modulated at one cf the tones used 
by the German transmitter. During tests the prototype M AS per- 
formed successfully and AIL received an order for a further forty- 
nine. (27) 
V 
The first five months cf 1944 had seen a steady increase in the 
number ct US countermeasures equipments deployed in Europe. During this 
period Division 15 was also heavily engaged in the preparations for the 
forthcoming invasion cf northern France, and in seeing into service equip- 
m ent for the B-29 force about to begin operating in the Far East.. This 
work will be described in detail in the chapters which follow. 
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CHAPTER 9 OPERATION OVERLORD 
Whatever the aiccess cf the bombing attacks on Germany and 
occupied F , trope, the Allied commanders knew ultimate victory cou ki 
come only after ground forces landed succes uIly cri the coast cf 
north-western Europe and defeated the German army in battle. 
Should the landings fail, however, lasses cf ADied men and materials 
w ou]d almost certainly be S high as to preclude any further attempt 
for at least a year; and, relieved of the need to withhold a subs- 
tantial army in the west, the G Erm an High C onn m and could sw itch 
troops to the eastern tront and poss. bly secure a decisve victory 
there. Clearly, whatever its outcome,, the invasion of northern 
Europe would be a major turning point in the corflict. 
Detailed planning for the invasion, code-named Operation 
OVERLORD, began late in 1943. Early cn Allied Gaff ±Eficers chcse 
the strip cif Normandy coastline, bounded to the west by the Cher- 
bourg Peninsula and the east by the estuary cf the River Sane, as 
the main ate for the landings. Soon after this decision came the 
first tentative discussons on the use cf radio countermeasures to 
support the operation. The first expert in this field to become invol- 
ved was Dr Robert Cockburn, head of the countermeasures section at 
the Telecom m unications Research Establishment at Malvern. (1) 
Cockburn and his team began work to prepare the counter- 
measures plan to support the invasion, but within a short time 
AB L-15 cf the Radio Research Laboratory was closely 
inwlvpd Also. 
- 140 - 
Security was tight and throughout the preparatory w oiic robed y was 
allowed to know more about the invasion plan than was strictly 
necessary for his assigned task. As with most aspects of Operation 
OVERLORD there was close integration between the American and 
British efforts at all levels. Equipment and personnel were freely 
irterchanged and each nation planned operations to assist the other's 
landings. Because of this, the account which follows will cover the 
whole Allied countermeasures plan in support cf OVERLORD and not 
be restricted to just the American ade of the operation. 
When the landings began it was vitally important to delay the 
GErm an reaction for as long as possble. The countermeasures 
operation supporting OVERLORD had, therefore, to achieve the 
fallowing aims (2): 
a) To prevent the enemy obtaining early warning aE, and acc- 
urate plots on, approaching si rface forces. 
b) To prevent enemy coastal batteries from us ng rad ar- 
controlLed gunfire against surface forces. 
c) To support airborne operations by - 
i. Reducing and conf usng the enemy's early warning 
system, thus delaying both the arrival cf fighter amongst 
and alerting cf the threatened &opc. ng zones. 
ii. Interfering with enemy fighter control R/ T,, thus affect- 
ing both the movement cE night fighters into the area cf 
operations and the vectoring cf intercepting fighters. 
in. Producing diversionary threats and thereby dividing the 
enemy's available fighter effort. 
d) To delay the movement ct enemy reserve ground forces by prod- 
ucing threats cf apparent assaults, bath airborne and seaborne. 
In order to reduce the problem cf jamming and spoofing the 
German radar network along the coasts cf France, Belgium and 
Holland to manageable proportions, the first priority was to knocK 
out as many of the radar statirns as pcssble. The target was a 
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formidable one: as part cf Hitler's West Wall there were no fewer 
than ninety-two radar rtes on the north&n shores cf France and 
Belgium able to give warring ± the approach of an Allied lancing 
force (3). These stations were equipped with the entire menagerie d 
German ground radar systems: Mammut and Wassermann early 
warning radars, Freyas and Seetakts, Giant and small Wuerzburgs 
(for trief descriptions and technical details of these radars, see 
Appendix E). During the softening-up rations leading to 
OVERLORD, it was important that these give no hint cf where the 
invason was to take place. To keep the German High Command 
guessng, for every target attacked in the area of the intended 
invason at least two were to be attacked in areas outsde it. (4) 
The success of air attacks on the German radar stations would 
depend on the accuracy d intelligence information on their loca- 
tirons. By the spring cf 1944 Dr R. V. Jcnes's Scientific Irtelligence 
department at the Air Mirristry in London had built up a mi ru tely 
detailed picture of the German radar netw oiic. But this picture had 
to be updated continually: radar sets, especially the highly mobile 
Freyas and W uerzburgs, could be moved quickly and become oper- 
ational within hours of the .r arrival at new rtes. To asst in plott- 
ing the radars the Telcornmunicatiions Research Establishment 
produced a special ground direction firxier code-named 'Ping Pang' 
which could determine the bearing cf a radar transmitter to within a 
quarter cf a degree. From widely separated parts in the s*uth cf 
England three Ping Pongs took bearings an enemy radars along the 
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north coast cf France (5). After triangulation of the bearings thus 
found, photographic reconnaissance confirmed the exact ocstions cf 
the German radar ates. Further help in locating the German radars 
came from the decoding cf radio reports on the movements of Allied 
aircraft broadcast by the German air defence system. As part a 
British operation code-named OCULIST, the Royal Air Force somit 
reconnaissance aircraft over occupied Europe flying carefully plann- 
ed tracks and altitudes and photographing the ground beneath to 
provide an accurate record of their tracks. By Ficking up and 
decoding the G&man radio reports of the tracks cf these aircraft, 
and back-platting the distances and bearings coven by the radar 
stations, intelligence cf ficers were able to find the positions cf 
several of the German stations. (6) 
The radar stations were small 1n-point targets, usually well 
protected by 20 mm and 37 mm anti- r craft guns. The specialized 
task cf destroying them was asagned to the M csquito, SFitfire and 
Typhoon squadrons aE the mai my-Biitish 2nd Tactical Air Force. The 
anti-radar operations began on 16 March, when twelve Typhoons Cf 
No 198 Squadron set out for the Wassermann early warring radar 
stations near Ostend on the Belgian coast. D Emig the 
iritia1 attack 
four cf the aircraft attacked the radar with rockets and cannon, 
while the other eight strafed flak emplacements su rrouncing the main 
target. As the fighter-bombers left the target the 130-foot. ugh 
aerial tower was still upright, so d Laing the late afternoon 
the 
fighter-bombers returned. more rockets tit the structure, but though 
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battered the tower remained standing; at first it seemed tnat the 
radar had survived the attack (7). The Achilles' Heel cf the Wasser- 
mann lay in the aerial rotating mechanism, however; the aerial was 
attached to a rotating sleeve which turned on a fixed vertical cyl- 
index. Rocket damage to the sleeve prevented it rotating, and the 
desgn cf the aerial was such that the tower could be lowered only 
if it faced in a certain direction. With the aerial tower now rigidly 
locked in the vertical position, German engineers had to dismantle 
the entire structure before they could begin repair work. The Ostend 
Wassermann would still be off the air in June when the Allied 
invason began. (8) 
The fixed-aerial Mammut also had a major weakness. The rear of 
the aerial frame was a mass of feeder cables which had to be care- 
fully adjusted to give the correct beam shape; after adjustment, the 
radar had to be checked against a series of calibration flights by an 
aircraft flying a series of carefully set patterns. The feeder cables 
routed up the aitsde of the aerial were vulnerable even to small 
calibre machine-gun fire; and if they were hit the damaged feeders 
all had to be replaced and the tedious calibrati. on process repeated. 
(9) 
II 
As the programme t attacks an the German radar rtes began to 
take r=ff ect, the first specialist US radio countermeasures flying unit 
in England began forming : the 803rd Bombardment Squadron based at 
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S flthorpe and belonging to the 8th Air Force, irntially eqiupp*-, j 
with six B -17 Fortresses. In April Major C. Scott assumed com ma rid 
of the unit, which initially operated closely with No 100 Group of 
the Royal Air Force (an RAF Group is equivalent to a US Wing) also 
asagned to the countermeasures role. (10) 
In May the 803rd Squadron transEerred to a new be at Oulton 
in Norfolk. At the time cf the move the unit possesged Eight B-17s 
fitted with various combinations cf Carpet and British Mandrel 
jammers (typically, an aircraft carried nine Carpets and four British 
MancreLs), a ninth B-17 was fitted out as a Ferret aircraft with 
SCR-587 and Hallicrafters S. 27 receivers. The squadron was due to 
become operational early in June, in time for OVERLORD. (11) 
III 
By this stage cE the war the Allied intelligence services were 
gaining sich a wealth cf information from de-aypted enemy ag nals 
that communications jamming was not permitted unless there were 
exceptional circumstances; but there was still a need to have such a 
capability in case the forthcoming land battle entered a aatical 
phase w here this type cf jamming might swing the balance. Dun ng 
1943 the RRL had desgned a family cf communications jam m&s to 
operate on the frequencies used by the German aircraft and tank 
radios. Two of these }a m mers, the airborne ART-3 J ac k, al and the 
ground MR T-1, went into limited prod uction. (12) 
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The M RT-1, code-named 'Elephant Cigar', was another of wLn 
Salisbury's wiper-high-power creations. This one operated in the 38 
to 52 M Hz band and radiated 50 Kw from a large directional 1? nal 
mounted on 105-foot high towers (13). One Elephant Cigar arrived in 
England in March 1944 and Royal Air Force techrucaans assembled it 
at a ate near B lighton on the south coast. The work on the tra na- 
mitten itself was completed in May, but that cn the aerial had to 
wait until the last possble moment before the inva ion - the aerial 
was to point towards Normandy, and if a German reconnaissance 
aircraft photographed it this could have betrayed the intended 
invason area. (14) 
IV 
Also at this time work began in England to install counter- 
measures equipment into several warships and landing craft ear- 
marked for OVERLORD. The task of fitting these to the U S-assgned 
lancing craft was the respon i ility of the Special Can m unications 
U rit (R C M) at the US Naval Amphibious Supply Base at Exeter in 
Devon, under Lieutenant Commander Waiter asssted by personnel 
from AB L-15. The crash programme to inkall the ja m mers greatly 
extended AB L-15 resources, however, and it im mediately beca me 
clear that more personnel would be needed if they were to 
be fitted 
in time for the invasion. General Eisenhower sent an urgent message 
to General Marshall in Washington, reque in9 that further ox=ter- 
measures experts from RRL be sit to England to asast with 
the 
invason preparations. This drew an im mediate response, and 
sxteen 
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key members of the laboratory were rushed across the Atlantic to 
asst with the work. (15) 
The initial plan was to fit the jammers into sxteen LCT A's 
(landing craft., tank, attack) and nine LC G L's (lancing craft, gun, 
large). In each case the equipments specified - Carpet, Rug, 
American and British M ancreLs - had been deagned for irb-ta1L3tion in 
aircraft and the were problems putting them into landing c rift. 
The following extract from the AB L-15 log (16) gives an idea of 
some of the difficukies, human and technical, facing those involved 
with this work: 
By May 24, all of the officinally planned installations had 
been completed and checked, and six additional LC TA (5)s had 
been fitted with one RCM transmitter each. One American 
Mandrel, one British Mandrel, and f our Rugs w ere included in 
this additional gear. It should be emphasized that the completion 
of these installations was pcssble cnly because of a great deal 
of hard work by the Navy technicians. Some of them worked 10 
to 14 hours a day for more than three weeks, and none of them 
had a day of liberty in more than two months while the install- 
ations were in progress. Our experience in this busness brought 
forcibly to our attention the very extensive amount of work that 
must ensue between the planning of the installation of X pieces 
of RCM gear on Y craft and the actual accomplishment of this 
goal. Particular credit is due to the Navy technicians who did 
the dirty wont; they gave unstintingly of then time and energy 
on this job, and were a mighty tired crew when the last ant- 
enna was mounted and the last Onan bolted on the deck ... 
Orders were sent to the captains of the LCGL and LC TA 
flotilla through Lt. Commander W alter to be transmitted to the 
skippers of the landing craft. These orders explained in detail 
how to turn the equipment on when the appointed hour came. 
Previously one of the cf ficers had talked with each skipper, 
explained t iefly the purpose of the equipment, and made sure 
that the skipper and the radioman or electrician )ew how to 
turn on the RCM gear. Some of the skippers who r. _ally 
understood the nature of the equipment and its purpose were 
enthusiastic in desiring to have it. Others, who had a mistaken 
idea about its effect, were lukewarm or in a few cases openly 
=Intagorastirc. The antagonism was felt by only a few C. O. s who 
somehow got the idea that enemy radar would DF on their pm m- 
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ing agnals. We corrected every case of this nature that *%,,, found. The worst case was the slipper of an LC TA" ho w -i: ted until the Lechs had half completed an irstallation and then ord- ered everything taken off his craft. 
A total of 16 LCTAs, 6 LCTA(5)s, and 9 LCGLs were finally fitted with RCM Equipment. The following tabL ,OA the completed installations on US landing craft: 
Set LCTA LCTA(5) LCGL TOTAL 
Carpet. -- 10 10 
British Carpet. 32 - 10 42 
Mandrel 4149 
British Mandrel -1-1 
Rug -4 10 14 
The reader will recall that the British Carpets and M anckels were 
similar in capability to the American sets of the same name, but had 
been designed independently. In addition to installing jamming trar- 
mitters to the landing craft, AB L-15 and US Navy personnel fitted 
the amphibious headquarters ship USS A ncrn and the cruiser USS 
Tuscaloosa with a full range of listening receivers to cover the 
spectrum from 28 to 3,000 MHz (6,000 MHz in the case of the latter) 
(17); thus their operators couple monitor the spectrum, so that if 
the Germans introduced new types cf radar or radio controlled 
weapons during operations against the invasion, the signals assoc- 
iated with these could be analyzed and countermeasures initiated 
with minimum delay. 
Also at this time Jammers were fitted into several cf the Allied 
warships ass gned to provide bombardment rapport for the invason 
(18). 
V 
While US and British technicians were busy fitting proven equip- 
ment to the warships, the Telecom m unicati, ons Research Laboratory 
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was completing two new airborne homing devices specially for 
OVERLORD. 
To secure the flanks of the seaborne invasion American and 
British troops were to carry out a large-scale parachute and glider 
assaults. Preceding these, pathfinder teams were to erect 'Eureka' 
radar transponder beacons to enable the main body df transport. 
aircraft to locate th®r dropping zones. If the G Er ma ns reacted 
swiftly and sent aircraft to jam or spoof 'Eureka' they might 
seriously disrupt the airborne landings. To meet this poaEi ty TR E 
engineers fitted four Mosquito night fighters with modified 'Lucero' 
equipment to enable them to home on aircraft carrying sich jammers; 
only ten days elapsed between the formulation cf the requirement 
and the initial proving flight by the first modified aircraft. (19) 
A rx ther interesting device which emerged from TRE at this tim e 
was code-named ' Abdullah', the first attempt to produce an airborne 
receiver for fighter-bombers to home on enemy ground radars. Tuned 
to the frequencies used by Wuerzburg, Abdullah was fitted to a few 
Typhoons used to lead formations during attacks on radar rtes (20). 
Although the homer worked well enough during tests against a 
captured W uerzburg in England, when used against German sets in 
northern France it was found that operators would switch cf i if they 
detected high speed contacts coining straight for them. Because ct 
this, and the likelihood that a direct approach from such a homing 
impending attack and time to alert w wJd c ve operators warring cl impend 
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the flak defences, the homer was judged technically successful but 
tactically unusable (21). F orm ati. on leaders proved able to find the 
radar sates using normal map-reading techniques, and used an cb1 ue 
approach turning on to the target at the last moment to retain the 
element aE surprise. 
VI 
While the sjstem atic destruction of the German radar network in 
France and Belgium was in progress, and Allied engineers were 
hastily fitting countermeasures equipment into dips and aircraft for 
OVERLORD, Dr Cockburn and his team at the T elecom m unicat. ions 
Research E stab]ishm ent were putting the fi rushi ng touches to the 
mcst elaborate p. ece cE electronic spocfery ever to aipport a 
military operation : the am ulation on radar cf two huge ghost `fleets' 
to divert attention away from the main Allied landings. Obviously 
the amplest method of achieving sich an aim would be to use large 
numbers of full-a z ed ships. But the invasion stretched shipping 
resources to the utmost and no large dips could be spared for this 
purpose. Cockburn wonted out a method cf producing a huge radar 
echo, similar to that from a large assembly cf ships but without 
us ng any real ships. By dropping Rope - long lengths cf metal foil - 
from aircraft flying carefully arranged tracks, he hoped to sect an 
enormous radar reflector covering an area sixteen by fourteen miles, 
a total cf 224 square miles. (22) 
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The most important German coast-watching radar was the 
Seetakt operating in the 370 MHz band, and Cockburn planned his 
ghost fleet' Spoof Primarily to be df ecti ve agai nst that system ; he 
hoped it would aL9o prove sicce ul against ether German radars. 
The beam width cf Seetakt was 15 °, so at a distance cf ten miles 
the beam was over 2 miles wide. Allowing a margin for error, the 
plan called for Rope clouds within two miles of eachcther along the 
frontage cf the 'fleet' to produce a continuous 'blip' with no gaps on 
the Seetakt screen. The pulse width cf the Seetakt was 3 micro- 
seconds, which meant that the set could not discriminate between 
objects less than 520 yards apart in range; so to get a cori. inucus 
'blip' on the radar in range, the Rope clouds had to be closer than 
that. The bombers releasing the Rope would be flying at 180 mph, 
three miles per miruute; so if the crews dropped Rope at 12 bundles 
per minute this would result in one per 440 yards, sufficient for the 
purpose. (23) 
Altogether, a full ghost 'fleet' operation required sx to eight 
aircraft, split into two waves; the first wave would fly in line 
abreast with two miles between aircraft, and eight miles behind them 
would come the second wave in as milar formation. To dm ulate the 
advance the 'fleet', the two waves of aircraft would fly a series 
cf oblong 'race-track' patterns, each cblong measuring Eight miles by 
two. Each orbit would take 7 minutes, and at the end of each the 
f orm ati, on was to move forward me mile to give a rate c advance 
1 the formation - and therefore the ghost `fleet' - cf 8 knots to 
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make it look plausibly like an advancing assembly cf ships. To add 
realism to the snocf other aircraft were to orbit nearby radiating 
Mandrel jamming on the German early warring radar frequencies; but 
in the areas of the ghost 'fleets' the aircraft would ortit in pasitions 
far enough from the German radars to enable their operators to 
discern the fake 'invasion fleet' through the blanket of jamming. (24) 
During May 1944 Cockburn ran a ghost fleet' towards captured 
German Seetakt, Wuerzburg and Freya radars set up cn cliffs 
overlooking the Firth cf Forth; the spocf worked effectively against 
all cf them. But the radar cperators had all known they were seeing 
asm ulated invasion fleet; the next stage was to test the spo E 
against operators who had not been told what to expect. Eight 
bombers flew a ghost 'fleet' against a British Type 11 radar, the 
nearest equivalent to the Giant Wuerzburg, stuated at Flamborough 
Head on the Yorkshire coast. The unsuspecting operators reported 
the echoes on their screens as coming from a very large convoy 
indeed - far larger than any they had seen before. Now C ock bur n 
and his team could be reasonably confident that the spoor would also 
work against German operators. (25) 
Shortly before the invasion Cockburn obtained the use of a small 
additional force to assist with his ocfs : four high speed air-sea 
rescue launches and fourteen small er naval launches not required for 
other tasks on the morning cf the invason. To add further realism to 
the ghost 'fleets' TRE engineers fitted the rescue launches w i_. h 
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'Moonshine' repeaters: devices s mil ar to those used to support the 
US heavy bombers during their initial attacks in the summer aE 1942, 
but now tuned to the 5 50 MHz Hohentw iel radar carried by German 
maritime patrol aircraft. Each launch was also to tow a float flying 
a' Filbert' :a 29-f oot long naval barrage balloon with a 9-f oot 
diameter radar reflector inside the envelope to give a radar echo 
similar to that from a large ship. In addition to towing the floats, 
the fourteen small naval launches were to fly one 'Filbert' from 
their hulls. (26) 
101 
By the evening of 5 June, when the vanguard cf the invasion 
fleet set out from England, all but dxteen of the original ninety-two 
radar s. tes along the northern coasts of France and Belgium had 
been attacked from the air; most of their sets were now cut of 
action, including all C the long range early warning Wassermann and 
Mammut radars (27). Now the 'softening up' phase of OVERLORD 
was complete, the jamming and spoof"i ng phases could go ahead. 
On the right preceding the invasion two ghost armadas 'set sail' : 
The larger, with Rope dropped from eight Lancaster bombers cc No 
617 Squadron of the RAF, the Dam Busters, made for Le Havre - 
this was Operation TAXABLE; the small er', flown by sx Stirlings of 
No 218 Squadron, made for the Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne area - 
this was Operation GLIMMER. Orbiting to the north ct the real and 
ghost invasion fleets were four B-17's cf the US 803rd Bambardm ýýnt 
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Squadron on their first operational rmsson and sxteen Stirlirbgs cf 
the RAF No 199 Squadron; these aircraft put up a Mandrel screen týo 
cover the various operations, with the jamming deliberately tin to 
the east to allow the G& man operators to c±serve the TAX ABLE 
and G LIM MER spoofs. (28) 
Beneath the oibitting aircraft and their falling clouds cf Rope, 
the snall f ilia cf launches headed through the choppy sea with 
their ungainly 'Filbert' balloons trailing low over the water down- 
wind. Cockburn was full cf praise for the Moonshine operators on 
the boats that right; 
The Moonshine operators came from an American Army 
signals unit. These men had arrived from Iceland too late to be 
brigaded into the main invason, so they were given to us. They 
were absolutely first class. They hadn't seen any war, they were 
tickled pink at the idea cf taking part and were keen as 
mustard. The launches ran in - can you imagine it, 6 knots in 
such a craft in a Force 6 sea? The Moonshine operators were 
seasLck to a man but they operated their equipment magnif- 
icently. (29) 
As the launches rumbled toward the French coast the Moonshine 
operators observed . goals from German airborne radars on their 
cathode-ray tubes and returned them 'with interest'. (30) 
When the two ghost 'fleets' arrived at their stop lines some ten 
miles cff the coast d France, the launches anchored the floats with 
the 'Filbert' balloons then laid a smoke-screen and troadcast over 
loud-speakers recordings of the squeals, rattles and splashes 
germane to a large ru mber cf sea-going ships drops ng anchor. Their 
deception task corn plete, the boats withdrew . (31) 
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While the TAXABLE and GLIMMER forces moved th ¬r labon ou s 
ways towards the coast of France, ether misch1Ei was afoot: tw e, nty- 
tine Stirling and Halifax bombers cI Ncs 90,138,149 and 161 
Squadrons of the RAF staged fake air borne invasions - code-nam ed 
TITA [IC - in the Caen and Cap d' Az Lifer areas. On their way to the 
'dropping zones' the bombers released large quantities of Rope, to 
increase the apparent sze cf the force an enemy long range radars. 
In the simulated lancing areas they unloaded large cumbers cf dummy 
paratroops fitted with special fireworks, which exploded to give 1f 
the crackles and bangs cf a ground battle in progress; to add realism 
to this spoof, the bombers also dropped a few men of the British 
Special Air S&vice with orders to create diversons. (32) 
To isolate the real dropping zones from marauding G&man right 
fighters, twenty-rene Lancaster and Flying Fortress bombers d the 
RAF N cs 101 and 214 Squadrons flew a communications jamming 
screen over eastern France. This was to ensure that enemy night 
fighters operating to the west of the ja m ging screen could not 
receive instructions from their ground control stations to the east. 
To increase the apparent ss ze cE t is force on the German radar 
screens, and to gi vie the enemy night fighters som et. hi rig to chase 
when they entered the area, these bombers too dropped large quarr 
titles of Rope. (33) 
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The spoofs were siccessfuL The German fighter orntrollers ý1 
into the trap and ordered right fighters to intercept the ghost 
'bomber stream' over eastern France. But once the fighters w, re in 
the area cf the communications jamming they could receive no 
further instructions from the ground, and wandered aimlessly among 
the clouds cf Rope looking for targets until shortage cl fuel forced 
them to return home. 0 ne cf the RAF bombers involved in the 
operation was caught and shot down, but the crew survived (34). 
Meanwhile the huge armada cf more than a the isand unarmed 
transport aircraft and gliders, laden with paratroops and their 
equipment, was able to deliver the airborne divisions to their drop 
zones and return to England without losing a single aircraft to night 
fighter attack. 
More than two hundred warships and landing craft taking part in 
the main landing operation carried jamming transmitters, and all 
were switched on as the thips approached the beaches. A veritable 
powerhouse of jamming shimmered across the screens cf the 
GErman coastal radars which had survived the bombing and -ctrafing 
attacks during the previous weeks. There was nothing subtle about 
this, the final trick in the Allies' radio countermeasures repertoire. 
It blinded the defenders as cruelly and as of fecti vely as pepper 
thrown in their eyes. Only one German radar was able to observe the 
approach cf the real invason fleet; and sich was the general chaos 
in the area due to the various spoffs, it's warring went unheeded. 
(35) 
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The first indication that major forces were moving towards the 
coast cf Normandy, to be believed by the German High Command, 
came at 2 am an the morning of 6 June when lookouts at doservation 
posts on the eastern side cl the Cherbourg Peninsula heard with 
their naked ears the rumble from the engines cf the Allied ships. No 
conceivable radio countermeasures effort could have achieved more, 
for urtil then seaborne invaders' approach had been concealed. 
Off the landing areas the jamming .f the Seetakt fire cortrol. 
radars greatly reduced the accuracy of the return fire from the 
coastal gun batteries. Only one Allied warship, a destroyer, was last 
to this cause though a few others siff &ed damage. 
There is evidence that the German radar operators observed 
and reported the approach of the G LIM ME R 'fleet' .A telephone 
message logged at 10.15 on the morning cf D-day (36) at the forward 
echelon of Luftwaffe High Command (ax hours after the end cf the 
operation by which time Allied troops were ashore in strength) 
cortair sa clear reference to G LIM ME R: 
On the night of 6 June the enemy carried out landings in the 
Sein Bay. Reports up to 0800 hours provide the following 
picture: at about 0300 hours a large ruin ber of enemy landing 
craft and escorts neared the coast of the Seine Bay between 
Caen and Carentan. From observations on the coast and air 
reconnaissance, it appears that some 200 ships were involved. 
Landings appear to have been successful near C arenta n and near 
the mouth of the Vire. The rumber of lancing craft involved has 
not been reported. Near Berrieres 33 landing craft have been 
reported, and 44 more near the mouth of the Orne (north of 
Caen). It is estimated that eighty large landing craft would be 
able to put ashore 3 to 4 divisions. 
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Ding the early morring darkness (first light was it 0500 
hours) artillery fire fell at the following places: Grandcamp, 
C olleville, Arromanches. There are no reports on the pions cf 
the ships doing the (ring. B E#L w een 0600 hours and 0700 hours 
coastal observers reported sx large warships, inclucflng battle- 
ships, and approximately 20 destroyers at a portion 10 sea 
miles west of Le Havre. Further reports on assemblies Cf ships: 
at 0645 hours to the north of Lesardn eux [west of St M alo], 
where it has been specifically reported that no la n ings have 
taken place up to now. According to reports from reconnaissance 
aircraft, ships were assembling during the morning cff Dieppe 
and Le Treport. The reports eE ships assembling off Calais and 
Dunkirk at 0400 hours have not, so far, been confirmed. 
[author's underlining ]. 
The German commander in the area dispatched reconnaissance &r- 
craft and patrol boats to scour the seas off the coast between 
Dunkirk and Boulogne for the si spected invason force; but it took a 
disconcertingly long time to prove concLasvely that the enemy was 
not in an area where he was is thought to be. 
Operation TAXABLE, though probably correctly mounted r 
appears n&- to have been noticed by the defenders. Den to a careful 
search ct German records the author has not been able to find any 
reports that can be linked to that pof . 
The rest of the story is well known. Once the Allied troops had 
established a beachhead in Normandy no power at Adolf Hitl is 
command could dislodge them. Some cf the countermeasures prepared 
for OVERLORD w ere not needed. No new types cf German radar or 
radio guided misste were brought into action against tie 
invasion 
forces, so the comprehensive mo ritozi ng eq uip m nt on board the 
USS 
Ancon and Tuscaloosa revealed nothing important. Nor was there any 
German attempt to disrupt the airborne landings by jamming 
a gnats 
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from the Eureka beacons marking the dropping zones, so tna 'Lucero' 
Mc squitoes saw no action. As the ground battle developed the Allied 
fighter force maintained a powerful umbrella d protective patrols 
over the beachhead and it proved impossble for the Luftwaffe to 
mount co-ordinated attacks into the area. As a result the huge 
Elephant Cigar communications jammer at Brighton, though held 
ready throughout the operation to beam a cacophony of jamming an 
the German aircraft radio channels, remained dent. (37) 
VaI 
The success cf the landings in Normandy completely over- 
shadowed Operation DRAGOON, the landings an the south coast cf 
France ten weeks later. Mthough smaller than OVERLORD, 
DRAGOON was large by any other standard : to support the landings 
by one US and two French Army Corps, 4 battleships, 9 aircraft 
carriers, 24 cruisers and 105 destroyers took part. These land. ngs 
began with an airborne assault during the early morning darkness of 
15 August sipported by an all-B atish radio jamming and spoofing 
operation involving a Mandrel screen, dummy airborne lancing and a 
ghost 'flee. ' operation along s milar lines to those during 
OVERLORD. But in this area the radar chain was far less dense than 
that in Normandy and the defending forces, their best units having 
already departed for the main battle in the north, were unable to 
pose any serious threat to the invasion force. (38 ) 
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Ix 
By producing conf uson and preventing the G man commanders 
from gaining an accurate appreciation of Allied movements, then-, 
can be no doubt that the radio countermeasures operations materially 
asg. sted the landings in northern and southern France and did much 
to reduce casualties. In terms d the lasses they saved, the resources 
committed. to countermeasures had been mi rn m aL For the student cf 
electronic warfare the operations in support cf OVERLORD and 
DRAG00N provide an important abject lesson on w hat can be 
achieved if a card ully planned programme cf countermeasures is 
used to support a one-cf -a-kind operation cf the highest importance. 
For the rund-the-mill bombing operations repeated day after day, 
week after week, such elaborate spoof ery will soon be recognized by 
the enemy and in most cases will not be worth a large Effort; but 
for once- or tw i, ce in-a-w ar seaborne landing operations, where the 
risks are invariably high and the stakes large, such an effort will 
repay itself a hundred f ald. 
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CHAPTER 10 JAPANESE RADAR: THE PICTURE SHARPENS 
W hi e the countermeasures contest in the European theatre cf 
operations approached its climax, events in the Pa©fic moved at a 
far more lei. 9 irely pace. N ct only were the development and pproo- 
uction of radar far slower in Japan than in Germany, but the vastly 
greater area cf the Pacific war zone mean that the few available 
Japanese radars had to be spread far more thinly than were those in 
Europe. Following the capture of the Mark I Model 1 early warning 
radar on Guadalcanal cEt the opening cf the Sciom on Lslanct campaign 
in Augua 1942, and the subsequent discovery cf amilar radars on 
Kiska and W ake Island, new izf ormation on Japanese radars was slow 
to come in. 
Dicing the spring ct 1943 Chief Petty Officer Jack Churchill 
and his Cast Mike 1 team continued to fly their intercept receivers 
with PBY Catalina squadrons resdent in the south Pacific area. Be. - 
weer the beginning of 1943 and the middle of June the members cf 
the team flew on rum Brous patrol m sons - Churchill himself flew 
on 17 - but without detecting any enemy radar sgnals (1). Then on 
the night aE 18 June, flying in a 'Black Cat' piloted by Lieutenart 
Harold Johnson of VP-54 near the Shortland Islands just south ct 
Bcugaiinvi]Le, Churchill picked up sgnals from an enemy sit. But the 
Catalina carried no direction finder and it was im jxssble to p npoir t 
the location of the Japanese radar. During later missons other 
operators also picked up agnaLs and confirmed the presence aE an 
enemy radar in the area. (2) 
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The Cast Mike 1 team had no radar direction-firing equipment, 
nor was there a prospect cf getting any in the immediate future. So 
Jack Churchill and his team improvised their own. Asssted by 'metal 
benders' of VP-54 they built a pair of Yagi homing aerials and fitted 
them on each s. de cf the nose cf a Catalina. These aerials were 
connected to an ASE radar receiver modified to accept sgnals on 
frequencies around 100 MHz, and the resultant output was displayed 
as left - right indications on the cathode ray tube of an ASE 
indicator unit (3). All in all it was a remarkable piece cf 
improvisation, undertaken in the most primitive conditions on Guadal- 
canal. 
Uang the improvised direction finder, on the right c# 8 Sept- 
ember Lieutenant Harold Johnson and his crew obtained three good 
bearings on the Japanese radar and established its position on Popor- 
ang Island south cf B augainville. F Blow ing this, a reconnaissance 
aircraft photographed the radar and the set was later attacked by 
fighter-bombers. (4) 
11 
Also in the summer cf 194 3 there was a resargence cf US 
ccourtermeasures activity in the Aleutians, in preparation for an 
operation to re-take those islands Seized by the Japanese the 
previous year. Iriti. ally it was felt that the two radars on Kiska, 
sited on a 525 foot hill and able to doserve forces approaching the 
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island from several sectors, might hinder such an invasion. I, TO 
coulter the radars it was decided to set ip a ground jamming ration 
on the 7 50 foot high plateau at Cape Bird on the US-held island cl 
Amchitka, some 50 miles east of Kiska. The operation was 
code-named BEAVER. The lst Signal Service P]atoor r (S pecsav , with 
a strength cf three cfficers and 40 enlisted mein drawn from the 
Army and the Navy, arrived on the island after a hasty course 
training at RRL to operate and maintain its equipment: an APT-3 
Mandrel fitted with an AM-14 APT amplifier to boost its jamming 
power up to 140 watts, with directional aerials to beam the jamming 
at the Japanese radars. The ground jammers would be at the limit cf 
the direct transmission path to Kiska but RRL experts had judged 
the operation to be technically feasible. (5) 
As plans for the invason of Kiska took shape, however, it was 
decided that the landings would take place on a part cE the island in 
the blind sector of the Japanese radars. So the jamming from 
Amchitka could not screen the landings, though it might deceive the 
defenders by drawing their attention away from the real assault. 
While this was being conadered the listening post an Amchitka 
logged sgnals on 300 MHz, thought to come from a new type of 
Japanese radar on Kiska. Immediately an APQ-2 Rug pmmer was 
rushed to Amchitka to cover that part of the -specuv m. (6) 
In the event the BEA VE R operation came to nothing. 0n4 
August, just over a week before the invasion was planned to begin, 
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the Japanese blew up their radars on Kiska and abandoned the island 
under cover CE fog. When US forces landed they found parts of two 
Mark I Model I radars, sets a milar to that captured on Guadalcanal. 
(7) 
Nothing was found of the 300 MHz radar and from Japanese 
records we know there was no such equipment. In retrospect it is 
clear that a spurious sgnal had triggered the scare, almost certainly 
a harmonic. 
nI 
The installation of radar irtercept equipment in warships was an 
obvious yep once it was clear that the opposing ade possessed 
radar, and it is interesting to note that Japanese warships began to 
carry such equipment same time before those of the US Navy. Dieing 
the action between opposing cruiser and destroyer forces 1t 
Kciombangara Island in the Soldomans on the right cf July 12 1943, 
the Japanese destroyer Yukikaze was able to detect radar sgnals on 
175 MHz from US ships (probably from their SA or SC air search 
radars) some two hours before the main engagement began (8). As a 
result, although the Allied warships carried : iperior radar, the 
Japanese destroyers were able to launch their torpedo attack first. 
In the ensuing action the destroyer USS G win was sunk and the 
cruisers Honolulu, St Laus and Leander damaged. The sole Japanese 
loss was the light cruiser Jintsu. 
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After the inconclvs ve action between oppcm n destroyers c{ r 
Vella Lavella island in the Solomon on the night d August 17, three 
cf the four Japanese destroyers involved were repcrted to be 
carrying radar intercept receivers. (9) 
Shortly afterwards US Navy warships in the combat zone began 
carrying X ARD and AR C-1 intercept receivers. One ± the first to 
do sD was the cruiser USS Montpelier, which took part in bombard- 
ments to support ct landing operations on New Georgia in the 
Solomops in August; her operators were able to corfirm the presence 
of Japanese early warning radars in the area. (10) 
In September two US warships fitted with ARC-1 formed part of 
the escort for the carriers mounting air strikes on Tarawa in the 
Gilbert Islands. One cf the ships carrying the receiver, the cruiser 
Minneapolis, afterwards reported: 
By keeping a careful watch on the Japanese radars on the 
small islands, it was possble for our force to evade many d 
them and at the worst know the moment when an-prise was no 
langer effective because of radar detection. (11) 
This operation provided some valuable lessons for the development cf 
future E1ir t equri pm ent and techniques. The report on the action 
recom mended that in addition to intercept receivers, warships should 
carry equipment to measure the pulse repetition frequency and pulse 
width of radar s. gnals so that operators could gain more information 
from the enemy transnissons. To assist operators to differentiate 
between friendly and enemy sgi als, the report asked that irf orm a- 
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tion be provided on the characteristics cf friendly radar agnals (thy 
had not been available ). 
As the US Elicit effort expanded, SD did the number cf reports cf 
what we now know were spurious 9 goals - though at the time it was 
difficult to discount the latter. By the late ai mm er 1 1943 US A-iips 
and aircraft had reported signals from possible Japanese radars on 34 
occasions - but several cf these were logged on frequencies between 
30 0 and 700MHz (12), a part of the cpectru m where there w ere in 
fact no Japanese radars. These spuneus sgnals appeared to indicate 
that the frequency spread cf the Japanese sets was far greater than 
was the case. (2) 
IV 
Given the few intercept receivers available to the Allied forces 
in the Pacific theatre, the great c1stances involved and the scarcity 
of Japanese radars, it is hardly surprising that there were major gaps 
in the Allied irt-elligence picture of what the enemy were doing in 
this field. Throughout almost the whole of 1943 there was reliable 
information on only one type of Japanese radar, the Naval M ark I 
Model 1 early warning set. Even at the end cf that period there was 
little evidence cf enemy shipbcrne cr airborne radars, or cf radars 
for fire cortrcL- this, at a time when Japanese forces had deployed - 
albeit in small numbers - no fewer than three dif f erent types cf 
ship-borne radar, an airborne radar for patrol aircraft and four 
different types cf anti--araraft in and searchlight control radar (for 
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a fuller account of the evolution of Japanese radar, see Appendix 
G). 
Only near the close cf 1943 did the first hard i rf or mation on 
other types of Japanese radar begin to tzickle in. On 2 November, 
following a low altitude attack by US bombers on shipEi ng cf f 
Rabaul, New Britain, an aircraft returned with a phctograph cf a 
Nachi class c wiser showing a beclspn ng-type aerial on top cf her 
mainmast (the aerial cf a Mark II Model 1 radar) (13). At about the 
same time a radioman from the light cruiser Jirtsu, captured at ter 
his Aiip was sunk in the action off Kdornbangara Island, mentioned. 
under interrogation that his ship had carried radar (14); he went rn 
to state that all new Japanese cruisers carried the device. Another 
Japanese Navy prisoner, captured on New Georgia, repeated this 
assertion. (15) 
Also during November 1943 a low-flying US reconnaissance aLr- 
craft photographed a previously unknown type cf mobile radar (in 
fact a Navy Mark I Model 2) near Rabaul (16) 
In the autumn cf 1943 the Navy Cast Mike 1 team cf enlisted 
radiomen was disbanded, and in its place came teams cf aircrew 
officers to carry out much the same task of installing 
intercept 
receivers into reconnaissance or bomber aircraft and operating the 
equipment in the air. One cf those involved in the w obc was 
Lieuten- 
ant Lawrence Heron who, with another officer, received orders in 
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November 1943 to join Patrol Squadron VP-104 operating PB4Y Lib- 
erators out of Henderson Field, Guadalcanal. As in the case Ct 
earlier Navy aircraft involved in Flirt work, Heron had to make rus 
own installation to enable the ARC-1 receivers to be trangerred 
from aircraft to ad. rc raft; he recall : 
We mounted our equipment on a couple cE Eieces cf plywood, 
the sheets sawed so that they would fit through the hatches cf 
the PB 4Y. They could be carried into the airplane, fastened to i 
table and the power cables plugged in. 
Up to February 1944 I flew about twenty nüssons to such 
locations as Truk and Kapingamarangi [in the Caroline Islands] 
and several - which scared the Hell out cf us - to Rabaul, New 
Britain, which was very heavily defended by the Japanese. (17) 
V 
Late in 1943 a new headquarters unit was formed in the South 
West Pacific theatre to co-ordinate Allied countermeasures activities 
in the area: Section 22 cf General Headquarters. This irter-Alli--d 
organization, located at Brisbane in Australia, was commanded by 
Major General Spencer Akin cf the US Army Signal Caps. Section 22 
included members of the US Army Signal Corps, Army Air Farces, 
Marines and Navy, as well as British, Australian, New Zealand, and 
Dutch personnel. The headquarters was responsble for collecting 
irf orm ation on enemy radar and radio systems, analyzing and c ssem - 
inating intelligence and re usitioning and assgning countermeasures 
personnel and equipment. The Section was also responable for 
analyzing Allied d goals traffic for anything that might i tri y 
movements or irtentions to the enemy, and traf riing Allied radio and 
radar operators to recognize enemy jamming and w here pass. ble work 
through it. (18) 
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Dtuing the autumn ct 1943 a further two B-24's, deagnar-ed 
F errets 01 and Vom, were prepared tar operations in the P acidc 
theatre. one cf the se involved in the work was Lieutenant Frank 
Witry, a Boca Raton graduate assgned to the crew cl Ferret VL, 
who remembered: 
We were given an old B-24, it was the most pathetic looking 
airplane I had ever seen. When we first saw it at Eglin it was 
stetting on its tail with the new heel cf f the ground. It lacked 
as if it had given up. We hauled it off to the sub-depot at Eglin 
and began work on it. We built a plywood compartment in the 
after end cf the bomb bay to house two operators; the operat- 
ors' seats were on the right ade of the compartment and the 
equipment racks were on the left ade. People from Wright Field 
and RRL ass. sted with the work. 
The counter measures siite for these B-24 Ferrets comprised 
SCR-587, Hallicrafters SX. 28 and S. 36 receivers, a panoramic 
adapter to measure pulse repetition frequency and a hand-belt 
prototype recording receiver; there were anni-directional aerials and 
a motor-driven rotatable Y agi directional aerial system hand-built by 
RRL, which in flight was lowered beneath the fuselage cf the 
aircraft. Late in 1943 the two new Ferrets set cut for Australia 
where they were assgned to Section 22. (19) 
By the end of 1943 Section 22 had begun to assemble a detailed 
picture cf the enemy radar network in its area. The step by step 
collection of i rf orm ation on the Japanese radar ate at Cape St 
George, on New Ireland in the Soiomons, illustrates well the cumul- 
ative results Cf the Flirt orations being mounted at this time; it 
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also shows the limitations of the first-generation egLn. rment used, 
which was liable to produce a spread of results: (20) 
Date Freq. PRF Remarks 
Oct 11, 43 100 me 800 cps Heard 50 miles NE 
cf C ape St George 
Failed to track 
plane. 
Oct. 30, 43 101 Mc 100 0 cps Heard 40 miles E 
Cape St George. 
Tracked plane. 
Oct 31, 43 105 me 1000 cps Reported by SW PA 
as posable St 
George radar. 
Dec 31, 43 192 me 1000 cps Reported by 
190 me 1000 cps SW PA as possble 
Cape St George 
radar. 
The analysis report put out by Section 22 to amplify this collection 
of data stated: 
Definitely established air warning radar, verified by photo- 
graphs as being located on high ground near tip cl Cape St 
George. Frequency is averaged as 101 megacycles, and is check- 
ed closely by SW PA (Southwest Pacific Area, US Navy) report cf 
105 megacycles. Pulse Repetition Frequency is reported at 800 
to 1,000, and may be assumed to be 1,000, common in Jap Mark I 
[Model 11 Type 2 radars. This radar installation has been bombed 
on numerous occasions, but to date is reported undamaged by 
intelligence summaries. This radar is thought to be still operat- 
ing, but on an interrupted schedule. This station is important in 
that it provides warning for Rabaul against strikes from the 
east, but its importance is lessened by the fact that it may be 
supplemented by coast watchers during daylight hours. 
Signals on 192 and 190 megacycles reported by SW PA indi- 
cate a poss. ble second radar in this area, although this unit is 
not found in photographs. Due to lack of evidence cf controlled 
A/A fire experienced by pilots, the possble second radar may be 
for surface search [ Author's note: the second radar was probably 
a Navy Mark I Model 2 tra n xrtable early warning set] " 
In January 1944 Frets 01 and VIII arrived in the theatre and 
began operations. For admirristrative purposes they were attached to 
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the 63rd Squadron of the 43rd Bomb Group, a Fifth Air r once B-24 
unit based at Fenton Field near Darwin (21). Frank w&y recalled: 
We were sent to Port M orthy, New Guinea, and flew cur first miss. on from there: we were in the aär for about 8 hours, flying cff the north coast of New Guinea where the Japanese 
had their radars. We logged several agnals and took bearings on the radars. During this and later missons we searched the band 
below 200 M Hz, with once in a while a search above to make 
sure there was not something new at, say, 3 50 MHz that we had been ignoring. Uaially we flew alone but sJmetimes we would go 
along with the bomber outfit, to see if there was any special 
Japanese radar activity during attacks. We found none. (22) 
\6 
Still there was very little information available to the Allies an 
Japanese airborne radars. As late as January 1944 a US intelligence 
document noted: 
No Japanese airborne radars have been recovered; none have 
been photographed or seen, and in only one instance has a Signal 
been heard which was believed to emanate from a Japanese air- 
craft ... The possble airborne radar frequency heard was during an attack by Japanese night fighters on a B-24 over 
W ew ak [New Guinea] on January 19,1944. The frequency could 
not be determined, but the AR C-1 search receiver operator in 
the bomber reported the pulse repetition frequency as higher 
than 700 cps ... (23) 
In fact no Japanesse airborne irterception radar was operational at 
this time; tither the linking f the radar sgnals with the night 
fighter irtercepticn had been a coinddence, cx the . gnaLs were 
spurious. The only hard irf crmation on Japanese airborne radar sD 
far had come from an aircraft mechanic cf the 802nd Air Group 
taken prisoner dating the capture c Makin in the Gilbert Islands in 
November. He mentioned that the Type 2 four-encined reconnaissance 
flying boats (Allied vole-name 'Emily') belorx ng to ti s unit carried 
a device for detecting ships at long range. (24) 
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In the months to fallow there would irf request reports of Allied 
aircraft being intercepted at night, seemingly by Japanese fighters 
using airborne interception radar or homing rn the bombers' own IFF 
transmissions. Concerning the latter, an irtelligence report dated 1 
March 1944 noted: 
(a) A bomber of the Fifth Bombardment Group (H) was tailed 
by two aircraft early in October just before daylight after a 
night bombing run in the Bougainville area. The aircraft followed 
so long as the Allied IF F was turned on and lost the bomber 
when the IF F was switched off. 
(b) The Fifth Bombardment Group (H) reported other i re- 
tances pertaining to "triggering" in the Bougainville-Buka area. 
One cf the concerned a bomber which was intercepted half way 
through a bombing run by seven enemy planes. The righters were 
in formation and blinking their running lights. When they reached 
within 600 yards of cur bomber the IFF was turned off. The 
bomber descended from 1,500 to 800 feet and the fighters were 
immediately last. (25) 
In spite cE such evidence, however, it is clear from Japanese records 
and US post-war investigations that the Japanese fighters carried 
neither airborne interception radar ncr equipment for homing cn 
enemy ZFF transponders. Since it is impcssble in such circumstances 
to prove a negative, and enemy AI radar remained a distinct pc %b- 
ility, Allied intelligence cfficers cor1±ii d to chase these will-o'- 
the-whisps. At the end of M arch an irteUigence document issued by 
headquarters South Pacific Farces (26) stated: 
Irterception of enemy Al radar is even more difficult than 
ASV [air to surface vessel] radar. It is best accomplished by a 
plane fitted with search gear flying into enemy territory, and 
permitting night fighters to home on itself to within a reason- 
able distance. At present, one RCM equipped SO PAC (South 
Pacific] Army Snooper plane is flying right misaons with this in 
mind, but to date has received no enemy airborne sgnaLs. This is 
quite likely due to the present lull in enemy car activity. 
- 173 - 
With hirk1s. ght it is clear there were no Japanese right fighters with 
airborne interception radar in the area, but this in no way lessens 
the bravery cf the B-24 Ferret crew which flew over enemy territ- 
ay acting as 'h ve bait'. In 'permitting right fighters to home cn 
itself to within a reasonable distance' the crew placed themselves in 
cnsderable danger: during a sLmilar misson over Germany at the 
end cf 1942, which established the operating parameters cf the 
Lichtenstein radar, a Royal Air Force wellington Elint aircraft was 
badly shot up and two aE the crew were wounded. 
\AI 
Fallowing the capture cf Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Lslands 
in February 1944, US intelligence secured an windfall cf documents 
which, at a stroke, more than doubled the number cf enemy radars 
on which there was hard in orm ation (28). There were useful 
additional details on the two radar types photographed in the Rabaul 
area the previous November: the Mark I Model 2 mobile radar early 
warning set, described as operating on frequencies around 200 MHz 
(the badly damaged remains of one of these sets were found on 
Kw ajalei n); and the shipborne M ark II M odel 1, w hose ' bedspri ng' 
aerial had been photographed on the Japanese cruiser off R ab auL 
The confirmatory details were useful enough, but there was 
more: the documents gave trief descriptions of three 
impatant types 
aE Japanese radar on which the Allied intelligence services 
had 
received had little or no previous hard information. The most 
intrig- 
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uing tit-bit was a mention of the Mark 11 Model 2 surface search 
radar fitted to Japanese warships with an operating wavelength cf 
10 centimetres (29); it was the first indication that the enemy had a 
radar in service operating in that part cf the spectrum. Tie docu - 
meats revealed the designations of two sub-types cE air-to-surf ace- 
vessel radar, the M ark VI Type 2 Special Model and the M ark VI 
Type 3 Special M oriel, and stated that both operated on frequencies 
in the 150 MHz band (30). And there were references to the Mark IV 
Model 1 and Mark IV Model 2 radars, both c# which were described 
as land-based arti-av. rcraft fire cor traf radars (31). All in all the 
documents constituted a most useful find, which added seven new 
designations to the Allied catalogue of Japanese radars. 
The Allied advance continued, and with it flow of captured 
radar materiaL In April 1944 c ound forces found the receiver cf an 
Air Mark VI radar on an airfield the Japanese had abandoned near 
Hallancha, New Guinea (32). Then in the following June, with the 
landings on Saipan, came more important fi rxis. On one cf the 
island's airfields troops f cund an intact Nakajim aB 5N 2 torpedo 
bomber (Allied code-name 'K ate') complete with aerials and mounting 
racks for the Air M ark VI radar; and separately, in the sa me hangar, 
was the radar itself with a lit cf spare parts (33). The aircraft and 
its radar were chipped bacK to the USA far examination; both were 
later flight tested and detailed repots issued (34). Elsew here on 
Saipan US troops found a damaged Naval M ark IV Model 3 searchlight 
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and fire control radar, the first Japanese equipment in this category 
to be examined by Allied intelligence officers, (35) 
VE 
By the spying of 1944 it was clear that permanently modified 
aircraft sich as the Army Air Forces Ferrets, flown by crews whcse 
main role was Elint, were far more Ef ecti ve in finding enemy radars 
than the makeshift receiver installations on Navy bomber and 
reconnaissance arcraft cperated by 'gypsy' crewmen. In recognition 
aE this, Section 22 directed the formation of a dedicated Navy Ebnt 
unit equipped with two PB Y Catalinas. (36) 
In April 1944 Lieutenart Lawrence Heron, who had earlier flown 
as intercept receiver operator on some misaons with Navy Patrol 
Squadron VP-104, received orders to form the Catalina Ferret unit. 
The modification of the 'Black Cats' took place at the seaplane be 
at Palm Island near Townsville, Australia (37). Fitting ARC-1 recei- 
vers into the aircraft was ample enough, but from first-hand exper- 
ience Heron ]anew that a direction-fir ding aerial was essential if his 
unit was to be able to locate enemy radars. No suitable aerials were 
avc-nable at the time, so Heron and his men made their own out of 
Duralumin tubing. To make insulated mountings for the rotating 
aerials the Navy men melted the insulating material out d some 
spare co-axial cables, allowed it to set hard and then machined it to 
shape. (38) 
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T ow ands the end cf Apail Heron's 'Black Cat' Ferrets began 
operations, flying irntially from the seaplane bases at Pott. M cby 
and Sam arai Island to hunt for radars along the north coaast cf N. -, 4 
Gu nea. The area searched far enemy radars grew progress vely 
wider, and towards the end ci June 1944 'Black Cats' flew the first 
Ehrt missons to the Pti lipiines. For these flights the C atalinas 
staged through a paint near Cape Sar sapor on the western &id of 
New Guinea still in Japanese hands, to take fuel from a seaplane 
tender anchored in a deserted bay. (39) 
Ix 
Ding the spring and summer c1 1944 there was a crash prog- 
ramme at the main US fleet bases in the Pacific theatre, to install 
irtercept receivers into all US warships liable to enter the war zone. 
Irtended to provide warning d the presence cl enemy radars and 
enable ships to conduct Ehrt searches in the course ct their normal 
patrols, the standard suite cram prnsed an APR-1 receiver acrd AP A-6 
pulse analyzer (40). The albmarines found the new equipment espec- 
ially useful, as one official US Navy release later stated: 
The ability to detect Japanese radars - shore, ship, and 
particularly air borne - long before the pcs-%bility aE being 
detected by the radars even existed, meant a margin cl safety 
which permitted submerging and other evasive tactics and saved 
any number cf cur underwater craft for further rampages among 
Japanese shi, ppi ng. (41) 
In August 1944 the albmarine USS Burrfish took an underwater 
demolition team to reconnoitre beaches an Peleliu and A ngau r in the 
Palaus group, in preparation for landings planned to take place there 
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the following month; her captain's report (42) shows clearly the 
value cf irtercept receiver warnings in enabling her to avoid contact 
with the enemy and gauge the strength cf the defences: 
4 August 
0430 Enemy radar on APR. 
0 500 M ore enemy radar. 
2125 Enemy radar on 176 m c. Manned SJ [air search radar]. 
2157 SJ contact on port quarter 12,000. Clear lookouts 
from bridge. Lat 7° 04'N Long, 133° 55'E. 
2159 Contact moved rapidly to a position down moon and 
commenced coming in. Plane sghted at 9,000 yards by 
OOD [officer of the deck], coming in. 
2200 Dived with plane closing rapidly. Plane appeared to 
be a 2-motor bomber. His radar apparently had no 
trouble in staying on us and he was making a delib- 
erate run from down moon. But for the APR we would 
have, at best, taken a close one. Especially ance I did 
not turn on the SJ until after APR had cortact. 
10 August 
2300 Dived for radar equipped plane in Gat 6° 45'N Long 
133° 1l' E. Had cortact with plane on APR for 15 
minutes during which time the signals became prog- 
ress. vely stronger. Signal was very loud and steady 
when we dived. Ncte that weather was dark, overcast, 
with frequent rain squalls. Jap planes do not confine 
their patrols to clear moonlight nights. 
11 
APR sgnal t rom la rxi-based radar. 
Dived 10 miles east of Peleliu. 
Dived when two strong la nd- based radars came 
trained in our sector. We were 8100 yards from the 
beach at this time. 
2130 Came to APR depth - radars still. on. 
2355 Surfaced. No land radar operating. 
12 August 
1925 Came to APR depth - land radars are on. 
2000 Tasted again - radars on. Abandoned hope cl 
surfacing close to the islands tonight. 
2218 Surfaced - seven miles from lard. Land radars an, 
but 
sweep. ng. 
XI 
August 
0420 
0530 
2025 
By the summer of 1944 Mied intelligence cffiCETs had discov- 
eyed a great deal about the Japanese Navy radars 
deplciyed in the 
South West Pacific theatre cE operations. But at this time scarcely 
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anything was known about the separate family cf radars ä. _"vA1oped to 
fulfill the same tasks for the Japanese Army and widely ü,? ploy. _d 
throughout the occupied territories in China, Inca-C na, B urm i, 
Malaya and the horn e islands. The intelligence attack cn the was 
already in progress, how ever, launched in a completely dir f erent wa }- 
and from a quite different direction: by the B-29 Superfortress 
bomber units making the first large scale raids on metropolitan Japan 
itself, from bases deep insde Ctina. In the next chapter we shall s, e 
how these operations uncovered yet mcre Japanese radars. 
liý 
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CHAPThR 11 SUPE, RFORTRESSLS TO CHINA 
In mid-1943 the US Army Air Fcrces began to receive the first 
examples of an important new strategic bomber: the Boeing B-29 
Superfortress, which at the time represented the zenith cf heavy 
bomber design and construction. with a maximum all-up weight of 67 
tons, the B-29 was more than twice as heavy as the B-17 and the 
B-24 types it was to replace. The Superfoortress was the first heavy 
bomber fitted with a Pressurized cabin; and its defensive armament 
cE twelve . 5-in machine guns and one 20 mm cannon in remotely 
oantro]1 d barbettes was the most powerful yet seen (1). The B-29 
could deliver 6,000 pounds of bombs to a target 1,700 miles from its 
base and return, carrying normal operational fuel reserves; no other 
bomber of the period came close to matching this superb perform- 
ance. And, significantly for this history, the B-29 was also the first 
aircraft type to be delivered from the makers with mace reserved 
for radio countermeasures equipment. (2) 
As remarkable as anything else about the B-29 programme was 
the dispatch with which this revolutionary new heavy bomber was 
brought into service: the initial contract to Mild the aircraft was 
issued in June 1940 and the prototype first flew in September 1942. 
In June 1943 the first Superfortress unit, the 58th Bombardment 
Wing (Very Heavy), started to form to receive the initial production 
aircraft (3). By the end cf November 1943 the XX th Bomber 
Command was formed, to take control cf the Superfortress units 
forming at airfields in Kansas. The new bomber was to be used in 
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the far eastern theatres cf aperations and plans were laid for the 
first B-29 Wing to move to operational bases in north-east India in 
the wring of 1944. At the same time forward bases were being prep- 
aced in China, from which the B-29's were to mount attacks an 
Japan itself. (4) 
At this time Al iced intelligence officers had little idea of the 
strength ar the capability of the air defences cn the Japanese home 
islands. Until now the Japanese radars had posed little threat to 
Allied air or naval operations, but it was clear there were many gaps 
in the intelligence picture cf the enemy capability in this field. 
Obviously the Japanese appreciated the importance of radar for 
night operations, and had plenty of opportunity to learn of the h1 lied 
use of such equipment. It was not known to what extent German 
expertise and equipment were available to the Japanese; but sib- 
marines passed frequently between the two nations and it was gene-r- 
ally felt that the Japanese would know about developments in radar 
and vauntermeasures in Germany (in fact, up do the beginning of 
1944, technical co-cperati. on between the Germans and the Japanese 
had been minimal; as their war 3tuation deteriorated the Germans 
were more forthcoming with information and equipment, but the 
change of heart was boo late to have any impact an the war in the 
Pacific). US submarines on patrol off Japan had picked up signals 
from low frequency early warning radars, and there were continual 
reports of intercepts of radar signals all the way up the frequency 
spectrum; concerning the latter, however, there were by now strong 
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sons that many of these were harmonic indications aE sgnals 
from lower frequency radars. In the Allied intelligence community 
the general view was that the Japanese probably did have radars 
more advanced than those discovered a) far - possab1y the German 
Wuerzburg or something like it - but these were being held back for 
the defence of the homeland. (5) 
Also at the end of 19 43 the APR-4 radar intercept receiver 
produced by the C rosley Radio Corporation, the Army Air Fockes' 
version oaf the APR-l, began to emerge from the plant in Cincinnati 
in large numbers. Far use with both types of receiver came a series 
cf RR L-desgned attachments: a family of tuning units fitted with 
motorized sweep, Types rU-56A, TU-57B and TU-58B, to oxver the 
spectrum from 40 to 1,000 MHz; the AP A-6 pulse analyzer with an 
associated audio oscillator to measure the pulse repetition frequency 
and pulse width of radar sgnals; the APA-23 recorder which elect- 
iically etched on paper tape the time and radio frequency of signals 
received, for later analysis; and the AP A-17 and AP A-24 direction 
finders. (6) 
In April 194 4 Superfortresses aE the 58th Wing left Kansas to 
deploy to operational bases around K haragpur in Irxdia. 
One B-29 in four was to act as a countermeasures aircraft, initially 
carrying an APR-4, an AP A-6 pulse analyzer and a are w man to 
operate them; some of the aircraft were aL3 to carry the A RR-5 
com m unifications search receiver (the sere cie! gnation now given to 
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S. 27). When they went into 0o m bat the 
Superfortress units would have to pick up intelligence on the enemy 
defences, and hope not to run into boo many unpleasant sirposes in 
the process. (7) 
Dr Joe Pettit had worked at RRL on developments from the 
SCR-587 receiver and had been detached to the C rosley Radio Corp- 
cration to see the APR-4 into production. Early in 1944 he and 
another RRL engineer, Don MacQuivey, went to Irrdia with the 58th 
Wing as Technical Observers to oversee the US countermeasures 
efforts in the theatre. While there Petit kept a detailed technical 
diary and sent frequent reports on what he saw to General McC lell- 
and, the Air Communications Officer at the Army Air Farces dead- 
quarters in Washington. Fcrtunately for this history he retained his 
diary and copies of the reports, and kindly made them available to 
the author. Together, the documents convey a vivid picture of the 
unfolding pattern of operations and the diffloibies which had to be 
avereome. On 15 May 1944 Joe Pettit reported to Washington: 
The planning for the (radio countermeasures) search program 
is actively under way. Not all. the RC M equipment and cfficers 
have arrived in the four Groups. The Group personnel are round- 
ing up their equipment and setting up storage and maintenance 
bents. Difficulty is expected in protecting the equipment from 
dust and from moisture when the rains come next month. 
Extreme ranges of temperature will be encountered in the comb- 
ination of high-altitude flying and high temperatures on the 
ground. Shade temperatures at present run 105 degrees to 112 
degrees Fahrenheit, but since the airplanes are in the direct sun 
the temperatures inside are I. robablY well above 120 degrees 
Fahrenheit ... (8) 
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Since January 1944 No 160 Special Flight of the Royal Air Fcrce 
had been flying Elint missions from India and Ceylon using two 
modified B-24's. Joe Pettit made contact with the unit and learned 
that its aircraft had cx nducted missions along the aast of Burma, to 
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and to Sumatra. So far the only 
Japanese radar type positively identified in these areas was the 
well-known Navy Mark I Model 1 early warning set. (9) 
The 58th Wing went into action for the first time on 5 June 
1944, when ninety-eight B-29 's carried out a daylight attack on rail 
yards at Bangkok, Thailand. To initiate the intelligen n 
effort, sixteen SuPerfOrtresses carried intercept receivers and radio 
countermeasures afficers. The attack made it clear that some teeth- 
ing troubles remained after the hasty introduction of the B-29 into 
service: five aircraft were lost, none of them to enemy action. 
Afterwards Joe Pettit reported: 
Of the 16 RCM observers nine reached the target area with 
search equipment in operation. Of these, one was monitoring the 
1.5 - 18 Mc range with a BC-348 receiver, two monitored 27 - 
143 Mc with the A N/A RR -5, five the 75 - 300 Mc range with 
the AN/APR-4 and TU-58B and one in the 300 - 1000 Mc region 
with the AN/APR-4 and TU-57B. 
Only one or two satisfactory intercepts of the Japanese Mk 
I [Model 11 were obtained even though the flight crossed the Bay 
of Bengal where at least one Mk I installation is known to exist. 
Three operators logged a total of nine intercepts in the 
frequency range of 67 - 82 Mc. Of these, five had PR F's of 400 
- 500, three were recorded near 200, and one merely estimated 
as "low". Pulse-length measurements were highly inconsistent, 
but the indications are of a relatively long pulse. This class of 
signals seems to correspond to the two stations previously 
discovered at W ewak, New Guinea ... 
No signals rese m kling a German W uerzburg have been report 
ed, although only one receiver in this frequency range was in 
operation at the target of Mission * 1. (10) 
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The 67 - 82 MHz radar was the Japanese Army Tachi-6 early warn- 
ing set, which had first entered service in 1942 and was widely 
deployed throughout the home islands and occupied terr tab by 
mid-1944. The discovery of the radar at this late stage, when more 
than 200 were in service, is testLmony to the inadequacy of the 
Allied Elint effort in the China and south-east Asa theatres up to 
the middle of 1944. 
In his report to Pettit also discussed some of the count 
measures problems encountered during the mission. 
Some difficulties have resulted from the B-29 installation. 
Most serious is the location of the inverter [providing AC power 
for the countermeasures equipment] in the bomb bay, rather than 
in the pressurized cabin. A faire of the inverter, or one of the 
inverter fuses, renders the whole installation inoperative since a 
repair cannot be made in flight. Furthermore, on long missions 
when auxiliary bomb-bay gasoline tanks are carried, it has been 
necessary to shut crown the inverter during periods of fuel trans- 
fer due to the are hazard from the gasoline fumes. This results 
in periods of shutdown of the RC M equipment when search might 
be carried on ... The [radio countermeasures] observer's operating position [on 
the seat of the aircraft lavatory] has proved uncomfortable and 
not conducive to good observations. Several of the men have 
obtained permission to remove the toilet and replace it with a 
salvaged radar operator's seat. On a search mission it is difficult 
to reach and observe the necessary controls of the several items 
of equipment, namely one or more receivers, pulse analyzer, and 
audio oscillator. A better rack arrangement may be desirable for 
future installations, even if it involves moving to a new location, 
e. g. opposite the radar operator. (11) 
On 15 June the 58th Wing mounted its second operation, which 
was much more ambid than the first: an attack on the Imperial 
Iron and Steel Works at Yawata on the Japanese island of Kyushu. 
This was the first attack on the enemy homeland snce April 1942, 
when lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle led a small force of B-25 
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medium bombers off an aircraft carrier to attack Tokyo. For the 
attack on Yawata the B-29's had to deploy to forward a; rf e rear 
Hsnching in China, the nearest bases to Japan available to the 
Allies. Even so he distances were involved: with a round trip cif 
some 2,400 miles this was to be the longest range aerial bombing 
mission yet made. One of the radio countermeasures officers who 
flew on the mission with the 40th Bomb Group was Lieutenant Tom 
Friedman: 
On the afternoon of 15 June sixty-eight B-29's got airborne 
and followed each other north eastwards towards the enemy 
homeland. We were scheduled to reach the target around mid- 
night and attack singly, so there was no attempt to assemble in 
formation. 
As dusk fell I crawled back to the windowless, crowded 
radar compartment, to my position in the aircraft The counter- 
measures equipment had been a late addition to the B-29's 
inventory and, in spite of its great size, there was little spare 
space inside the pressurized compartments. The racks for my 
equipment had been squeezed in between the bulkhead and the 
chemical toilet. As the twelfth man in the aircraft my "seat" 
was the lid of the thilet itself -a subject for numerous wise- 
cracks on the appropriateness of my position! 
The carefully tested search gear was mounted in three racks 
in front of my "seat". My task during the mission was to monitor 
the range 75 to 300 MHz, with an occasional foray up to 500 to 
600 MHz to see if the Japanese were using anything similar to 
the German Wuerzburg radar. A small electric motor, controlled 
by limit reversing switches, ceaselessly swept the tuning control 
of the APR-4 back and forth across the band I had selected. (12) 
As his B-29 neared enemy territory Friedman started to hear signals 
from a Japanese radar on the APR-4. He switched aff the sweep 
motor and tuned in the receiver manually, until at 80 MHz he could 
hear the buzz of the radar. Half a minute's work with the APA-6 
revealed a square-topped pulse, 35 microseconds wide (13). The radar 
was an Army Tachi-6 early warning set, familiar to B-29 operators 
after the Bangkok raid. 
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So our approach had been detected well before we reached 
the coast of China and several hours before our target. It 
remained to be seen what use if any the enemy would make of 
this information. As we neared the coast of China further 
signals came in from other early warning radars, on frequencies 
around 80 MHz and around 100 MHz. The strengths of the signals 
slowly increased until at times I thought we passed directly over 
the sites. (14) 
The B-29 continued on towards the target, passing over the small 
island in the Strait of Taishima which was the Initial Pcint for the 
bombing run. 
It was an eerie feeling to know that far below us our every 
move was being carefully watched on the enemy scopes and 
noted on their plotting boards. The $64,000 question was what 
could, or would, they do about it? Busily I logged the character- 
istics of each set of radar signals in turn, carefully noting the 
time of each so that after the flight the positions where the 
signals had been received could be plotted. The enemy radars in 
the target area included some of the 80 MHz sets I had picked 
up initially, the Mark I Model I set on 100 MHz (similar to the 
one I had seen at Eglin, captured on Guadalcanal) and there was 
some activity at 150 and 200 MHz which I took to be either gun- 
laying or searchlight control sets. I found nothing at all during 
my incursions into the 500 to 600 MHz band. 
Nearly a score of enemy radars were following us during our 
bomb run. From time to time I switched my earphones from the 
search receiver to the regular interphone and could hear the 
chatter of the gunners and the bombardier as they noted the 
searchlights' beams around us and the flashes of the bursting 
[anti aircraft] shells. (15) 
At the end of the bombing run the B-29 pulled into a steep turn 
and set course for home. On the return flight Friedman logged a 
smilar set of signals to those he had found on the way out, before 
the bomber regained frLetxdly territory and the last of the enemy 
gnats faded out. The bomber landed at Hsching after a flight 
lasting more than 14 hours. (16) 
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Seven B-29's failed to return from the Yawata mission, in each 
case due to accidents ar mechanical failures. Analysis of the ooun- 
termeasures operators' logs gave the first hard information on the 
Japanese radar network in China and the home islands. Zn his report 
to Washington Joe Pettit wrote: 
On 15 June combat mission #2 was carried out against 
Yawata on Kyushu Island. This was a night mission, the planes 
crossing the target around midnight local time. Of the 16 RCM 
observers 11 completed the flight with search equipment in 
operation, although one of these turned back short of the target. 
Nine of the observers searched the 75 - 300 Mc range with the 
AN/APR-4. Six observers searched 300 - 1000, during all or part 
of the time, with the AN/APR-4. One observer monitored 60 - 
140 Mc with the AN/AR R-5. 
Results obtained in the 70 - 300 Mc range were quite good, 
the reports of the operators checking each other with good con- 
sistency. (17) 
Pettit robed that the 75 MHz band signals - from the Tachi-6 - were 
obviously from an early warning radar and were heard strongly along 
the entire route over enemy territory. The countermeasures 
operators reported that this type of radar appeared to be tracking 
them: 'no variation in signal strength' (18). This is explained by the 
omni-di ectional transmissions from the Tachi-6, which produced a 
continuous sgnal on an intercept receiver (this type of radar used 
directional aerials only for reception). 
The Mk I radar at 100 Mc was heard over most cf the route, 
particularly near the China Coast, Korea and the Japanese 
Islands. 
A few intercepts were made at 150 Mc. The PR F and pulse 
length do not check with similar intercepts in the S. W. P. A. 
(South West Pacific Area]. It is ected that these may be 
second-harmonic responses from 75 Mc stations. 
A large number of signals were heard between 175 and 220 
Mc. These signals were concentrated in the target area, off the 
tip Cf Kcrea, and in the vicinity cf Nanking. Ob®ervati, ons cf the 
PRF are not consistent, this is perhaps accountable to the inher- 
ent ciifficulty of concentrations cf signals during the relatively 
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short time in the target area. The pulse lengths were relatively 
short. (19) 
Almost certainly these sgnals were from the Navy Mark I Model 2 
early warning set, and also from the Mark VI Model 1 and 2 and 
Tachi-1 and -2 searchlight and fire-arntrol radars. 
Results in the range 300 - 1000 Mc were inconsistent. Of 
the sx observers monitoring this band two heard only one sgnal 
each, while one reported numerous signals throughout the entire 
flight. It is suspected that some of the latter are spurious. It 
can be said, however, that no signals were checked by more than 
one operator. Also no signals were logged having the character- 
istics of the German W uer zburg ... There was no positive evidence of radar-controlled flak ar 
searchlights. Anti-aircraft fire was stated to be moderate and 
generally inaccurate, and the fire seemed to be dependent upon 
illumination of the planes by searchlights. There were numerous 
cases of "coning" by searchlights, but only after one light had 
found the plane. The evidence is not definite that a GL [gun- 
laying] or SLC [searchlight control] type of radar does not exist, 
however. It would be suspected that the 175 - 200 Mc radars 
might be the ones intended for this purpose because of their 
concentration around the heavily defended areas. (19) 
The initial attack on Yawata had taken the defences by surprise 
and their reaction was weak and poorly co-c inated. Although the 
B-29 's had been tracked for much of their flight and there had been 
more than two hours warning of their approach to the target, the 
anti-aircraft gun defences had been ineffectual and bomber crews 
reported no evidence of enemy radar-fitted night fighters (in fact 
the Japanese had none in service even on the home islands). 
Following the Yawata rnLsgon the B-29's struck at other targets 
in Japan and Manchuria. The countermeasures cperators' logs from 
these missions confirmed the impýes ion gained dewing the earlier 
attacks: that the state cf technology of the Japanese radars was 
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about equal to that of Allied sets in 1941. Fcr the time being these 
radars posed no sen ups threat to the heavy bombers, but there oxuld 
be no doubt the attacks would spur the Japanese to improve the air 
defences of the homeland in any way they could. 
The fifth mission was a night attack by 54 Superfortresses on 10 
August, on the oil refinery at Palembang, Sumatra. This yielded a 
a, uple of interesting reports on the enemy defences, as Joe Pettit 
reported to Washington: 
One 200 Mc signal came on suddenly at Palembang, followed 
shortly by the appearance of twelve searchlights. This signal had 
aPRF of 1020 PPS and a pa se length of 6.4 microseconds. (20) 
Almost certainly the radar involved was a Tachi-1 or -2 or a Mark 
IV Model 1 or 2. 
One aircraft was followed by night fighters. During the time 
of their presence two strong signals were heard at 177 Mc; 
these had PRF's of 1100 and 2300, with pulse lengths of 4.4 and 
8 microseconds respectively. These signals may be an enemy AI 
[airborne interception] system based on triggering our Mark III 
IF F. One aircraft, in fact, reported night fighters attacking 
them off the west coast of Sumatra when their IFF was on, and 
losing them by turning off the IF F. (21) 
Commenting in his diary, Joe Pettit gave his personal opinions on the 
reports: 
First, there was the incident concerning the 12 searchlights 
which suddenly appeared following the turning on of a 200 Mc 
signals (1020 pps, 6 micro secs) while the plane was in the vicin- 
ity of the target, Palembang. It seems that the searchlights did 
not succeed in "coning" the plane, probably because of the heavy 
undercast. Thus the evidence regarding SLC radar is "incon- 
clusive" but not "negative". 
Second, there is the night fighter business. Apparently there 
was considerable trouble from night fighters off the west coast 
of Sumatra on the return trip. Field cyders called for our planes 
to turn on their IF F on leaving the coast, presumably to Provide 
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identification to our cooperating naval unit. At least two planes 
reported that the night fighters fallowing them could be 
shaken off by turning off the IFF. This is exactly what was 
reported from So. Pac. and leads to two possible conclusions: 
(1) the stay from So. Pac. has gotten around so well that they were influenced in their observations. 
(2) the Japs are actually using a type of AI based on an interrogator-responsor system like our SCR-729. This type of AI 
wouldn't be a bad idea (if we kept our I FF on), for a very low 
powered transmitter would suffice and the equipment could be 
quite light in weight. Time will tell. (22) 
As mentioned earlier, and in spite cf the sometimes convincing evid- 
ence to the contrary, it is clear from Japanese records that their 
night fighters had neither airborne intercept radar nor a device for 
deliberately triggering Allied IFF sets so that homings could be made 
on the reply signals. 
II 
Since his arrival in India in at the end of April 1944 Joe Pettit 
had pressed for a Ferret aircraft for the 14th Air Farce, to seek out 
the Japanese radars in China and south east Asia. It soon became 
clear that no fury modified aircraft would be forthcoming in the 
immediate future from the USA: if such an aircraft was needed it 
would have to be modified in-theatre. On 29 May a B-24 was made 
available for modification and work began to equip the aircraft with 
two SCR-587 receivers, two ARR-5 receivers, two APR-2 auto- 
search receivers, two APA-6 pulse analyzers and direction finding 
aerials. After several problems the aircraft was finally ready on 12 
August (23). On the following day it left for its operational be at 
Kunming in China, and during the months that followed the B-24 
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flew Elint missions to Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, Hainan and 
over much of Japanese occupied China. 
nI 
The B-29's flying from forward bases in China continued to 
deliver attacks on targets in Japan until early in 1945. But almost 
everything required at the forward bases, including bombs and 
aviation fuel, had to be brought in by air; it was the shortage of 
airlift capacity, rather than strength of the Japanese defences, 
which res dcted these early Superfortress operations. The ninth and 
final B-29 attack on Japan from China book place on 6 January 1945 
(25). From then on the B-29's based in Irxiia and China attacked only 
lesg-clistant targets in the Japanese occupied territories, until their 
departure for the Mariana islands at the end cf M arch. 
Before we examine the next phase of B-29 operations, however, 
chronology demands that we return our attention to the counter- 
measures congest in Europe. 
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CHAPTER 12 CRESCENDO OF JAMMING 
In Espe, with the successful completion cif the invasions cf 
northern and southern France, the main concern of the in the 
Army Air Fcrces involved with countermeasures returned to that cf 
providing sent Carpet Jammers to protect heavy bombers from 
the worst effects of the German radar-controlled flak. In the mean 
time the frequencies cfW uer z burg had continued to spread, to an 
extent that became all too clear to those who received the weekly 
histograms issued by Gene Fubini's section at 8th Air Fcrce 
headquarters. 
In some squadrons one heavy bomber in four now carried APR-1 
ar crude AB L-15 ' Pc nter' receivers, so that the new AP Q-9 version 
of Carpet could be spot-tuned on W uer z burg frequencies rot covered 
by the main barrage of jamming. But this necessitated specialized 
countermeasures crewmen on a quarter cf the aircraft - suddenly 
vastly more countermeasures operators were needed than could 
possibly be trained at Boca Raton. It on became clear that if the 
8th Air Force wanted additional crewmen for this purpose, it would 
have to train them itself. Lieutenant Joe Wack d bed how this 
programme was implemented in his unit, the 488th Bomb Group with 
B-24 Is: 
M though there was now a requirement for an additional 
crew member to operate the Carpets on the modified aircraft, 
no trained men arrived at the 448th to perform this task. It 
became my res)onslbiity to find volunteers for the job and train 
them to do it. Fortunately for my recruiting efforts I shared a 
Nissen hut with the squadron adjutant. Through him I had the ear 
cf the squadron commander whenever I needed people, SO there 
was never any . Some of the People 
I got were ex-radio 
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operators who had completed their 25 missions and volunteered 
for a second tour. Others were ex-gunners who had become red- 
undant when some of the gun positions were removed from the 
bombers because German fighters had become less of a threat. 
Others still were radio mechanics who wanted to get flying 
status. Almost anyone brave enough to volunteer to fly combat 
missions, and clever enough to learn the job, could become an 
RC M operator. Apart from me, nobody who did the job in the 
448th had any prior training in RC M or knowledge of it. 
I flew on a few of the early missions with the spot-tuned 
Carpets, to discover how best to operate the jammers so that I 
could instruct the others. Once in the defended area we would 
sweep the receiver up and down the Wuerzburg frequency band 
until we heard the growl of a radar tracking the formation. Ne 
would then switch on a Carpet to transmit and adjust its fre- 
quency until we heard the sound of "rushing water" blot out the 
radar signals. The jammer was then on frequency. That done, we 
would examine each of the pmm ed frequencies in turn, and turn 
off the jammer for a baief pause to listen if the radar was still 
following our formation. In an area where there were powerful 
flak defences the RCM operator could be a very busy man. As 
we were sweeping through the W uerzburg band with the receiv- 
er, we could often hear the "rushing water" sound as other 
aircraft jammed with their Carpets. (1) 
The US strategic bomber units in Europe needed many more 
Carpets to cover the increasingly wide frequency band used by 
Wuerzburg. Yet although the jammer was being produced in large 
numbers, far too few of them were reaching the operational bomber 
units. What was happening to the remainder? Earl Cullum had been 
one of the members of RRL sent to England to assist with installing 
countermeasures equipment into warships for the invasion. Once this 
task was complete, and before he returned to the USA, he decided 
to visit a bomber base to see how the new batches of Carpets were 
being received. He was shocked to discover that scarcely any had 
arrived at the unit; other bomb groups bold the same story (2). By 
this time about 500 Carpets had been installed in bombers in the 
European Theatre of Operations; but many cf these aircraft had 
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ibeequently been lost in action and by this time only about 225 
operational bombers carried the pm mer (3). C uIlum sent a priority 
signal to Pentagon reporting his discovery, which started an 
immediate investigation into the fate of the missing Carpets. They 
were tracked down to a depot at Cincinnati, where the officer in 
charge had no idea what they were for and was waiting for 
instructions on what to do with them. The jammers were immediately 
sent to the port of Newark, New , jersey, and loaded on the next 
available ship going to England. (4) 
It was October 1944 before the dam finally broke and a torrent 
of Carpets began to reach the operational units. The table below 
shows the steep rise in the number of Carpet installations fitted to 
8th Air Force heavy bombers (5): 
8th Air Force, Number of Heavy Bombers Fitted With Carpet 
Barrage Jamming Spot Tuned 
1943 
1944 
October 68 - 
February 16 125 - 
March 177 - 
May 21 approx 23 3 6 
July 165 31 
September 10 141 62 
October 10 120 81 
November 1 1342 126 
December 10 2746 147 
December 31 3460 507 
The massive influx cf Carpets into the 8th Air Farce in October 
1944 was followed by a similar rise in the number available to the 
15th Air Farce in Italy. 
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During 1944 there had also been a steady increase in the amount 
cf Chaff geed by the US strategic bombers over Europe, and by 
October consumption by the 8th Air Fcrce alone was running at 
about 1,000 tons per month. By now sent was known about this 
countermeasure for Headquarters 8th Air Force to allow its surd- 
irate Air Divisions complete freedom of action in its use. Bombers, 
carrying chutes to enable their crews to dispense large quantities of 
the metal fail rapidly, went ahead cf the main formations to seed 
their path. Fighters released special canisters filled with chaff, 
which broke up in their air to disgorge their contents. During this 
period 'way out' Chaff tactics were often employed, with the sole 
object of confusing the enemy gunners with new and unexpected 
effects. For example, on occasions the Chaff-dropping force would 
circle the target dispensing the material; on other occasions it would 
lay a Chaff trail along a course perpendicular to that of the main 
bombing force; on yet other occasions the Bomb Division attacking 
target A would dispense chaff up-wind cI target B, which another 
Bomb Division was to attack some ten minutes later (6). The decision 
had been taken to install automatic Chaff dispensing systems in 
replacement bombers to be sent to Europe, and these were eagerly 
awaited. But there were delays in the production of these units and 
until they became available every bundle 1 Chaff dropped from the 
heavy bombers had to be put out by hand. (7) 
During the second half cf 1944 the 8th Air Fccce lost approxi- 
mately 1,320 heavy bombers to flak and only 438 to enemy fighters: 
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the trend indicated er ie in the year, that flak was the mai- 
threat, was now firmly established (8). Surprisingly there was no 
sudden reduction in the number of bombers last to flak during the 
autumn of 1944, in any way commensurate with the he and sudden 
increase in the number of Carpet jammers in use. Only somewhat 
later did it become clear why this was so: when jamming denied them 
the use of their fire control radars the German gunners would aban- 
don predicted fire and resort to unaim ed barrage fire against the US 
bombers (9). The cost of this in terms of ammunition expenditure 
was, however, enormous. For example during the attack through 
overcast by 720 US bombers on Hamburg on 25 October 1944, the 
forty-four heavy gun surrounding the city fired 24,416 
rounds of 88mm, 105mm and 128mm ammunition, almost all of it in 
barrages after the majority of fire control radars had been pm med 
out. The powerful cannonade caused the destruction of jest one 
heavy bomber (10). Shortly after this action the German High 
Command issued orders that henceforth barrage fire was to be used 
only in the defence of fled targets of particular importance: if 
used generally it depleted stocks of heavy anti-aircraft shells faster 
than the German munitions industry could produce them. Fdlowing 
the implementation of the new cyder the effectiveness of the 
j3 m ming in reducing the number of heavy bombers lost cr damaged by 
flak, during bombing attacks through overcast, immediately became 
evident: this type of flak was now only one quarter as effective as 
when there was no jamming pent (11) 
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In spite ct the success aE countermeasures in reducing the over- 
all effectiveness of radar-]aid flak, there would be occasions when 
German gunners 'beat the odds' and inflicted heavier than usual 
losses on formations of attacking bombers. After the war one author- 
itative US report (12) stated: 
In the face of these various statements as to the effective- 
ness of our jamming, it is well to mention that our counter- 
measures were sometimes not effective. Many cases cited in 
German battle reports indicate that a certain number of flak 
radars would be able to track through even very string jamming. 
Conditions such as siting, luck in picking a good [ie. unja m med ] 
frequency, wind conditions (as regards effects of Window 
motion on the "laus" devices [anti-Chaff modifications such as 
Wuerzlaus]), relative location and flight path of the attacking 
formations all entered into such occurrences. After strong jamm- 
ing began, particular cases of tracking by a few radars still. 
occurred. This is a natural conclusion when it is realized that 
radar control of flak was able to achieve an overall effective- 
ness of one quarter of normaL 
The German reacted to the powerful increase in Carpet ja m Ming 
in the autumn of 1944 by introducing an entirely new band of 
frequencies for the Wuerzburg and Mannheim radars: the C Band, 
running from 440 to 470 MHz. In arider to keep the new frequencies 
secret - and therefore free from jamming - for as long as possible 
radar operators had strict orders to switch to the new band only if 
absolutely necessary (13). To counter the ever-increasing quantities 
cf Chaff being dropped by the AIlied bombers two new modifications 
were introduced for the flak-control radars: K -laus and Tastlatis. But 
although these were somewhat more effective than the earlier 
uerzlaus, dense concentrations of Chaff could saturate either cf 
them (14) (Far a description of the anti-lamming modifications fitted 
to W uerzlxirg see Appendix E). 
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The increase in countermeasures activity by the 8th Air Farce in 
England was fo]]owed by a similar increase by the 15th Air Fcrce in 
Italy. It that theatre, however, the only RRL assistance was from 
the three technical representatives: John Fcster (who during the 
Nixon administration would become Director of Research and 
Engineering at the Pentagon), Roger Avery and Robert Buss. In 
Italy there were few countermeasures-trained officers with the Bomb 
Groups and it fell to the RRL representatives to provide the 
necessary instruction for operators assigned to C arpet spot- m ming 
aircraft, nicknamed 'Panthers' in the 15th Air Force (15). When the 
RRL representatives began visiting units, however, it on became 
clear that after the initial and obvious success of Chaff in the 
theatre earlier in the year there had been a marked decline in inter- 
est in countermeasures. The main reason was that the crews that had 
been convinced of their value, those flying missions at the time the 
countermeasure was introduced and who had seen an immediate 
reduction in the effectiveness of enemy anti-aircraft gunnery, had 
reached the end of their tours of co m bat duty and returned to the 
USA. Those who replaced them had little idea cf what counter- 
measures could do for them. Reporting to Dr Terman, Robert Buss 
wrote: 
After working through the first two or three Bomb Groups, 
it became obvious that training Panther operators was only a 
small portion of a badly needed training program. In almost 
every Bomb Group, the conditions that existed were roughly as 
follows: the combat crews knew little or nothing about RC M. 
Rumors on the detrimental effect of this equipment were so bad 
that Chaff cr Carpet at times purposely were not used. It is 
very doubtful if more than twenty percent of the equipment was 
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being used. The ignorance of the crews was such that only a 
small portion of the equipment used could have been effective. The information given above was not readily available. It was 
not possible for a Technical Observer to obtain this information 
within a few days - if the normal methods were employed. The 
radar officer was seldom aware of the conditions. (The 
absence of RCM officers was responsible for a large portion of this trouble. ) Most of the information was obtained by S/Sgt 
Burrell who as a seasoned GI was able to detect the real situa- 
tion behind the "inspection front". (16) 
In response to this clear requirement it was arranged that John 
Faster and Staff Sergeant Clifton Burrell would provide a series of 
lectures at the operational bomber bases in Italy, in addition to the 
instruction for spot-jammer operators. The move was an immediate 
success. 
Lectures were scheduled for all combat crews. Since most 
theaters only held six hundred persons at a time, several lect- 
ures had to be given at each Bomb Group. As the crews came 
into a theater there was considerable discui. on as to whether it 
would be the usual ditching, escape or V. D. lecture. At these 
lectures the combat crews were gild of the various forms Cf 
Radio Countermeasure and how they worked. The information 
given at these lectures was much more complete and everything 
was presented in a language that could be understood. Various 
German A. J. [anti jamming] devices were mentioned, and their 
operation dramatized by a "Fritz and Hermann Act". The current 
faults in crew procedure and negligence in operation of the 
equipment were exemplified by humorous and tragic incidents. 
All the information needed by a combat crew was given, but 
the presentation was such that the audience spent ten percent 
of their time laughing. A common remark made by any member 
of the crew was "Best damn lecture we've heard overseas". They 
were glad to be "let in" on some of the "secret devices" that 
were designed to save their lives. (17) 
The lecture tour of bases in Italy lasted three months, during which 
the 11 hour presentation was delivered before a total of more than 
20,000 servicemen. The increased level of interest in counter- 
measures at the Bomb Groups produced some unexpected ssde 
effects: there was a flurry of complaints about 'wet Chaff' being 
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sued before Missions, as crews rejected material which earlier 
they would have accepted without quern; and there were so many 
curious visitors to the countermeasures servicing sheds that in many 
cases these had to be enlarged. (18) 
The RRL experience in Italy holds clear lessons for those 
charged with introducing countermeasures equipment into combat 
units and remain valid to the present day. Often there is a temp- 
tat ion to hide everything to coo with electronic warfare under a 
cloak of secrecy and apply the 'need to know' rsincip1 over- 
zealously. But if this happens the chances are that, at best, 
aircrews will lack the understanding necessary to make use of the 
equipment; and at worst they will succumb to rumours that in action 
the equipment will 'act like a beacon' and simply leave it switched 
off. 
II 
At this stage the US jEim ming in the European theatre was con- 
centrated entirely against the German radio controlled missiles and 
ground radars; there was relatively little interest in jam ming enemy 
communications. While he was in England in the summer ct 1944 
O. G . 'Mike' Villard discussed the matter with various service agen- 
des, and set down his impressions in a revealing letter to Earl 
Cullum at RRL; he commented: 
It is sad to note that for all practical purposes, Tuba and 
Ground Cigar went down the drain. There is no great interest in 
jamming enemy fighters now - the operational people only want 
to get them up in the air so they can be shot down! And there 
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were no fighters in evidence anywhere on D-day. Curiously 
enough, no jamming from the German side was encountered on 
D-day either. 
The desire to get fighters up in the air so they can be shot 
down explains why, for example, there is no interest at present 
in AR Q-8's or in communication jamming in general (with one 
exception). Please note that this theater has some AR Q-8's on 
order, although the present tactical situation is such that they 
would almost certainly not be used. The procurement people in 
CaL Dixon's office are a bit embarrassed about having a require- 
ment in for some equipment for which there is no visible need. 
However, they have been persuaded into it. 
The notable exception is, of course, the possiY. u'lity of tank 
jamming. At present everyone seems to want 1 Kw Jackals for 
this job, but there does not seem to be any reason why AR Q-8's 
would not be just as good, except for the increased difficulty of 
operating the gear. Will investigate this further. 
In the communications field, however, there seems to be a 
continuing need for voice recorders in this theater. The general 
idea is as follows: the ' Y' people who listen in on enemy fighter 
communications are getting a tremendous amount of information. 
The Germans carry on all conversations in clear, and it is almost 
possible for our people to direct our fighters on the basis of the 
remarks overheard. German-speaking operators are sent along 
with our formations, who write down whatever they hear so that 
the ground people can analyze it later in order to find out how 
Jerry is using his fighters. Now it frequently happens that these 
operators do not catch all that is being said, and that is where 
the recorder comes in. The recorder is switched on when an 
interesting conversation is heard. On the ground, the remarks 
can be fully transcribed and played over and over again if there 
is any doubt about a word or phrase ... (19) 
nI 
With the US radar jamming campaign in Europe now running at 
full spate, it is of value to compare its aims and tactics with those 
employed by Royal Air Fcrce Bomber Command while attacking 
similar targets though mainly at night (9). The British No 100 Group 
(equivalent in strength of a US Wing) had the task of supporting 
bombing attacks and flew jamming support missions, night fighter 
escorts and Elint cperations. (20) 
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In the pm ming support role No 100 Group operated Stirling, 
Halifax, Flying Fnrtmls and Liberator heavy bombers which flew 
Mandrel Screens, Window spoofs, jamming escort and target support 
operations. The Mandrel screen comprised six cr eight aircraft c rbk- 
ing clear of German-held territory and jamming with Mandrel on the 
enemy early warning radar frequencies, to conceal the approach of 
raiding forces; such screens were often flown when no bombing oper- 
actions were planned, to maintain the pressure on the defences and 
prime the value of this tactic (21). Window spoofs involved the 
use of a few aircraft releasing large quantities of Rc pe, to give the 
impression of large forces of bombers attacking diversionary targets. 
Jam ming escort aircraft flew with the main forces of bombers, 
radiating }3 m ming on the German night fighter VHF radio command 
channels. Target support aircraft o bited in the area of the main 
targets, radiating Carpet jamming on the Wuerzburg fire control 
radar frequencies. (22 ) 
The night escort units operated two-seat Mosquito fighters 
which carried, in addition to AI radar, equipment to enable them to 
home on radar and IFF transmissions from German night fighters. As 
the bombers attacked, the Mosquitoes would crbit close to the 
fighter assembly beacons and air P1 which the Luftwaffe was 
expected to be use during the night's operations. Although the M ce- 
qukoes were unable to shoot down large numbers of enemy night 
fighters, they caused co ' din of the defences. (23) 
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Very few of the ac)untermeasures tactics employed by the RAF 
No 100 Group were appropriate to the US day bombing operations, 
however. Apart from the target support operations the British jam m- 
ing was devoted almost entirely to countering or slowing operations 
by the defending night fighter force, which posed the most danger- 
ous threat to the night bombers; as we have already observed, such 
tactics could have little success by day because the defending fight- 
ers did not carry radar and were far less reliant on radar control 
from the ground. Only the target support operations were aimed at 
reducing the effectiveness of the defending flak batteries; and by 
day a few aircraft crbiting close to the targets for any length of 
time would have been extremely vulnerable. The countermeasures 
required to support day operations were quite different from those 
used at night. 
Following its initial operations in support of Operation OVER- 
LORD the 803rd Bombardment Squadron, the specialized radio 
c untermeasures unit belonging to the 8th Air Farce in England, 
underwent some major changes. First it was re-equipped with the 
more-roomy B-24 Liberator, a better aircraft for this type of work 
(24). Then in August 1944 it was re-designated the 36th Bombard- 
ment Squadron and moved to a new base at Cheddington north cf 
London. During the summer the unit operated mainly with the RAF 
No 100 Group, taking part in mandrel Screen operations in support 
cf British night attacks. Not until 10 October did the 36th begin to 
support US daylight bombing attacks, with a Mandrel screen by 
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seven B-24's to cover a small-scale leaflet dropping operation over 
Holland in bad weather. (25) 
In November 1944 the Squadron began sending B-24's to orbit ctf 
the Dutch coast, to jam VHF frequencies used by American heavy 
bombers. The aim was to prevent the German radio monitoring 
service from obtaining useful intelligence while formations assembled 
over eastern England (26). For these VHF screening operations each 
B-24 carried five standard SCR-522 VHF co mm unk ati, ons radios 
fitted with noise modulators. From 25 November until the end of the 
war in Europe, the 36th Bombardment Squadron mounted almost daily 
VHF screening operations with up to ten B-24's. And, from time to 
time, the unit continued to take part in Mandrel Screen operations 
in support of Royal Air Force night attacks. (27) 
Late in 1944 a small batch of ART-3 Jackal airborne co mm un- 
ications jammers arrived at ABL-15 for use by the 36th Squadron. 
Don Reynolds, the ABL-15 representative working with the Squad- 
ron, had to make sure the jammer would not have smilarly em barr- 
rising side-effects if it was used in combat. 
Jackal put out about 1,000 watts, frequency modulated at 
an audio rate. It was a crude form of jamming, but very effect- 
ive against an amplitude modulated receiver with no limiters - 
like the sets fitted to German tanks. We were afraid that the 
-jamming might also interfere with US tank com m unications - 
there was some overlap between their frequency bands, but our 
tank radio sets used frequency modulation. So we flew some 
field bests using the jammer against captured G erman tank 
radios, with US tank radios nearby to see if they were affected. 
We found that the pm ming had little affect on the US tank 
radios, it produced only a light buzz in the background, the 
operators could cperate right through the pm ming and get 10 to 
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15 mile ranges between tanks; that same jamming produced a 
screaming buzz on the German tank radios, which reduced their 
effective range to about i mile. (28) 
Not lang afterwards there was an opportunity to use Jackal in 
action. In December 1944 the German army launched its final all-out 
counteroffensive in the west, with a massive attack intended to 
drive a wedge between American and British armies in eastern 
France: the Battle of the Bulge. After fierce fighting and substantial 
gains the German advance ground to a halt; then the PJ iced ground 
forces went over to the offensive to squeeze the enemy out of the 
salient The 36th Bombardment Squadron supported these operations 
on 28 December, when it sent three B-24's carrying Jackal to orbit 
in formation over the Ardennes for a four-hour period jamming on 
German tank radio channels in the band 27 to 33 MHz. Accompanying 
these aircraft was a B-24 Elint aircraft of the same unit, to 
monitor the effectiveness of the jamming. The 36th Bombardment 
Squadron flew similar missions in support of Allied ground operations 
on 31 December 1944, and on 2,5 and 7 January 1945. (29) 
IV 
W pile the support of the strategic bombing operations continued 
to be the main task for the AB L-15 personnel at Malvern, there 
were the occasional 'panics' which required immediate attention and 
diverted effort. one such occurred shortly after the invasion, when 
a German V2 rocket launched from the test establishment at Peene- 
muende veered off course and headed north across the Baltic before 
it broke up in mid-air. The pieces rained down on neutral Sweden 
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where, following some hasty bargaining, the British intelligence 
service secured the wreckage and flew it to England (30). A 
committee was formed to discuss the implementation cf counter- 
measures against the new menace and ABL-15 was called in to 
asst. John Dyer, head of the laboratory snce the previous April, 
described what happened next: 
Within a couple of weeks the pieces of the rocket found 
their way to the British test establishment at Farnborough for 
examination. The wayward rocket was found to be carrying a 
transponder to enable it to be tracked on radar, and receivers 
to pick up radio guidance signals; and that meant that the 
weapon could be vulnerable to jamming. I was brought into the 
sa-called Big Ben Committee ["Big Ben" was the Allied code- 
name for the V 21, with a group under Robert Watson- Natt 
which met to consider what in the way of radio countermeasures 
could be employed against the missile. I was particularly imp- 
ressed with the speed at which the British Intelligence people 
had been able to assess their find: the rocket's receivers had 
fallen in a swamp and, though they had been pretty badly beat- 
en up by the time they arrived at Farnborough, they had been 
made to work and their characteristics had been determined. 
Still very little was known about the destructive potential of the 
V 2, but the British were very worried about it and assigned 
top priority to the provision of countermeasures. (31) 
The transponder found in the rocket received ssgnals on a pre- 
set frequency in the band 18 to 27 MHz, and transmitted on a 
frequency in the band 45 to 54 MHz. One of the other receivers was 
identical to that carried by the Henschel 293 glider bomb, used for 
the reception of radio guidance sgnals on one channel in the band 
47 to 50 MHz (32); and a further receiver could receive sgnals an a 
channel in the band 46 to 54 MHz. From this, British 
intelligence 
officers postulated that the transponder provided the ground control 
station with an indication of the range of the rocket; 
that the 
missile could be radio guided in flight to follow a predetermined 
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trajectory; and the remaining receiver was probably to vary ar stop 
the fuel supply to the rocket motor, or posdb]y detonate the war- 
head if the missile began to wander atf course. (33) 
On the basis of this intelligence the 50 KwRR L-designed 
' F. ]ephant Cigar' transmitter at Brighton - originally intended to 
beam communications jamming against German aircraft over Nxman- 
dy but never used - was modified to transmit high powered jamming 
against missile-control signals in the band 19 to 40 MHz. Nearby, a 
further jamming site was set up using less powerful British broadcast 
transmitters requisitioned for the purpose (34). To protect the British 
capital against a large scale attack by V 2s, possibly with several 
rockets a ming in smultaneously with guidance sgnals on different 
frequencies, many more high powered jammers would be required 
and these were not available from normal British sources. AB L-15 
sent an urgent request to the USA for several of the RR Ldeveloped 
high powered ground communications jammers held in reserve to be 
shipped to England at the highest rriority. Some twenty GR Q-17's (a 
modified R CA broadcast transmitter with an output of 50 K w, able 
to jam frequencies in the band 20 to 55 MHz) and the MR T-1 Cigar 
(15 Kw, 38 to 55 MHz) were rushed across the Atlantic. (35) 
The first V2 rocket fell on London on 8 September, followed 
by many others during the weeks that ffflowed. The reinforcement aE 
high powered jammers from the USA had not yet arrived, but the 
available jammers including Elephant Cigar radiated 5-gecond 
bursts 
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Jamming On frequencies around 50 MHz whenever British ground 
early . 19 warning radar stations observed incoming rockets. British 
countermeasures experts hoped the jamming might disrupt the 
miglrs' guidance systems. But ground monitoring stations picked up 
no signals that could be positively linked with the V2 firings, and 
after a week the jamming was stopped to enable the monitors to 
conduct a more-careful search for transmissions going to or coming 
from the rockets. (36) 
No such radio signals were ever found - because as we now know 
there were none. What the Allied intelligence aarvices did not know, 
until very much later, was that the V2 carried a crude form of 
inertial guidance system. It flew a pre--set ballistic trajectory indep- 
endent of ground transmissions and was, therefore, invulnerable to 
electronic jamming. As luck would have it, the missile which crash- 
ed in Sweden had been testing the radio guidance system for 
'W asserfaU' ,a first generation surface-to-air misste system based 
on the bombardment rocket; this had put the British intelligence 
service on the wrong trail (37). So the plan to use radio counter- 
measures against 'Big Ben' came to nothing. The resources diverted 
do this effort had not been large, however, and in time of war such 
risks have to be taken if there is to be any chance of countering a 
new enemy system soon after its introduction. The reader will 
observe later, however, that had the war in Europe continued into 
the summer of 1945 the jamming equipment assembled to counter the 
V2 might have had an extremely important role tD play. 
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Gradually AB L-15 became better known as a place where oper- 
ational units could obtain answers to questions worrying them con- 
cerning electronics. Joe Pettit, who joined the laboratory after his 
return from India where he had a sted with the B-29 operations, 
described the sort of phenomena ABL-15 was asked to investigate: 
One of those I remember concerned reports we were getting 
from the bomber units, that sometimes during daylight missions 
their aircraft were tracked by enemy searchlights and then sub- 
jected to particularly accurate flak. Might the 'searchlight' be 
some form of radar working on optical frequencies? It sounded 
very unlikely, but it was our job to investigate such stories to 
see if there was any substance in them. The Laboratory built a 
simple optical electric cell, a demodulator, an audio amplifier 
and a pair of earphones through which the operator could hear 
the pulsing of enemy signals if there were any. The device was 
designed, built and flown over Germany within a few weeks of 
our having received the request to investigate the phenomenon. 
As we had expected, we found no evidence that the Germans 
had produced an optical radar. Almost certainly the "search- 
lights" reported by the bomber crews had been mistaken for the 
sun reflecting off patches of water, and the accurate flak had 
been optically laid. (38) 
Ding the summer of 1944 ABL-15 sent a small team of Tech- 
nical Observers to France to assist with electronics-related problems 
which arose there. One of its tasks was to supply the so-called 
'Posit' teams attached to each US Army Group, operating receiving 
equipment to search for signs that the Germans were employing 
countermeasures against the newly introduced radio proximity-fazed 
shells. AB L-15 assi sted with this Project until trained men could be 
sent from the USA; the assignment was only a precaution, in fact 
the Germans never attempted sich pm ming. (39) 
_2-12_ 
V 
By January 1945 the US heavy bombers and their escorts, 
backed by a considerable electronic superiority, ruled the skies over 
Germany and her rapidly shrinking empire. Yet although much had 
been achieved the Mies knew enough about their adversary to 
realise that it would be imprudent to rest on their laurels: until the 
very end, they could never be certain that the Germans were not 
about to introduce some new and previously undiscovered 'secret 
weapon' to swing the balance in their favour. 
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CHAPTER 13 THE END IN EUROPE 
By the beginning aE 1945 the use of electronic jamming and 
Chaff by the US heavy bombers over Europe was on such a massive 
scale that it swamped every counter-oountermeasure fitted to the 
Wuerzburg and Mannheim fire-control radars. The real answer to the 
German gunners' problems was an entirely new type cif radar for flak 
control, one working on oentimetric wavelengths which would be far 
less vulnerable to countermeasures. In fact the Germans had begun 
to develop centimetric radar only at the beginning cif 1943, following 
the discovery of a 3,300 MHz H2S bombing radar in the wreck of a 
British bomber which crashed in Holland (1). Before then Getman 
scientists had done no serious work on microwave radar, and the 
sudden revelation that the enemy had such radars in service came as 
a profound shock to the German scientific community. The armed 
forces launched crash programmes to develop centimet is radars for 
flak control and lightweight airborne sets for night fighters and 
bombers. But by this stage of the war the German electronics 
industry was under considerable pressure to meet orders for existing 
types of radar; and as the killed radio countermeasures began to 
take effect technicians had tD be pulled away from work on new 
types of radar in favour of work on anti-ja m ming modifications to 
enable existing radars to continue operating. The destructive Al ied 
bombing attacks and the continual drafting into the armed forces of 
men fit enough to fight, regardless of their indusbdal qualifications, 
did nothing to help matters. Thus it was not until the end of 1944 
that the prototype of the first German centimetric wavelength flak 
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control radar system, the Egerland operating on frequencies around 
3,300 MHz, began operational tests at Sch uandorf rear Berlin. Initial 
tests showed that the new set was a considerate improvement over 
earlier ones and the Luftwaffe placed at city cyder for a 
thousand of these radars. (2) 
Egerland was still a long way from large-scale service, however; 
in the mean time the battle continued between Carpet in its various 
forms and Chaff, on the one side, and Wuerzburg and Mannheim on 
the other. Towards the end of 1944 the more-powerful APT-5 version 
of Carpet, with a power output of 15 watts, reached the bomber 
units in Europe. Lieutenant Joe W ack described the stuatiion at his 
unit, the 488th Bomb Group, at the beginning of 1945: 
One quarter of our B-24's carried AP Q-9 Carpets with oper- 
ators, the other three quarters continued operating with pre- 
tuned APT-2's barrage jamming as much as the W uer z burg band 
as possible. Towards the end of the war we received a few 
APT-5 Carpets, which developed three times as much power as 
the earlier APT-2 and so could cover a wider spread of frequen- 
cies. As APT-5's arrived in ones and twos they replaced the 
APT-2's, though the latter set continued in use until the end of 
the war. 
There were mixed feelings in the Group regarding the use- 
fulness of RCM. Some of the alder hands would say "Glad to 
have you aboard; you're helping keep down losses compared with 
what we used to suffer from flak. " Others, especially the new- 
comers who had not seen what the flak was like before there 
was Carpet protection, remained skeptical and did little more 
than tolerate our presence. (3) 
By this stage cf the war the regard for countermeasures varied 
greatly from unit to unit; as always, much depended on the opinions 
of individual commanders. One notable enthusiast was Brigadier 
General H. Turner commanding the 40th Combat Bomb Wing of the 
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8th Air Fcrce operating B-17's. Realising that Chaff did little to 
protect the aircraft at the head of the formation, he came up with 
the idea of sending a few high speed Mc squitos to ]ay out Chaff 
lanes ahead cf the bombers. By following an undulating course in the 
target area the Mosquitos themselves would be in little danger from 
flak. Lieutenant Les Slate, a Boca Raton graduate assigned to the 
Wing, told the author: 
We fitted an automatic Chaff dispenser in the bomb bay of a 
Mosquito, but the darned thing never worked. Either the g 
forces were too great or the mechanism wasn't adequate but it 
would always jam, we could never get the Chaff out So then we 
experimented with a couple of P-51 drop tanks each loaded with 
Chaff, fitted under the wings of the Mosquito. These Chaff 
"bombs" could be released in the target area and would break up 
to release their Chaff. I worked out a method of cutting the 
tanks longitudinally and using the metal straps used for straw 
bales to hold them together. And that worked. On several 
occasions the Mosquitoes were sent ahead of the bombers to 
release their Chaff "bombs". About four Mosquitoes would be 
used dropping eight "bombs", and that was enough. This cut 
loves, there was much less flak damage. (4) 
With the strategic bombers well able to provide their own 
countermeasures protection over targets the task of the 36th Bomb- 
ardment Squadron, the 8th Air Farce's countermeasures 
unit, was relegated to providing the VHF screens described earlier to 
prevent the German monitoring service listening in to the radio 
chatter from bombers during formation assembly over Erxgland. During 
February 1945, for example, the 36th mounted VHF screening opera- 
tions on 24 out of the 28 days in the month, flying between two and 
nine sorties each day (5). In March the Squadron received three 
' Droop Snoot' two-seater P-38 Lightning fighters, fitted with inter- 
cept receivers for ant operations; during the 
final months of the 
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war in Europe these were active over occupied Europe, co-crdinating 
their activities with the Elint MoEqujtx)es of the Royal Air Farce's 
No 192 Squadron. At least one of the P-38's carried the new APR-7 
microwave receiver developed by RRL, to search for the long- 
expected German centimetric-wavelength radars (6). From time to 
time Allied Elint operators did record centimetiic-wavelength signals 
not originating from friendly radars, but such intercepts were infre- 
quent and no German aentimetric-wavelength radar was positively 
located by the Allies before the end of the war in Europe. 
II 
During the closing stages of the war the German armed forces 
were able to make little use of radio countermeasures against the 
Allies. Commanders were all too aware of the possibilities but, for 
reasons already discussed, the German electronics industry was under 
such pressure that there was little capacity to mare for work in this 
field. German bombers dropped Chaff and in carried pm ming 
transmitters for protection against radar laid gunfire and night 
fighters; but these were ineffective against the centimetric- 
wavelength radars now in large scale use by A- ed 
forces. 
III 
To the end of the conflict A BL-15 continued to develop new 
systems to meet needs perceived by front line units. John Dyer de 
csibed one such device , 'Perfectos', along the lines of the IF F-homer 
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it had been thought Japanese night fighters might have been t ng in 
the Pacific theatre. 
one interesting requirement that came in early in 1945 was for a means of locating the German Messerschmitt 262 jet 
fighters at long range, so that our fighters could home in and 
destroy them. The British had developed a device called 
"Perfectos" for their night fighters, which radiated an interrcx - 
ating signal on the frequency used by the German IF F sets; the 
device als ticked up the reply signals from German aircraft in 
the vicinity and enabled the night fighter crew to home on them. 
The "Perfectos" idea suited our purpose, but we needed a some- 
what greater range than that provided by the British device. 
Usng components from an SCR-729 and a Navy ASB radar, we 
developed our own version which gave ranges of around 100 
miles - enough for our purpose. Our "Perfectos" was installed 
into a Mosquito obtained from the British and operational tests 
began; but unfortunately our Mosquito was shot down by 
"friendly" fighters on its second mission. we built another homer 
and fitted it into a two-seat P-47 operated by the 56th Fighter 
Group which, during the final days of the war, led single-seat 
P-47's in for the destruction of M essersch mitt 262s on a couple 
of occasions. (7) 
AB L-15 also instai le 'Perfectos' into a two-seat P-51 Mustang, but 
hostilities ended before this aircraft could go into action. 
The Germans surrendered in May 1945, and almost immediately 
AB L-15 began to transfer men and materials back to the USA. The 
victorious Allies sent teams cf experts to our Germany for inform- 
at ion on the latest technical developments and question German 
radar officers and technician of all ranks, and experts from 
industry, on the work they had been doing and the effects of Al ied 
imming. From their answers it was clear that the massive use of 
countermeasures had indeed swamped the flak control radars (8). 
Generalmajor Vieth, who had commanded the Flak School Division of 
the Luftwaffe, remarked tD his interrogators: 
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Jamming became really serious aft-or October 1944 ... Chaff gave some trouble commencing in the autumn of 1943, but 
these difficulties had to a certain extent been overcome ... as a result of active [electronic] jamming radar at times became 
completely useless, and in such cases [when firing was conducted 
under non-visual conditions] Flak did not go into action at all as 
the practice of barrage fixing had bo be given up. (9) 
Fifteen Wuerzburg radar coperators from flak batteries in different 
parts of Germany were asked about the proportion of occasions they 
had been able to track bombers successfully in the presence of both 
Chuff and electronic jamming. The replies varied greatly, from five 
of the operators who wild 'none of the time' to one operator who 
claimed he had been able to do so 80 per cent of the time. Only he 
and one other operator said they could do it more than 50 per cent 
of the time. Averaging all of the replies, including the extreme 
values cited, the interrogators concluded that in the face of the two 
types of jamming tracking was possible only about 30 per cent of the 
time. Similar questioning of three Mannheim radar operators drew an 
average response of 20 per cent of the time. (10) 
After the war Robert Soderman and Richard O'Brien from 
AB L-15 put together a comprehensive report entitled 'I elligence 
Information on RCM Effectiveness in the E. T. O. '. This is the defin- 
itive account on the effect aE electronic countermeasures used by 
the US strategic air forces in Europe, and is a model of how such a 
report should be written. The full document runs to 80 pages; large 
sections of it are given in Appendix F. 
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Else where in Germany Allied investigators discovered that at the 
end of the war the Germans were on the point of placing into prod- 
action two types of radio command guided surface--to-air missile: 
Schmetterling and Wasserfall. Schmetterling (Butterfly) was a 14 
foot long winged rocket-propelled missile, with a maximum speed cf 
470 mph and a range of 20 miles, weighing 970 pounds at launch of 
which approximately 90 pounds was warhead. Wasserfall (waterfall) 
was a much larger and more am bitioi weapon, actually a scaled- 
down version of the V2 missile used to bombard London; it was 
nearly 26 feet long, had a maximum speed of 1,700 mph, a range of 
16 mies and at launch weighed 8,400 pounds of which 200 pounds 
was warhead. (11) 
The Luftwaffe planned to get the first three batteries of 
Schmetterling into service before the summer of 1945, and 70 of 
Schmetterling and three of Wasserfall by the end of the year (12). 
Had the weapons become operational, however, the programme which 
Allied countermeasures experts had hastily improvised in the summer 
of 1944 for use the V2 bombardment missile would have found an 
operational use. It will be remembered that the jammers had been 
designed to vounter the errant V2- actually a test round fitted 
with the radio guidance system for Wasserfall - which had come 
down in Sweden and whose wreckage had been taken to England. 
Without realizing it, Allied experts had prepared a family of ground 
and airborne jammers tailor-made to counter the next generation of 
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German anti-aircraft weapons. It does not happen alten in war that 
one does the right thing for entirely the wrong reasons. 
V 
There can be no doubt that, during the final year of the war, 
the use of radio countermeasures greatly reduced losses of heavy 
bombers to radar-laid flak and increased the cost-effectiveness of 
the US strategic bombing force by a corresponding amount Between 
September 1944 and the end of the war in Europe the 8th Air Farce 
flew approximately 144,000 sorties and lost 1,100 aircraft to flak 
(13). The average loss rate for this type of mission was one--half of 
one percent, amounting to 150 aircraft during the period. To 
extrapolate such figures to estimate the number of aircraft saved by 
the various forms of countermeasures is however extremly difficult. 
Because it is almost impossible to prove a negative one cannot say 
for certain which bombers would have been shot down and which 
would have survived had there been no jamming. But there is reason 
to believe that the radio x untermeasures saved between 400 and 
450 US heavy bombers from destruction during the war over Europe 
(14), and between 4,000 and 4,500 trained aircrew m en from death cr 
captivity. The volt of the bombers alone was about $150 million, cr 
twice the cost of the entire flak countermeasures programme. By any 
standards it had been a highly effective investment. 
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CHAPTER 14 COUNTER MEASURES AID THE ISLAND HOPPERS 
By the autumn of 1944 the US amphibious forces were an the 
offensive throughout the Pacific, with a relentless island-hopping 
advance westwards. At the same time far-reaching plans were in 
train for the installation of active jammers in the larger US Navy 
warships. The ultimate aim was to fit the high-powered TD Y jammer 
(frequency coverage at that time 350 - 800 MHz) in all battleships, 
aircraft carriers, cruisers, headquarters ships and certain destroyers 
(1). The production of equipment and its installation an such a scale 
would take many months, however, so in the interim and to cover the 
lower part of the frequency spectrum several ships were fitted with 
low-powered jammers c riginaUy designed for airborne use: the s 'r-1 
and SP I-4 (Naval verions of the APT-1 and AP Q-2 respectively) and 
the AP Q-2 in its original form. (2) 
The US Navy opened its p mming campaign in the Pacific in 
September 1944 as part of operations in support of the landings on 
Peleliu and Angaur in the Palaus Island Group. During their prepara- 
terry bombardment the fire support group comprising five battleships, 
Trine cruisers and 14 destroyers used adapted airtxrne jammers 
against Japanese early warning and anti-aircraft fire antral radars 
on the islands operating in the 100 to 200 MHz band (3) (the TD Y, 
carried on a few of the warships, could not then jEjm frequencies 
below 350 MHz). The Japanese had no radars on the islands for 
surfac ace fire control, however, so none of their sets posed 
any direct threat to US warships. The islands were quickly secured, 
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and on one of them US forces captured almost intact a Navy Mark IV 
Model IAA fire control radar. (4) 
In the following month, October, US Navy Task Farce 38 with 
seventeen aircraft carriers supported by sx battleships, 15 cruisers 
and numerous destroyers, launched a series aE air stdkes on Japanese 
airfields on Fcrmosa. B-29's of the XX th Air Fcrce in India pined in 
the bombardment The attacks were intended to give the impression 
of softening-up operations in readiness for the invasion of Formosa, 
part of the deception cover for the landings an Leyte in the Phi]. i- 
ppine LSlands planned to take place shortly afterwards. 
The feint was entirely successf uL As well as drawing to their 
destruction many of the aircraft based on Formosa, it forced the 
Japanese high command to commit the 'T-Buntai': its elite force of 
radar-fitted twin-engined torpedo bombers being held back on the 
home islands for the decisive battle against the US fleet,. On the 
evening of 12 October about a hundred aircraft of the ' T-B untai' 
took off from Kyushu and Okinawa to launch a large scale night 
torpedo attack with radar as istance on the US Task Fcrce - the 
first of its kind ever attempted by the Japanese (5). M cyst of the 
aircraft involved were Navy Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' bombers fitted 
with the 150 to 160 MHz Air Mark VI search radar. But there were 
also twenty-three cf the new Army Mitsubishi K i-67 'Peggy' bombers 
carrying the 200 to 209 MHz Taki-1 search radar - neither this 
aircraft nor its radar had previously been encountered by US forces 
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(6). The Japanese raiders arrived in the area of the warships to find 
heavy rain squalls which prevented effective torpedo attacks. How- 
ever these same weather conditions did not hinder the radar- fitted 
Hellcats of night fighter squadron VFW-41 operating from USS 
Independence. The US fighters fought a running battle with the torp- 
edo bombers and claimed five shot down (7); others fell to the guns 
of the US warships. A similar Japanese air attack on the following 
evening resulted in a hit on the cruiser Canberra and a very near 
miss on the aircraft carrier Franklin; this, for the loss of 42 or 
nearly half of the T-Buntai's aircraft (8) 
Although the night torpedo attacks achieved little success they 
caused a flurry of excitement in the US Pacific Fleet: the Japanese 
airborne radars operated on frequencies well below the cover cf the 
high power TD Y jammer; and the lower power jammers designed for 
aircraft use could not be guaranteed to conceal warships on the 
radars of bombers closing to short range to launch torpedoes. On this 
occasion the US warships had been lucky - the weather had been bad 
and the Hellcats had been able to spoil many of the attacks. Another 
time the ships might not be so fortunate. It was essential that US 
warships receive an effective high-powered jammer to counter the 
enemy airborne radars operating on frequencies in the 
150 to 210 
MHz band, and quickly. A cry for help reached Division 15 and Dr 
Guy Suits described what happened next: 
Somebody pushed the panic button and Division 15 was task- 
ed with producing a modification of TD Y to enah'k, 
it txO counter 
the [lower frequency Japanese] radars, as rapidly as poesihl. 
Under our sponsorship Albert Hull and its team at the General 
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Electric laboratories redesigned the TD Y magnetron to over the lower frequencies and within a week they had hand-built fifty 
units. These were rushed to the Pacific by air and within two 
weeks of the initial request the first had been installed in 
and were ready to go into action. (9) 
dAps 
In 1944 the official term for the procedure to deal with such high 
parity orders was ' Crash Procurement Procedure'; the modern term 
'Quick Reaction Capability' had yet to be coined, but there can be 
no doubt that the capability itself existed in full measure. 
In the days to follow, off both Formosa and the Philippines, 
Japanese Army and Navy attack aircraft attempted further night 
torpedo strikes on US shipping but without success. During the early 
morning darkness on the 19 October, for example, the destroyer USS 
Leutze intercepted signals from an Air Mark VI radar of a Japanese 
aircraft shadowing the fleet and jammed it ugng SP `I -4 (10). On the 
following night, as a destroyer Task Group was approaching Leyte 
Gulf, a force of Japanese torpedo bombers approached and the ships 
intercepted signals on several radars an frequencies between 152 and 
157 MHz. The destroyers used SP T-4 to barrage jam this band and no 
attack developed (11). There were other similar incidents in the 
area, but each time the Japanese aircraft encountered m ming they 
broke away. It seems the Japanese radar operators did not know that 
if they closed to short range they could 'burn through' the -jamming 
and the enemy strips would re-appear on their screens. Unless ar until 
the Japanese aircrew learned better, the low-powered jammers adap- 
ted from aircraft sets would continue to provide US ships with 
adequate protection. 
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Throughout the summer and autumn of 1944 Section 22's B-24 
and Catalina Ferrets flew numerous missions to the Philippine Lslands 
to map the enemy radar chain and hunt for indications cf previously 
unknown types of radar. In October a B-24 Ferret made the first. 
unequivocal intercept of signals from a Japanese ship-borne radar 
(almost certainly a Mark II Model 1,185 to 210 MHz), when the crew 
linked the bearing from their intercept receiver with the 'paint' of 
the ship on the aircraft's search radar (12). Some Ferrets now carr- 
ied the APR-5 intercept receiver covering the band 1,000 to 3,100 
MHz; its arrival in the theatre came the first reliable reports of 
signals from the Japanese shi. pborne Mark II Model 2 centimetric 
radar mentioned in the documents captured on Kwajalein earlier in 
the year. 
Information on the Japanese use of anti-aircraft fire control 
radar was slow to come in. Although Ferrets intercepted signals from 
them on several occasions, it was not until October 1944 that a B-24 
of the 868th Squadron, 13th Air Force, positively established that a 
200 MHz Japanese radar at Balikpapan, Borneo, was directing 
searchlights (13) (probably a Navy Mark IV Model D. Soon afterwards 
signals from a 75 MHz radar at Takao, Formosa, showed character- 
istics which suggested the set might be used for controlling anti- 
aircraft fire (14) (almost certainly a Tachi-3). 
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The Elint activity around the Philippines increased progres i vely 
until the invasion of Leyte by US forces on 20 October. A few days 
before the main landings an Army Air Fcrces B-24 Ferret inter- 
aepted sgnal s from a Japanese search radar an Suluan Island over- 
looking the entrance to Leyte G ulf where the troops were to go 
ashore. As a result of this discovery a party of Rangers landed on 
Suhuan before the main invaslon and destroyed the set (15) 
Also during the pm-invasion softening-up operations, US carrier- 
borne aircraft used countermeasures for the first time. Dive bombers 
attacking targets around Manila released Rope as they entered their 
dives, to counter two 200 MHz Japanese radars in the area which it 
was thought might be used for gunlaying. Afterwards crews reported 
concentrations of anti-aircraft bursts in the area of the Rope, but 
could draw no definite conclusions an the usefulness aE the counter- 
measure. (16 ) 
Synchronized with the landings on Leyte during the early morn- 
ing darkness on 20 October, Ferrets VII and VIII dropped Rope and 
another B-24 jammed the Japanese early warning radar frequencies 
with APT-1 Dina, to simulate an attack on the neighbouring island of 
Mindanao (17). Although it appeared to have been correctly execut 
ed, the spoof drew no recognizable reaction from the defenders. 
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On the night of the 20th/2L9t, following the landings on Leyte, 
Lieutenant Lawrence Heron was airborne in one of his 'Black Cat' 
Catalinas on an Elint mission over northern Borneo: 
We started hearing a great many microwave radar sig naLs. 
We were pretty sure they were Japanese, because no American 
ships were known to be in the area. We ducked below cloud and 
saw an enormous number of ships - which had a rather profound 
effect on myself and the rest of the crew. Nobody shot at us. 
Why they didn't discover us I was never quite sure, unless they 
thought it was one of their own planes. Probably they assumed 
that no American in his right mind would operate in that area! 
As soon as I got clear I originated a secret and urgent signal 
back to the Task Force. (18) 
When he returned to his seaplane tender off M oxotai the following 
morning Heron was angered to discover that the message had not 
been passed on, nor would it be, because other searchers in that 
general area had reported seeing no enemy ships. In fact the 'enor- 
mous number of ships' Heron and his crew had seen was Vice-Admiral 
Takeo K urita's First Striking Fcrce, the main fighting body cf the 
Japanese fleet comprising seven batt esh ps, thirteen cruisers and 
numerous destroyers. This powerful armada had left Singapore two 
days earlier and put into Brunei Bay on the north coast of Borneo to 
refuel, before moving on to engage the US fleet off the Philippines 
in what later became the Battle of Leyte Gulf. As a result of the 
lapse it was not until the morning cf 23 October that Kunta's force, 
by then off Palawan island and well an its way to the Philippines, 
was Snally reported by US submarines. Subsequent investigations led 
to the officer who had failed to pass on Heron's signal being relieved 
c¢ his command. (19) 
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Once US forces were firmly estab]ished on the Philippines there 
was effort to spare to knock out some ct the Japanese ground radars 
on the area. Fitted with improvised homing aerials, B-24's cf the 
868th Squadron, 13th Air Fcrce, began flying radar-busting missions, 
On 3 November one cf the Liberators detected ssgnals from a Japan- 
ese radar at Sibago L%Iand in the Sulu Archipelago off the north-east 
of Bcrneo. The aircraft homed on the set, photographed it, then 
attacked it with bombs and machine gun fire. (20) 
In a hazardous mission on the night of 14-15 December, twenty- 
four C atalinas of Nos 11 and 43 Squadrons of the Royal Australian 
Air Farce flew into the heavily defended anchorage at Manila Bay to 
drop mines from low altitude (21). Supporting the force, Lawrence 
Heron flew overhead in a 'Black Cat' Ferret radiating APT-1 and 
APT-3 jamming, while his aircraft and an Australian Catalina releas- 
ed ]arge quantities of Rape to confuse the Japanese defences. In the 
course of the action Heron's aircraft spot-jammed a total of sixteen 
enemy radars in the 100,150 and 200 MHz bands. The radar cxunter- 
measures were highly aiccessf ul and only one aircraft was lost- (22) 
11 
By the autumn of 1944 the US Navy was ready to begin wing 
vountermeasures on a large scale from its aircraft Thirteen of the 
eighteen ]and-base patrol bomber squadrons in the Pacific theatre 
already had some aircraft fitted to carry the APR-1 receiver and 
one jamming transmitter (either an APT-l, an APT-3 cr an AP Q-2 ); 
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in addition, a few Liberators were fitted with APR-5 receivers to 
look for s, gnals from suspected Japanese microwave radars (23). 
Carrier-based Avenger attack aircraft also received an allocation of 
active countermeasures equipment each carrier air group received 
equipment for five aircraft installations aom psising the APR-1. 
APT-l. and AP Q-2, and two with the APR-2 and APR-5. (24) 
In the months to follow there was much experimentation by US 
Navy carrier aircraft to evolve the most effective tactics against 
Japanese radars. During the air strikes on Shanghai, Hong Kong and 
Fcrmosa, carrier aircraft made frequent use of Rope against enemy 
200 MHz ground radars. Detailed records of the countermeasures 
employed during these operations appear not to have been kept, but 
evidently the tactics were considered successful because early in 
1945 the Navy increased the allocation of countermeasures equipment 
to front line units: each squadron of carrier- based Avengers was to 
receive sifficient to fit five aircraft with AP'I'-1 and APT-2 
jammers; each squadron of multi-eng ned aircraft would get 
went equipment to fit three aircraft with AP Q-2, while forward 
area depots were to hold APT-l, APT-2 and APT-3 jamming 
transmitters for use when required. (25) 
By February 1945 the huge task of procuring, trara orting and 
installing this mass of additional countermeasures equipment was 
largely complete. During the daring series of air ices at the heart 
of the Japanese empire, against targets around Tokyo to divert 
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attention away from the impending invasion cif Iwo Jima, the carrier 
air groups put the new equipment to good use. The excerpt below, 
taken from the Action Report of the USS Bunker HilL is typical of 
those from the eleven large and five smaller canders which partici- 
pated; note that the aircraft involved in the attacks were all sng]e- 
engined types: 
February 16,1945. Five TB M's [Avengers] each equipped 
with AN/APT-1 pre-set to 19 8-20 2 Mc, attacked strategic targets and shi ping in the Tokyo area. One of the five aircraft 
was equipped with APR-1 and AP A-11 [direction finding 
antenna]. Each VT [Avenger] and VB [ Helldiver] accompanying 
the five TB M's was supplied with S- and P-band Window [S-band, 
as then defined, was 1,650 to 5,200 MHz; P-band was 200 to 390 
MHz]. Electronic jammers were used from land-fall to land's-end. 
Two hundred Mc and 10 cm Window was dispensed in the target 
area. No planes were lost to enemy action. Subsequent attack by 
seven more VB's, each carrying 50 sleeves 10 cm Window and 90 
sleeves 200 Mc Window. 
Crew Comment: All AA bursts downwind. (26) 
During this time there was an important addition to the US Navy 
oversea reconnaissance force in the Pacific theatre, with the arrival 
on Tinian in the Marianas of Patrol Bomber Squadron VP B-106 
equipped with the new PB 4 Y-2 Privateer. This aircraft, developed 
from the PB 4Y Liberator, was specially modified for long range 
maritime patrol operations and featured a 7-foot extension to the 
fuselage to enable it to carry an operating crew of up to fifteen. 
There were provisions for an extensive radio countermeasures install- 
ation which included the following: APR-1, APR-2 and APR-5 radar 
intercept receivers with pulse analyzers and direction finding aerial 
ARR -5 and ARR -7 com m unicat i ons intercept receivers and APT-l, 
AP Q-2 and APT-5 jammers. Not all of this equipment could be 
carried at the same time, but the standard mounting racks allowed 
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for the interchange of intercept, analyzing and jamming equip ment 
depending on the nature of the aircraft's mission. VPB-106 began 
operations flying barrier patrols of up to 16 hours in support of US 
Naval surface forces moving in for the assault on Iwo Jima. In 
addition to providing cover for the Task Fcrce, the Privateers acted 
as flying oo mm unircati, ons centres and relayed messages between ships 
and assisted ocean-going refuellers to rendezvous with the ships they 
were to supply. By this stage of the war, however, the few remain- 
ing units of the once-powerful Japanese surface fleet rarely put to 
sea. As a result there was little opportunity for the Privateers to 
exploit their excellent electronic countermeasures capability. (27) 
II 
In parallel with the fitting of countermeasures equipment into 
the US Navy aircraft there was a smilar programme to upgrade the 
signal intercept capability of ships. All warships of destroyer escort 
size and larger, including headquarters siii. ps, were to carry the Navy 
RD0 receiver fitted with pulse analyzer, panoramic adapter and 
direction finding aerials (all developed by NR L), and an SP R-2 
receiver (a Navy version of the APR-5). The standard allocation of 
equipment for submarines was an SP R-1 (a Naval version cf the 
APR-1 which it was to replace) and an SPR-2, and a pulse analyzer 
later to be supplemented with a panoramic adapter and direction 
finding aerials (28). The main purpose of the receiver installations 
was to provide warships and submarines with an intelligence gather- 
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ing and radar warning capability; but early in 1945 a US submarine 
demonstrated that the receivers could aL9o be used Ifengvely. 
By the end of January 1945 the Japanese air forces on the Phil- 
ippines had been virtually destroyed, leaving large numbers of 
trained aircrew stranded on the islands. Four Japanese submarines 
were ordered to Luzon to evacuate them, but US Navy crypto- 
analysis experts were able to read the enemy ardess and an ambush 
was prepared (29). USS Batfish (Commander John Fyfe), was one of 
four submarines cdered to block the Japanese move; she reached her 
patrol area in the Babuyan Channel off the north of Luzon on the 
6th, and waited quietly for the three days that followed. Then, on 
the evening of the 9th, the submarine began a remarkable run of 
successes aU initiated by intercepts cf signals from the Mark 11 
Model 4 air search radars fitted to Japanese submarines; during 
these actions Batfish used the APR-1 receiver (she had not been 
retrofitted with the SP R-1). 
Batfish surfaced at 1823 hours on the 9th and jtst under three 
hours later, at 2110 hours, Radioman 2nd Class Hugh Lowder aperat 
ing the intercept receiver picked up radar signals on 158 MHz with a 
pýu19e repetition 
frequency of 500. He informed the captain, and the 
SD air-search radar was switched on briefly to look for p is i h]e 
aircraft in the area. If found none: almost certainly the sgnals were 
Doming from an enemy craft on the surface, either a ship ac a 
submarine. The aerials for the APR-1 were fixed d4mles on either 
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säe of the conning tower, and t heir lobe pattern could be swung 
only by ttn ming the submarine itse lf. Lowder recalled: 
To determine where the signals were coming from we swung the boat in a complete circle. Lieutenant Berman, the Commun- ications Officer, worked out a bearing on the transmissions and 
we headed in that direction. Periodically we keyed our SST radar for bi. ef periods, we knew there was something out there but we didn't want to give ourselves; away. (30) 
Moving at 20 knots on the surface, during the next 40 minutes 
Batfish covered about 13 miles towards the enemy craft. captain 
Fyfe's account in the boat's Action Report now takes up the story: 
2250 SJ [radar] contact bearing 240° True, 11,000 yards. Commen- 
ced tracking. Target tracked on course 310 °, speed 12 knots 
so went to battle stations and commenced approach ... Saturation signals on APR at 158 mgrs which increased in 
intensity as range decreased. 
2331 Commenced firing tubes 1,2,3 and 4 on 130 ° starboard track 
gyros practically zero, range 1850 yards torpedoes set for 
six feet using a 2° divergent spread. All missed. 
2339 (10s - 40s) Four end of run explosions. (31) 
Still the enemy craft continued doggedly towards Formosa, its crew 
seemingly oblivious to their periL And still the craft's air search 
radar continued to belch out signals. Lowder continued: 
We would never have operated our radar like that, we put 
our set on only sporadically. We thought it insane cf them to be 
running with their radar blaring away. And we were even more 
surpri. 9ed when the boat took no action after our torpedoes went 
past it. (32) 
Batfish continued to close the range, using SJ radar in short bursts 
to confirm the position of the enemy. Shortly after midnight Fyfe 
sighted his prey. 
0001 With the range to target 1020 yards a Japanese I c1ac sir 
marine was clearly visible from the tzidge. We were in a 
beautiful position - 90 track zero gyros so at 
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0002 Commenced firing tubes forward. #1 was a hot run in the tube, #2 hit, and number three passed over spot where the 
submarine sank. The hit was accompanied by a brilliant red explosion that lit up the whole sky and the target sank 
almost immediately. Radar indications on the APR ceased 
abruptly. This radar signal was apparently no nail type, and Probably anti-aircraft since we closed to 900 yards 
without this giving any indication that he was aware of our 
presence. Target disappeared from visual sight and on radar 
screen almost immediately, screws stopped and loud breaking 
up noises were heard on sound gear. (33) 
The Japanese submarine, the RO-55, went down with all hands. 
Batfish remained in the area throughout the 10th and at dusk on 
the 11th she surfaced. Soon afterwards her intercept receiver picked 
up signals from a 158 MHz radar with the same characteristics as 
those heard earlier. Again Batfish closed to visual range, and Fyfe's 
account continued: 
2037 Sighted target from bridge at range 1,300 yards, identified 
as submarine with no shears, very low in water, and perhaps 
slightly smaller than our last target. 
2043 With range to target 1,200 yards, on a course for a 90° 
starboard track, had made up my mind to shoot when the 
gyro angles decreased 10 more degrees to 10 ° left, when at 
20 4 3-30 Signal from APR went off and target dove. Changed 
course to left and speeded up, in the meantime trying to 
reconcile myself to the fact that I had lost this one by 
trying to wait fror the theoretically perfect set up. Why he 
dove became a point of discussion because at 
2105 Just one half hour later sound heard a swishing noise [on 
sonar] from general direction of target that was universally 
accepted as the sound of a submarine blowing its ballast 
tanks. At 
2106 Sure enough, APR showed that 158 mgrs was back on and SJ 
made contact 8,650 yards, bearing 018° True. Whether the 
target heard us or thought he heard us; saw us or thought he 
saw us; had us on his radar or thought he did or just made a 
normal and routine night dive I don't know, but I do know 
that unless he has a radar detector that will intercept our 
SJ, he's going to have a hard time finding us this time. (34) 
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Again Fyfe dosed on his prey and just before reaching a firing 
position gave orders to submerge to radar depth. Soon afterwards 
Batfish launched a salvo of four torpedoes. Fifty seconds later there 
was a loud explosion as the struck first the enemy boat, followed 
rune seconds later by a second and eight seconds after that by a 
third. That was the end of RO-112. 
Batfish then moved to a new patrol area west of Calayan Island, 
where she spent the whole of 12 February without incident. Shortly 
after midnight, on the morning of the 13th, the APR-1 yet again 
indicated radar signals similar to those from Japanese sub marines but 
this time on a frequency of 157 MHz. As during the previous action, 
the enemy boat dived just as Batfish was cling in to attack. The 
US boat waited quietly on the surface then, half an hour later, 
further radar signals announced that the Japanese submarine had 
re-surfaced. A quick burst on the Si radar established its range at 
9,800 yards. Batfish closed to 6,800 yards, then dived to radar depth; 
shortly afterwards she fired a salvo cf three torpedoes from her 
stem tubes, one of which struck the target and exploded (35). Again 
there were no survivors from the enemy submarine, R O-1-13. 
Far their parts in the series of actions several members of the 
crew of Batfish received decorations- Commander John Fyfe was 
awarded the Navy Cross and Lieutenant Gerson Berman, the boat's 
C om m unircati, ons officer who had directed the use of the APR-1 
information sc) effectively, received the Silver Star (36). Although 
- 238 - 
the ambush Pens had been selected using information from 
decrypted Japanese signals, it should be noted that this intelligence 
had not been accurate enough to take Batfish to within effective Si 
radar range - about 6 miles - of the quarry. In each case the bear- 
ings the enemy signals from APR-1 had taken the boat to a point 
from which radar could be used for the final stages of the attack. 
Alone, Batfish's success in sinking three enemy submarines justified 
the entire Cost of developing and producing the intercept receiver. 
IV 
During the latter part of 1944 the US Navy established firm 
doctrines for the use of radio x untermeasures equipment on strips. 
The xders to the Pacific Fleet outlined the main oricnitieS for the 
use of such equipment: 
As of December 1944, the principal enemy radar threat is 
the use of 150 - 160 megacycles for airborne radars in snoopers 
and torpedo planes. Barrage pm ming in this band can be accom- 
plished by modified SP T-4 (Rug) ja mm ers on ships without RCM 
personnel Spot jamming ships would also be required whenever 
barrage }a m ming is employed; the spot pmm ers should be on 
strips with RC M personnel, intercept receivers and jammers 
capable of jamming enemy -signals between 100 - 160 megacycles. 
Recommended procedure is for RC M technical personnel to 
stagger-, tune the barrage jammers to cover the 150 - 160 meaa- 
cycle band. The frequency read between jammers should not 
exceed 2.5 megacycles whenever possihle. (37) 
To obtain maximum warning of the approach of Japanese search 
aircraft it was important that US ships intercept and identify their 
radar signals as rapidly as poeSi hl e. Destroyers operating as early 
warning radar pickets now carried radar intercept equipment and 
served in the complementary role of radio countermeasures pickets. 
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During preparations for the invasion cif Iwo Jima in February 
1945, Ferret and photographic reconnaissance aircraft established 
the presence of four Japanese radars on the island; three were early 
warning sets operating on 100 and 150 MHz, the fourth a Mark IV 
Model 3 anti-aircraft gun control radar on 200 MHz (38). There was 
no indication of any fire control radars citable for directing share 
batteries engaging ships at sea (in fact the Japanese had rn) radar in 
service suitable for this purpose, though Al ied intelligence officers 
did not know this for certain). As in the case of the landing opera- 
tions in Europe, jamming cover for the ships going close inshore 
would come from adapted airborne sets fitted to the bombardment- 
support landing craft (LCIG's), ten of which carried SP T-4 jammers 
pre-timed to the frequencies used by the Air Mark VI radar fitted to 
Japanese aircraft. (39) 
Fallowing the opening bombardment of Iwo Jima on 16 February, 
US warships in the area maintained a continuous intercept watch for 
enemy radar activity on the islands. This established that in general 
the early warning radars operated intermittently and only at night 
after the main bombardments had ceased, probably to watch the US 
ships' dispositi ns. The single anti-aircraft fire control radar oper- 
ated only at night and when US aircraft were present By the after- 
noon of the 18th, the day before the invasion was due to begin, the 
naval bombardment had destroyed all of the radars on the 
island. Nat 
until the night of the 19th, after the landings had begun, were 
sg- 
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nals from an Air Mark VI radar intercepted for the first time in the 
area. All the ships turned on their jammers and the lone shadower 
turned away apparently without gaining anything usef uL (40) 
V 
By the end of March 1945 the XX th Bomber Command, operating 
B-29's from India cr forward bases in China, had flown a total aE 49 
miens of which nine had been against targets in metropolitan 
Japan. In the mean time the XXIst Bomber Command had deployed to 
airfields on the newly captured islands of Guam and Tinian on the 
Marianas and it too opened its offensive against Japan. From the end 
of October 1944 to the end of March 1945 the X XIst Bomber 
Command flew a total of 50 missions of which 29 had been against 
Japan itself. During March and April 1945 the B-29 units of the 
XX th Bomber Command moved from Ixx1ia to the Marianas and were 
absorbed into the X XIst Bomber Command. (41) 
Apart from a few early missions,, until the first week in March 
1945 the majority of B-29 attacks on Japan had been by day and all 
were from altitudes above 20,000 feet. At these altitudes bomber 
crews often found difficult weather conditions with high clouds, 
turbulence and strong winds which made accurate bombing dificult. 
One way out of the problem would be to attack from lower altitudes, 
but B-29's attacking in this way by day would be far more vulnerable 
to the enemy defences. At night it would be ano ther matter, 
however. By now it was clear that the Japanese had no cperational 
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night, fighters fitted with radar. And even though they had some 
anti-aircraft fire control radars in service, there were not many 
even for the defence of the home islands: almost invariably, when 
bombers were engaged by fighters cr guns at night, they had first 
been illuminated by searchlights. With the factors in mind Ma-pr 
General Curtis Le M ay, commanding the X XLst Bomber Command, 
ordered a radical tactical experiment Far a single maximum-effort. 
night raid on Tokyo he ordered crews bo attack from altitudes 
between 5,000 and 6,000 feet, beneath the effective engagement 
altitude of the enemy heavy anti-aircraft guns and where radar 
bombing would be considerably more accurate than from high level. 
Because enemy night fighters posed little threat, for this mission all 
gun positions except that in the tail were to be unmanned and have 
their ammunition removed. The 11 tons thus saved, plus the reduced 
fuel load required because the bombers would not have to climb to 
high altituude, meant the B-29's could carry a bomb load twice as 
heavy as during revinus attacks: six tons instead of three tons (42). 
Understandably the bomber crews did not greet the new tactics with 
wholehearted enthusiasm. Long schooled in the belief that safety 
from the enemy defences depended an their flying as high as poste 
ihle, many felt that at low altitude the B-29's would be '-sitting 
ducks. 
In spite of the misgivings Le M ay's new tactics proved succ uL 
On the afternoon of 9 March 1945 a force of 325 Superfortresses 
book off from their island bases for the heaviest attack they had 
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ever attempted. Accurately laid concentrations aE incendiary bombs 
started huge fires which, by the time they burned themselves out the 
following day, had ]aid waste large sections aE the Japanese capital 
Although the Tokyo anti-aircraft gun defences were the most power- 
ful in Japan, smoke from the great fires made it difficult to engage 
the bombers as they roared overhead. Thirteen B-29's failed to 
return from the attack; one was seen to go down over the target 
after being hit by ground fire, seven others were listed as 'missing' 
, : )bably to the same cause, and the remaining five ditched on the 
way home and their crews were rescued. This loss represented jest 
over 4 per cent of the attacking force, a figure comparable with 
that during earlier, less successf ul, attacks on Japan. From now on 
low altitude night attack became the primary means of hitting the 
enemy cities and in the ten days that followed Nagoya, Osaka and 
Kobe suffered smilar raids (43). Still there was no recourse to 
active radio countermeasures t3o shield the bombers from the defen- 
oes: although jammers were held in store at the bombers' bases, the 
time was not judged ripe to use them over the enemy homeland. 
VI 
In parallel with the bombing attacks there was a huge Ebnt 
effort to plot the positions of the many radars operating on and 
around the Japanese home islands and learn as much as pos ihm 
about the operation of the air defences. e]iigence-gather ng by 
the X X7st Bomber Command book many forms. Throughout the camp- 
aigu a proportion of the attacking B-29's carried an APR-4 and a 
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radio countermeasures oFficer. In addition five B-24 Ferrets cper- 
ated with the 3rd Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, part of the 
Twentieth Air Fcrce (44). These late-war Ferrets carried a compre- 
hensive suite of electronic equipment. 
Radar Search Receivers: 
APR-4 (40 to 1,000 MHz) 
APR-5A (1000 to 6000 MHz) 
AP A-10 Panoramic Adaptor 
APA-11 Pulse Analyzer 
AP A-17 Direction Finder 
AP A-23 Radar Signal Recorder 
APA-24 Radar Direction Finder 
C om m unications Search Receivers: 
ARR-5 (27 to 143 MHz - Hallicrafters S. 27) 
ARR-7 (550 KHz to 28 MHz - Hallicrafters SX. 28) 
ANQ-1 Wire Recorder (45) 
The initial task of the XX th Air Farce Ferrets was to map the 
enemy radars in the Nanpo Shoto chain of islands, which ran between 
Iwo Jima and Japan. Intercepts of enemy signals indicated several. 
early warning radars on the islands whose locations needed to be 
established. During attack missions on metropolitan Japan from the 
Marianas the B-29's were usually routed to follow the island chain 
on their way north; although this gave the Japanese air defences 
long warning of attacks, it simplified navigation and any alternative 
touting would have greatly increased the flight times to and from 
targets. 
To gather further intelligence on the Japanese air defences, 
during bombing moons B-29's flying with the attacking force often 
carried Nisei radio operators (Americans of Japanese ancestry) to 
monitor enemy fighter and fighter control radio frequencies; the 
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aircraft carried AR R-5 communications search receivers and disk, 
later wire, recording equipment (46) 
Radio countermeasures officers regu]arly flew on B-29's engaged 
in weather reconnaissance, air-sea rescue and minelaying missions 
near enemy territory. These aircraft brought back much additional 
intelligence, and were able to show that there was little Japanese 
early warning radar activity and practically none by gunlaying cr 
searchlight control radars when few aircraft were present (47) (this 
revelation would be duly noted by those planning tactics for the 
atomic bomb attacks). The Countermeasures Air Analysis Center at 
XXIst Bomber Command headquarters collected data on Japanese 
radar and radio systems from all sources and collated it to build a 
comprehensive picture. 
US Navy submarines operating off the Japanese home islands a13 
brought back a wealth of information. During her patrol off the 
southern islands from 16 February to 9 March 1945, for example, 
Bluefish (Lt Cdr G. Fcrbes) reported nicking up signals from Japan- 
ese radars in several areas: 
The Army Tachi 6 early warning radar: 
77-79-81,500,20-23-28 (frequency in MHz, PRF, pulse 
width in microseconds). Contacted nearly every 
night while in the area. Bearings taken from 
different positions by swinging ship place this 
radar on the northern end of Amami 0 Shima. 
The Navy Mark I Model I early warning radar: 
110,500,1-2.18 Feb. Signal weak, triangular pulse shape. ' 
The Mark I Model III Air and surface search radar: 
154-155-160,500,10-12-15 Contacted nearly every even- 
ing after surfacing, and at other times during the 
night when close to ]and. This contact came in 
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Chong on the night of March 6. A bearing taken 
by swinging ship placed this radar on the aDuth- 
een end of Kikai Jima. Irregular periods of sweep 
were noted. 
The Air Mark VI airborne radar: 
151,1000,12 17 Mar, Strong, Probably airborne, Appar- 
ently keyed at irregular intervals. (48) 
VII 
The Japanese made little use cf metal fail to jam radar, ' Giman- 
shi' as they called it, following their initial use of this counter- 
measure in the autumn of 1943. On the few occasions G iman-shi was 
used, the strips were invariably dropped in small quantities from the 
few bombers taking part in attacks and as a result achieved little. 
On the night of 24 November 1944, for example, a force of aircraft 
estimated at less than five attacked Al ied troops at C hengkung in 
China. During the raid one of the bombers released a small quantity 
of tinfoil strips 23 in long and 2-in wide, tuned to counter radars in 
the 225 MHz band. On this occasion the countermeasure achieved 
nothing, except to reveal the fact that the Japanese had conducted 
no proper Elint reconnaissance in the area beforehand: there were no 
Allied radars around C hengkung! (49) 
From this and other pointers it was obvious that although the 
Japanese had not yet mounted effective radio countermeasures, a 
clear threat existed. Accordingly a radio countermeasures training 
unit, nicknamed the Anti-Jamming Medicine Show, was sent to 
demonstrate the effects of Chaff, Rope and noise pm ming to cperat- 
ors at radar rtes in the south-west Pacific theatre. A Royal 
Australian Air Fcnce Hudson bomber was fitted with several -ammers, 
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an intercept receiver, a portable jamming sm u]ator for lecture 
purposes and several types of Chaff and Rope; the aircraft cperatzng 
crew was Australian, with two lieutenants from the US Army Air 
Fcrces and one from the US Navy to give the jamming demonstrations 
and advise radar operators on how best to overcome the effects of 
the various countermeasures. An account of one of the demonstra- 
t ions dated: 
The next morning the Hudson took off on its first demons- 
tration flight, while on the ground the radar operators huddled 
around several SCR-268 scopes. This was electronic pm ming. 
During the two-hour demonstration they sweated and fumed, 
trying to track through the noise. At first the job seemed 
impossible, but by the time the run was over they were catching 
on, seeing through the grass and railings [the latter caused by 
pulse-locked jamming ]. 
In the afternoon they saw Window. Several kinds of Chaff 
were launched from the plane, first in small batches, then in big 
ones to show the different tracking effects. The men at the 
scopes found themselves profiting from their roise-' m ming 
baptism. The Window symptoms were different, but the general 
idea was the same. They did tracking that afternoon that would 
have sent them yelling for the maintenance man 24 hours earlier. 
(50) 
One valuable byproduct resulted from these 'Medicine Show' 
demonstrations: they made everyone conscious of the pc iii ity of 
enemy jamming and they highlighted fundamental weaknesses in 
Allied radar operations. In New Guinea, for example, the Hudson 
caused quite a stir when its single APT-1 easily jammed all six 
SC R-268 radars controlling the anti-aircraft gun defences around one 
important position: all of the radars had been shed within sx miles 
of the position and all operated on frequencies within 1MHz of 
eachother. Previously radar cperatars had complained ct their 
vulnerability to enemy jamming, but not until senior officers in the 
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area witnessed its devastating effects was urgency given to re-siting 
the radars and spreading their operating frequencies. (51) 
VI 
During the six months between the middle of September, 1944, 
and March, 1945, the status of US radio countermeasures in the 
Pacific theatre had been transformed. Now front line air and naval 
units were keenly aware of the advantages of using passive intercept 
receivers, Rope and electronic jammers. The equipment, coverage 
and capaýailities the Japanese radar network were becoming well 
known and naval and air operations invariably exploited gaps found 
in the cover; where no gaps existed, they could be made by mounting 
air strikes on individual radars or using jamming to screen forces 
penetrating the enemy defences. The stage was set for the next step 
in the island-hopping war in the Pacific: the invasion of the strateg- 
ically vital island of Okinawa, one of the final goals before the 
invasion of Japan itself. 
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CHAPTER 15 CLIMAX IN THE PACIFIC 
By the final week in March 1945 US forces were ready to strike 
at the strategically important island of Okinawa less than 350 miles 
from the Japanese home islands. At the same time the B-29 units oI 
the X Xlst Bomber Command on the Marianas, having been brought to 
their full strength of five Combat Wings, were mounting ever more 
devastating attacks on Japanese cities and indusbdal targets (1). The 
Stage was set for the climax of the war in the Pacific, backed by 
the fu]l panoply of radio countermeasures devices at the US forces' 
command. 
Prior to the landings on Okinawa and the nearby islands, Flint 
had established the existence of about a dozen early warning radars 
in the area. These could cause little trouble to US naval forces, 
however, and the main threat was still from the radars carried by 
the Japanese patrol and torpedo aircraft. To counter these, in add- 
tion to the warships' jammers, some 30 landing craft adapted for 
bombardment support (LCIG's) carried SPT-1 and SPT-4 jammers. (2) 
The injHal landings took place on the Kerama Retto islands 20 
miles south of Okinawa on 25 March and the Japanese Army and 
Naval Air Forces reacted strongly with day and night attacks against 
the concentration of US shipping, with many by Kamikaze suicide 
aircraft. These attacks became all the more ferocious after 1 April 
when landings began on Okinawa itself (3). Yet in spite of the ]arme 
number of attacks there was sir 91Y little Japanese airborne 
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radar activity. Afterwards the RC M control officer on the head- 
quarters 44 U SS Estes reported: 
The only airborne intercepts obtained during the nights of 
L-7 to L+4 [7 days before the initial landings to 4 days after 
them] were signals from the Mark VI radar (153,1000,8) [frequen- 
cy, PRF, pulse width], although bogies were within the vicinity 
of Okinawa almost constantly during these nights few such inter- 
cepts were obtained. From a total of 36 raids in the above 
period, Mark VI intercepts were obtained on three of them. 
Signals were picked up when the bogies were 80 - 90 miles away 
and were received intermittently while they closed. No signals 
were heard after the enemy aircraft approached to within 15 
miles of Okinawa. Look-through periods varied anywhere from 
ten seconds to six minutes, while the bogies were approaching. 
Periods between looks varied in a similar manner. Such tactics 
indicated that the enemy might be using his radar to find and 
then home on the island of Okinawa. Undoubtedly he was prev- 
iously informed of the fact that we could jam his set. (4) 
During the 30 day period following the landings on Okinawa, observ- 
ers on Estes estimated that signals from the Air Mark VI and Talei 1 
radars were intercepted on only about fifteen occasions in the area 
around the island (5). The reason for so few sg nals was that only 
the guide aircraft leading formations of Kamikazes carried radar, 
and these aircraft would turn back before they reached the US war- 
During the sea and air battle to secure Okinawa the radar and 
radio countermeasures ricket dyers patrolled in the most expoe-- 
ed positions around the islands, and suffered accordingly. Of the 
thirty--Six destroyers which served as pickets sx were sunk, thirteen 
set. usly damaged and five suffered minor damage (6). It was well 
into June before the desperate Japanese resistance an the island 
began to falter. 
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Following the hard-fought actions around Okinawa there was a 
lull in the war at sea, as the US and Al ied naval forces withdrew to 
repair and and the Japanese gathered their remaining 
resources in preparation for the final battle to defend their home- 
land. 
11 
Also at the beginning of April 1945, senior cfficers with the 
XXIst Bomber Command on the Marianas decided to start making full 
use of the B-29s' radio countermeasures capability. No sudden 
increase in the effectiveness of the enemy air defences prompted 
this decision: the loss of 14 Superfortresses during the initial low 
altitude night attack on Tokyo on 9 March would not be repeated 
during any of the maximum effort raids in the four weeks which foil- 
owed. Now the main consideration was that the Fifth Air Force and 
the Navy had already used electronic jamming and Rope against 
Japanese radars on the Philippines, Formosa and the home islands, 9o 
there was little point in holding back a weapon which the enemy 
a]ready knew about. And anything the radio countermeasures could 
do to reduce B-29 losses would be worth while. 
Since the opening of the B-29 attacks on the Japanese home 
islands the previous summer the air defences had improved somewhat, 
though they were still able to inflict only minimal lneses on the 
raiding forces. The air defence of metropolitan Japan was the res- 
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porksibdlity of the Army, which controlled most aE the gun defences 
and day and night fighters a9signed to the home defence task (7). 
The defence of the naval b ases and larger seaports was a naval res- 
ponsi biZity, however; and a part from exchanging some early warning 
information with the Army, the Navy operated an entirely separate 
defensive system with its o wn radars for gunnery C ontrol and its own 
fighters (8). The separate defensive systems were, of course, ext- 
remely wasteful in effort. 
The main sDurces af early warning for Army air defence apP_ra- 
ti, ons came from the Type A doppler warning system, the Tachi-6 
static early warning radar (68 to 80 MHz) and the Tachi-18 mot e 
early warning radar (100 MHz); for the mound control of fighters 
the radars operated in conjunction with the few available Tachi 20 
height finders (94 to 106 MHz). The Japanese Navy employed its 
Mark I Model 1 (100 MHz) and Mark I Model 111 (146 to 165 MHz) 
radars for early warning (for further details on the Japanese radars 
see Appendix G). 
In fact, throughout the Japanese air defence operations, there 
was never any shortage of warning on the B-29 attacks: whether the 
bombers came from China cr the Mari. anas, they had to make long 
approach flights in full view cf radars in occupied China, Cr on the 
Nahpo Shoto islands and radar picket boats in position ttf the coast. 
(9) 
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For control of the searchlights and heavy anti-aircraft guns of 
75 mm, 88 mm and 120 mm calibres, the main Army radars were the 
Tachi-1 and -2 (185 to 205 MHz), the Tachi-3 (72 to 84 MHz) and the 
Tachi-4 (187 to 214 MHz). The main Navy radars for this purpose 
were the Mark IV Models 1,2 and 3 (187 to 214 MHz). Although the 
Japanese had fragmented their meagre research effort to produce 
several different types of searchlight and fire control radar, there 
had been little effort to spread their operating frequencies to make 
them less vulnerable to jamming. Moreover, even at this stage of the 
war there was a serious shortage of fire control radars and many 
anti-aircraft gun and searchlight units had rune. Due to the shortage 
of anti-aircraft ammunition, batteries were forbidden to employ 
barrage fire; thus if targets could not be tracked on radar or Mum- 
mated by searchlights, the guns stayed sleet. There were several 
instances where B-29 raids of more than a hundred aircraft were met 
with less than 10 0 rounds of heavy anti-aircraft fire. (10) 
Two different types of airborne intercept radar and one for the 
ground control of night fighters were under development at this 
time, but none was yet ready for operational use. This all night 
fighter interceptions had to be made visually. From time to time 
searchlights would illuminate targets for night fighters, but this was 
incidental to their primary task ct illuminating targets for the anti- 
aircraft gum (11) 
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This, then, was the target for the countermeasures of the X XLa 
Bomber Command. By killed standards rune of the Japanese radars 
represented any technology later than about 1941, and most were 
first-generation sets ct even earlier vintage. Against these, the 
B-29's were about to open a jamming campaign using equipment with 
1942 to 1944 levels of technology. The Japanese early warning 
radars posed no real threat so the jamming was to be concentrated 
against the searchlight and fire control radars operating in the 72 to 
84 and 18 5 to 214 MHz bands. (12) 
The B-29's first used their countermeasures capability on 7 April 
1945, during a two-pronged daylight attack against industrial targets 
on the main Japanese island of Honshu. The 73rd Bomb Wing with 
107 B-29 's was to attack the Nakajma aircraft engine plant rnorth- 
west of Tokyo. At the same time 194 aircraft of the 313rd and 314th 
Bomb Wings were to hit the Mitsubishi engine plant at Nagoya. On 
this occasion, also for the first time over , japan, the Tokyo attack 
force would be escorted by P-51 Mustang fighters operating from 
Iwo Jima; the Nagoya attack force would enjpy no such protection. 
(13) 
Between them the Superfortresses carried 247 jamming trans- 
mitters, APT-1 Dinas and AP Q-2 Rugs. In aad itiron the bombers took 
13,000 bundles of Rope type RR--VU,, each 13-oz bundle containing 
three rolls of foil 400 feet long and 4-in wide with a 3-in square 
'parachute' at one end. The B-29's flew in standard cardboard 
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daylight attack formations, with nine to eleven aircraft per squadron 
and squadrons following each other at approximately half-mile inter- 
vats. Each squadron acted as a self-screening unit, with ten APT-1's 
pre-set to barrage jam the 185 to 205 MHz band, and two APQ-2's 
spot-ja m ming radars on frequencies outside the main barrage. To 
counter the Tachi-3 on 72 to 84 MHz, aircraft in the lead of each 
column of squadrons were to drop ten bundles of Rupee per minute. 
(14) 
Both raiding formations were heavl1y engaged by Japanese 
fighters and anti-aircraft fire and five B-29's (1.6 per cent of the 
force) were shot down. Three of the bombers are believed to have 
fallen to fighters, the other two fell to anti-aircraft fire. (15) 
Following their use over Japan by day, countermeasures were 
also employed by the B-29 's attacking at night. The night bombers 
attacked in a loose stream, however, with a far greater spacing 
between aircraft than by day. As a result there was a much lower 
concentration of electronic jamming and Rope in the target area. 
Initially the low altitude attacks had taken the defenders by surprise 
and on occasions as many as twenty searchlights would follow a 
single B-29 while the gunners engaged it with everything that could 
be brought to bear. This was sometimes fatal for the unfortunate 
crew but it meant scores of other bombers enjoyed a 'free ride' 
through the defended area. Quickly the Japanese searchlight opera- 
tors improved their tactics: with the aid of a radar-controlled master 
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light, one pair of lights would follow an individual bomber through 
the target area while others would seek new targets. To determine 
the effectiveness of Rape against searchlights the XXIst Bomber 
Command ran some experiments as Stanley Kaisel, the RRL Tech- 
nical Observer attached to the Command, wrote at the time: 
On the [night] mission on 13 April 1945 to Tokyo Arsenal 
two aircraft of the 314th Wing [out of a total attacking force of 
3271 were supplied with [Rope type] RR-? JU and in one of the 
two aircraft it was found that when they were "coned" [held by 
two or more searchlights], throwing out ten bundles would cause 
the lights to drift off the ships to the rear. On the basis of this, 
80 units each were placed in six aircraft [out of 1941 for the 15 
April [night] mission to Kawasaki. The men dispensing were 
briefed to throw out 5-6 bundles when a searchlight hit the strip, 
and to dispense at a rate of 1 unit per second when the flak 
looked dangerous. One (of the aircraft carrying Rape] failed to 
return, and four of the remaining five reported between three to 
six successful evasions of searchlights and were convinced of the 
efficacy of the the method. The fifth ship reported lack of 
success in two instances of "coning", but the gunner reported 
that at the time that rope was thrown out several other search- 
lights suddenly converged behind the aircraft. On the mission to 
Tokyo on 13 April 1945 the 73rd Wing reported that the use of 
rope caused searchlight and flak to be directed at the rope, the 
aircraft was untouched. Two separate instances of searchlight 
evasion were reported by the 73rd Wing on this occasion. 
The Commanding General has authorized full scale use of 
rope, but to conserve our meager supply outstanding directives 
to the Wings provide that it only be used at night or under 
conditions of poor visibility in the daytime. A regulation being 
issued states that 3 bundles of RR-VU should be dropped every 
10 seconds whenever the plane is in trouble from searchlights or 
flak. This should create a number of discrete echoes on the 
enemy radar, leading to temporary confusion. (16) 
Bomber crews quickly realized that Rope could be very effective in 
ridding themselves of the troublesome Japanese searchlight beams 
and became very keen to use it. But supply fell far below demand in 
the Pacific theatre: duri ng A pcil. the B-29 u nits received only 
150,000 bundles against a monthly requirement of l million bundles. 
As Kaisel told the author: 
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At that time the European theatre still had the higher 
pity and supplies were limited. One interesting result was 
that aircrews became very "Rope conscious",, they would remove 
unused bundles from their aircraft after missions and store them 
securely in their quarters; any bundles left in an aircraft were 
swiftly "appropriated" by other crews to increase their own 
supply. (17) 
By May 1945 the improved Japanese tactics, coupled with the 
deployment of more the antral radars, led to an increase in B-29 
losses during low altitude night attacks. This culminated on the 
nights of May 23 and 25 when the raiding forces over Tokyo lost 17 
out of 520 (3.3 per cent) and 26 out of 464 (5.6 per cent) respect- 
ively. (5) 
To provide electronic jamming against Tachi-3 radars operating 
in the 72 to 84 MHz band, B-29's began to carry AR Q-8's pre-tuned 
to barrage jam these frequencies. Bombers assigned to the spot 
jamming task carried three APT-3 jammers (later replaced by three 
AP Q-2's modified for single-dial low-band operation). Work began on 
a programme to fit about half the B-29's as spot jamming aircraft, 
though because of shortages of equipment this would not be 
completed before the war ended (19). The increase in the number of 
spot jamming aircraft meant there were insufficient radio counter- 
measures officers to operate the equipment and, as had been the 
case earlier in Europe, volunteer aircrew men received a hasty train- 
ing tD enable them to perform this task. 
Still there was insufficient density jamming at the targets to 
protect the widely spaced night bombers, however. So the idea arose 
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of operating spedal B-29's carrying large numbers of jammers in 
place of bomb loads, to orbit near targets and screen attacking 
forces as they passed through defended areas. Because the jamming 
B-29's had numerous bade aerials sticking out from their fuselages 
the aircraft were im mediate y nicknamed ' Pcrcupines' (20). The 
plan was to fit four aircraft in each Bomb Wing with siffic. i. ent 
equipment to jam all frequency bands used by the Japanese search- 
light and fire control radars. With four such jamming aircraft flying 
separate patterns in random fashion over the target there was a 
good chance that at any given time a ire control radar in the area 
would have at least one Porcupine transmitting down its main lobe 
and the other three jamming its side and back lobes. (21) 
That was the theory, but for a Porcupine B-29 to pm the entire 
band of frequencies used by the Japanese searchlight and fire 
control radars - 72 to 84 and 180 to 220 MHz - it would need to 
carry at least eight 200 MHz band jammers, five 78 MHz band 
jammers, some 2,000 bundles of Rape with provision for automatic 
dispensing, and two spot-Jamming operators. To cram so much equip- 
ment into the B-29 posed problems of space, power supplies, cabling 
and location of the necessary aerials. Although two different layouts 
for this 'full Parcupine' fit were investigated no such aircraft would 
be ready for operations before the war ended. (22) 
Pending the arrival of the ideal solution each Bomb Wing began 
work to modify four B-29's as 'interim Porcupines' carrying sx or 
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more jamming transmitters. The fib became operational in June 
1945, and in the weeks to follow others joined them to screen night 
attacks. During the four-Wing mission on the night of July 16, for 
example, the 73rd Wing sent 129 bombers to hit Oita supported by 
two jamming aircraft; the 314th hit Hiratsuka with 132 bombers 
supported by four jamming aircraft; the 58th Wing hit N uma zu and 
the 313rd Kuwana, with 128 and 99 bombers respectively, but these 
units had no P crcup i nes with them and the bombers had only the 
pratectioon of their own ja m meas. No B-29's were lost during the 
night's operations though several suffered damage. (23) 
Soon four out of the five Wings of the XXIst Bomber Command 
were operating interim Porcupines, each modified to a different 
pattern, to support night missions. The 58th Wing, for example, 
adapted its countermeasures aircraft to carry three spot-tuned 
jammers and an APR-4 in the rear compartment, and ten or more 
pre-set barrage jammers in the bomb bay. Lieutenant Harry Smith, 
one of the unit's radio countermeasures officers, recalled his 
missions on board the interim Porcupines: 
For obvious reasons the RC M B-29's soon gained the nick- 
na me "Guardian Angels", and I flew several missions aboard 
them. The RC M operator's job was to switch on the barrage 
jammers at the correct time, then use his spot jammers to take 
out any enemy radars not covered by the main barrage. Normally 
the Guardian Angels would precede the main force Cl bombers to 
the target area, then begin jamming and fly racetrack patterns 
over the target at a1Htudes above 12,000 feet. The lowest 
Guardian Angel would orbit clockwise, the next one up counter- 
clockwise, and so on up the stack. Since we arrived in the 
target area first the gunners an the ground would start off by 
trying to engage us. That part of the mission could be very 
exciting and sometimes we took damage. But soon afterwards the 
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main force of bombers would come in at altitudes around 5,000 feet and they took the heat off us. 
As soon as the Guardian Angel B-29's started operating 
there was a dramatic reduction in the number of aircraft lost, or 
which returned with damage. Overnight the status of the RC M 
officer rose from "mere passenger" to "fantastic guy". After th 
success of the first such mission our Wing Commander became 
very enthusiastic and wanted the pro n of Guardian Angels 
even when we were attacking targets where there were no 
threatening radars. Sometimes we could talk him out of the idea if it was a daylight raid. But at night he usually wanted us to go 
along even if there was nothing on the ground to ja m; he would 
say "To Hell with that, the aircraft are modified so let's use 
them! " (24) 
As well as the interim and full Pcrcupine programmes with the 
B-29, RRL Technical Observer Stanley K aisel was also involved with 
installing an automatic dispenser for Rope into the aircraft. He told 
the author: 
Dudng missions the Rope had to be dispensed by hand 
through the camera hatch situated behind the rear pressurized 
cabin. This was far from satisfactory, especially if strike photos 
were required and the hatch had to be used for its intended 
purpose. But although Wright Field had been experimenting for 
some time they had failed to find a location for an automatic 
dispenser on the B-29 that satisfied all the requirements. We 
managed to get hold of an A-1 automatic dispenser on Guam 
and, after studying the B-29, concluded that the best place for 
it was in the unpressurized section of the rear fuselage, close to 
the camera hatch used for manual dispensing. But we were 
warned that 700 pounds of Rope, plus the dispenser itself, in 
that position would shift the aircraft's oe. ntre of gravity aft to a 
serious extent and would never get official approvaL When we 
approached the operations people at XXIst Bomber Command, 
however, their reply was " We need the pro n; you tell as 
where it will fit and we'll solve the weight and balance 
problem. " The incident was a good example of the differences 
between the operational people who have to solve problems 
rapidly and pragmatically, and the research and development 
organizations who can search for years for ideal solutions to 
satisfy everybody and may never succeed. By the end of July 
1945 we had Completed the prototype installation of an auto- 
matic dispenser in the rear of a B-29 and had it approved. But 
the war ended before the full installation programme could get 
under way. (25) 
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III 
The day and night fire raids were tearing the heart out of 
Japan's cities and systematically wrecking her industrial base. Yet 
worse was in store, however, with a weapon vastly more powerful 
than anything previously conceived about to be unleashed against 
that nation: the atomic bomb. Under the strictest secrecy a B-29 
unit was making final preparations to carry out this new form of 
attack: the 393rd Squadron of the 509th Composite Group. The 
Squadron's Electronic Officer, Lieutenant Jacob Beser, was to fly on 
the atomic bomb attacks and found himself in the unique position of 
being able to choose the radio oountermeasur suite he took on an 
operational mission. For the protection of his B-29 Besen selected a 
mix of APT-l, APT-4 and AR Q-8 jammers, for use if the bomber was 
engaged by accurate radar-laid anti-aircraft fire. As important as 
warding off possible Japanese ground fire, Beser had also to ensure 
there were no radars in the target area which might trigger the 
atomic bomb's radar air-burst fuzing system prematurely. To deton- 
ate them at an altitude of about 1,900 feet above the target, for 
maximum blast damage, the early atomic bombs each carried four 
separate radar fuzes: modified APS-13 tail warning radars (410 to 
420 MHz) mounted around the circumference of the bomb with the 
directional aerials pointing forwards. As a back-up for the radar 
fuzes there was a barometric fuze set to the same altitude; and in 
case neither the radar nor the barometric fuzes 
functioned properly, 
the bomb carried mechanical impact fuzes in the nose and tail to set 
it off when it struck the ground. (26) 
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There was no intelligence information on a Japanese radar offer 
acing in the 410 MHz band which might interfere directly with the 
bomb fuzing radars, but there was always a chance that such a radar 
might be introduced. More likkely, there was the poesibiity that 
harmonic signals from an enemy radar operating on, say, 205 MHz 
might be strong enough to trigger one of the radar fuzes during the 
bomb's fall and set off the weapon prematurely. If that happened 
there was a serious risk that the B-29 would be incinerated in the 
fire baU from its own bomb. To prevent this, during the bombing run 
BeBer was to monitor the frequencies used by the bomb fuze radars 
with his APR-4 receiver. If there were transmissions which might 
have triggered the bomb, at any tame up to bomb release he could 
switch off some or all of the fuze radars and, as a last resort., leave 
the detonation of the weapon to the barometric or impact fuzes. (27) 
Jacob Besser was the only man to fly on bath atomic bomb 
missions, against Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945 
respectively. On neither mission did enemy radar contro]kd anti- 
aircraft guns attempt to engage the B-29; and at neither target did 
he detect transmissions which might have triggered the bomb prema- 
turely. (28) 
The two atomic bomb attacks brought the war in the Pacific to 
an abrupt halt, much to the relief of the soldiers and sailors prepar- 
ing for the invasion of the Japanese home islands. 
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IV 
During their fourteen months of operations against metropolitan 
Japan, from mid-June 1944 to mid-August 1945, Superfortresses flew 
a total of 27 7 raids with more than 27,000 s rti. e& Of the raids 
116 involved less than fifty aircraft and 21 involved more than two 
hundred. B-29 lasses known or believed from enemy action totalled 
214 aircraft, or just under .8 per vent of those taking part.. The 
causes of the losses were as follows: 
Due to anti-aircraft fire 48 
Due to fighters 58 
Due to anti-aircraft fire and fighters 29 
Due to unknown causes 79 (39) 
The majority of B-29 losses to fighter attack occurred during day- 
light mmsirons before US escorts became available in April 1945. 
Similarly most kisses to anti. -aircraft fire took place before the 
countermeasures campaign began to take effect. Following the intro- 
duction of the interim Porcupine B-29 's to screen raiding forces at 
the beginning of June 1945, lasses during the night attacks im medi, at- 
ely fell: during the 2} months from then until the end of the war, in 
the course of 10 3 attacks involving over 8,800 sorties, only 28 
bombers were lost to all causes: only .3 per cent of those takM 
part (30). As with the jamming over Europe, it is impossible to 
calculate with accuracy the number of US heavy bombers saved over 
Japan by the use of countermeasures; we know the jamming caused 
Considerable degredation of the Japanese air defences, however, and 
a@ ball park' figure is probably about 200 aircraft 
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V 
Following the end of the war in the Pacific there was an influx 
of US technical personnel into Japan to examine the state of the art 
of the enemy technology, in an effort am. ilar to that taking place in 
Espe. Fcr a full description of the Japanese reaction to the US 
radio countermeasures, based on these investigations, see A opendix 
H. 
Any consideration of Japanese anti-jamming methods dwing the 
war should be seen against the background of severe shortages of 
research and production capacity, both made more acute by the 
devastating B-29 raids, coupled with an almost complete separation 
of the Army and Navy work on radar and anti-jamming systems. Even 
in the summer of 19 45 when the nation was almost at its knees, 
co-operation between the two services was minimal and there was 
much useless duplication of effort. And time was not on the side of 
the Japanese: from the start of the main jamming campaign eatly in 
April 1945 only four months elapsed before the war ended. (31) 
The Japanese had received details of the German W uerzlaus 
anti-Chaff system and the Army conducted some experiments with it. 
But it was felt that radar operators could track aircraft through 
Rape clouds (probably they vvuld, so long as supplies of the material. 
th B-29 units remained i uffic-lent) and the counter-countermeasure 
aroused little interest in Japan. To enable existing radars to operate 
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in the face of electronic jamming, the Army and the Navy each init- 
iat&1 a separate modification programme to enable sets to switch to 
new frequencies up to 10 MHz above or below those previously used. 
At the end of the war, however, the Army had got no further than 
initiating a crash programme to work on this problem; and Navy work 
had stalled 'due to design diffi7des'. (32) 
Bath services realized the vital need for a searchlight and fire 
control control radar more modern than the first-generation sets 
then in use. Great hopes were placed on near-copies of the 560 MHz 
German W uerzburg, for which a set of drawings and parts had 
arrived by submarine in January 1944. The Army version of the 
radar, the Tachi 24 re-engineered for mass-production in Japan, was 
to have been built in large numbers by the Sumitomo and Tokyo 
Shibaura companies. By the end of the war only one Japanese-built 
prototype of this radar was complete and it did not see operational 
use. Meanwhile, in a typically wasteful piece of duplication, the Japr 
anese Navy produced its own version of W uerzburg: the Hama 61, 
intended as a height finder for the ground control of fighters. In 
vie w of the relative ease with which US bombers had been able to 
neutralize W uerzburg over Europe, it is difficult to believe that the 
Tachi 24 cr the Hama 61 could have brought the Japanese air defen- 
ces any lasting relief from jamming. (33) 
More realistically, the Navy started work on a version of its 
3,000 MHz shipborne Mark II Model 2 radar, for searchlight control. 
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Had it gone into service this radar might for a time have presented a 
difficult jamming problem for the B-29's. Countermeasures equip- 
ments to cover this part cf the spectrum had been developed by the 
Radio Research Laboratory and PrOtDtYPes existed; but it would have 
taken some months to get such equipment into service in quantity. It 
would not prove necessary: when the war ended only one Mark II 
Model 2 radar had been adapted for the new role and it was not 
used operatioonaUy. (34) 
Both the Army and the Navy appreciated the value of intercept 
receivers to provide information on the types of enemy radar in use 
against them. Both initiated programmes to develop such receivers, 
though their use was not widespread. In addition the Army developed 
two types of airborne 'wave disturber' (ie jamming transmitter) - the 
Talei 8 and the Taki 23 - to counter enemy radars operating on 
frequencies between 40 and 375 MHz. It would seem that by the time 
these jammers were working the war was in its closing stages, and 
very few were built. The author has found no record of any deliber- 
ate enemy electronic jamming of Al ied radars in the Pacific theatre. 
(35) 
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CHAPTER 16 MEANWHILE, BACK 1 2,4 USA ... 
The Harvard Radio ReSearch Laboratory reached its peak 
strength in July 1944, with a total of about 210 research asgociates 
and 600 her personnel (1). Having put into the field equipment to 
counter almost every type of radar introduced by the Germans and 
the Japanese, the research teams worked to produce jammers 
developing yet higher powers and systems to counter pos hle new 
enemy radars operating higher in the frequency spectrum. 
In parallel with the TD Y high power magnetron jammer for the 
US Navy with an output of 150 watts, RRL developed an airborne 
equivalent for rise against Wuerzburg: the APT-4 Broadloom (150 to 
780 MHz). The development of APT-4 was completed in 1944 and it 
was placed into mass production, but the war ended before it could 
be used in action (2). To cover the spectrum below APT-4 RRL 
developed another high powered magnetron jammer, the APT-6 which 
also developed 150 watts; APT-6 was not quite ready for production 
when the war ended. (3) 
To counter po hle new enemy radars operating on frequencies 
higher in the spectrum, the RRL transmitter section developed two 
new airborne jammers: the APT-9 and APT-10. The APT-9 was a 
Spot-Jammer which used a conventional lighthouse valve as power 
source and covered the band 1,000 to 2,500 MHz; linked with an 
mated receiver and panoramic adaptor this was designated the 
APQ-21. The APT-10 spot-mmer used a tunable magnetron as 
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power source and covered the band 2,230 to 4,030 MHz; linked with 
an aociated receiver based on the APR-5,. this was designated the 
AP Q-20 (4). The AP Q-20 and AP Q-21 were built in small numbers 
and tested, then held in reserve ready for massoducti, on if needed 
to vaunter enemy microwave radars. 
At the end of 1944 US Navy divers salvaged parts of the Mark U 
Model 2 microwave air and surface warning radar (operating frequen- 
cy between 2,857 and 3,125 MHz) from a Japanese warship sink in 
the Gulf of Leyte (5). The US Navy issued a top priority requirement 
for a state--of-the-art shipborne microwave jammer and in February 
1945 RRL began work on the device, code-named 'Elephant'. Like 
the airborne APT-l0, the shipborne Elephant employed a tunable 
magnetron as the jamming power source. By the time its operating 
concept had been finalized, the Elephant had become the most elab - 
crate equipment of its type produced anywhere during world war IL 
Joe Kearney, one of those involved with it, recalled: 
The Elephant was a most ambitius project for its time, the 
first-ever attempt at a completely integrated receiving and 
jamming system on microwave frequencies. Intended for ship- 
board use, it was a spot jammer covering the band 2,460 to 
3,610 MHz and we were to aim at a power output of 1Kw- one 
heck of a lot of power on such frequencies at that time. In fact 
we were able to get only 600 to 700 watts, but that was still 
very good. 
The receiver was not only to pick up the agnals from the 
enemy radar and tune in the jammer, it was also to measure the 
bearing from the enemy radar. There were to be two transmitter 
antennas, one at either end of the ship. 0 ne of these was 
trained on the enemy radar, the jamming antenna held on the 
required bearing by a system of servo amplifiers deriving their 
information from the ship's main gyros; so even if the ship 
changed heading, the pm ming went out on the same bearing 
relative to north. (6) 
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Arther important RRL crash programme early in 1945 was the 
APA-48 homing attachment for use with the APR-1 receiver, which 
enabled suitably modified Navy F6F Hellcat fighters to home on 
radar signals from Japanese aircraft. Twenty-iivoe of these homers 
were hand-built at RRL and the Radiomarine Ccrpooration of America 
prepared the device for production, but the war ended before it 
could be used in combat. (7) 
During the closing stages of the war RRL personnel were engag- 
ed in other countermeasures projects too numerous to be described in 
detail in this account. A mongst these were the AR Q-11, a 1.5 Kw 
airborne jammer to counter the guidance systems of enemy guided 
missiles in the 20 to 70 MHz band (8); various types of air dropped 
expendable jELm mer node-named 'Chicks', to counter enemy ground 
controlled intercept and the control radars ((9); a range of signal 
repeaters given the generic code-name ' Peter', to induce directional 
errors in lobe-switching or conical scanning radars (10); and there 
were several attempts to produce better intercept receivers. There 
was continuous development of Chaff, Rcpe and Angels (comer 
reflectors), including types for use against microwave radars, and 
work aimed at improving their efficiency by getting a langer radar 
echo for a given weight or cost of material (11). The RRL sponsored 
work on new types of valve and itself developed several specialized 
types of aerial for countermeasures applicatiorns. And for each of the 
jammers it produced, the RRL designed the associated test 
equipment to asst maintenance. (12) 
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In the nature of their work, it was to be expected that RRL 
engineers would find themselves trying to push the 1940s' technology 
further than it would go. One example of this was the AP Q-14 Moth 
receiver to enable missiles to home on enemy radars. Three types of 
winged missile were considered for use for this radar-busting mole: 
the 10-foot an Pelican carrying a 1,000 pound warhead; the 
12-foot an Dragon carrying a 3,000 pound warhead; and the huge 
36-foot an Glomb (glider bomb) which was to carry a warhead of 
4,000 pounds (13). Pelican and Dragon were to be carried under 
heavy bombers, Glomb was to be towed like a glider. All three of 
these missiles had originally been designed for u9e with other types 
of control - the Glo m b, for example, had been tested with radio 
oo mm and guidance and a television camera in the nose to pass back 
a picture of the scene in front of the missile (14). The RRL tests 
were not the first with anti-radiation weapons - similar tests in 
Germany predated them by a few months - but they were certainly 
amongst the first. Dr John Christensen was one of those involved in 
this work and recalled some of the difficulties encountered: 
In the anti-radiation role the missiles were intended to 
attack coastal radar stations and to simulate the we set up a 
transmitter near the shore at Toms River, New Jersey, for our 
bests. The initial runs were made with the homing receiver fitted 
in an aircraft and it seemed to work well enough. But when we 
put the homing equipment into one of the missiles and began 
its with the full system, we found there was a basin problem 
we had not foreseen. After release the missile came gliding 
down towards the transmitter accurately enough in the horizon- 
tal plane - to within about 100 feet. But the missile antennas 
picked up quite a stung image of reflection of the transmitted 
signals off the surface of the sea. which made it appear that the 
emitter was very much larger than it was. As a result the accur- 
acy of the missile in range was not good enough for it to have 
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been effective in action. The work on the anti-radiation missiles 
continued until the end of the war, without resolving this 
fundamental problem. (15) 
At this time the other organizations acted with the RRL, 
within Division 15, were also heavi Ly engaged. 0 ne very interesting 
proposal to emerge from the Airborne Instruments Laboratory was a 
jammer to counter the V1 flying bomb, with which the Germans 
were bombarding London during the summer of 1944. This weapon 
was invulnerable to radio countermeasures in the normal sense of the 
word: it employed no radar or radio guidance whose signals could be 
jammed. Azimuth guidance was by means of a magnetic compass 
controlling a gyro, which operated the rudder via a servo system . 
Nevertheless even this weapon could have been jammed, as Dr Guy 
Suits explained to the author: 
The problem was passed to Dr Don Hare and his team at AIL 
and they figured out a way that was aksalutely fantastic. Their 
idea was to form a magnetic loop employing existing railway 
lines, suitably interconnected, all the way around London -a 
circumference of about 60 miles. This loop would be energized 
with a hefty current to make it into a giant magnetic deflector. 
They worked out a system which would have required something 
like 1,000 amps DC, to provide the necessary magnetic field to 
deflect the compass of a flying bomb at 1,000 feet. The power 
requirement for the system would have been of the order of 20 
to 30 megawatts, which would have meant dedicating quite a 
large [commercial] power station for this purpose. The system 
was very seriously considered and design work began on some of 
the necessary equipment (16) 
While the device was still in the conceptual stage, however, Allied 
ground troops overran the area in Northern France from which most 
of the flying bombs were being launched against England. So the idea 
came to nothing. The jammer to counter the V1 flying bomb easily 
- 273 - 
holds the record for the most powerful electronic countermeasures 
equipment ever considered. 
One crash programme aimed at meeting a potential threat 
stemmed from the final German offensive in the west, the 'Battle of 
the Bulge' at the end of 1944. During the enemy advance a US Army 
munitions dump had been captured with large numbers of the new 
radar proximity-fuzed shells. Earlier in the year this weapon had 
demonstrated its effectiveness against V1 flying bombs launched 
against England: it required an average of only 156 shells to knock 
down aV1, compared with about 2,800 of the earlier mechanically- 
fuzed shells (17). Headquarters Army Air Fccces became deeply 
concerned that the Germans might copy the new type of X11 and 
start using it against Allied aircraft. The Research Division of the 
Aircraft Radio Laboratory at Wright Field was asked to investigate 
the development of a suitable jammer, calling in RRL assistance if 
necessary. Lieutenant Jack Bowers, an engineer with the 
Development Branch at Wright, remembered: 
The proximity fuze had been a closely guarded secret on our 
side. Even though we had been working on countermeasures for a 
long time, we at Wright Field had never heard of the device. 
Now we were asked to investigate, on a crash basis, the possibil- 
ity of a jammer to counter the fuze. We asked why such a 
jammer had not been developed earlier, and were told that the 
developing agency had conducted tests and concluded that the 
fuze could not be jammed! We worked on the probe m, and 
within two weeks a jammer had been built which would detonate 
the proximity fuzes prematurely. (18) 
The body of the shell served as the aerial for the radar proximity 
fuze, and this limited the frequency spread of the radar to the band 
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180 to 220 MHz. The APT-4 high powered Jammer covered that part 
of the spectrum, and was fitted with a motor-driven tuner to sweep 
the jamming up and down the band used by the fuzes. Modified 
APT-4's were fitted into a B-17, and a top priority full scale trial 
usýn9 a battery of 90 mm guns was arranged at Eglin to see whether 
the jamming would be effective. The guns had to fire high explosive 
shells, because the VT fuze was about 11 inches longer than the 
normal mechanical fuze and it could rot be fitted into a shell carry- 
ing a spotting charge. As a safety measure the guns were to be 
offset by a small angle, initially 30 mils (about L 7°] later decreased 
to 12 mils [about . 6°]. One of the jamming operators on the B-17, 
Lieutenant Ingwald Haugen, remembered: 
It was the sort of test that would never be allowed today, 
under the prevailing flight safety guidelines. But at the time 
there was a war on, and the small risk to our one aircraft had 
to be weighed against the far larger risk to our whole bomber 
force if the Germans used such a weapon against us. We who 
were to fly the test were confident we would be all right - we 
hoped that the jamming would work as planned, and if it didn't 
the offset fed into the guns would burst the shells at least 240 
feet away from us at a range of about 20,000 feet. 
The test lasted about 3 months, during which about 1,600 VT 
shells were fired, individually, in our direction. Sitting in the 
fuselage of the B-17 the two RCM operators could pick up the 
radar transmissions from the shells coming up. The VT fuze 
radiated CW [continuous wave] signals, but the projectiles would 
often yaw a little in flight and this, in combination with the spin 
of the shell., would modulate the -signal. We in the back could 
not see out. But the pilots and the navigator would get a kick 
out of watching the shells burst well below or, if there was a 
]ate burst because the jamming had taken some time to sweep 
through the shell's frequency, it might explode close to our 
altitude. The general conclusion of the test was that, modified 
to radiate CW swept across the VT fuze band, the APT-4 jamm- 
ing could significantly reduce the effectiveness of the proximity 
fuzed AA she1L (19) 
- 275 - 
One further aspect of the work of Division 15 that deserves 
mention is the effort put into the development cif anti-ja mming 
devices, to enable US radars to operate in the face of counter- 
measures (20). The RRL aL developed training devices to show the 
appearance of jamming on the various types of mi-service radars. The 
Laboratory assisted the Army and Navy to produce training films and 
gave demonstrations to show operators how they could best deal with 
enemy jamming. As we have seen, neither the Germans nor the 
Japanese had the development or production capacity to spare for a 
sustained campaign of this type. And nothing either nation could do 
was effective against the AIlied microwave radars - the introduction 
of the latter can be considered a successful electronic counter- 
countermeasure in its own right Fcr these reasons there was little 
military demand for counter-, countermeasures modifications to radars 
in operational use. Nevertheless US operators did receive some 
training in operations in the face of jamming, and the anti-Jamming 
section at RRL maintained a close liaison with the Radiation 
Laboratory and informed them of the latest jamming techniques. 
11 
From late in 1944 Division 15, like many of the research organ- 
izations set up during the a nflic't, began to prepare for the end of 
the war and the need for its services. The Division accepted new 
projects only where they met a clearly defined need and could be 
completed within a relatively short time. After the end of the war in 
Europe there was a further shift in emphasis away from long term 
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projects in favour of short term measures to make the most effective 
use of existing equipments against Japanese radars. In June 1945 
there was an increase in the number of RRL personnel working with 
the front-line units to increase the usefulness of existing equipment, 
and had the war continued into 1946 at least half RR L's technical 
effort would have been employed in this way. (21) 
Immediately following the Japanese amender in August 1945, 
the RRL Project Committee and the Army and Navy agencies with 
which it worked reviewed all projects in hand and divided them into 
three categories: those near to completion or those whose post-war 
merit was ant to warrant their being carried to a conclusion 
(provided this could be done before 1 November 1945); those whose 
importance was such that they should be carried on, to the point at 
which the value of past research would be preserved; and those of 
no further usefulness which could be upped. (22) 
One of the few projects on which work continued after the end 
of the war was the Elephant shipborne microwave jammer, as Joe 
Kearney explained: 
The end of the war brought down the guillotine on the work 
to develop jammers, with one exception: the US Navy was still 
very interested in the Elephant project and, since the prototype 
was completed and ready to be installed in a ship, wanted to 
conduct sea tests with it. I was only 23 and it was the first 
position of real responsibility that I have ever been offered. I 
jumped at the opportunity. 
The patrol frigate USS Ashville was made available to us for 
the Elephant tests. At the Brooklyn Navy Yard the ship's anti- 
submarine gear was all removed and the jamming equipment inst- 
alled in its place. Then we took her to Portland, Maine, our base 
for the sea tests. Ashville was taken up and town the east 
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coast, testing out the new "toy" and putting out jmm. ing agav- 
ground, shipborne and airborne microwave radars in the area. 
The Elephant worked beautifully. There was considerable US 
Navy interest in our activities and we received a continual 
stream of high powered visitors. (23) 
The sea test of Elephant was the last major project undertaken by 
RRL. Following its concltEion the jammer went to the Naval 
Research Laboratory. Although it performed successfully the jammer 
died not go into production: at the time no potentially hostile navy 
used microwave radar. The jammer was retained as a working 
prototype, ready to go into production should a threat arise. (24) 
By November 19 45 the strength of RRL was down to 50 research 
personnel and 260 other staff, and the numbers of both were falling 
rapidly. Most of the final work involved the completion of reports on 
the various projects, with Mike Villan3 putting together a detailed 
overall report on the work of the laboratory. The physical plant at 
RRL, including the office furniture, machine tools, workshop equip- 
meet, etc, were turned over to the new Airborne Radio Division of 
the Naval Research Laboratory. Several projects were transferred en 
black, with all equipment and documentation, to service research 
agencies such as the Naval Research Laboratory and the Army's Air- 
craft Radio Laboratory. The remaining equipment was offered to 
interested branches of the services and what was left found its way 
to the surplus market. The closing-down af the other departments cf 
Division 15 moved as rapidly, in similar ways. The final meeting cf 
the Division 15 committee, with Dr Guy Suits in the chair, took place 
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at the Tech-Williams Club in New Y cck on the evening of 6D ece m- 
ber 1945. (25) 
III 
Following the end of World War II and the demise of Division 15 
there was a virtual cessation of work on electronic countermeasures 
in the USA, except for the development of the APR-9 based on the 
receiver portion of Elephant and a few low priority projects at the 
Naval Research Laboratory and the Aircraft Radio Laboratory. But 
the huge wartime effort left a residue which survived the military 
rundown. There remained moderately large numbers cf wartime 
jammers, receivers and Chaff dispensers, now removed from aircraft 
and ships and held in store at service depots against a possi. hle 
future need (the rest of this equipment was soli as government 
surplus); there was the vast pool of experience in the production, 
development and use of electronic countermeasures that could again 
be tapped should the need arise; and, probably most important of all, 
there was a first-hand awareness amongst members of the fighting 
services, some of whom would ogress to very high rank in the 
years to follow, that electronic warfare would confer a major advan- 
tage in any conflict against a technically advanced nation. The new 
field of military endeavour, effectively only four years old in the 
USA in 1946, was rnot dead. It was only doormant. 
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CHAPTER 17 IN RETROSPECT 
It is a truism that nothing to do with war is cheap, but some a 1u- 
tions to problems are a good deal more expensive than others. vý hat was 
the cost of the US radio muntermeasures effort during W crld War II, and 
what did it achieve? 
The Harvard Radio Research Laboratory, which carried out more 
than three-quarters of the US work to develop radio countermeasures 
during the conIIict-, grew from a mere 25 employees in March 1942 to 810 
persons of all grades at its peak in the summer of 1944 (1). Between the 
opening of the laboratory and its closure in February 1946, a period of 
four years, the laboratory's total budget for wages, running costs, 
research and model construction was $15 million; an additional $710,000 
was spent on the ABL-15 offshoot in England (2). During this 4-year 
period RRL engineers designed and produced more than 150 separate 
equipments which drew service orders totalling $242 million; by October 
1945 when the remaining contracts were terminated, 427,000 items cost 
ing $160 million had been delivered (3). These figures exclude the supply 
of Chaff and Rope, of which same 30,000 tons were produced at a cost of 
$39 miWon. Thus, for each dollar spent on research at the RRL, some 13 
dollars worth of equipment were delivered to the US ar Allred armed 
forces. A list of the main countermeasures devices originating from RRL, 
with details of each and the approximate cost of several of the programs, 
is given in Appendix C C. (4) 
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In addition the laboratory built, or had built under sub-contract, 
some 2,800 items of equipment worth $2,680,000 which it turned over to 
the services for test cr experimental use with no transfer of funds (5). In 
cases where the services had urgent operational needs which could not be 
met rapidly enough by other means, the laboratory 'crash' produced or 
arranged for the production of an additional 463 items of equipment 
costing $2,805,000. (6) 
A]though initially the US research into radio countermeasures was 
based on work previously cone in Great Britain, it was not long before 
the Radio Research Laboratory making innovations of its own. The 
development of high efficiency Chaff and machinery to mass-produce it, 
the high powered airborne magnetron jammers and the super-high powered 
ground jammers, are examples of advances which stemmed directly from 
cziginal US work. In 1945 advanced microwave jammers such as the 
shipborne Elephant and the airborne AP Q-20, then in the testing stage, 
were a match for state-of-the-art radars then being produced. 
The most significant US contribution to countermeasures during 
World War It, however, stemmed from the harnessing of the nation's huge 
electronics industry to mass produce equipment for the Allied forces. 
Although exact figures are not available on the number of counter- 
measures equipments produced by ether nations, there can be no doubt 
that during the conflict US production in this field easily outstripped that 
of all other nations put together; indeed the production of APT-2 Carpet 
which exceeded seven thousand (7), alone, probably achieved this. W hen it 
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came to mass production the USA had shown herself in this field, as in 
others, to be pre-eminent. 
In return for all of this effort, what did the US armed forces 
receive? As we have already seen, it has been estimated that radio 
aountermeasures probably saved about 400 US heavy bombers during oper- 
ations over Europe; the replacement cost of the aircraft alone was 
about $150 million at 1944 prices. In the Pic the use of counter- 
measures probably saved some 200 B-29 Superfortresses costing a similar 
amount. These savings in bombers not shot down exceeded the total cost 
of RRL and the production of the various countermeasures devices. Added 
too this were numerous other savings and successes made poembl by the 
use cf vauntermeasures: the reduction in the number of aircraft damaged 
during bombing raids; the continually up-dated picture cf the positions 
and types of enemy radar deployed and their areas of cover, so that 
operations could be planned to achieve maximum surprise; the inking cE 
three Japanese submarines on as many nights by the USS Batfish; the US 
submarines not lost because intercept receivers warned their clews of the 
presence of enemy ships or aircraft in the vicinity using radar; the delay 
in any effective German reaction against the Allied ships landing troops 
on the coast of Normandy on the morning of D-day, 6 June 1944, and a 
smilar slowing of the defences during the many amphibious operations in 
the Pacific. These are but a few examples, the full list would be 
cxnsiderably longer. And with every such success came a saving in the 
most precious commodity of all: human lives. 
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The countermeasures had a riot incormderable effect in raising the 
morale of Allied o0m bat personnel, who could see for them selves the 
reduced effectiveness of the enemy weapons which reed; and at the 
higher command levels there was the rea ce that if the enemy 
deployed new types of radar oar radio-guided weapons, countermeasures 
could be rapidly implemented. When called upon to do so the Radio 
Research Laboratory, and the other US agencies developing counter- 
measures, showed they were able tc) react within weeks, air even days, to 
meet new threats as they arose. 
As a bonus, the countermeasures effort made the Allied radar 
designers and service personnel continually aware of the poems. ity of 
jamming from the enemy, and the need to make equipment technically and 
tactically as invulnerable as possible to j3 m ming. 
Far the enemy forces there was a concomitant reduction in morale 
at all levels, as the fighting men saw the reduced effectiveness of their 
own weapons and commanders knew they could do little cr nothing to 
overcome the jamming or reply in kind. The use of countermeasures gave 
the Allies the powerful advantage of the initiative in the radar war, 
leaving their apponents to react to events as best they could. The 
Germans, in particular, were forced to introduce modifications to enable 
existing radars to continue functioning. This shifted resources away from 
the development and production of microwave radar, the only real slur 
tion to the problem. In Japan there was insufficient time, too few 
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resources and too little vD-aperation between the services for anything 
effective to be done to counter the US ja m ming. 
Some readers might be tempted to attribute the success of the US 
and British countermeasures efforts, compared with those of Germany and 
Japan, to the different social, military and political systems in the o oe- 
ing camps. In this writer's opinion the effect of such factors is extremely 
difficult to prove or disprove. Certainly neither the Germans nor the 
Japanese were able to deploy their full rte tial effort in the electronics 
battle during the conflict, but for the reasons for this we must look e1se- 
where. In each of the Axis nations the AI Lied strategic bombing attacks 
caused delays in the production of electronic equipment which became 
serious as the war entered its final phase. After 1942 the German elect- 
ronics industry, like most others in that country, had to give up large 
numbers of ab]e-bodied men to the armed forces to replace ]oases at the 
battle fronts; the poorly trained women and foreign workers that took 
their places could barely maintain the production of already- proven items 
of equipment. In japan there were similar problems, to which must be 
added the wasteful practice of developing quite separate families of 
radars for the Army and the Navy. W hile these factors certainly slowed 
the reactions of Germany and Japan during the countermeasures battle, 
the essential question remains: given their relatively small electronics 
industries and the problems of securing any useful degree of co-operation 
between them, could any conceivable development and production effort 
on their part have come near the massive and co-crdinated effort 
mounted by the USA and Great Britain? In this writer's opinion 
it could 
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not. In the mass production of countermeasures equipment the huge US 
electronics industry, unhindered by air attack ar any serious shortage of 
slulled manpower, outproduced by a considerable margin all the other 
warring nations put together. In the application of science as in most 
aspects of warfare, God tends to sde with the big battalions. 
There are other factors to be taken into account. A countermeasures 
attack cannot be considered in isolation, it has to be related to the 
military cperations of which it is an adjunct. During World War 11 the 
most important single application of radar countermeasures was the 
support of strategic bombing attacks. Relatively little use was made of 
countermeasures before the beginning of 1942 and a year would elapse 
before they were being used on a large scale. By that stage of the war 
only the USA and Britain were able to deploy large forces cf heavy 
bombers and mount powerful strategic bombing attacks. Lacking large 
forces of heavy bombers, neither the Germans nor the Japanese could 
have gained much from diverting part of their limited electronic research 
efforts into countermeasures. In the Axis states scientists were forced to 
concentrate on keeping defensive radars operational in the face of hostile 
interference, rather than taking the battle to the enemy. Once it was 
clear the Axis nations had lost the initiative in the electronics battle, 
their respective industries were under such pressure that they were 
unable to close the technalogical gap that existed between the two side& 
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II 
Some lessons from the past are absolute and remain applicable to the 
Present day, others do not; wisdom consists in knowing the difference. 
Du MW cl, d War II it had been relatively easy to jam the German and 
Japanese radars. But it should be remembered that in every case the 
victim radars were first-generation sets, designed with little or no 
knowledge of the types of countermeasure that might be used against 
them. Initially radars of the same type operated within a very narrow 
band of frequencies; and even when sets were modified to operate over a 
wider spread of frequencies, that spread was relatively narrow by today's 
standards. Another factor which made jamming easier was the sheer scale 
of the bombing raids during World War IL Attacks by forces of more than 
500 bombers were commonplace. The cumulative effect of so many 
aircraft radiating jamming and dropping Chaff could be devastating to an 
enemy defensive system employing a few fire control radars operating in 
relatively narrow parts of the frequency spectrum - even if individual 
jammers put out little power and Chaff was hand launched at low rates. 
The spira1ling cost of modern military aircraft, and the greatly 
increased effectiveness of their weapons, has seen to it that never again 
will bombers be used in the numbers employed during World War IL M cce- 
over, penetrating the air defence system of the 1980's 
is considerably 
more difficult than that of the 1940's. There are many more types of 
anti-aircraft weapons system, controlled by numerous 
different types of 
radar operating across a he spread of frequencies and 
in many cases 
fitted with complex anti-jamming circuitry and optical 
back-up systems. 
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Similar problems face the modern warship in its efforts to avoid attack by 
homing missiles which can be fired from below the radar horizon. 
Nevertheless, as in the past, each threatening weapon system can be 
likened to a chain with at least one link weaker than the rest; and if the 
chain of weapons control can be broken at any point, even for a 
relatively short time, an aircraft or ship can survive the engagement. 
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William Rambo, Mr George Rappaport, Dr Richard Raymond, Dr Donald 
Reynolds, Lt Cdr Douglas Roberts, Dr Win Salisbury, Dr Don Sinclair, Dr 
Les Mote,, Dr Robert Soderman, Colonel Harry Smith, Mr Edwin Speak man, 
Mr J. Greg Stephenson, Dr C. Guy Suits, Pnmfessor Frederick E. Terman, 
MR Edward Tietz, Herr Flitz Trenkle, Commander Donald Vaughan, Dr 0. 
G. ' Mike' Villard, Colonel Joseph Wack, Colonel Hugh Winter, Cd onel 
Frank Wintry. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
ABL-15. American-British Laboxatary of Division 15, US Countermeasures 
laboratory at M alvernt England. 
AL Airborne interception (radar). 
ALL. Airborne Instruments Laboratory. During the early part of the war 
this laboratory was part of NRDC Division 6 engaged in research into 
anti-submarine devices. At the end of 1943 became part of Division 
15. After the war became an independent company working on 
aircraft electronic systems, including a ountermeasures. 
A/J. Anti-jamming. 
Angels. Generic code-name for radar corner reflectors used to deceive 
enemy radar. 
ASV. Air to surface vgl (radar). 
Band Designation Letters (World War ID: 
P Band - 200 to 390 MHz 
L Band - 390 to 1,650 MHz 
S Band - 1,650 to 5,200 MHz 
X Band - 5,200 to 11,900 MHz 
Big Ben. Allied code-name of the German V2 bombardment rocket. 
Back Cats. Nickname for US Navy PB Y Catalina flying boats and 
amphibians which usually operated at night in the Pai£i, c theatre. 
The book part in Elint work on several occasions. 
Broadloom. Code-name far the APT-4 jammer. 
Carpet. Code-name for the APT-2, APT-5 and AP Q-9 series of equip- 
ments to jam radars in the 560 MHz band. 
- 300 - 
CAST MIKE PROJECT 1. C ode-name given to the team undertaking the 
initial US Navy Elint operations in the south Pacific area. 
Chaff. Metal foil cut to approximately half the wavelength of t ne radar 
to be jammed. 
Chain Home. British early warning radar. 
D/F. Direction finding (by radio cr radar means). 
Dina. Code-name for the APT-1 jammer. 
Division 15. Division of the W crld War II US National Defense Research 
Committee, re onsible for work on electronic cDunter m easures, 
DRAGOON. Code-name for the Allied invasion of Southern France in 
August 1944. 
DueppeL German vale-name for C tuff . 
Egerland. German microwave Flak oantral radar system. 
Elephant. US Navy shipborne microwave jammer, under development when 
the war ended. 
Elephant Cigar. Code name for the M RI-1 VHF high powered ground 
communications jammer. 
Eint Electronic intell' Bence. 
E W. Early warning (radar). 
Ferret. Aircraft fitted with intercept receiving equipment, to search for 
enemy radars. 
Flak. German abbreviation for Fliegerabwehrkanonen - anti-aircraft guns. 
Freya. German early warning radar. 
Fritz-X. G e&man radio controlled guided bom b. 
FuGe 16. German VHF airborne cx mm uni, cations transceiver. 
G CL Ground axntroUed in n (radar). 
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GEE. British hyperbolic navigation device, carried by some US aircraft. 
G man- i (deceiving paper). Japanese code-name for Chaff. 
G LIM MrR. Code-name for the feint attack against the Boubgne area, 
mounted in support of the invasion of Northern France on the night 
of 5-6 June 1944. 
H2S. British ground mapping radar, carried by some US aircraft 
H2X. US ground mapping radar. 
Henschel 29 3. German radio controlled glider bomb. 
HUSKY. Cede-name for the invasion of Sicily. 
IF F. Ix ntificati on Friend cr Foe, radar transponder equipment. 
JackaL Generic code-name for US airborne com m uni, cations jammer. 
Kettenhund. German airborne jamming equipment, for use against radars 
in the 200 MHz band. 
LC G L. Landing Craft, Gun, Large. Landing craft sometimes fitted with 
radar jammers to aver landings. 
LC 1G . Landing Craft, Infantry, Gun. Comments as above. 
LCTA. Landing Craft, Tank, Attack. Comments as above. 
Lichtenstein BC. German airborne interception radar. 
Mammut German early warning radar. 
MandreL Generic code-name fror US and British jammers against radars in 
the 125 M rI z band, including the APT-3. 
Mannheim. German searchlight and Flak control radar. 
Moonshine. Generic code-name for the Allied radar repeater pm mers. 
Nuernburg. Code-name for German modification to the w uerzburg radar, 
to give some relief from the effects of Chaff Jamming. 
NRL. Naval Research Laboratory. 
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OVERLORD. Code-name for the ABied invasion of NC there France in 
June 1944. 
Oboe. British ground controlled bombing device, carried by sc) me US 
aircraft.. 
P-540. General Radio Company designation of the prototype equipment 
which formed the bads for the SCR-587,, APR -1 and APR-4 family 
of intercept receivers. 
Perfectos. Generic code-name for device to tzigger the German FuGe 25 
RT equipment, and enable Allied fighters to home on the reply 
signals. 
Porcupine. B-29 dedicated to the radar jamming rule. 
Radiation Laboratory (sometimes shortened to Radlab). US centre for 
research into radar during World War II, operating under the MIT at 
C am bridge M assachusetts. 
Raven. US nickname for electronic oc)untermeasures equipment, and 
electronic countermeasures operators. 
RRL. Radio Re®earch Laboratory, Harvard; centre for the development 
of US radio countermeasures equipment during W arld war IL 
Rope. Code-name for long untuned lengths of metal foil dropped from 
aircraft to jam low frequency radars. 
Rotterdam. German code-name for H2S bombing radar carried by Allied 
Rug. Code-name for the APQ-2 jammer. 
SCR-268. US searchlight and fire control radar. 
SC R-270. US early warning radar. 
SC R-271. US early warning radar. 
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SCR-545. US microwave fire control radar. 
SCR-584. US microwave fire control radar. 
SCR-587. US airborne intercept receiver. 
Seetakt German naval surface search and fire control radar. 
SL C. Searchlight control (radar). 
Tachi. Generic term for Japanese Army ground radars. 
Taki. Generic term for Japanese Army airborne radars and pmmers. 
Tase. Generic term for Japanese Army shipborne radars. 
TITANIC. Code-name for the fake airborne invasion mounted in support 
of the invasion of Ncrthern France on the night of 5-6 June 1944. 
TAXABLE. C ode-name for the feint attack against the Le Havre area, 
mounted in support of the invasion of Northern France on the night 
af 5-6 June 1944. 
TD Y. US Navy high powered shipborne jamming equipment. 
Tuba. C ode-name for the MP Q-1 high powered ground radar jammer. 
VT (variable time). Proximity fuse. 
Wassermann. German early warning radar. 
window. Original British code-name for reflective devices such as Chaff 
and Rcpe; sometimes this code-name was aLso used in the USA. 
Wismar. Code-name for the modification of the W uerzburg radar, to 
enable its operating frequency to be shifted to avoid electronic 
jamming. 
Wuerzburg. German searchlight and Flak control radar. 
W uerzlaus. C ode-name for a modification of the W uerzburg radar, to 
provide some relief from Chaff jamming. 
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XARD. Designation of an early intercept receiver produced by the `aval 
Research Laboratory. 
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APPENDIX A 
Original recommendation from the National Defense Research Committee, 
in January 1942, which led in the foUowing month to the establishment 
of the Radio Research Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, C am bri, e, Massachusetts. 
NATIONAL DEFENSE, RESEARCH COMMITTEE 
Microwave Section D-1 
Proposal No. 030642 -B 
Subject: ESTABLISHMENT OF RADAR COUNTER-Mr; ASURE LABORATORY 
It is recom mended to the ND RC that a contract be entered into with 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for the ES TAB LIS HMENT0F 
A RADAR COUNTER-MEASURE LABORATORY. The sum of this cont- 
Tact is not to exceed $300,000. 
Recently, at the insistence of the Navy, a program on Radar 
Countermeasures has been started under the leadership of Professor F. E. 
Te9rman of Stanford University. In order to get this project under way 
and to take advantage of the crgani. zational background of the Radiation 
Laboratory, this project has been started at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. 
Since it is desirable to separate from the Radiation Laboratory as 
many related activities as can be advantageously carried out in her 
places, and also, since the Radar Counter-Measures program is substan- 
tially different in character and in the interest cf secrecy should be 
separate from the Radiation Laboratory, the Radar Counter- M easure 
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project should be set up as a separate and distinct organization and its 
early removal from the framework of the Radiation Laboratory is to be 
encouraged. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has indicated its 
willingness to handle the Radar Counter Measure project as a separate 
unit with the expectation that it will later be transferred completely to 
another contractor. 
Contractor: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Cambridge Massachusetts. 
Letter of Intention Mr N. M. Sage, Mass. Inst. of Tech. 
to be sent to: C am fridge, Massachusetts 
Origin of Project: Navy, through Admiral J. A. Furer 
Official Investigator: Dr F. E. Terman 
Project Discussed By: NDRC: Dr K. T. Compton, Dr A. L. Loomis 
Prof. E. L. Bowles 
Navy: Admiral J. A. Furer, Comm. L. V. Barkner 
Rad. Lab.: Dr F. E. Terman, Dr L. A. DuBrk ge 
Effective Date: January 1,1942 
Terminating Date: June 20,1942 
Performance and To establish a laboratory for research and 
Reports: development in the field of radar 
counter-measures, to supply apparatus to the 
Services, to assist in operational studies, and 
to report from time to time as requested. 
Amount: $300,000. 
classification: Secret 
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APPENDIX B 
Letter dated February 16 1942, from Karl T. Compton cf the National 
Defense Research Committee to Dr Frederick E. Terman, confirming the 
latter's appointment as Director of the US radio countermeasures labora- 
tory. This step marked the beginning of efforts to develop this form cf 
warfare in the USA. 
SECRET 
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH COM MITTEE 
of the Council of National Defense 
1530 P Street NW 
Washington D. C. 
February 16,1942 
Dr. Frederick E. Terman 
Radiation Laboratory 
Dear Dr. Terman: 
This letter is to confirm, on behalf of the N. D. R. C.,. your appoint- 
ment as Director of the R. C. M. eject which is being set up under 
Section D-1, and to set forth certain understandings in regard to the 
development of this new project. 
It is understood that the R. C. M. project initially will be set up as 
part of the Radiation Laboratory and will operate for the present as a 
separate and distinct project under the general policies and within the 
structure of the Radiation Laboratory. For various reasons, however, it 
is desirable that this project should be administratively separate from 
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the Radiation laboratory as soon as possible, after which time the 
R. C. M. project and the Radiation Laboratory will be parallel activities, 
each under a director, both reporting to Section D-1. In this stage the 
connection between R. C. M. and the Radiation laboratories will be 
through Section D-1 at the top and through informal personal cooperation 
down the line. 
N. R. D. C. believes, as a matter of general policy, that undue concent- 
ration of its activities in any one institution should be avoided unless 
there are sound reasons of efficiency in such concentration. Consequen- 
tly it is my hope that the sponsorship of the R. C. M. project can later be 
transferred from M. L'I' to some other institution, preferably Harvard in 
order that the easy working relationships with the Radiation Laboratory 
can be maintained. I would not recommend transference of this project 
away from this locality unless this should meet with your approval as 
director of the project. But even before possible transfer to the sponsor- 
ship of another institution, I believe that the administration of the 
R. C. M. project should be established as a separate entity as soon as this 
can be worked out between yourself for N. D. R. C. and Mr Sage represent- 
ing the contractor. Until this can be done, however, the R. C. M. group 
can use the purchasing and personnel organization of the Radiation 
Laboratory. 
It is understood that as director of the R. C. M. project you will 
assume the following responsibilities and authorities: 
1. To recruit the necessary personnel for an adequate organization 
to conduct this project. Some of the initial members of your organization 
may be, by mutual consent, furnished by the Radiation Laboratory, but 
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you are autIxxized to secure additional personnel from outside the 
Laboratory, fc11owing in general the personnel and salary arrangements 
which are in force in the Radiation Laboratory, with such changes which 
seem to be necessary in particular cases as are agreed upon between 
yourself, Dr F. W. Loomis, and the DIC office at M. LT. 
2. To make the necessary arrangements, in oc>nsu1tation with Dr. A. J. 
Alen, for preparing, occupying and equipping ice in the Hood Building 
in which the laboratory will operate for the present. 
3. To purchase, at first through the Radiation Laboratory and M. L `I 
purchasing organizations, such permanent equipment for the Laboratory 
and such apparatus and aippbes as are required for carrying on this 
work. 
4. To authorize travel cyders for yourself, and such others of your 
organization as you designate, to make necessary trips for purposes of 
recruiting, consulting with Army and Navy officer s and industrial 
companies in regard to the program of your Laboratory. 
It is furthermore understood that you will be willing to take full 
responsibility for planning, organizing and directing the work connected 
with this project. The objective of the R. C. M. project I think has been 
made clear to you in general terms. The general policies under which the 
project operates are laid down by the Microwave Committee, Section 
o-1, and you are designated as their agent to execute these Policies- 
It 
will be your responsibility to determine the size of the organization 
required to carry out these general plans and to recommend 
to Section 
D-1 the appropriation cf the fu nds which you estimate will 
be required. 
You understand alsoi, that the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology as 
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contractor with the N. D. R. C. is responsible for the general operation of 
the Radiation Laboratory and your Laboratory, and that both ]aborator- 
ies operate under administrative procedures set up by M. L T. 
It is impossible at the present time to outline the scope and size cf 
the R. C. M. project. The Microwave Committee has agreed, at the 
request of the Army and Navy, to undertake an intensive program on this 
subject. The particular lines of attack to be undertaken, however, will 
have to be outlined by your own organization, in consultation with the 
armed services, Microwave Committee and Radiation Labcratory 
members. It is anticipated that this project will be a very important one, 
and that during the next six or eight months it will have reached a 
status of employing 50 to 75 individuals. No definite budget for this 
project can yet be set up but you will be asked to sub mit budget esti- 
mates as soon as these can be made to cover the work in the im med- 
lately forseeable future. 
The many administrative matters aannected with the scientific 
program and the crganization of this project cannot be outlined in 
writing, but must be worked out as they arise, in od aboxation with and 
consultation with the Director of the Radiation Laboratory, the Chair- 
man of the Microwave Section, Dr. Alfred Loomis, and with the Prei - 
ent and other Administrative cfficers of M. L If., all of whom will colla b- 
orate with you to the fullest extent to make possible the greatest 
possi e aiccess of this very urgent and important project. 
In conclusion I would emphasize the ukra-secret character of this 
project. The work of the Radiation Laboratory itself is very importantly 
in the secret category,, but the R. C C. M M. project is of such character that 
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even greater care should be taken, not only to prevent any disclosure of 
information, but even to prevent every unnecessary intimation that work 
of this sort is in progress. Only by such care can the collaboration of 
the armed services and of our allies be secured and can the risk be 
avoided of losing the benefits of our effort. 
Very sincerely yours 
Karl T. Compton (sgned) 
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APPENDIX C 
DETAILS, PRODUCTION AND COSTS Or THE MALN 
COUNTERMEASURES EQUIPMENTS DEVELOPED BY THE RADIO 
RESEARCH LABORATORY 
Sources: RRL Transition Department Final Reported dated 1 December 
1945; and the Summary Technical Report of DivisLon 15 NRDC. 
Note: Unless otherwise stated, the numbers and prices are those of the 
production versions of the equipments; unit prices are averaged over the 
total production run. 
1. JAMMERS. 
APT-1 'Dina'. Airborne Jamming transmitter covering the 90 to 220 MHz 
band, power output 12 watts. Production: RRL7; Deloo Radio 
Division 6,195. Cost $8.8 m ($1,430 each). 
SP T-1. Shipbarne version of the APT-1. Production: Delco Radio Division 
50. 
APT-2 'C met' . Airborne jamming transmitter covering the 
450 to 720 
MHz band, power output 5 watts. Production: Delos Radio Division 
6,270; Hudson American Cctp 1,000. Cast $2.9 m ($400 each). 
SP T-2. Shipborne version ct the APT-2. Production: D elcx Radio Division 
400. 
APT-3 'Mandrel'. Airborne jamming transmitter cx vez±r the 85 to 135 
MHz band, power output 10 watts. Production: Del m Radio Division 
Ii nc r- C7 Sm ($2,200 each). 
rZe 
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SPT-3 Shipborne version cf the APT-3. Production: Delco Radio Division 
60. 
APT-4 'Broadloom' High powered magnetron airborne jamming transmitter 
covering the 150 to 780 MHz band, power output 150 watts. 
Production: General Electric Co 2,092; Strom berg C arln Co 100. 
Cost $6.57m ($3,000 each). 
TD Y. Sh pbarne version of the APT-4, initially covered the band 350 to 
800 MHz band (later modified to }am to a lower frequency limit of 
116 MHz; some modified to jam to an upper frequency of about 
3,000 MHz), power output 150 watts. Production: General Electric 
Co 1,538. Cost $7.8 m ($5,700 each. ) 
APT-5 'Carpet IV' Airborne jamming transmitter covering the 350 to 
1200 MHz band, power output 15 watts. Production: Aireon Mfg Co 
4,100; Delco Radio Division 2,663. Cost $6.5m ($968 each). 
SP T-6 Naval version cf the APT-5. Production: Aireon Mfg Co 81. 
AP Q-2 'Rug'. Airborne jamming transmitter covering the 450 to 720 MHz 
band, power output 5 watts. Could be modified to extend the lower 
frequency to 150 MHz. Production: Delcx Radio Division 8,. 265. Cost 
$4m ($4,650 each). 
SPT-4. Shöpbarne version c¢ the AP Q-2. Production: Delon Radio Division 
719. 
AP Q-9. 'Carpet III' Airborne }a m ming transmitter covering the 475 to 
585 MHz band, power output 20 watts. Production: Delco Radio 
Division 9,279; Hudson American Carp 5,174. Cast $7.97m ($551 
each). 
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SP T-5. Shipborne version of the AP Q-9. Production: Delcx Radio Division 
240. 
AP Q-20 . Airborne jamming system covering the 21300 to 4,200 MHz bard, 
power output 10 watts. System included the AP r-10 transmitter, 
APR-5A receiver and a panoramic adaptor. Production: Belmont 
Radio Cep 56, built under a crash programme at a cost of $746,000 
($13,300 each). 
AR Q-8. 'Dina', or 'Dinamate' Airborne jEtmming transmitter oDvering the 
25 to 100 MHz band, power output 30 watts. Production: RRL 50; 
Halli, crafters 1,210. Cost $2.16m ($1,714 each). 
MP Q-1 'Tuba'. Grund jamming transmitter vaveYing the 480 to 500 MHz 
band, power output 25 K w, two such transmitters per 4te. 
Production: RRL 1; Delta Star 2. Cast $L9 m ($. 6m ea). 
RECEIVERS AND ATTACHMENTS 
APR -1. R adar intercept receiver fitted with a range of tuning units. 
Initial coverage 100 to 950 MHz; final coverage 40 to 3,300 MHz 
band. Production: Galvin Mfg Co 2,571; figure includes the SP ct -1, 
the d ipborne version. 
APR-2. Automatically recording intercept receiver covering the 90 to 
1,000 MHz band. Production: Galvin Mfg Co 325. 
APR-4. Radar intercept receiver, version of APR-1 for Army Air Farces 
manufactured by C rt 1ey C crrp. Frequency voverage as for APR-1. 
Production: Crosley Carp 4,356. 
APR-5 and APR-5A. APR-5 was a radar intercept receiver covering the 
,"""7:. "! " '3ý, tand. APR-5A was similar, but modified to give 
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a frequency coverage of 3,000 to 6,000 MHz. Production: Galvin 
Mfg Co 3,432; figure includes the SPR-2, the shipborne version. 
APR-7. Radar intercept receiver covering the 1,000 to 3,500 MHz band. 
Production: RRL 25; Union Electronics Co 100. 
AP A-17. Airborne broadband direction finder 250 to 1000 MHz. 
Production: Hoffman Radio Ccrp 888; Avirila 557. 
AS-186/AP A-17. Microwave direction finding attachment for AP A-17, 
1000 to 5000 MHz. Production: Craig Machine Wcrks 1,025. 
APA -23. Paper tape recording device for use with APR-1 and APR-4 
receivers. Production: Gamewell Co 1,496. 
AP A-24. 'Setter' Direction finder 100 to 750 MHz for use with intercept 
receivers. Production: Heyer Products 310. 
AP A-42. Direction finder 60 to 750 MHz. Production: RRL 17; Lear Inc 
40. 
APA-48. Homing system Navy F6F Hellrat fighter,, to enable the aircraft 
to home on radar emissions from enemy aircraft. Production: RRL 
25 
CHAFF, ROPE AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT 
OC A-2.18" Chaff cutter. Production: International Paper Boot & 
machinery Co 444. 
0C A-3.12" Chaff cutter. Production: International Paper Box & 
Machinery Co 87. 
A-l. Automatic airborne dispenser for Chaff or Rope, usLng taped 
bundles. Production: Airmetal Products Co 12,705; Dayton Acme Co 
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A-2. Automatic airborne dispenser for Chaff or Rope, for carriage by 
fighters. Production: Prosperity Inc 1,620. 
Chaff (Main Types): 
CHA-2. Paper backed bent Chaff (347 to 404 MHz). Production: Reynalds 
Metal Co l. 14m pounds. 
C HA-3. Paper backed bent Chaff (510 to 595 MHz). Production: Reynalds 
Metal Co2.16 m pounds. 
CHA-25. Embossed bent Chaff (320 to 600 MHz). Production: Aluminum 
Co of America 1.027 m pounds; Standard Rolling Mills 27,000 
pounds. 
CH A-28. Paper backed bent Chaff (450 to 600 MHz). Production: 
Reynolds Metal. Co .3m pounds; Standard Rolling Mi31s .1m pounds. 
CH A-28 (R R-4, /U). Embossed bent Chaff (450 to 600 MHz). Production: 
Reynolds Metal Co 3.79 5m pounds; Johnston Tinfoil Co 1.415 m 
pounds; Standard Rolling Mills . 22 m pounds. 
RR-4/U-T. As above, but bundles taped for use from automatic dispens- 
ers. PYOduction: Reynolds Metal Co, 2.44 m pounds; Standard Railing 
Mills 1.18 m pounds. 
CH B-0. Paper backed flat Chaff (110 to 116 MHz). Standard Rolling Mills 
. 296 m pounds; Reynolds Metal Co . 246 m pounds; Johnston Tinfoil 
Co 21,200 pounds. 
U ntuned Rope: 
CHR -1 (RR-2,10). Each bundle contained three rolls of fail, each 400 feet 
long with a small parachute to hold it vertical in the sky after 
deployment Production: Standard Rolling Mills 2.46 m pounds. 
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CHR -2 (RR-VU). Fail content as for CHR -1, but with 3-in square card 
instead of a parachute. Production: Reynolds Metal Co 1.46 m 
pounds; Johnston Tinfoil Co 1.32 m pounds; Standard Rolling Mills 
. 13 m pounds. 
RR-3/U-T. As above, but bundles taped for use from automatic dispermg- 
ers. Production: Standard Railing Mills 2.9 m pounds; Reynolds 
Metal. Co . 16 m pounds. 
-318- 
APPENDIX D 
NOTE ON THE, OPERATION OF HEAVY ANTI ALRCRAFT GUNS 
DURING WORLD WAR II 
During W ar1, d War II the victim radars for mast of the US jamming 
were the German and Japanese sets used to ac)ntrol fire from heavy anti- 
aircraft gun batteries. Some readers may not be familiar with w cr1d war 
31 anti-aircraft the control methods, and for an understanding of their 
vulnerability to jamming this Appendix is included. 
W crLd War II anti-aircraft (AA) guns can be divided into two main 
categod. es: heavy A AO, angle-shot weapons cf calibre 75 mm cc greater, 
aimed using predictors to engage targets at medium or high altitude; and 
light A A, automatic firing weapons of calibre 40 mm and smaller, aimed 
umeng direct sighting cptticcal methods to engage targets at low altitude. 
Neither the Germans nor the Japanese attempted to use radar fire axntral 
for light AA guns, and this type of fire will not be considered further. 
Heavy AA weapons, of 88 mm, 105 mm and 128 mm calibre in the 
case of the German guns, or 75,88 and 120 mm calibre in the case of the 
Japanese, for the most part fired high explosive time-ftsed shells which 
burst at previously set distances from the gun. Usually a battery of heavy 
guns oomrrLc ed four, six cr eight weapons and a basic fire control system 
comprising a predictor and an optical rangefinder. Usng range and bear- 
ing information from the range finder, the predictor continually calcul- 
ated where the target aircraft would be when the shells reached it. 
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Taking as an example an aircraft flying at 20,000 feet at a slant range of 
51 miles, an 88 mm Shell would take about 19 seconds to cover this dist- 
ance; and in this time a B-17 at 225 mph would fly just over a mile. So 
for an accurate engagement, at the time cf firing the gun barrels had to 
be aligned on a point in the sky more than a mile in front of the aircraft. 
The predict-or calculated this lead distance and converted it into a oxnt 
inually varying series of settings, which it passed by pointers to 
the crewmen laying the guns in azimuth and elevation. The predictor also 
calculated the time-bf-fLight of the shell., which it passed to the gun 
loaders who set the shell's clockwork fuse to detonate at the correct 
range (the proximity fused shells used by the Allied during the final year 
of the war did not require this setting, but neither the Germans nor the 
Japanese were able to ! ring this type of shell into service). Firing was 
usually by salvoes, with all guns engaging the same target aircraft. When 
engaging a formation, it was the usual practise to aim at the lead air- 
craft. 
For night engagements using the basic fire control system, an air- 
craft at medium or high altitude had to be illuminated by searchlights so 
that the range-finder crew could track it. Precision radars, such as the 
German Wuerzburg and Mannheim or the Japanese Tachi 1,2,3,31 and 
Mark IV Models 1,2 or 3 could be used to set searchlights on to targets. 
Or, at night or if the target was above cloud, these radars could provide 
tracking information on the target which was fed into the predictor and 
thence to the guns. Thus any interference of the control radars would 
render impossible accurate predicted fire against targets above c]oud; and 
Lý 
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it sei usly reduced the chances of a successful engagement at night even 
if the skies were clear. 
When their searchlight and fire control radars were jammed, both 
the Germans and the Japanese made attempts to use acoustic locates to 
track aircraft at night or above c]Dud. But because it was limited by the 
relatively ]ow speed of sound, this method was virtually ineffective again- 
st aircraft flying at more than 200 mph or above 10,000 feet: at a range 
of 6,000 yards the sound of an aircraft's engine noises took 18 seconds to 
reach the locator, which meant that the resultant bearing information was 
invariably well out of date. 
If predicted fire was riot possible gunners could resort to barrage 
fire; i. e. aiming their weapons at a designated point in the sky through 
which it was calculated the enemy bombers would have to fly to reach 
their bomb-release point. In terms of the number of aircraft irought 
down this method used vast quantities of ammunition, however, and 
neither German nor Japanese gunners were permitted to make large-scale 
use cif it. 
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APPENDIX E 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RADAR IN GERMANY, TO THE END OF 
WORLD WAR II 
Sources: Di, e deutschen Funkmessverfahren bis 1945 by F. Trenkle. 
'Intelligence Information on RC M Effectiveness in the ET O' 
German work on the development of radar began in earnest in 1933 
when Dr Rudolph Kuehnold, head of the Naval signals research depart- 
meet, initiated research in this field By October the following year a 
continuous wave radar operating on 600 MHz, built by the GEMA comp- 
any, was detecting ships at ranges of up to 7 miles. German work cn 
radar proceeded independently of similar work taking place in her 
nations and during 1935 tests with an improved radar, employing pulsed 
transmissions and fitted to the tests ship Welle, gave ranges cf 5 miles 
on other ships and 12 miles on coastlines. In the spring of 1936 Gk MA 
bwlt a 150 MHz pulsed radar able too detect aircraft 30 miles away; with 
some alterations this became the Freya operating on 125 MHz, the first 
German early warning radar to go into production. The Navy received 
the first production Freyas early in 1938. 
FE W inq its success with Freya GEMA produced the 375 MHz 
Seetakt, a surface search and gunnery control radar; one of these was on 
board the heavy cruiser Graf Spee when she intervened in the Spanish 
Civil War in the summer of 1938. Meanwhile the Telefunken company had 
a19 begun work on a mobile 560 MHz radar for the control of anti- 
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aircraft guns; this performed svccessfuILy during tests and the Luftwaffe 
ordered it into large-scale production. 
At the outbreak of Wc rld War II, in September 1939, the Luftwaffe 
and the Navy had in operation about a hundred Freyas. In the simmer of 
1940 the A-Model Wuerzburg entered service with the Luftwaffe; as well 
as Providing fire control information for guns this set was used to direct 
searchlights, for early experiments in the control of night fighters and as 
a height finder at the more important Freya rtes. 
In the two years that followed there was a steady expansion of the 
German radar network, as more and more sets became available and 
improved models went into production. At this time the sets deployed in 
the greatest numbers were the Freya for air early warning, and the 
Naval Seetakt at coastal sites and on warships; both were soon overtaken 
in numbers by the W uerzburg, however, as production cf this set went 
ahead with the intention of providing ant for one for each flak 
battery. 
During this period the only attacks mounted against the German 
homeland were by the Royal Air Force night bombers, and most of the 
improvements to radars were aimed at increasing their effectiveness to 
munter this threat Fcc early warning the Mammut and Wassermann 
radars were introduced, developed from Freya and operating on similar 
frequencies but with more powerful transmitters and larger antenna 
reflectors to extend their range. The Mammut, built by the LG. Farben 
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company, employed a fixed antenna 90 feet wide and 35 feet high - 
about the size of a tennis court - and was the world's first phased-array 
radar to go into service; in azimuth its beam was swung electronically to 
500 either sicke of the normal, in front of the array. The GEMA c3eve1op - 
ment of Freya, code named Wassermann, featured an antenna array 130 
feet high, rotated for azimuth scanning and employing electronic vertical 
scanning for height finding. 
At the same time there were improvements to the Wuerzburg. The 
C-model, with lobe-switching to improve alignment accuracy, followed the 
A-model into production. Then in the autumn of 1941 the D-model went 
into production, featuring 25 Hz conical scanning aligned manually, to 
improve accuracy further; the Wuerzburg D would be b, 1117 in large 
numbers and remained numerically the most important German fire control 
radar until the end of the war. To provide a low risk precision radar of 
increased range for the close control of night fighters, Telefunken prod- 
uced the Giant W uerzburg (W uerzburg Riese); this set was electrically 
similar to the Wuerzburg D but featured a dish-shaped with 
more than twice the diameter (26 feet instead of 10 feet) to increase the 
maximum range from 25 miles to 40 miles. 
Telefunken also produced an airborne interception radar for night 
fighters,, the 490 MHz Lichtenstein. Fcr maritime search GEMA produced 
the 120 MHz Rostock and the F]i f unkforsch unginstitut developed the 
180 MHz Neptun; these were built in only small numbers, however, and 
the main airborne surface search radar was the 550 MHz Hohentwiel 
&L'. 
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from Lcrenz which appeared at the end cf 1942. A modifi, cati, on f 
Neptun saw munch greater use fitted to many types of combat aircraft as 
a tail-warning radar. 
The opening cf the US strategic bombing offensive in Europe, in the 
summer of 1942, imposed no new demands on the German radar system. 
Day bombers attacking in clear skies were far easier for fighters to 
intercept and flak to engage than night bombers, and the systems 
designed to munter the latter could easily cope with the former. 
During 1943 Telefunken placed in production the slightly more 
powerful Mannheim radar operating on the same frequencies as w uerz- 
burg, and intended to replace the earlier set. Mannheim provided a 
smoother and more accurate flow of fire vontral data and had several 
interesting features including aided manual tracking, dual meter/scope 
presentation and, in a few versions, automatic tracking. 
By the autumn of 1943 the US and British jamming offensives were 
in full swing, with the entire range Cl German air defense radars exper- 
ienci. ng both Chaff and electronic jam rr ng. In the case aE the Lichten- 
stein airborne interception radar and the Giant W uer zburg when used for 
night fighter control, the effects aE Chaff proved so severe that neither 
set could continue in use in its oziginal role. To replace the Lichtenstein 
the entirely new 90 MHz SN-2 radar was hastily introduced for night 
fighters; and because the Giant W uerzburg was no longer effective for 
the purpose, the Luftwaffe abandoned close control for night fighters and 
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id resorted to loose control methods. A few Giant v uer zburgs were 
relegated to use as flak control radars, and served in this role at some of 
the more important targets. 
Far the her German radars there was a steady stream of modific- 
ations, with the introduction of new frequencies to avoid electronic 
jamming and various types of moving target indicator to avoid the 
effects of Chaff (several of the anti-jamming systems are listed with the 
technical details of the various radars at the end of this Appendix. ) 
Meanwhile, the Mannheim radar had started to replace the W uer z- 
burg at many flak batteries. But when vonfmnted by Chaff and elect- 
tonic jamming the new set proved just as vulnerable as its predecessor, 
and the high priority accorded to the production aE Mannheim was 
&mpped. 
Two interesting developments of previous radars entered service in 
1944: the Jagdschloss and the Giant Wuerzburg-Gustav. The Jagdschloss 
was yet another radar based on the Freya, but with a greater power and 
fitted - for the Einst time in a German production set - with a plan posi- 
t ion indicator presentation. Jagdschloss was the most important ground 
controlled interception radar during the closing months cf the conflict. 
The Giant W uerzburg-Gustav was a normal Giant Wuerzburg, to which had 
been added the components of a Freya radar whose antennas used the 
same dish. Thus if there was jElmming on the w uerzburg frequencies, the 
Giant W uerzburg could get an approximate bearing on the jamming and 
iik1 
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the Freya could obtain range readings. This set was used for the control 
cf flak at some of the more important targets. 
The real solution to the jamming problem was to introduce a range 
of entirely new microwave radars, and the Germans had been intent on 
doing this snce they had captured an almost intact example of the 
British 3,300 MHz H2S bombing radar early in 1943. Due to the steady 
stream of crash programmes to replace oc modify earlier radars to 
operate in the face of jamming, however, it was not until the end of 
1944 that the fast German microwave radar system began operational 
tests: the Egerland developed by Telef unken in a nj inction with the 
Luftwaffe proving station at Werneuchen. The Egerland system comp- 
rised two separate radars: the Kulm back search radar operating in the 
3,450 to 3,615 MHz band, which provided target acquisition; and the 
Marbach cperating in the 3,245 to 3,315 MHz band, which tracked 
targets and provided the fire control data. One complete Egeriand 
station was used cperationally, from a site at Schuandcrff near Berlin, 
from January 1945. In this installation the Kulmbach and Marbach oper- 
atrors controlled their radars from an underground operating room. w hen 
the war ended no further Egerland stations had entered service. 
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DETAILS OF THE MAIN TYPES OF GERMAN GROUND RADAR 
Nate: Because all of the radars ran to numerous sub-typesr the tech- 
rücal details given should be regarded as representative for the type 
ally. 
Freya Early Warning Radar 
Quantity built 1,000 plus 
First used 1938 
Maximum search range about 100 miles 
Frequencies used: 120 - 130 MHz (criginally) 
57 - 187 MHz (by the end of the war) 
Anti-jamming systems fitted: 
Peak power 15 - 20 Kw 
Pulse Length 3 m1 cro ecs 
PRF 500 
The only system fitted was Freya-]aus, a doppler-detection sys- 
tem to filter out the echoes from Rcpe. 
Seetakt Surface Vessel Reporting and Gun Ranging Radar 
Quantity built about 200 
First t ed 1938 
Maximum range: against ships, 
depended on site. 
Frequencies used: 368 - 390 MHz 
Mammut Early warning Radar 
This radar employed a fixed antenna, 
Peak power 8Kw 
Pulse Length 3 
PRF 500 
with electronic scanning. 
Quantity built about 20 Peak power 200 Kw 
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First used 1942 
Maximum search range up to 185 miles 
Frequencies used: 120 - 130 MHz (aciginally) 
120 - 150 MHz (by the end cf the war) 
Anti-jamming systems fitted: 
As for Freya. 
Wassermann Early Warning Radar 
PRF 500 
This radar employed a normal rotating antenna for azimuth scanning, 
and used electronic scanning for height finding. 
Quantity built about 150 
First used 1942 
Maximum search range up to 175 miles 
Frequencies used: 120 - 130 MHz (criginally) 
Peak power 100 Kw 
PRF 500 
119 - 156 MHz (by the endcf the war) 
Anti-damming systems fitted: 
W a- soh, similar to the Freya-]aus, fitted to some sets. One 
version of this radar, the M2,. could be re-tuned rapidly to any 
other frequency within the coverage of the radar to avoid 
jamming. 
Jagdschloss Ground C ont rol]ed Interception Radar 
This search radar was the first German set to go into production 
uang the plan position irndicator method ci presentation. 
Quantity built 80 Peak power 150 Kw 
First used 1944 Pulse length 1 microsec 
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Maximum search range up to 112 miles PR F 500 
Frequencies wed: 129 to 165 MHz. 
A nti-m ming systems fitted: no specific systems, but the radar was 
able to switch rapidly to unjammed frequencies. 
W uer zburg Model D Flak and Searchlight Control Radar 
Quantity built 3,000 to 4,000 
First used 19 40 
Maximum search range 25 miles 
Peak power 7-11 Kw 
Pulse Length 2 miicrosec: s 
PRF3,750 
Maximum tracking range 15 miles, using 25 Hz conical an 
Frequencies used: 
A Band, 553 - 566 MHz (initial operating band) 
B Band, 517 - 529 MHz (introduced in Autumn of 1943) 
C Band, 440 - 470 MHz (introduced at end of 1944) 
Anti-jamming systems fitted: 
The Wuerzburg D was the mast-used German flak control radar 
during World war IL, and the main victim of the US jamming. For 
this reason the radar was modified to employ a greater range of 
anti-jamming systems than any other. The list given 
below is not 
comprehensive: 
Stendal Modification to permit direction-firxiing on 
jamming sgnals. In practice accuracy was 
poor, and little tactical use was made cf this 
device. 
W uerziaus Introduced in the Autumn of 
1943, to counter 
the effect's aE Chaff. This was a coherent 
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pulse system,, claimed to be able to track 
aircraft through Chaff echoes three mimes the 
amplitude of the aircraft echo. 
Nuernberg Introduced in the Autumn of 1943. This system 
enabled aircraft to be tracked through C haft, 
tmng the propeller modulation. 
Taunus Introduced in the Autumn of 194 3. Used a 
short time constant video filter, to improve 
the ability of the radar to track targets 
through weak concentrations Cl Chaff. 
Wismar Fitted to all sets from the summer cf 1944, to 
enable them to switch frequencies rapidly 
between bands. 
Tastlaus Had replaced W uerzlaus on most radars by the 
early part of 19 45. Used an improved coherent 
pu]se system, to allow the Wismar system 
and the 'laus' method to be used 
sm u}taneously. 
Eidechse This was a frequency changing technique, to 
a]k, w the direct frequency shift within given 
Urechse This modification made pos i h]e the frequency 
shift between W uezzburg band and all. 
intervening frequencies. Thus BC Urechse 
provided frequency shift from the high end of 
the B band to the lo w end of the C band. 
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ABC Urechse allowed continuous frequency 
shift over the entire Wu zlxirt3 spectrum. 
K -laus Intended for fitting to most sets, only about 
125 had received it by the end of the war. 
This modification made use cif range- xobing 
and band-pass video metering of dopp1er 
frequencies to afford good separation of 
doppler frequencies. Claimed to enable 
aircraft to be tracked tlimugh C haf f echoes 
of 15 to 20 times their amplitude. 
Mannheim Flak and Searchlight Control Radar 
Quantity built 400 plus 
First used mid-1943 
Maximum search range 19 miles 
Peak power 15 - 20 Kw 
Pulse length 1.4 microsecs 
PR F 3,570 
Maximum tracking range 12.5 miles, using 25 Hz conical scan. 
Frequencies used: 
A, B and C Bands as for W uerzburg. 
Anti-jamming systems fitted: 
Wuerzlaus, Wismar, Tatlaus, Eidechse and/or K -laus fitted to 
most sets. Also Windlaus, irsta]led in a few sets in the Spring cf 
1944; this was an auxiliary to Tastla ß, which permitted the 
c Aerator to balance out partLcular doppl er frequencies cx inciding 
with the wind motion cf Chaff. 
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Giant W uerzburg. O2iginally used for the antral of night fighters, about 
50 were in use at the end of the war for flak control at the more 
important targets. 
Quantity buht about 1,500 Peak power? -11 Kw 
First used 19 41 
Maximum search range 37 miles 
Pulse length 2 microsecs 
PRF 1,875 
Maximum tracking range 22 miles, using 25 Hz conical scan. 
Frequencies used: 
A and B Bands as for W uerzbuxg. 
Anti-jamming systems fitted: 
Several of the systems used with W uerzburg. 
Giant W uer z burg-Gustav Flak Control Radar 
This was a cco m bination of the normal Giant W uer z burg (W uer z burg 
Riese) and a Freya. The Freya components were mounted on the 
Giant W uerzburg, and the Freya antennas were fitted to the W uerz- 
burg reflector dish. The Freya was used as an aid to setting the 
Giant W uerzburg on to targets, and it could also provide range infor- 
mation when the latter was jammed. 
Quantity built: modification fitted to nearly all Giant w uer z burgs 
used for flak control. Details below relate to Freya attachment. 
First used 1944 
Maximum search range: 95 miles 
Peak power 15 - 20 Kw 
Pulse length 2 micresecs 
Frequencies used: 136 - 187 MHz PRF 500 
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Egerland Microwave Flak Control System. 
Only one complete system built, began operational tests at the 
beginning of 1945. This system comprised two separate radars, the 
K ulmbach search radar for target acquisition and the Marbach for 
target tracking. 
K ulm bath 
Maximum search range 31 mAes 
Frequencies used: 
Peak power 20 Kw 
Pulse length .6 micrcsecs 
3,450 - 3,615 MHz PR F 1,500 
M arbach 
Maximum search range 15 miles Peak power 20 Kw 
Frequencies used: 
3,243 - 3,315 MHz 
Pulse length .6 micrceecs 
PRF 1,500 
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APPENDIX F 
THE EFFE C'ITVjNESS OF US RADIO COUNTER MEASURES L\ HE 
EUROPEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS 
Note: this Appendix is extracted from the lengthy and definitive post- 
war report 'Intelligence Information on RCM Effectiveness in the E 10' , 
prepared by AB L-15 and dated 16 June 1945. 
Indications of Effectiveness from German Sources 
A quantitative indication of the extent to which our -um ming impair- 
ed German Flak operation is very difficult to obtain. The difficulty is 
exemplified by the reaction of many German P W's who, when asked to 
give a quantitative figure, quietly threw up their hands. A number of 
factors enter into any estimate which attempts to be quantitative, some 
of the more important being the personal characteristics of the individ- 
ual making the estimate, the directness of the information the individual 
has at hand, the vast differences in operational conditions at various 
locations, the changes in RC M and radar operations and equipment as a 
function of time, and the tendencies of an individual to remember the 
extreme case rather than the typical encounters. In view of all these 
posýhilitI of uncertainty it is 91mmcri N that relatively cor L ent 
estimates have been obtained from many divergent German sources. In 
general, it appears that an overall impairment of radar controUed Flak 
to approximately 25 % cf its normal effectiveness resulted from the 
combined use of Window and Carpet jamming. This means that in cases 
where weather condition during daylight operations made radar tracking 
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necessary, USA AF jamming allowed the Germans to operate only to 
one-fourth of their capabilities for Flak defense. 
The importance of this reduction is emphasized when it is realized 
that on a yearly average, approximately 40 % of the 8th Air Force 
missions in the E-rO were under conditions of 8/10 - 10/10 cloud, essen- 
tially bind operating conditions. In the period 1st September to 31st 
December 1944,50 % of all missions from the UK encountered over 8/10 
cloud, 35 % encountering 10/10 cloud over target areas. If the statements 
that Flak is only 25 % effective when radar control must be used in the 
presence of jamming, and that weather conditions force radar control to 
be used 40 % cf the time, can be accepted, then it appears that jamming 
caused the overate, all weather, Flak effectiveness to be reduced to 70 % 
of normal These figures, however, must riot be taken at face value, but 
rather as an indication of the fact that RC M was effective. To enable 
the reader to draw independent conclusi, ýns, it is desirable to present the 
actual statements and information obtained from German Generals, 
engineers, radar officers, radar technicians, radar cperatars, and from 
published reports, which led to such figures. 
In reading these statements, it is important to understand that sev- 
eral different points of view are involved. Some of the estimates refer 
to the reduction in radar tracking ability resulting from our j®m ming. 
Others are based on the person's understanding of the reduction in Flak 
effectiveness, and are thus comparisons between good radar directed fire 
and whatever substitute fire is employed. In all cases, the recollections 
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are based on operations during recent strong USA AFpm ming. The 
increase in our Window jamming strength from its beginning was duly felt 
by the Germans and the very great increase in Carpet pm ming in F all 
' 44 was considered a severe blow. Carpet jamming had not been entirely A 
effective before that date. Thus, the following statements are based on 
German experience after our combined Window and Carpet jamming 
program realized its full strength, since November - December 1944. 
Also, they are restricted in all cases to consideration of only US daylight 
operations. RAF jamming of W uer zburgs had not been considered quite as 
serious a matter as USAAF' practices; several Germans having emphasized 
this point. The RAF tactics were such that saturation (electric) jamming 
was never possible. RAF Window, of course, caused a great amount of 
interference, but alone it could more frequently be handled by the radar 
operators. 
(1) Radar Operators' Opi ruons - Fifteen operators of W uer zburg D 
radar from North, Central and Southern parts of w eaten 
Germany were asked on what percent cf their attempted radar 
tracks in the presence of co m brined Window and electronic 
jamming were they able to track successfully. Replies ranged 
from that of five operators who replied "none of the time", to 
one estimate of 80 % of the time. Only two estimates exceeded 
50 %. By zones, the average estimates ran: North, 27t; 
Central, 34%; South, 30 %. A hen all replies were averaged, 
including the extreme values cited, it was found that trackLng, 
under the conditions stated, was possible 30 % of the time. 
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The same questions put to three Mannheim operators 
brought firth replies of 0,20 %, 40 %, averaging 20 %. 
Nine operators of rv uerzburg Riese's [Giant W uerz burgs 
gave answers which averaged to 41 %. From this, it might be 
tentatively concluded that though it did certainly suffer from 
jamming, the Riese was somewhat more effective than the 
Wuerzburg D against jamming. Because of this difference and 
because of the small scale use of Riese, this figure is not 
included in the overall average. 
(2) Radar Technical Sergeants - Two Technical Sergeants inter 
ogated had worked at various operational sites and in addition 
had put in considerable time on experimental work at the 
Gelman Air Force station at Heiligensee/Berlin. To quote a 
translated statement written j intly by these two men, 
"Approximately 90 % of the radar sets employed during jamming 
had to fall out during constant jamming even though at first 
they were able to track. Completely jammed targets could not 
be tracked. " From this it may be inferred that the Flak 
control radar was, on the average, only 10 % effective when 
jamming was present. 
(3) Comments from Two Wuerzburg D Technicians - Two experienced 
technicians stated that they had experienced acs m pined window 
and electric pm ming, and had found it poesib]e to track 
aiccessf uny using N uernberg and Wismar techniques during 30 % 
of the time. 
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(4) Comment of a Mannheim Technician - This P yr stated that "the 
combination of Window and radio jamming is the most success- 
ful Allied radar countermeasure. " He stated further that he 
tracked the target successful1y 25 % of the time in the face of 
Window and radio j3 m ming. As pointed out elsewhere in this 
report, the jamming suscepH hiliti, es of W uerzburg D and 
Mannheim radars were commensurate. 
(5) Opinion of Flak Generals - Generals Giese, Von R ant za u, and 
Roemer jointly made a statement to the effect that German 
radar attained roughly 30 % of the standard attained before we 
began to ja in. 
(6) Comment by a Radar 0 fficer -A Leutnant Whisken, radar 
Officer for the Hamburg area, indicated that ýv indo w had very 
severely hampered radar Flak control even before the intro- 
duction of electric jammers. He further explained that the 
presence of electric }ýmmers had made radar fire control even 
more difficult, and he estimated that snce early 1945 the 
Germans had been able to get only 10 % effectiveness from 
their radar as a result of jamming. 
(7) Information Published by Luftwaffe - In the 12th Supplement to 
"Summary of Previous Enemy Jamming of German Ground and 
Airborne Radar, " dated 2-7-45 (included in EIS - 12, /45), a 
chart was included on which day-t iay records for the month 
of January 1945 show the percentage of Flak radars, in areas 
flown over by US bombers, which encountered pm ming. If ane 
could jistify considering the jammed radars to have been 
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rendered ineffective, a figure of 27 % effectiveness in the 
presence of jamming would be obtained. 
(8) Comment by German Scientist - Dr Elbe on the staff of the BH r' 
[Government agency mimed for the development of microwave 
radar techniques] and one cf the leaders of A/J research in 
Germany, when interrogated cn the effectiveness of Allied 
daylight jamming, replied "In general the probability of hits, 
when a ]arge amount of Window is used, is reduced by a factor 
of 5. " This statement, based only on Window jamming, would 
infer that even here only 20 % effectiveness was realized with 
radar Flak cunt roL 
(9) Comment by an Air Face Technical Advisor on Radar Problems - 
On the subject of US jamming Professor Mueller, in charge of 
technical liaison between the research organizations and the 
Air Fcxce, made the following statement, "The Allied vombin- 
ation of Window and electronic jamming was very effective. " 
In answer to a question of how much the jamming reduced the 
effectiveness of Flak, Professor Mueller made it clear that 
this was a very difficult question to answer, but he thought 
that the effectiveness of Flak was reduced to 33 % of that 
obtained when no jamming was present on non-visual fire. This 
figure takes into account the difference between radar- 
controlled predicted fire effectiveness and barrage fire effect- 
iveness as it was used in certain parts of the Reich. 
(10) Comment by German Scientist - Dr H ueter, who worked on A/J 
devices at the Ernst Lecher Institut, thought that our roise 
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jamming was very effective and in most cases sifficient by 
itself to completely jam practically all the radars. In December 
19 4 4, he had made a trip to several of the best Flak radar 
sites in Germany in xder to become acquainted with the aper- 
ational jamming problems. He estimates that from his exper- 
ience, the probability of hits was reduced by a factor of 5. Dr 
Plendl, who was in charge of the German high frequency 
research effort in 1943, also shared this opinion. 
(11) Comment by German General - Generalleutnant Veith, command- 
er of the Flak School Division, estimated the efficiency of 
optircaUy controlled Flak as compared with radar cx ntroUed 
Flak as three to one. As reasons for this difference, he includ- 
ed human errors from involvement of a larger number of 
persons, more complicated data transmission path, and disturb- 
ances of radar data. One cannot take the 33 per cent figure 
as completely attributable to jamming in this case, although 
from other statements by the same General one can justify 
charging a large portion of the loss in effectiveness to the 
jamming. The General was thinking in terms of overall 
performance when the figure was given. 
These statements are so arranged that numbers 1 through 7 are based on 
estimates of radar impairment whereas numbers 8 trough 11 deal with 
estimates of overall Flak impairment. Taking unweighted averages of 
these two groups of comments, a figure of 22 per cent effectiveness if 
obtained for radar tracking capability and of 26.5 per cent 
for Flak 
effectiveness. The difference in the fig res might be taken as a 
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measure of the partial effectiveness of the barrage Flak fire substituted 
for Predicted fire when the radar was -Fimmed. However, the extent of 
the data available is by no means sufficient to support such a conclusion. 
The only figure which can be justifi is that roughly 25 per cent 
effectiveness was realized by German Flak defenses when strong pm mang 
was encountered. 
An additional source of information from which references can be 
drawn as to jamming effectiveness is the available data on the number of 
rounds of Flak fire required to shoot clown our aircraft. The General Von 
Rantzau mentioned earlier stated that for the 88 millimeter guns around 
Berlin, 800 rounds per kill was considered a good fire record against US 
heavy formations. This was stated as the average for parts of January 
and February cf 1945 "when conditions were favorable. " In unfavorable 
periods the average would go down to something of the arider of 3,000 
rounds per kill. Use of barrage fire under blind conditions was made 
necessary by jamming and was stated as the principal factor entering 
into this reduction of effectiveness. Taking the ratio between the 
barrage and the predicted firing figures, it appears that the effective- 
ness was reduced to 26.7 per cent largely as a result of jamming. 
The close resemblance of this figure to that obtained by averaging 
the estimates of F]ak impairment is interesting but does nat mean any- 
thing further than an additional check on orders of magnitude. Taking 
the radar impairment figure to 22 per cent, the Flak impairment esti- 
mates of 26.5 per cent and the rounds per lä11 figures of 26.7 per cent, 
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one can derive only one pertinent vonc]usian: the alternative means of 
Flak firing used when radar control was jammed was so ineffective as to 
make reduction in radar effectiveness almost synonymous with the 
reduction in Flak effectiveness ... 
An indirect indication of the effect of jamming on German radar 
Flak-control may be found in the changes ordered in firing procedure at 
various times. Before jamming became serious the procedure was, of 
course, to use radar control whenever visual or visual-radar control was 
not possible. Strenuous efforts were made to operate the radars through 
the jamming and to obtain at least some measure of fire contraL To a 
certain extent these measures were successful,, but as our Window and 
eventually Carpet jamming became stronger during 1944, orders were 
given to Flak batteries to fire SO-Called predicted-barrage when aompi t 
ely vontroýlled fire was impossible. Extensive installations and procedures 
were evolved at important target areas such as Berlin and Hamburg for 
limited control of barrage fire from the Flak Division Headquarters. 
Batteries fired an the basis of altitudes and grid-square bca- 
t ions, such information being based on general location data supplied by 
the Jagd [fighter] Division in the area. Wuerzburg Riese and Riese G 
sets were used to supply anal data for use in this procedure. 
Similar methods were used at neatly all target areas. None of the 
German defense personnel had a high cpi, nion cE this procedure and it 
was truly an interim proposition. Although it was generally inefficient 
and wasteful of ammunition, it was used for several reasons: 
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a. To make US aircrews think that countermeasures were ineffectiv 
and to possibly bring about abandonment of jamming. 
b. To maintain the morale cf both the civil and military population 
of the target area by providing the same sound effects that 
would pertain to clear-weather defenses. 
c. To get at least some advantage from lucky hits. 
To a certain extent the first point was accomplished. Oberst (Colonel] 
Hentz cited a particular raid where the controlled barrage was used at 
Berlin. The consensus among the Germans was that the activity had been 
most ineffective. However, Hentz interrogated several crew-men from 
downed Eighth Air Force planes and found that these men were under 
the impression that the Flak had been very accurate and that their 
countermeasures had failed them. Of course, such firing practice did not 
fulfill the intended function of Flak, and it became extremely costly in 
ammunition at a time when ammunition and transportation were becoming 
critical items. Thus, between October and December of 1944 the practice 
was gradually restricted until, during most of 1945, barrage fixing was 
employed only at the target areas which the Germans considered of high- 
est importance for either military or political reasons. 
Further qualitative indications cf the effects of our jELm m. ing have 
been obtained from various P/ W's of all ranks. The general impression is 
that practiicaUy everyone connected with Flak in Germany, regardless of 
his particular job, was well aware ti the existence and general effect- 
iveness of the jEkmming. In some Commands it has been found that the 
pm ming and the scan about its effectiveness which circulated among 
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the personnel of the Command had so undermined the trust of the 
Commanding Viers in radar, that they were extremely adverse to any 
usae of radar fire direction equipment- mil 
General agreement has been found among Germans that the oom bºin- 
ation of Window and electric jamming was particularly effective. For 
example General Veith, Head of the Flak Artillery School Division of the 
F]akwaffe, made the following statement "Jamming became really serious 
after October 1944 ... Chaff gave some trouble commencing in the 
autumn of 1943, but these diffioilHes had to a certain extent been over- 
come ... as a result of active (electric) jamming, radar at times became 
completely useless, and in such cases (when firing was conducted under 
non-visual conditions) Flak did not go into action at all as the practice 
of barrage firing had been given up. " 
Further testimony as to the value of combined Window and electric 
jamming was offered by Flak Officer General Giese who stated that 
"Active jamming alone would not have been successful, since some 
German radars would soon hit upon a frequency not jammed. Window 
kil this possibility" ... 
In the face of these various statements as to the effectiveness of 
our jamming, it is well to mention that our countermeasures were sjme- 
times not effective. Many cases cited in German Battle Reports indicate 
that a certain number of Flak radars would be able to track through 
even very strong jamming. Conditions such as sting, luck in picking a 
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good fre4uencYº wind oonditi, ons (as regards effects of window motion on 
the 'Jaus" crevices), relative location and flight path of the attacking 
formations all entered into such occurrences. During most of 1944 such 
individual AJ successes were common. After strong jamming began, parti- 
cular cases of tracking by a few radars skill occurred. This is a natural 
conclusion when it is realized that radar control of Flak was able to 
achieve an overall effectiveness of } of normaL 
A detailed study of such Battle Reports would lead to a more fact- 
ual evaluation of jamming effectiveness than is attempted herein. How- 
ever, it is felt that the Germans' overall estimates are a aiffiiciently 
good source of information for this report. Thus, from the German p na- 
oners' opthic)ns and recollections of statistics, it can be seen that }3m m- 
ing of Flak control radar by our Eighth Air Force and Fifteenth Air 
Farce raids over Germany was decidedly effective. Jamming bothered the 
Germans from its first use, but as they developed circuitmeasiues and 
operating techniques, a particular type jamming would be more easily 
countered, though never completely. However, it appears from the 
various comments and estimates, that after late 1944, our combined 
Carpet and Window jamming became so severe as to succeed in reducing 
their blind-Flak effectiveness to the order of one-quarter of narmaL The 
Germans' situation was not comfortable and can best be summed up by 
the statement of General Giese "From the summer of 1943 on, it was no 
fun being a German AA afficer. " 
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German Anti-damming Measures 
As is true in all types ct warfare, the lamming war consisted of a 
Seri, of attacks and counterattacks. Introduction of new types of 
pm ming and new tactics by the AB i es constituted the attacks and the 
development and application a various anti- m ming measures by the 
Germans formed the counter-attacks. In the following pages, a brief 
history and des n of the technical warfare between the German 
Flak control radars and the jamming efforts of the USAAF is presented. 
From the very beginning of the war, the Germans feared the possible 
effects of Allied jamming of their radar. In 1940 they first investigated 
the pons iilitiýes of using Window for Jamming, and found its potential 
effectiveness so great that they discontinued the investigation and kept 
all information on it very secret in fear of pocihle use against them if 
the Allies found out about it, but never considered developing AJ 
measures for it for defensive use. 
The capture of the W uerzburg at Bruneval in 1942 caused aa nsid- 
erab]e amount of concern in military circles and General Martini, Chief 
of radar for the Air Farce, called a conference with representatives 
from the military, research and industrial crganizations to discuss the 
matter (the Air Force was responsible for the Flak defenses in the 
German military organization). It appears that their main concern was 
over the p of electronic jamming aE the W uerzburgs by the 
A]]ies and no consideration was given to the possibility of W indo w 
jamming. The decision reached was that the best countermeasure for any 
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Allied electronic jamming would be the spreading cf the W uerzburgs over 
a wide frequency band. Telefunken was given the task of developing such 
a system. Flak Artillery School III at Heiligen See later made some tests 
of the effect of electronic iEkm ming using a modulated Laren z 40L trans- 
mitter as a jammer and developed the Stendal procedure. 
In January 1943 small scale tests of Window jamming were conducted 
9 .. but the secrecy was still kept very high and "Ostrich" tactics were 
continued. Window was given the code name "Dueppel", but it was not 
allowed to appear in print. 
In mite of their previous work, the Germans were totally surppri_ed 
and unprepared when the RAF first dropped Window on Hamburg in July 
1943. In fact Prof. Scherzer, who was later second in command of the 
BFH, said that General Martini telephoned him at 2 am on the night of 
the raid to tell him how the British had dropped Dueppel and had 
completely jammed their radar. He wanted to know what could be done 
to overcome it ... 
When the shock due to the beginning ciE Window jamming wore cff, 
the effectiveness of the radars against the Window jamming increased 
somewhat as the operators did riot give up when they saw Window echoes 
on the screen but tried to plot through them. However, this was not 
successful most of the time as the Window jamming was too strong and 
the jamming did resu]t in an appreciable reduction in the effectiveness 
of radar Flak contraL 
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A very high priority was assigned to the development of anti- 
jamming devices for Window and a large number of scirentists and engin- 
eery were put to work on the problem. Attempts at solutions were made 
using the foUr) wing pcincip]ýes: 
(1) Propeller modulation. 
(2) Doppler effect. 
(3) Special CRO screens to distinguish moving targets from 
non-moving ones. 
The first device developed was the Wuerzlaus, which was invented by Dr 
Fach and Dr Moe]ler of the Max Wien Institut, within two weeks after 
the first Window raid. This modification operated on the coherent-pulse 
doppler piinc3p1 and under ideal conditions made it posen to track an 
aircraft whose echo was 1/3 the amplitude of the reflection of the 
Window cloud. However, a considerable amount of skill was required to 
use it effectively and keep it tuned up popery, and also its 
effectiveness decreased rapidly with the movement of the Window by the 
wind. 
Taunus and Nuemberg devices were produced next. Taunus was 
intended bo clear much of the Window clutter from the CR0 screen by 
removing the low frequency components. N uetnberg originally was 
designed as a device working on propeller modulation which would enable 
the radar to obtain accurate fire control data. However, it was 
unsuccessful in this respect, but was used as an auxiliary to W uer z1aus 
bra keep the radar approximately tracking targets when the 6 inflow was 
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too dense for successful vperation of w uerz]. a . In this way, it was 
pc ih]e to take advantage of any holes in the Window cloud for obtain- 
ing accurate fire control data using W uerzlaus. 
Within three months of the first use of Window, 60 per cent of all 
Wuerzbxargs were equipped with Wuerzlaus, Taunus and Nuernberg. A 
large scale operator training program was initiated as the effectiveness 
of the AJ devices against Window was very largely dependent on the 
skill of the operator. Motion pictures were made on pm ming and anti- 
Jamming, training manuals were published, practice raids were flown 
dropping Window, and a staff of instructors was obtained and trained. 
However, practically all of the operator training was done in the field 
under adverse conditions and as a result the success cif the program was 
far from complete. Also around the end of 1943, drafting of young men 
from the Flak defenses started and resulted in a continuous decrease in 
the number of intelligent and experienced operators. However, in spite of 
this fact, the effectiveness of the radars against Window Jamming grad- 
wally increased as a result of W uerzlaus and the training program. 
The commencement of electronic jamming of the Wuerzburgs in 
October 1943 by the USA A F, and in February 1944 by the RAF, caused 
the Germans a considerable amount of concern. Immediately, plans were 
made for spreading out the W uerzburgs over a wider frequency band and 
for the development cf techniques for surft ng frequency rapidly. The 
effectiveness of the electronic ja mming as first carried out by the 
USAAF was probably riot very great as the barrage was quite thin and no 
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Window was used. However, when the US AAF also commenced dropping 
Window in December 1943, the combination of the two appeared to have 
been very aiccful in preventing the Germans from obtaining accurate 
radar fire-control information. 
The deployment of the Mannheim Flak radar in the field started in 
late 1943 and by December, 120 were operational at high priority tar- 
gets. However, according to practically all the interrogated Germans, 
there was practically no difference between the Mannheim and the Small 
W uerzburg in their susceptibility to both window and Carpet jamming, 
and therefore no distinction will be made between them in the following 
discus on. Practically all of the AJ devices were applied to both 
Wuerzburgs and Mannheims, but in most cases it was much more difficult 
to adapt an AJ device to the Mannheim than to the W uerzburg. Thus, in 
general, the application of the various Ai devices to Mannheims lagged 
the Wuerzburgs by several months. 
Countermeasures against electronic jamming were introduced in the 
field early in 1944 and consisted of modifications of Wuerzburgs to shift 
frequency within certain bands during operations (Wismar) and for oper- 
ation in either the old A band or the new B band. In this connection, the 
broad band dipole was also introduced in the field. By March 1944, a 
large number of modifications had been completed. 
At this time W uerzburrg radars in the field were equipped with sever- 
al typ cf transmitter and local oscillator units which 
had different 
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tuning ranges. The older models operated ally at fixed frequencies in A 
band; newer models operated in either Aar B band, but either used two 
complete interchangeable transmitter local oscillator units ar used one 
unit which required the services of the maintenance crew to shift in 
frequency. The newest models could be tuned rapidly to any frequency 
inside of either band by the operators but required the services of a 
mechanic for shifting bands. In the newest type cf unit, A and B. it was 
mesi b]e to shift frequency during an attack if the radar was jammed, 
and resume tracking a the formation quickly enough to permit fixing by 
the batteries. In fact, with practice, it appears from interrogation of 
operators that an average crew was able to shift frequency within a 
band in slightly less than a minute and between bands in about four 
minutes. The German operators claim that the shift to B band was very 
effective for a short period of time, but on this band became partially 
jammed. 
One factor which limited the effectiveness of Wismar was that when 
it was used during cperations against electronic jamming, wuerzlaus 
could not be used against Window as the tuning adjmtments required in 
shifting the frequency of the coherent oscillator used in W urzlaus were 
very delircatýe and required too much time to oomplete. Hence a oonsid- 
erable sacrifice in the effectiveness of the radar in the presence cf 
Window pmming resumed when Wismar was used. 
In crder to, overcome this difficulty, the development aE another type 
aE a pulse doppler unit called Tastlaus, which did not need to be tuned 
6- 
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when the radar frequency was changed, was started. However, this 
device was not completed until late in the year ... 
By the summer of 1944, the Germans apparently were beginning to 
be able to cope with window jamming and carpet pm ming fairly effect- 
ively as the amount of electronic jamming was decreasing and the Oper- 
ators were becoming experienced in working against Window. However, 
the Germans claimed that in the summer the Window dropped began to 
increase appreciably, and it continued to increase until the quantities 
dropped were sc) great that even W uerzlaus was ineffective most of the 
time. At this time more pressure was placed on the development cf 
anti-Window devices to enable radars to work effectively through these 
heavy clouds. 
On top of this increase in the quality of Window jamming, the sudden 
increase in the amount of electronic jamming in October 1944 caught the 
Germans entirely by sarprise and proved to be very effective. All of the 
scientists, engineers and military personnel agreed that the most effect- 
ive means of jamming was the combined use of Window and Carpet, and 
that the tactics employed by the US AAF were very effective in jamming 
their Wuerzburg radars. Prof. Scherzen of the BHF and others said that 
only two solutions were advanced which were riot long-range projects. 
One was the extended spreading cf the frequency coverage, and the 
ether was the increasing of the transmitter power. Development was 
started on both ideas. Plans were made for the design and production aE 
modifications which would permit operation in the C band and for the 
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development of a1 megawatt W uerzburg. The first, plan was carried out 
but the second was not completed by the end of the war. Also, a very 
large number of personnel were employed in longer-range problems for 
solving this problem. 
The only immediate measure that was at all effective was the use cf 
Wismar. Tastlaus was introduced into the field in quantity in November 
and Contributed somewhat toward the freeing of the radars from 
jamming, but in general it appears that both the electronic and window 
Jamming were too strong for either Wismar or Tas-tlaus to be very 
effective. 
W hen it was possible for the operators to find a hole in the jamming, 
it was usually possible to track the target long enough before it was 
jammed to obtain enough information for Eu: ng. As an average it took 
the operators about one minute to shift frequency within bands and 
about four minutes to shift from one band to another. They also thought 
that on an average they were able to track for about three minutes 
before they were jammed again. 
The Sbendal procedure had been tried earlier against electronic 
jamming, and had not proven to be successful probably due to the very 
poor accuracy ring and to the circular polarization cf the jamming 
after our use of the Fishhook antenna beginning in summer-fall 1944. 
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The pinpointing of a formation carrying a jEim mer by D/Fing on it 
with two radars was tried but was unsuccessful due to the uncertainty as 
to which formation each radar was observing. 
The Wuerzburg Riese cx Giant was used in limited quantities for 
Flak cx ntraL The set was o nally designed for G CI [ground controlled 
interception] operation but its use for Flak control was begun at about 
the time that our jamming began. Due to its immobility, it was usually 
used only at important targets where a fixed location was j. Late 
in the fall of 1944, the Riese-Gustav attachment was installed, providing 
the Riese with a built-in Freya radar. The original function of Gustav 
was to facilitate setting on-target for actual tracking with the Riese 
and was intended for G CI service ... There was indication cf some 
usage of the Riese-Gustav to supply range and, by D/F on jamming, 
directional information to Division Headquarters for the predicted 
barrage firing plans. The Riese-Gustav was slightly more effective 
against jamming than the Wuerzburg D for the following reasons: 
(1) The narrower beam width reduced the Window echo slightly and 
als reduced the area in which jammers would be effective. 
(2) The Freya components were useful in setting the w uerzburgs on. 
(3) In the presence of electronic jamming, the Freya section could 
obtain the range and approximately keep the W uerzburg set an 
the formation when it was jammed, thus enabling the operators 
to make more effective use of Nuernberg (accurate angular 
data was not obtainable from the Freya as no split was used). 
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In general the Gustav was slightly more effective in overcoming -; m ming 
than Small WuerzI rg, but the improvement was not very great ... 
The area-controlled cr "predicted" barrage fire c cubed previously 
was used as an interim firing procedure in cases where the Flak radars 
were thoroughly jammed. This was an attempt to get firing data for all 
batteries from whatever radars in the area were free from pm ming. Thus, 
in the Berlin area, Jagdschlom, Freya, Wassermann, Farstuhl Freya and by 
chance a few unjam med Rieses, Mannheims, and W uerzburgs were used as 
sources for data, the firing instructions for all batteries were given from 
Division Headquarters on the basis of a combination of all this data. In a 
sere, the tactic was a grandiose scheme for utilizing widely spread radar 
frequencies but, of course, the firing data being given only as grid-square 
and altitude, was so inaccurate as to make the system a poor substitute 
for tracked firing. The Germans realized this limitation but felt the 
procedure was the best that could be evolved under the circumstances. 
In the winter of 1944, a new anti-Window device called the K -laus 
was developed which made it possih1 to track aircraft when the ratio of 
the Window echo to the aircraft echo was between 15 and 20 to L 
Several experimental sets were isst 
January, 1945, approximately 40 or 
placed for 1,000 more. This device 
jamming and Wismar had to be used 
jamming. However, it was certainly 
and against Window and Carpet whE 
filled in December 1944. Late 
50 were cper'ational, and crders were 
was very suscept! to electronic 
first to fired a 1x)le in the electronic 
very effective against vNindow aloe, 
!n it was possible to f id a hole. 
,i 
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According to Oberst Hentz, in operational tests at Hannover around 
the first of the year, two battexies equipped with this device scored 12 
kills in a two-month period, which was phenomenal as two normal batter- 
ies usually did not more any )rills in that length of time. He also thought 
that most of the victories occurred at night as the electronic J3mrTWW 
was less intense then, and it was easier to find a hole. 
At the end of 1944 two modifications for use in the Wismar i roce- 
dure were introduced which were called Urechse and Eidechse. Urechse 
was a device which permitted tuning of the radar over A, B and C bands 
and all frequencies between the bands. Eidechse was a smilar device, 
but permitted operation only within the A. B and C bands. These devices 
were designed to allow further spreading of the W uerzburgs to C band 
and to frequencies between B and C bands in cycler to get away from 
electronic jamming (C band covers approximately 440 to 470 Mc). 
Urechse, however, had a seri , ýus defect in that it was equipped to work 
with W uerzlaus and not Tastlaus, and hence was difficult to tune rapidly 
if W uerzla . Ls was not used. Eidechse, 
however, was equipped with Tast- 
]sins which made it easier to tune, but it did not cover the frequencies 
between bands. Around the first of the year the W uerzburgs started to 
operate in C band as it was found that the jamming was much less 
effective there. Here again, the Germans tried to hide the C band and 
gave strict instructions: 
(1) Not to operate radars in the C band unless abmlutiely recessary. 
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(2) Nat to track single aircraft Cr small formations that might be 
radar reconnaissance aircraft. 
(3) To operate duri ng a raid for the shor test possible time. 
In January 1945, about 100 cr 4 per cent of the GL [gunlaying] radars 
were operating on C band according to both German and Eighth AAF 
spat-mming records. Oberst Hentz stated that plans had been made for 
rapidly shifting a large number of sets to C band, but he did not know 
how many had been equipped for C band operation by the end cf the 
war. Eighth Air Fcrce search logs showed about 25 per cent cf the 
W uerzburgs operating in C band in March. 
The Germans claimed that only a small amount of electronic jEimming 
was encountered in this band although the Window jamming was still 
effective. As a result, the radars were able to track targets a much 
]arger per cent of the time. 
One trick which was once tried at Ham burg in an attempt to fool our 
spot-m ming operators, was to arrange the frequencies ct the radars in 
such a manner around the target that there was an outer ring operating 
in A band, an inner ling operating on B band and a central ring operat- 
ing on C band. The plan was to turn on the sets on A band first to draw 
our spot-Jammers; on them, then turn on the B barxl sets to scare the 
remainder, and finally turn on the C band sets which they hoped would 
be unjam med and hence would be able to supply accurate tracking 
information b c) their respective batteries. This was said to be unsuccess- 
- 358 - 
ful as all of the spot operators were not fooled, and a proper account 
had not been taken of our barrage cover of the A and B bands. 
At the end of January the ist 9 centimeter GL set, Egerland, was 
used operationally. The Germans claimed that this equipment operated 
very satisfactorily and were well pleased with it. Another Egelland was 
completed, but its whereabouts is unknown. One thousand Egerlands were 
on carder and 10 0 were scheduled for delivery in 1944 but the AM ed 
bombing had delayed production. 
All of the Germans felt that one of the most important reasons that 
their anti-damming program was not more successful was the continual 
lowering of the level of intelligence and experience of the Flak radar 
personnel M any of the experienced cperators had been drafted into the 
infantry and their replacements were old men cr girls who were rushed 
thrrough a brief training course and sent into the field- All of the tech- 
nical personnel interrogated felt that a good operator Duld do a lot to 
overcome the effects of jamming; but good operators were very scarce. 
Many comments were made to the effect that the various AJ devices 
required a very good operator to make them work. 
The German scientists felt that by early in 1945 they had solved the 
Window problem as they were convinced they had devices in use cr 
in 
development which would render Window jamming ineffective """ 
However, they had no practical solution for noise jamming except oper- 
ations on the centimeter band, and they felt that 
in time they would 
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have the same trouble with this band and hence were working frantically 
to find a solution to the overall parable m. 
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APPENDIX G 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RADAR IN JAPAN, TO THE END OF 
WORLD WAR II 
Sources: US offit'ial report 'A Short Survey of Japanese Radar' by the 
Operations Analysis Section and the Air Technical Intelligence 
Group of the Far East Air Fccce, dated 20 November 1945. 
Royal Air Fcrce Signal Intelligence Report 'Japanese Radar 
Equipment, 30 November 1944. 
Note: only the more important radars are d bed in the account which 
follows. 
The development of radar in Japan dates from 1936, when Profes9or 
K. Okabe at the University of Osaka began work on an electronic method 
of detecting aircraft. Wc rking under the famous Dr Y agi (who gave his 
name to the Yagi aerial), Okabe concentrated on the development Cl a 
bistatlc system with a separated transmitter and receiver, to detecte the 
interference to radio sgnals caused when an aircraft passed between the 
two. The method of operation was, therefore, the same as that tried at 
the US Naval Research Laboratory in the 1920's and early 1930's but 
which had already been overtaken by p ll9ed systems. Unlike the work in 
the US, however, the Japanese were to continue the development cf the 
interference detector in parallel with that of pulsed radars. To differen- 
tiate between the two systems the Japanese refereed to the interference 
detector as the Type A equipment and the pulsed radar as the Iype B. 
O kabe saw the great advantage of the Type A equipment to be that, 
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compared with a pulsed system, for a given transmitted power far greater 
detection ranges could be achieved. Since low transmitter power was 
dog the Japanese radar program throughout the conflict, this was an 
important consideration. The great drawback of the interference detector 
was that did not give the position of the aircraft along the line between 
the transmitter and the receiver, and despite much hard work the 
Japanese team was never able to resolve this fundamental probte m. After 
a lot of experimentation the Type A system went into production in 1940, 
operating in the 40 to 80 MHz band and using transmitters developing 
between 3 and 400 watts. During 1941 the Type A entered service with 
the Japanese Army and was deployed in quite large numbers; in all about 
a hundred of these equipments were built and they remained in service 
until the end of the war. The longest Type A line of detection was from 
Formosa to Shanghai, a distance of more than 400 miles. 
Japanese work on the development cf pulsed radar began in 1941, 
with completely separate programs by the Army and the Navy which 
wed in a considerable waste of effort to produce different radars of 
similar (and, compared with those vi the Allies low) performance. 
Because of their separate lines of development, the Army and the Navy 
programs will be described separately in this account 
The Japanese Army radars followed a fairly logical de nation 
system. Each equipment had a type number preceded by Tachi meaning 
]and-based ('chi' from tsuchi meaning 'earth') º Tapse meaning stiiprborr 
('se' from misui meaning 'water') cr Taki meaning air--borne (' ki' from 
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kuki meaning 'air'); in each case the type designation was prefixed ' Tal 
from 'Tama Institute', the Army's research institute near Tokyo. 
The th st Army radar to go into production was the Tachi-6 static 
early warning set which operated on frequencies in the 68 to 80 MHz 
band. Thus unusual radar employed a transmitter with an omni-directional 
or wide-angle aerial, and three cr four separate receivers each with 
rotatable directional aerials to search for echoes from targets (in more 
recent times this same principle, lobe-on-receive only, has been reintro- 
duced as a means of making tracking radars less vulnerable to electronic 
jamming). The first Tachi-6's were deployed in 1942, and gave ranges up 
to 18 5 miles on high flying aircraft. 
Fallowing the Tachi-6 came the only slightly less cumbersome (18 
ton) but transportable Tachi-7 for the same ppurpoee, operating on 
frequencies around 100 MHz and with a maximum range smilar to that of 
the earlier set. About 60 Tachi 7's were bum and from October 1943 
these were deployed throughout the home islands and occupied territor- 
ies. For service in the combat zone a yet lighter set was needed, and 
early in 1944 the 4-ton Tachi-18 appeared which also operated on 
frequencies around 100 MHz. 
Norne ct the early warning radars mentioned above could give indir 
ations cl altitude so the Tachi-20, which operated on frequencies in the 
same band as the Tachi-6, was developed. This set did not go into 
service until March 1945 and about a dozen were deployed. The 
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Tashi 35, operating on 82 MHz, entered service for the same purpose in 
May and only a few were deployed before the war ended. 
Japanese Army work on the development of precision radars for 
searchlight and AA gunlaying received a considerable boost early in 
1942, following the capture the American and British bases at Corregidor 
and Singapore. At Cc rrregick r the Japanese captured an intact SCR-268 
and a badly damaged early warning radar, probably an SCR-270. On 
Singapore they captured badly damaged examples of an early warning set 
and a gunlaying radar, and also found some useful technical manuals. 
As a result of these finds two Japanese searchlight and fire control 
radars appeared, the Tachi-1 and the Tachi-2, both operating on frequen- 
ties around 200 MHz and employing many techniques copied from the 
SC R-268. The reason for the two different radars was that two 
companies, Sumitomo (Tachi-1) and Tokyo Shibaura (Tachi 2) had each 
received a contract to develop an AA gunlaying radar (a further example 
of the fragmentation of effort which characterised Japanese radar at this 
time). Neither radar was not successful, however, and in total only 65 
were built. Sumitomo then switched production to the Tachi-3 (72 to 84 
MHz) based an the British G unlaying Mark II radar; about 150 of these 
were buht and it became numerically the most important Japanese set in 
this category. 
The Tachi-4 was a mobile set intended to replace the Tashi-2 and 
operating on the same frequencies, but it was unsuccessful and saw little 
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use. However a development aE the Tashi 4, the Tashi-31, proved much 
more successful; about 70 had been beult by the end cif the war it had 
become the most important Frec mon radar operating in the 200 MHz 
band. 
From the beginning of 1944 the Tama Institute worked to produce a 
Japanese Army version of the German W uer zburg radar, one of which 
had been delivered to Japan by submarine. Before it could go into maser 
production, however, it was decided to re-engineer the set to Japanese 
specifications. As a result of this and the severe disruption in production 
caused by the B-29 attacks the Tachi-24 , as the set became known, was 
still in the prototype stage when the war ended. 
The only Japanese Army airborne radar to go into mass production 
was the 150 MHz Taki-1 ship-search equipment, fitted to maritime patrol 
aircraft and torpedo bombers. This radar first saw operational use in the 
fall of 1944. 
As has been said, the development of radar for the Japanese Navy 
proceeded entirely separately from that for the Army. There was even a 
security barrier between the two programs to maintain t Ws separation. 
Thus the Nihon Musen company, one of the three principal Japanese 
concerns producing radar during the war, had to divide its main plant at 
Mataka near Tokyo into two when buil, dirig equipment for the two 
services; there was even a ban on company engineers working on the 
different contracts from exchanging information. 
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The Japanese Navy system of designating radars was quite different 
from that used by the Army. Sets were categorized by purpose. Thus the 
Mark I radars were all ground early warning sets; the Mark II's were 
ship-borne sets, the Mark IV's were ground precision radars for search- 
light and/or AA gunnery control and the Mark VI's were airborne 
ship-search equipments. A notable departure from this system was the 
Gyoku-3 designation for the Navy airborne interception radar. 
The main research and development agency for Navy radars was the 
Second Naval Technical Institute near Tokyo. The first Navy set to go 
into production was the Mark I Model 1 early warring radar which 
operated on frequencies around 100 MHz. The first cf these to become 
operational was installed at Rabaul in the spring of 1942 and altogether 
about 80 were delivered. The next set in this category to enter produc- 
tion was the Mark I Model 2, a mobile radar operating on frequencies 
around 200 MHz; about 300 of the were buflt. This set in its turn was 
followed into production in 1943 by the lightweight Mark I Model 3 Oper- 
ating on frequencies in the 147 to 165 MHz band. About 1,500 were built 
and it saw widespread use. The reader will note the many imilý, rities 
between this family of early warning radars, and the quite separate 
family developed for the same purpose by the Army. 
The first Japanese Navy shipborne radar, the Mark a Model 1 oper- 
acting on frequencies around 200 MHz, began sea bests an the battl, est 
Ise in March 1942. A few months later the radically different Mark II 
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Model 2 appeared, operating an frequencies in the 3,000 Mhz band and 
t gg a2 Kw magnetron as power source (it is interesting to rote that 
at the beginning of 1942 Japanese work on micro wave radar was only a 
few months behind that in the USA, though the gap increased rapidly 
during the course of the war). Mare than 400 of these microwave radars 
were built during the conflict, and versions were fitted to ships of all 
sizes and submarines. The Navy re-engineered its own version of the 
German Wuerzburg and re-designated it the Mark II Model 3; as in the 
case of the Army version, however, this radar was only in the prototype 
stage when the war ended. The Mark II Model 4 was a lightweight set 
operating on frequencies around 150 MHz and fitted to small ships and 
submarines. In most cases these ship-bome radars were intended to 
provide air and surface warning, with anti-aircraft and surface gunnery 
control as an auxiliary function; this requirement for radars to perform 
conflicting functions was beyond the capability of Japanese technology 
at the time, and resulted in sets whose performance was mediocre in 
most respects. 
For the control of the searchlights and anti-aircraft guns defending 
its shore bases, the Japanese Navy developed its own version of the 
SCR-268, the Mark IV Model 1, which also operated on frequencies 
around 200 MHz; the first of the went into operation at Rabaul in 
November 1943, and in all 80 were I nW Fdlowing this set in production 
was the Mark IV Model 2, with several improvements to make it easier to 
build and maintain. The Mark IV Model 3 was a direct copy of the Army's 
Tashi-1 (and a rare example cf inter-service co-operation); the Navy 
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found it as unsatisfactory for searchlight control as the Army had for 
gunnery control, however, and few were built 
Towards the end of 1941 the Japanese Navy began work on a 
lightweight ship-search radar for its patrol aircraft. This resulted in the 
Mark VI series of equipments Operating an frequencies around 150 MHz, 
which first entered service in 1943. Altogether some 2,000 examples of 
this radar were built and the set saw wide scale use. 
When the war ended the Navy had under development an airborne 
interception radar for night fighters: the 150 MHz Gyoku-3. Although 
tests had begun, the radar was too late to see action. 
Throughout, the picture of Japanese radar development up to the 
end of W cold War II is one of poiece m eal developments of sets, which in 
most cases brought little improvement in capability over their predec-es - 
ars. The reed to run almost completely separate and parallel radar devel- 
cpment programs for the Army and the Navy reduced the effectiveness of 
the nation's limited radar research effort; and individual services even 
Placed contracts with different companies to produce radars to do the 
same job. The outcome was that the small Japanese electronics industry 
found itself required to turn out relatively small production runs of many 
different types of radar. It proved quite impossible to keep pace with the 
quantity and quality of Allied radar development and production. The 
large scale use cf countermeasures against the Japanese radars did not 
begin until April 1945, and in the four months between then and the end 
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of the war there was no time to react effectively. The impact of the US 
jamming on the Japanese air defense system is covered in the next 
Appendix. 
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DETAILS OF THE MAIN TYPES OF JAPANESE RADAR 
Note: Because most cf the radars ran to numerous 
sub-types,, 
the 
technical details given below should be regarded as representative for 
the type only. 
ARMY RADARS 
Type A Bi-static Doppler Interference Detector. 
Quantity built about 100 3,10,100 and 400 watt versions. 
First used 1941 
Maximum range up to 440 miles 
Frequencies 40 - 80 MHz 
Note: although strictly speaking this equipment was not a radar, it 
has been included in this list for completeness. 
Tachi 1 Grund Searchlight and AA Fire Control Radar 
Quantity built 30 Peak power 5Kw 
First used 1943 
Maximum range about 12 miles 
Frequencies used: around 200 MHz 
Tachi-2 Ground Searchlight and AA Fire Control Radar 
Quantity built 35 Peak power 10 Kw 
First used 1943 
Maximum range about 25 miles 
Pulse length 2 mi=secs 
PRF1,000 
Frequencies used: around 200 MHz 
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Tachi 3 Ground Searchlight and AA Fire C cntrol Radar 
Quantity bit about 150 Peak power 50 Kw 
First used 1944 
Maximum range about 25 miles 
Frequencies used: 72 to 84 MHz 
Tachi-6 Static Early Warning Radar 
Employed omni-directional or wide-angle transmitter aerial, and up 
to four separate directional and movable receiver aerials. 
Quantity tilt 350 
First used 1942 
Peak power 10 - 50 Kw 
Pulse length 25 - 35 microsecs 
Maximum range 185 miles 
Frequencies used: 68 to 80 MHz 
PRF 500 cr 1,000 
Tach1-7 Transportable Early Warning Radar 
Quantity built about 60 Peak power 50 Kw 
First used 1943 
Maximum range 185 miles 
Frequencies used: around 100 MHz 
-rachi 18 Mobile Early Warning Radar 
Quantity built 400 Peak power 50 Kw 
First used 1944 
Maximum range 185 miles 
Frequencies used: 94 to 106 MHz 
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Tashi-31 Ground Searchlight and AA Fire Control Radar 
Quantity bmU 70 Peak power 50 Kw 
First used 1945 
Maximum range 25 miles 
Frequencies used: 187 to 214 MHz 
Talei-1 Airborne Ship-Search Radar 
Quantity built about 1,000 Peak power 10 Kw 
First used 1944 
Maximum range about 60 miles on a large ship 
Frequencies used: around 150 MHz. 
NAVY RADARS 
Mark I Model 1 Static Ground Early Warning Radar 
Quantity built about 80 
First used 1942 
Maximum range about 90 miles 
Peak power 5Kw 
Pulse length 10 - 30 m1cmsecs 
PRF 530 - 1,250 
Frequencies wed: 92 to 108 MHz 
Mark I Model 2 Transportable Grund Early Warning Radar 
Quantity built about 300 Peak power 5Kw 
First used 1942 
Maximum range about 90 miles 
Pulse length 3- 20 microeecs 
PRF 750 - 1,500 
Frequencies used: 187 to 214 MHz 
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Mark I Model 3 Portable Ground Early Warning Radar 
Quantity built about 1,500 Peak power 10 Kw 
First used 1943 
Maximum range about 90 miles 
Frequencies rased: 146 to 165 MHz 
P ulae- length 3- 12 rruLcxosecs 
PRF 400 - 600 
Mark a Model 1 Shipborne Air and Surface Search Radar 
First used 1942 
Maximum range 90 miles on aircraft 
18 miles on ]arge stomp 
Frequencies used: 185 to 210 MHz 
Peak power 5Kw 
Pulse length 3- 20 microsec. 
PRF 500 - 1,100 
Mark 11 Model 2 Shipborne Surface Search and Fire Control. Radar 
First used 1942 
Maximum range 22 miles on large ship 
Frequencies used: 2,857 to 3,125 MHz 
Peak power 2Kw 
Pulse length 2- 10 micro®ec 
Mark IV Model 1 Ground Searchlight and AA Fire Control Radar 
Quantity built 80 
First used 19 43 
Maximum range 30 miles 
Peak power 30 Kw 
Frequencies used: around 200 MHz 
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Mark IV Model 2 Ground Searchlight and AA Fire Control Radar 
Improved version of the Mark IV Model 1 
First used 1944 
Maximum range 30 miles 
Frequencies used: around 200 MHz 
M ark VI Airborne Strip Search Radar 
Quantity built more than 2,000 
First used 19 43 
Maximum range 43 miles on a large ship 
Peak power 30 Kw 
Pulse length 3 nucrosecs 
PRF 1,000 
Peakpower3-6 Kw 
Pulse length 3- 10 m'secs 
PRF 700 - 1,200 
Frequencies used: 140 to 160 MHz 
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APPENDIX H 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF US RADIO COUNTERMEASURES LN THE 
PACIFIC THEATRE OF OPERATIONS 
Note: this Appendix is extracted from the post-war report ' American 
Radar Countermeasures VS Japanese Flak & EW Radar', prepared by the 
Air Technical Intelligence Group and dated 10 December 1945. 
AA Procedures - Army 
Japan was divided into four main Army areas for protection by AA 
Divisions, the Tokyo area, Nagoya area, Osaka area and the northern 
part of the island of Kyushu. Each Area Hq seems to have handled all air 
warning information that affected its own area of oontroL There was 
very little liaison between the ground and air forces in such matters as 
G CI or SLC [ground controlled interception or searchlight control 
radars]. The only way they could keep track cf their own fighters was by 
constant plane to ground radio chatter, and the various Flak batteries 
were notified from time to time of the movements of friendly planes by 
telephone. 
The coastal areas around the main cities and military target areas of 
Japan were protected both by EW stations and by a 'radio fence' ugng 
the Doppler system ... Early warning radars were never used 
in the 
actual 'setting on' of Flak radars, but in the last months of the war 
same thought seems to have been given to this as additional equipment 
were dreamed up (Tachi-20 and Tachi-35) to measure elevation angle as 
well as range and azimuth. The only real use they clot out of the 
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additional equipment, however, was to use it as an aid to vectoring 
fighters for intercept purposes. 
According to weather conditions, cloud cover, time of day etc, 
tracking was done by radar or a combination cf radar and cptical means. 
when possible, radar was used for obtaining range, and optical means for 
determining azimuth and elevation (sonic devices seem to have been wed 
in isolated cases, without very much success). Several officers who were 
interrogated, admitted that on different occasions the operates had 
difficulty in determining if both the radar and optical devices were 
tracking the same target. 
An effort was made to determine what percentage of the air raids 
radar and/or optical firing data was used, but no statistics were 
available - same old story 'aU records destroyed', and anyway the 
Japanese made little effort to keep track of such information. Records 
of this sort would have been valuable to us in determining the over-all. 
effectiveness of our jamming program. 
AA Procedures - Navy 
In the early part of the war the Navy was primarily responsible for 
the defense of all islands in Japan's extensive 'outer circle', but as the 
war progressed they also took over from the Army part of the responsib- 
ility for defending from air raids certain sections in the 'home' islands 
and a good part of Fcrmosa. These naval Flak positions were mainly 
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around naval bases and the larger seaports ct Kyushu, Honshu and 
Fcrmosa. 
When the Flak radars and early warning radars were first set up, 
little consideration was given to any other problem than convenience of 
installation. Thus in most cases it happened that the EW sites might be 
miles from the Flak radars and all data on an approaching raid had to be 
telephoned to them. This resulted in considerable delay and confusion 
and so an overall plan was prepared to set up the EW and GL radars side 
by side. This plan, however, they never got around to carrying out. 
To a great extent the Flak radars depended almost entirely on the 
EW radars for specific data to 'get on' the target. Their range was 
comparatively short and their searching ability very poor -go it was 
necessary to get warning of an approaching raid as early and as accur- 
ately as possible so that the batteries themselves could be prepared ... 
Thus when the EW radars were partially jammed on trop cf this, the 
meager information obtained had to be telephoned to the Flak radar, it 
left the whole system in a state of confusion and preparedness. And now 
add to that the severe jamming of the Flak radars themselves. 
Effectiveness of RCM 
Japanese Ai Equipments - Army 
This subject can be summed up in one word, 'rune'. 
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Japanese AJ Techniques - Army 
The Japanese Army had received from Germany the general pxincipr 
als of the 'W uerz]aus' method and had done considerable work expeLl- 
meeting with it. However the Army operators decided they could read 
through our 'Rope' well enough and so this method was never used in the 
Against electronic jamming they had practically no means of count- 
enacting its effect. In some cases azimuth was obtained by a crude sort 
of D/Fing on the source of the jamming sgnal by tEing the point of 
maximum disturbance on the receiver indicator, and the range was 
obtained, if possible, by some radar not too badly jammed. Various 
Japanese personnel questioned stated that it seemed the 200 Mc frequen- 
cy was more often jammed in the Tokyo area, while the 78 Mc GL 
frequency would be jammed west of the Tokyo area. No reason can be 
found for this opinion. Since they had sets us ng both ffrequenci, es scatt- 
eyed through the various Flak defenses, usually some radar would be 
partially free of ja m ming - not that it ever did them much good. (They 
had no plan or order in the selecting of frequencies for any particular 
Flak battery. They simply used whatever set was available at the time 
the battery was placed. Some estimates state that only one out of every 
eight AA positions was radar vxntrolled. ) 
When our electronic jamming became se. rius, they attempted to 
hasten the research and the solving of production problems they were 
encountering on the Japanese version of the German W uerzburg. They 
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felt confident that since its directivity was good, any Jamming effective- 
Hess would be greatly minimized except from an aircraft directly within 
the beam-width of the antenna. The net result was, one Wueszburg set 
up for final tests. Also they planned to modify their existing 1.5 meter 
(200 Mc) equipment so that when jammed they could switch bands either 
to 1.7 m (176 Mc) cs to 1.3 m (230 Mc). This seems to be rather extreme 
band shifting and no information is available as to how this was to be 
accomplished. By the end of the war, the Army had only gotten as far 
with the plan as to send an order through to the labs and manufacturers 
to start research on the problem. However, very high prionty was assign- 
ed to the project. 
Indications of Effectiveness of Jamming from Japanese Sources 
Many Army officers, both technical and operational, were question- 
ed, as well as numerous civilian technicians and radar engineers, 
concerning the effectiveness of our jamming efforts. In almost every 
case, the person questioned, in effect, threw up his hands and said ' Our 
anti-aircraft firing radars were useless under the "wave disturbing" from 
your aircraft. ' They admitted an almost 100 % reduction in effectiveness 
of their Flak radars. And unless means for obtaining optical data were 
good, the batteries just did riot fire when the radars were jammed. As 
for Rope and/or Window jamming, the story was different. Mast personel 
questioned claimed that iced cperators could track aircraft 
through the clutter but 'with ' diffiCultY. 
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The foll wing statements are direct quotes from statements madam by 
several responsible officers connected with technical research and with 
the tactical use of radar: Cal. K. Sataki, Tama Research Institute (radar 
research and production) 'Highest priority given to anti-Jamming au ies 
and to efforts to modify existing radars so that band shifting would be 
possible. ' Lt Gen. Tada, Chief of Tama Institute 'About 10 % of the high 
frequency research effort in all fields, or about 80 % of the research 
effort on radar projects alone, was diverted to the development of 
antik m ming equipments. ' Lt Cal Hiroshi Tominaga, Sig. Sect, Imperial 
Gen. Staff (was in charge of planning and setting up of radar sties in 
China and some on Honshu) 'A meiican jamming was so oo mplete that 
maximum research effort was expended to develop our radar to combat 
it. Mast 'search' experiments He with intercept receivers] were dropped' 
(vonsiderable research had been in progress to develop search receivers 
by which Allied radars might be Ferreted). 
Lt Gen. Tada also expressed an opinion that, through air raids, 
Japan's capacity for radar production was knocked down to about one 
third of its former level and its capacity for research to about one half, 
still he believed that six months would have been ant to greatly 
improve Japanese radar in its ability to combat our jamming. The above 
statements and opinions can be accepted as the sum and stance of the 
answers received from almost every person questioned. 
There seems to be no available figures on the number of rourxis cf 
AA ammunition per aircraft kill, tang radar controlled batteries either 
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with or without ja m mir, but operational officers state that ja m aw)g 
reduced the detection ar tracking range of B-29 s from approxim at Jy 18 
to 25 miles down to 1 to 3 miles. 
Japanese Ai Equipments - Navy 
The Navy, like the Army, had had no time to develop anything to 
combat our ja m ming. 
Japanese AJ Techniques - Navy 
They claim that no foreign information was used in any way in their 
AJ research. And like the Army, they state that window and/cor Rope 
jamming caused negligible difficulty. Operators were given 'on the spot' 
instruction by officers from the naval radar schools, who travelled 
around to the various sites and conducted tests on Chaff amended from 
balloons. Operators were taught to recognize the difference in 'beat' 
between the Widow return and the target return. Also they attempted to 
discriminate between the wave shape of a Window return and that of a 
plane. Window jamming began very early compared with electronic 
jamming and was first carried out by B-29's [more likely B-24's - author] 
attacking from China bases. The Japanese claim that this gave them lots 
of practise tracking through Window echoes, eY in Fcrmosa, and 
that they had consWerable success with their Flak radars there. 
But with electronic jamming it was a much different story. Like the 
Army, the Navy very freely admits that its Flak radars were practically 
ageless at any time electronic pm ming was clone by American aircraft. 
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They claim to have first had trouble in the Kyushu district in 'April c z- 
May 19 45', and later, in 'June 1945', in the Kanto cr Tokyo digit. 
Their plans to minimize the effect of electronic jamming acxsisted of 
two parts: 
1. Research was started to modify their existing GL radars so that a 
frequency shift of as much as 10 Mc either -side of the Qiginal 
frequency might be attained (this however was never completed 
'due to design difficuhies', though some experiments were 
carried out with EW radar so modified and they claimed the 
were quite successf uL ) 
2. An attempt was made to modify the Mark 11 Model 2,10 cm ship- 
borne to measure elevation angle. Experiments against aircraft 
indicated a range up to 20 km (12 mi) for this set. However, 
work on this was not completed either, before the end cf the 
war. 
The Mark II Model 2 (10 cm) was also experimented with as an SLC 
radar and one such set was found at Lsukishima, a branch of the 2nd 
Naval Tech. Institute in Tokyo. 
The S-8 A [also known as the Mark II Model 31, a 58 cm Flak radar, 
was felt bo be another answer to the jamming problem, and 
it was given 
high prior ity, but again they f ailed becau9e cf little time and 
loss cf 
production facilities due to air raid damage. 
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There was no special training given to radar operators because as 
the words of one Japanese officer 'the concrete plan to anti-am mim 
was not exist'. However, some efforts along that line were made but 
with doubtful success. 0 perators were advised to use the 'gain' control 
in attempting to bring the echo out of the noise, and an attempt was 
made to do 'lobe comparison by noise amplitude'. What they did was use 
the receiver indicator as a nmugh D/Fing unit, using the paint of greatest 
noise amplitude as a means of determining azimuth and elevation; then to 
get the range they would use the Mark I Model 3 150 Mc EW set. They 
admitted this method was very inefficient and inaccurate - 'The method 
to use the enemy's disturbance waves in reverse as our direction finder, 
afforded us only to discern the approximate direction of the enemy 
owing to the bad condition for minuteness (they found that pip matching 
on the maximum strength of our electronic noise was almost impoe ih]e 
due to the wide side-bands of our jamming frequency) and shooting was 
also difficillf-I That classic of understatement just quoted was made by 
Vice Admiral Nawa, chief of the Megura Park branch of the 2nä Naval 
Technical Institute. 
M any of the individuals querns stated flatly that at night or in 
bad weather ' when your aircraft "disturbed our locators" we could not 
and did not shoot. ' This seems to have been especially true 
in Kyushu 
and the Tokyo areas. Around the Sasebo Naval be in western 
Kyushu, 
and in Formosa, they claimed to have had better success - more 
practice, as they put it. 
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Very high priority was given to anti-jamming research but nothing 
was accomplished in the dort time they had from April 1945 until the 
end of the war. Captain Ideura of the Naval Tech Dept., stated that 
their only hope was the modification of their shipborne 10 cm job, and if 
this was susceptible to ja m ming 'then we could not see the way for 
defense'. And he and other officers and engineers of his department 
were quite frank in admitting that modification of any radar in the last 
months of the war was next to impossible. Laboratories and manufact- 
wring plants were being further dispersed; small factories supplying badly 
needed components were bombed out; and lastly, the airplanes used to 
conduct tests against their experimental radars 'had to take refuge 
occasionally' from our planes - and to crown it all, they quite often did 
not have enough gas to fly the planes to conduct the tests to see 
whether cr not they had a radar that would c the work planned for it. 
Vice Admiral Nawa, chief cf the Mogura Park branch of the 2nd 
Naval Technical Irstitute, complained that 'to do effective research we 
must get rid of the B-29s, but to get rid of the B-29s we must have 
radars not susceptible to ja m ming' - he left off there, unable to come to 
a definite conclusion. As Lt. Cdr Messaki so ably put it 'In trief, we 
were troubled by American j9Lm ming from beginning to end; our Flak 
radars did not perfectly get out its faculties. ' 
After discussing it with numerous officers and engineers of the 2nd 
Naval Tech Institute, the aoncensus of opinion was that, by the end a 
the war, production facilities had been reduced by air raids to about 
10 % 
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of normal, and electronic research to about 15 to 20% of nor: naL Since 
the Navy was not primarily interested in land-based GL radar, only about 
10 % of its total electronics research effort was turned to anti-mining. 
But this 10 % represented practically all the 'brains' involved with the 
design and production of this type of radar. 
They explain this extreme loss of production and research ability not 
so much by the actual damage from the air raids, but because aE: 
1. Shortage of parts (mechanical and electrical). 
2. Faulty production (experts and technicians drafted, mental distress 
due to air raids). 
3. Shortage of transportation. 
4. Loss of production volume by dispersal of factories. 
5. Frequent changes of plans. 
Of course, 1,3 and 5 above are plainly due to air raid damage, and 
behind their inability to maintain any sort of adequate defense against or 
air blows, was their almost total lack of countermeasures against our 
radar and our jamming. 
